conjoined with the hypothetical caliditas, frigiditas, &c. &c., taught
that it was gifted with such a degree of inherent activity, as to render
it capable under certain states of combination, of exhibiting all the
phenomena of organic and animal life? It is certain that he regarded
these active qualities, as the causes of all the phenomena, whether of
living or dead matter.--GLISSON ought not certainly then to be regarded
as the author of this dogma in medical philosophy. PLATO certainly
taught it. VAN HELMONT could not get along without investing matter with
what he called a "seminal likeness, which is the more inward spiritual
kernel of the seed," &c. But we will let him speak for himself.
"Whatsoever," says V. H., "cometh into the world, must needs have the
beginning of its motions, the stirrer up and inward director of
generation. Therefore all things, however hard and thick they are, yet
before that their soundness, they inclose in themselves an air, which
representeth the inward future generation to the seed in this respect
fruitful, and accompanies the thing generated, even to the end of the
stage: which air, although it be in some things more plentiful, yet, in
vegetables it is pressed together in the show of a juice, as also in
metals it is thickened with a most thick homogeniety or sameliness of
kind. Notwithstanding this gift hath happened to all things, which is
called _archeus_, or chief workman, containing the fruitfulness of
generations or seeds, as it were the internal efficient cause; I say
that workman hath the likeness of the thing generated, unto the
beginning whereof, he composeth the appointments of things to be done.
But the chief workman consists of the _conjoining of the vital air_, as
of the matter, with the seminal likeness, which is the more outward
spiritual kernel, containing the fruitfulness of the seed; but the
visible seed is only the husk of this. This image of the master workman,
issuing out of the first shape or idea of its predecessor, or snatching
the same to itself out of the cup or bosom of outward things, is not a
certain dead image, but made famous by a full knowledge, and adorned
with necessary powers of things to be done in its appointment; and so it
is the first or chief instrument of life and feeling. But since every
corporeal act is limited into a body, hence it comes to pass, that the
archeus, the workman and governor of generations, doth clothe himself
presently with a bodily clothing. For in things soulified, he walketh
thorow all the dens and retiring places of his seed, and begins to
transform the matter according to the perfect act of his own image; for
here he placeth the heart, but there appointeth the brain, and he every
where limiteth an unmoveable chief dweller, out of his whole monarchy,
according to the bounds of requirance of the parts and appointments. At
length that president remaineth the overseer and inward ruler of the
bounds, even until death; but the other, floating about and being
assigned to no member, keeps the oversight over the particular pilots of
the members, being clear and never at rest or keeping holiday."
Notwithstanding the affected and euphuistic jargon of the above
passages, it is evident that VAN HELMONT'S idea is very similar to that
of GALEN. By seminal likeness, we are to understand an aptitude in
matter to take on certain determinate forms, and this may be supposed to
differ not very essentially from those laws, which govern matter in
crystallization. But even this seminal likeness, as we perceive, is a
sort of abstraction, very analogous to the Galenical caliditas; for it
is the more inward spiritual kernel of the seed, whereby the matter is
enabled to enjoy a certain degree of activity, the degree of which is
much increased by the union of the air, or archeus, with it. So the
caliditas of GALEN, which, after all, is matter, gives to its subject
the powers which it enjoys. GLISSON, speaking of the natura seminalis,
says that it is a certain or specific essence, superadded to mere
elementary principles, by means of which mixt bodies adopt certain
determinate forms, and acquire the faculty of performing essential
operations, more noble than those which belong to naked elements.
We regret very much that we have been unable to procure a copy of
GLISSON'S treatise de vita naturae, which, so far as we know, can not be
had in this country. We shall, therefore, furnish our readers with the
following passage from the Biographie Medicale, from the pen of
JOURDAIN.
"The name of GLISSON occupies an honourable place in the history of
medicine, because to him we are indebted for the first elements of the
physiological doctrine of the present day. Instead of directing his
attention to movements alone, as the iatro-mathematicians, and even, to
a certain extent, the animists had done, he referred to vitality all the
phenomena of nature, of whatever kind, and attempted to reduce them to
one, common principle. To this end he admitted, that matter is
originally endued with forces inherent in it, and that living bodies in
particular, are invested in their organs with a radical force, which,
put in play by stimulants, whether internal or external, gives rise to
all the phenomena of life. He even went so far as to assert, that
sympathy may be explained by referring to the intercommunication of this
force, to which he gave the name of irritability."
We shall also cite from SPRENGEL, a passage which throws some light on
his theory.
"When they became unwilling, like DESCARTES and STAHL, to have constant
recourse in their explanations, to the soul, they tried to find a
philosophic proof of the existence of material forces, to show that
matter, as mere matter, is endowed with particular forces, with which
they might satisfactorily explain a great many of its phenomena. No one
had hitherto sought for a similar proof; for ARISTOTLE had contented
himself with an axiom, that all natural things contain in themselves the
sufficient cause of their movement and rest. GLISSON and LEIBNITZ set
themselves in search of this proof; but it was reserved for the immortal
KANT to find it in the nature of matter itself.
"FRANCIS GLISSON may with propriety be considered as the precursor of
LEIBNITZ. What he tried to demonstrate by scholastic subtlety, and by
thousands of syllogisms, was developed by LEIBNITZ with a clearness and
ability, which secured the suffrages, even of the unenlightened. Both of
them went too far, in attributing life and sensation to matter, instead
of claiming for it the two simple and primordial forces of attraction
and repulsion.
"GLISSON sets out with the idea of substance, but he does not explain it
with sufficient precision. Every substance has three substantial
rudiments,--_fundamental_ substance, by means of which it
exists,--_energetic_ substance, by means of which it acts,--and
_additional_ substance, which determines its accidental qualities. All
matter, as substance, must have an energetic substance or nature, which
is the internal principle of movement. Therefore whatever moves
spontaneously, and in virtue of an internal force, must _feel_ this
motion, _and desire it_. All matter feels that it is, and that it exists
by itself. It has therefore, consciousness of its own nature. Life
consists in the activity of the internal substantial energetic nature.
Death is the dissolution of the triple alliance of the internal
energetic substantial nature, with the vegetative and animal natures,
which two last belong to the _additional_ substance."[28]
In applying his theory to physiology, GLISSON'S idea is, that the fibres
of the human body are endowed with a force, which he divides into three
kinds; to wit, natural or inherent force, (robur insitum)--vital force,
(robur vitale)--and animal force, (robur animale.)
Natural or inherent force, is a part of the constitution of the fibre,
and is as much a property of its organization as are its tenacity,
tensibility, &c. The sum of this force varies, in proportion as the
constitution of the fibre is more or less perfect. It is strongest in
athletic men and strong animals, and weaker in relaxed and debilitated
persons. It may be compared with the contractilite de tissu of BICHAT.
The second, or vital force, is something superadded to the inherent
sort. It is an _influxus_, derived to any fibre or set of fibres, from
that greater sum of force, which arises out of a more elaborate,
complex, and exalted organization. It varies in proportion as the vital
spirits flow with more or less freedom; and in proportion as their
quality is more or less perfect.
The third kind, or robur animale, may be supposed to depend on the
organic constitution of the brain and nerves, and varies according to
the state of that organization. We cannot help adverting to the
resemblance between these two latter kinds, and the contractilite
organique, and contractilite animale, of BICHAT; and this robur
comprises, as we shall show hereafter, both the contractilite and
sensibilite of the French physiologist.
GLISSON, in his chapter de Irritabilitate fibrarum, commences by
remarking that a motive faculty existing in any fibre, unless it were of
an irritable nature, would leave such fibre in one of the two following
states: 1. It would either never cease from action, or 2ndly, being once
at rest, its motion could never be reproduced; but the varieties and
differences which we see in the actions of fibres, clearly demonstrate
them to be possessed of irritability: i.e. if a fibre may be by turns in
a state of action and repose, it is evidently possessed of a quality,
whereby it can be induced to move if in a state of rest; this quality he
terms irritable, or irritability. The next inference from this power of
alternate activity and repose is, that the fibre is possessed of a
faculty, whereby it can _perceive_ an irritation offered to it; but this
perception of irritation further implies an _appetence_ for a change of
its actual state, before the motion can really take place. Perception,
appetence, and motion, make a triunit. "In the mean time, says he, as
sensitive appetence, and sensibility, are frequently confounded with
natural perception, in this irritation of the fibres," he divides it
into three kinds, viz. Natural Perception, Sensitive Perception, and
Perception regulated by animal appetency.
Natural Perception is that principle whereby a fibre perceiving any
alteration offered to it, whether pleasing or displeasing, is excited
either to accept that change, or to avoid it, and moves accordingly.
Sensitive Perception, is that kind, in which a fibre, perceiving a
change effected in some other organ, is impelled ad aliquid appetendum,
and to move conformably.
The third sort, or Perception regulated by animal appetency, is that in
which the brain directs from within, such movements of the muscular
fibres, as are requisite for the execution of any purpose.
"Some persons," says GLISSON, "may doubt whether there really exists a
natural perception of irritation in the fibres; but we have elsewhere
asserted in general the reality of natural perception, to wit, in my
work, de Vita Naturae; and whoever has known it, will readily admit this
quality in fibres imbued with inherent, influent, and vital spirits. We
do not expect, in this place, to establish it as a general principle;
but if any proof, derived from a knowledge of the structure, uses, and
actions of the fibres, can be adduced, it may be here attempted."
"It is indubitable that the fibres are alternately at rest and in
motion; for, during sleep, they are all relaxed, with the exception of
such as subserve the functions of respiration and circulation, and even
these are by turns quiet and active. During waking again, they are all
in a state of moderate tonic motion; and moreover, during all movements
of the limbs, the antagonist muscles yield spontaneously, the abductors
being active, while the adductors are relaxed, and vice versa. Hence it
is manifest, that the fibres are alternately quiescent and active: but,
since they are not _principal_ or sui arbitrii agents, it is necessary,
in order to the new movement, that they should be irritated from some
source: for, it is impossible that a fibre in repose, can be set in
action without an irritating cause; nor can we conceive of a part being
irritated without _perceiving_ the irritation. It is like speaking to a
deaf man, or trying to awaken a dead one."
"If you say, fibres are possessed of sensibility, and can be excited by
virtue thereof, I confess that they are sensible parts, and may thereby
perceive some, not all irritating causes; but whether sensation excites
them immediately, or rather, is transmitted to the brain, and irritates
the animal appetency; and further, whether the animal appetence, effects
a movement in them directly, and to what sort of perception this
irritation may be properly and immediately ascribed, is detailed in
order below, when we come to explain sensitive perception, and
perception a phantasia imperata."
"Let us now go on to point out those cases, in which no suspicion of
_sensation_ can be entertained. The pulsation of the heart is neither
effected nor affected by sensation; its fibres, in virtue of the
irritation occasioned by the blood in its ventricles, are excited to
contract, and thus occasion the pulsation, but when the irritation is
remitted they relax, and recover the natural state. Now it cannot be
denied that this is an evident case of irritation of the fibres, for
according as is the irritation, so is the rythm of the pulsation, which
varies at times, as in febrile and other affections: nor is it right to
pretend that there is any sensation in this case; because this
perception of irritation _per vices_, is exercised as well during sleep,
when the senses are all locked up, as in the waking condition. The
fibres do not, therefore, _perceive_ in these actions by a sensitive,
_but by a natural perception_, the irritation of the vital blood, which
animates them to alternate contraction and relaxation. This is
corroborated by those tumultuous irregular motions which continue in
animals after decapitation; so also the intestines when still warm in a
recently opened animal, move and twist about; the muscles in dead
animals also, excited by the perception of cold, contract with a strong
tonic movement, and render the body rigid. The hearts of some animals
too, when torn out of the body, and even when dissected, continue their
endeavours to pulsate. Is there any further evidence wanting? We may
hence infer with sufficient confidence that the fibres (without the aid
of the senses) may _perceive_ irritation, and move themselves
conformably."
In the next place he examines the nature of sensitive perception of
fibres, and goes on to show how an impression made on an external part,
or a natural perception, becomes converted into sensation, and thus made
known to the sensorium. But his disquisition is not only very long but
very dark, and we shall therefore pass it by with the exception of the
following.
"Natural perception includes within itself a _rationem positivam_, and a
_negationem formalem_.
"The ratio positiva is the perception of the idea, or image of the
object moving or changing the fibre.
"The negatio formalis is a denial or refusal to communicate this image
to the sensorium. In the process of transformation into sensation, the
positive ratio is not changed, but remains the same, and is the first
part, or basis, both of internal and external sensation.
"The negatio formalis is destroyed or abolished in any case of
impression communicated to the sensorium. Natural perception, in its
ratio positiva, is not abolished or degraded by being converted into
sensation, but is rather exalted, or gifted with a more dignified
nature. By as much as public or general knowledge is preferable to
private, or public advantage to that of an individual, by so much is
sensation preferable to natural perception. Hence nature formed so many
organs of sense, that the phantasy might have notice of what ought to be
done, desired, or avoided."
He does not doubt that external sensibility is inherent in the nervous
parts of the external organ, whence he infers that it may readily incite
the fibres of such organ ad appetendum et movendum; for, as external
sensation is communicated to the brain by means of the nerves, it must
of necessity be true, that these nerves and nervous parts (such as the
fibres,) are the subjects of it. Since then sensibility causes its
subject to feel, it consequently enables it to desire and move
comformably. For perception in any subject is vain, unless it can
desire, and appetence is useless, unless it can move. External
sensibility, therefore, may be said to render the fibres _actu
irritabiles_, for example, as often as the irritating cause is
perceived; but as the irritation is perceived, not by a sensibility, but
by a mere natural perception, this it is which constitutes their
irritability.
Thus we may perceive that the triunit consisting of perception,
appetence, and motion, constitutes the celebrated irritability of our
author. But he has been too latitudinarian in his application of the
theory; for he did not limit it, as HALLER has subsequently done, to one
sort of fibres, or indeed to fibres alone, for he says in cap. IX., "It
is to be remarked that natural perception belongs to other parts of the
body besides fibres; to wit, to the parenchymata, bones, marrow, fat,
blood, recrementitious juices, humours of the eye, and such like, all
which are irritable, and increase the irritable constitution of the
parts, but these parts hardly admit of the existence of animal
perception." HALLER blames GLISSON for having gone so far in his
application of the theory, and it is well known that he himself
restrained it to the single tissue of muscular fibres, and denominated
it vis insitum, or inherent force; whereby he distinguished it from his
vis mortua or elastic contraction, on the one hand, and the vis nervosum
or voluntary power, on the other; the former being something less, and
the latter something more than irritability. GLISSON'S theory, when
fully explained, which we cannot for want of space do here, will be
found to bear a very strong resemblance, in many points, to that of
BICHAT, who has invested the matters of the body with vital powers, far
beyond those attributed by HALLER; and as we are not furnished in the
present article with sufficient space, we hope in some subsequent
number, to place this matter in a plainer light before our readers. In
the mean time we may remark, that GLISSON seems to be the first of those
who have placed the subject fairly before the medical public; for
although faint traces of a similar theory may be perceived before him,
especially by translating terms into their equivalents, yet he has the
merit of using a term which, in spite of all subsequent modifications,
is in daily use.
GLISSON'S latitudinarianism may be contrasted with HALLER'S rigid
application: for the latter says, "I call that an irritable part of the
human body, which on being touched by a foreign body, renders itself
shorter;" thus while GLISSON attributes his triunit of perception,
appetence, and motion to all the tissues and fluids, HALLER confines it
to muscular fibre alone. No one can doubt that the membranes of the body
are endowed with vital properties, but yet they do not shorten
themselves on being touched by a foreign body. BICHAT has distinguished
their vitality as organic vitality, and the contractile qualities
displayed are divided into insensible organic contractility, and into
contractility of tissue: but these sorts of contractility mount up by
insensible gradations. He says, that "entre la contractilite obscure
mais reelle, necessaire a la nutrition des ongles, des poils, &c. et
celle que nous presentent les mouvements des intestins, de l'estomac,
&c. il est des nuances infinies, qui servent de transition: tels sont
les mouvements du dartos, des arteres, de certaines parties de l'organ
cutane," &c. We will close with a comparison between GLISSON'S
irritability, and BICHAT'S contractility. At page 70 of the Treatise
_sur la Vie & la Mort_, BICHAT supposes that a "muscle enters into
action, 1st. by the influence of the nerves which it receives from the
brain, and this is a case of contractile animale," (which differs in no
respect from perception regulated by animal appetency of GLISSON).
2ndly. According to BICHAT, the muscle enters into action "by the
excitation of a chemical or physical stimulant applied to it, and which
artificially determines a movement of the whole muscle, analogous to
what is natural to the heart, and other involuntary muscles. This is
sensible organic contractility or irritability," and corresponds to the
sensitive perception of the old English physiologist. In the 3d place
it enters into action by the stimulus of the fluids which circulate in
it, and this is insensible organic contractility or tonicity of BICHAT,
and is nothing different from GLISSON'S natural perception. BICHAT makes
a fourth case; as for example, when a muscle is divided across, it
contracts by a _contractilite de tissue_, or _par defaut d'extension_.
We do not perceive how GLISSON'S natural perception can be applied to
this case, but he treats of it in his fifth chapter under the head of
Cessatio: it is that state to which a fibre is reduced when left to
itself, and freed from all stimulus.
BICHAT has attributed to some fibres the power of active elongation. On
this subject GLISSON says, "Impossible enim est, ut simplex fibra, sua
sola actione, se secundum longitudinem distendat, nec modus quo haec fiat
concipi nedum effari queat non negavero quin in distensione hac,
aliqualis fibrae actio includatur, sed ea tota contractiva est, &
distensioni ab extranea causa factae reluctatur." A doctrine as sound as
that of the 47th proposition; a doctrine too, without admitting which,
we think no man can understand the theory either of simple inflammation,
or of the febrile affections. We hope to resume this subject at an early
period.
FOOTNOTES:
[25] Haec ei generatim videbantur, ex igne omnia constare eodemque
interire. Diogenes Laertius.
[26]
Quatuor aeternus genitalia corpora mundus
Continet; ex illis duo sunt onerosa, suoque
Pondere in inferius, tellus atque unda, feruntur,
Et totidem gravitate carent, nulloque premente
Alta petunt, aer atque aere purior ignis.--OVID--_Metamorph._
[27] Lib. de Carnibus, HIPPOCRATES says: Quod Calidum vocamus, id mihi
immortale esse videtur, cunctaque intelligere, videre et audire,
sentireque omnia, tum praesentia tum futura: cujus pars maxima cum omnia
perturbata essent in supremum ambitum secessit; quod, mihi veteres
aethera appellasse videntur. Altera pars locum infimum sortita, terra
quidem appellatur, frigida et sicca multas que motiones habens, et in
qua multum sane calidi inest. Tertia vero pars medium aeris locum nacta
est, calidum quid existens. Quarta pars terrae proximum locum obtinens
humidissima et crassissima. His igitur in orbem agitatis cum turbata
essent, calidi magna pars alias in terra relicta est, partim quidem
magna, partim vero minor, alias etiam valde parva, sed in multas partes
divisa. Et temporis successu a calido resiccata est terra, ista in ea
tanquam in membranis contenta circumse putredines excitant, ac longo
tempore incalescens quod quidem ea terrae putredine pinguedinem sortitum
est et minimum humidi habet, id citissime exustum ossa produxit. Quae
vero naturam glutinosiorem sortita sunt et frigidi communionem habent,
ea neque calefacta exuri potuerunt, neque etiam humida fieri ideo formam
longe ab aliis diversam nacta sunt et nervi solidi exciterint, cum non
multum in iis frigidi inesset. At venae frigidi multum habebant cajus
pars circumcirca ambiens et quod erat glutinosissimum, a calido
exassatum membrana extitit. Quod vero erat frigidum, a calido superatum,
dissolutum est ideoque humidum evasit.
[28] K. SPRENGEL, Hist. de la Medicine.
QUARTERLY SUMMARY
OF MEDICAL AND SURGICAL INTELLIGENCE.
I. ANATOMY.