comic we can readily see that the comic originates from wide-spread
sources, and that conditions so specialized as those found in the naïve
cannot be expected in the case of the comic. In order to get a clue to
the conditions that are applicable to the comic the selection of the
first example is most important. We will examine first the comic
movement because we remember that the most primitive stage performance,
the pantomime, uses this means to make us laugh. The answer to the
question, Why do we laugh at the actions of clowns? would be that they
appear to us immoderate and inappropriate; that is, we really laugh over
the excessive expenditure of energy. Let us look for the same condition
outside of the manufactured comic, that is, under circumstances where it
may unintentionally be found. The child’s motions do not appear to us
comical, even if it jumps and fidgets, but it is comical to see a little
boy or girl follow with the tongue the movement of his pen-holder when
he is trying to master the art of writing; we see in these additional
motions a superfluous expenditure of energy which under similar
conditions we should save. In the same way we find it comical to see
unnecessary motions or even marked exaggeration of expressive motions in
adults. Among the genuinely comic cases we might mention the motions
made by the bowler after he has released the ball while he is following
its course as though he were still able to control it; all grimaces
which exaggerate the normal expression of the emotions are comical, even
if they are involuntary, as in the case of persons suffering from St.
Vitus’ dance (chorea); the impassioned movements of a modern orchestra
leader will appear comical to every unmusical person, who cannot
understand why they are necessary. Indeed, the comic element found in
bodily shapes and physiognomy is a branch of the comic of motion, in
that they are conceived as though they were the result of motion that
either has been carried too far or is purposeless. Wide exposed eyes, a
crook-shaped nose bent towards the mouth, handle-like ears, a hunch
back, and all similar physical defects probably produce a comical
impression only in so far as the movements that would be necessary to
produce these features are imagined, whereby the nose and other parts of
the body are pictured as more movable than they actually are. It is
certainly comical if some one can “wiggle his ears,” and it would
undoubtedly be a great deal more comical if he could raise and lower his
nose. A large part of the comical impression that animals make upon us
is due to the fact that we perceive in them movements which we cannot
imitate.
_Comic of Motion_
But how does it come about that we laugh as soon as we have recognized
that the actions of some one else are immoderate and inappropriate? I
believe that we laugh because we compare the motions observed in others
with those which we ourselves should produce if we were in their place.
The two persons must naturally be compared in accordance with the same
standard, but this standard is my own innervation expenditure connected
with my idea of motion in the one case as well as the other. This
assertion is in need of discussion and amplification.
What we are here putting into juxtaposition is, on the one hand, the
psychic expenditure of a given idea, and on the other hand, the content
of this idea. We maintain that the former is not primarily and
principally independent of the latter—the content of the
idea—particularly because the idea of something great requires a larger
expenditure than the idea of something small. As long as we are
concerned only with the idea of different coarse movements we shall
encounter no difficulties in the theoretical determination of our thesis
or in establishing its proof through observation. It will be shown that
in this case an attribute of the idea actually coincides with an
attribute of the object conceived, although psychology warns us of
confusions of this sort.
I obtain an idea of a definite coarse movement by performing this motion
or by imitating it, and in so doing I set a standard for this motion in
my feelings of innervation.[69]
Now if I perceive a similar more or less coarse motion in some one else,
the surest way to the understanding—to apperception—of the same is to
carry it out imitatively and the comparison will then enable me to
decide in which motion I expended more energy. Such an impulse to
imitate certainly arises on perceiving a movement. But in reality I do
not carry out the imitation any more than I still spell out words simply
because I have learnt to read by means of spelling. Instead of imitating
the movement by my muscles I substitute the idea of the same through my
memory traces of the expenditures necessary for similar motions.
Perceiving, or “thinking,” differs above all from acting or carrying out
things by the fact that it entails a very much smaller displacement of
energy and keeps the main expenditure from being discharged. But how is
the quantitative factor, the more or less big element of the movement
perceived, given expression in the idea? And if the representation of
the quantity is left off from the idea that is composed of qualities,
how am I to differentiate the ideas of different big movements, how am I
to compare them?
Here, physiology shows the way in that it teaches us that even while an
idea is in the process of conception innervations proceed to the
muscles, which naturally represent only a moderate expenditure. It is
now easy to assume that this expenditure of innervation which
accompanies the conception of the idea is utilized to represent the
quantitative factor of the idea, and that when a great motion is
imagined it is greater than it would be in the case of a small one. The
conception of greater motions would thus actually be greater, that is,
it would be a conception accompanied by greater expenditure.
_Ideational Mimicry_
Observation shows directly that human beings are in the habit of
expressing the big and small things in their ideation content by means
of a manifold expenditure or by means of a sort of _ideational mimicry_.
When a child or a person of the common people or one belonging to a
certain race imparts or depicts something, one can easily observe that
he is not content to make his ideas intelligible to the hearer through
the choice of correct words alone, but that he also represents the
contents of the same through his expressive motions. Thus he designates
the quantities and intensities of “a high mountain” by raising his hands
over his head, and those of “a little dwarf” by lowering his hand to the
ground. If he broke himself of the habit of depicting with his hands, he
would nevertheless do it with his voice, and if he should also control
his voice, one may be sure that in picturing something big he would
distend his eyes, and describing something little he would press his
eyes together. It is not his own affects that he thus expresses, but it
is really the content of what he imagines.
Shall we now assume that this need for mimicry is first aroused through
the demand for imparting, whereas a good part of this manner of
representation still escapes the attention of the hearer? I rather
believe that this mimicry, though less vivid, exists even if all
imparting is left out of the question, that it comes about when the
person imagines for himself alone, or thinks of something in a graphic
manner; that then such a person, just as in talking, expresses through
his body the idea of big and small which manifests itself at least
through a change of innervation in the facial expressions and sensory
organs. Indeed, I can imagine that the bodily innervation which is
consensual to the content of the idea conceived is the beginning and
origin of mimicry for purposes of communication. For, in order to be in
a position to serve this purpose, it is only necessary to increase it
and make it conspicuous to the other. When I take the view that this
“expression of the ideation content” should be added to the expression
of the emotions, which are known as a physical by-effect of psychic
processes, I am well aware that my observations which refer to the
category of the big and small do not exhaust the subject. I myself could
add still other things, even before reaching to the phenomenon of
tension through which a person physically indicates the accumulation of
his attention and the _niveau_ of abstraction upon which his thoughts
happen to rest. I maintain that this subject is very important, and I
believe that tracing the ideation mimicry in other fields of æsthetics
would be just as useful for the understanding of the comic as it is
here.
To return to the comic movement, I repeat that with the perception of a
certain motion the impulse to conceive it will be given through a
certain expenditure. In the “desire to understand,” in the apperception
of this movement I produce a certain expenditure, and I behave in this
part of the psychic process just as if I put myself in the place of the
person observed. Simultaneously I probably grasp the aim of the motion,
and through former experiences I am able to estimate the amount of
expenditure necessary to attain this aim. I thereby drop out of
consideration the person observed and behave as if I myself wished to
attain the aim of the motion. These two ideational possibilities depend
on a comparison of the motion observed with my own inhibited motion. In
the case of an immoderate or inappropriate movement on the part of the
other, my greater expenditure for understanding becomes inhibited _statu
nascendi_ during the mobilization as it were, it is declared superfluous
and stands free for further use or for discharge through laughing. If
other favorable conditions supervened this would be the nature of the
origin of pleasure in comic movement,—an innervation expenditure which,
when compared with one’s own motion, becomes an inapplicable surplus.
_Comparison of Two Kinds of Expenditure as Pleasure-sources_
We now note that we must continue our discussion by following two
different paths; first, to determine the conditions for the discharge of
the surplus; secondly, to test whether the other cases of the comic can
be conceived similarly to our conception of comic motion.
We shall turn first to the latter task and after considering comic
movement and action we shall turn to the comic found in the psychic
activities and peculiarities of others.
As an example of this kind we may consider the comical nonsense produced
by ignorant students at examinations; it is more difficult, however, to
give a simple example of the peculiarities. We must not be confused by
the fact that nonsense and foolishness which so often act in a comical
manner are nevertheless not perceived as comical in all cases, just as
the same things which once made us laugh because they seemed comical
later may appear to us contemptible and hateful. This fact, which we
must not forget to take into account, seems only to show that besides
the comparison familiar to us other relations come into consideration
for the comic effect,—conditions which we can investigate in other
connections.
The comic found in the mental and psychic attributes of another person
is apparently again the result of a comparison between him and my own
ego. But it is remarkable that it is a comparison which mostly furnishes
the result opposite to that obtained through comic movement and action.
In the latter case it is comical if the other person assumes a greater
expenditure than I believe to be necessary for me; in the case of
psychic activity it is just the reverse, it is comical if the other
person economizes in expenditure, which I consider indispensable; for
nonsense and foolishness are nothing but inferior activities. In the
first case I laugh because he makes it too difficult for himself, and in
the latter case because he makes it too easy for himself. In the case of
the comic effect it seems to be a question only of the difference
between the two energy expenditures—the one of “feeling one’s self into
something” (_Einfühlung_)—and the other of the ego—and it makes no
difference in whose favor this difference inclines. This peculiarity,
which at first confuses our judgment, disappears, however, when we
consider that it is in accord with our personal development towards a
higher stage of culture, to limit our muscular work and increase our
mental work. By heightening our mental expenditure we produce a
diminution of motion expenditure for the same activity. Our machines
bear witness to this cultural success.[70]
Thus it coincides with a uniform understanding that that person appears
comical to us who puts forth too much expenditure in his psychical
activities and too little in his mental activities; and it cannot be
denied that in both cases our laughing is the expression of a
pleasurably perceived superiority which we adjudge to ourselves in
comparison with him. If the relation in both cases becomes reversed,
that is, if the somatic expenditure of the other is less and the psychic
expenditure greater, then we no longer laugh, but are struck with
amazement and admiration.[71]
_Comic of Situation._
The origin of the comic pleasure discussed here, that is, the origin of
such pleasure in a comparison of the other person with one’s own self in
respect to the difference between the identification expenditure
(_Einfühlungsaufwand_) and normal expenditure—is genetically probably
the most important. It is certain, however, that it is not the only one.
We have learned before to disregard any such comparison between the
other person and one’s self, and to obtain the pleasure-bringing
difference from one side only, either from identification, or from the
processes in one’s own ego, proving thereby that the feeling of
superiority bears no essential relations to comic pleasure. A comparison
is indispensable, however, for the origin of this pleasure, and we find
this comparison between two energy expenditures which rapidly follow
each other and refer to the same function. It is produced either in
ourselves by way of identification with the other, or we find it without
any identification in our own psychic processes. The first case, in
which the other person still plays a part, though he is not compared
with ourselves, results when the pleasure-producing difference of energy
expenditures comes into existence through outer influences which we can
comprehend as a “situation,” for which reason this species of comic is
also called the “comic of situation.” The peculiarities of the person
who furnishes the comic do not here come into essential consideration;
we laugh when we admit to ourselves that had we been placed in the same
situation we should have done the same thing. Here we draw the comic
from the relation of the individual to the often all-too-powerful outer
world, which is represented in the psychic processes of the individual
by the conventions and necessities of society, and even by his bodily
needs. A typical example of the latter is when a person engaged in an
activity, which claims all his psychic forces, is suddenly disturbed by
a pain or excremental need. The opposite case which furnishes us the
comic difference through identification, lies between the great interest
which existed before the disturbance occurred and the minimum left for
his psychic activity after the disturbance made its appearance. The
person who furnishes us this difference again becomes comical through
inferiority; but he is only inferior in comparison with his former ego
and not in comparison with us, for we know that in a similar case we
could not have behaved differently. It is remarkable, however, that we
find this inferiority of the person only in the case where we “feel
ourselves” into some one, that is, we can only find it comical in the
other, whereas we ourselves are conscious only of painful emotions when
such or similar embarrassments happen to us. It is by keeping away the
painful from our own person that we are probably first enabled to enjoy
as pleasurable the difference which resulted from the comparison of the
changing energy.
_Comic of Expectation_
The other source of the comic, which we find in our own changes of
investing energy, lies in our relations to the future, which we are
accustomed to anticipate through our ideas of expectation. I assume that
a quantitatively determined expenditure underlies our every idea of
expectation, which in case of disappointment becomes diminished by a
certain difference, and I again refer to the observations made before
concerning “ideational mimicry.” But it seems to me easier to
demonstrate the real mobilized psychic expenditure for the cases of
expectation. It is well known concerning a whole series of cases that
the manifestation of expectation is formed by motor preliminaries; this
is first of all true of cases in which the expected events make demands
on my motility, and these preparations are quantitatively determinable
without anything further. If I am expecting to catch a ball thrown at
me, I put my body in states of tension in order to enable me to
withstand the collision with the ball, and the superfluous motions which
I make if the ball turns out to be light make me look comical to the
spectators. I allowed myself to be misled by the expectation to exert an
immoderate expenditure of motion. A similar thing happens if, for
example, I lift out a basket of fruit which I took to be heavy but which
was hollow and formed out of wax in order to deceive me. By its upward
jerk my arm betrays the fact that I have prepared a superfluous
innervation for this purpose and hence I am laughed at. In fact there is
at least one case in which the expectation expenditure can be directly
demonstrated by means of physiological experimentation with animals. In
Pawlof’s experiments with salivary secretions of dogs who, provided with
salivary fistulæ, are shown different kinds of food, it is noticed that
the amount of saliva secreted through the fistulæ depends on whether the
conditions of the experiment have strengthened or disappointed the dogs’
expectation to be fed with the food shown them.
Even where the thing expected lays claims only to my sensory organs, and
not to my motility, I may assume that the expectation manifests itself
in a certain motor emanation causing tension of the senses, and I may
even conceive the suspension of attention as a motor activity which is
equivalent to a certain amount of expenditure. Moreover, I can
presuppose that the preparatory activity of expectation is not
independent of the amount of the expected impression, but that I
represent mimically the bigness and smallness of the same by means of a
greater or smaller preparatory expenditure, just as in the case of
imparting something and in the case of thinking when there is no
expectation. The expectation expenditure naturally will be composed of
many components, and also for my disappointment diverse factors will
come into consideration; it is not only a question whether the realized
event is perceptibly greater or smaller than the expected one, but also
whether the expectation is worthy of the great interest which I had
offered for it. In this manner I am instructed to consider, besides the
expenditure for the representation of bigness and smallness (the
conceptual mimicry), also the expenditure for the tension of attention
(expectation expenditure), and in addition to these two expenditures
there is in all cases the abstraction expenditure. But these other forms
of expenditure can easily be reduced to the one of bigness and
smallness, for what we call more interesting, more sublime, and even
more abstract, are only particularly qualified special cases of what is
greater. Let us add to this that, among other things, Lipps holds that
the quantitative, not the qualitative, contrast is primarily the source
of comic pleasure, and we shall be altogether content to have chosen the
comic element of motion as the starting-point of our investigation.
In working out Kant’s thesis, “The comic is an expectation dwindled into
nothing,” Lipps made the attempt in his book, often cited here, to trace
the comic pleasure altogether to expectation. Despite the many
instructive and valuable results which this attempt brought to light I
should like to agree with the criticism expressed by other authors,
namely, that Lipps has formulated a field of origin of the comic which
is much too narrow, and that he could not subject its phenomena to his
formula without much forcing.
_Caricature_
Human beings are not satisfied with enjoying the comic as they encounter
it in life, but they aim to produce it purposely, thus we discover more
of the nature of the comic by studying the methods employed in producing
the comic. Above all one can produce comical elements in one’s
personality for the amusement of others, by making one’s self appear
awkward or stupid. One then produces the comic exactly as if one were
really so, by complying with the condition of comparison which leads to
the difference of expenditure; but one does not make himself laughable
or contemptible through this; indeed, under certain circumstances one
can even secure admiration. The feeling of superiority does not come
into existence in the other when he knows that the actor is only
shamming, and this furnishes us a good new proof that the comic is
independent in principle of the feeling of superiority.
To make another comical, the method most commonly employed is to
transfer him into situations wherein he becomes comical regardless of
his personal qualities, as a result of human dependence upon external
circumstances, especially social factors; in other words, one resorts to
the comical situation. This transferring into a comic situation may be
real as in practical jokes, such as placing the foot in front of one so
that he falls like a clumsy person, or making one appear stupid by
utilizing his credulity to make him believe some nonsense, etc., or it
can be feigned by means of speech or play. It is a good aid in
aggression, in the service of which production of the comic is wont to
place itself in order that the comic pleasure may be independent of the
reality of the comic situation; thus every person is really defenseless
against being made comical.
But there are still other means of making one comical which deserve
special attention and which in part also show new sources of comic
pleasure. _Imitation_, for example, belongs here; it accords the hearer
an extraordinary amount of pleasure and makes its subject comic, even if
it still keeps away from the exaggeration of caricature. It is much
easier to fathom the comic effect of caricature than that of simple
imitation. Caricature, parody and travesty, like their practical
counterpart—unmasking, range themselves against persons and objects who
command authority and respect and who are exalted in some sense—these
are procedures tending towards degradation.[72] In the transferred
psychic sense, the exalted is equivalent to something great and I want
to make the statement, or more accurately to repeat the statement, that
psychic greatness like somatic greatness is exhibited by means of an
increased expenditure. It needs little observation to ascertain that
when I speak of the exalted I give a different innervation to my voice,
I change my facial expression, an attempt to bring my entire bearing as
it were into complete accord with the dignity of that which I present. I
impose upon myself a dignified restriction not much different than if I
were coming into the presence of an illustrious personage, monarch, or
prince of science. I can scarcely err when I assume that this added
innervation of conceptual mimicry corresponds to an increased
expenditure. The third case of such an added expenditure I readily find
when I indulge in abstract trains of thought instead of in the concrete
and plastic ideas. If I can now imagine that the mentioned processes for
degrading the illustrious are quite ordinary, that during their activity
I need not be on my guard and in whose ideal presence I may, to use a
military formula, put myself “at ease,” all that saves me the added
expenditure of dignified restriction. Moreover, the comparison of this
manner of presentation instigated by identification with the manner of
presentation to which I have been hitherto accustomed which seeks to
present itself at the same time, again produces a difference in
expenditure which can be discharged through laughter.
As is known, caricature brings about the degradation by rendering
prominent one feature, comic in itself, from the entire picture of the
exalted object, a feature which would be overlooked if viewed with the
entire picture. Only by isolating this feature can the comic effect be
obtained which spreads in our memory over the whole picture. This has,
however, this condition; the presence of the exalted itself must not
force us into a disposition of reverence. Where such a comical feature
is really lacking then caricature unhesitatingly creates it by
exaggerating one that is not comical in itself. It is again
characteristic of the origin of comic pleasure that the effect of the
caricature is not essentially impaired through such a falsifying of
reality.
_Unmasking_