conception of the wit-work as originally discovered in our study of
dreams. It is true that it is common to hear one say “I _made_ a joke,”
but one feels that one behaves differently during this process than when
one pronounces a judgment or offers an objection. Wit shows in a most
pronounced manner the character of an involuntary “inspiration” or a
sudden flash of thought. A moment before one cannot tell what kind of
joke one is going to make, though it lacks only the words to clothe it.
One usually experiences something indefinable which I should like most
to compare to an absence, or sudden drop of intellectual tension; then
all of a sudden the witticism appears, usually simultaneously with its
verbal investment. Some of the means of wit are also utilized in the
expression of thought along other lines, as in the cases of comparison
and allusion. I can purposely will to make an allusion. In doing this I
have first in mind (in the inner hearing) the direct expression of my
thought, but as I am inhibited from expressing the same through some
objection from the situation in question, I almost resolve to substitute
the direct expression by a form of indirect expression, and then I utter
it in the form of an allusion. But the allusion that comes into
existence in this manner having been formed under my continuous control
is never witty, no matter how useful it may be. On the other hand, the
witty allusion appears without my having been able to follow up these
preparatory stages in my mind. I do not wish to attribute too much value
to this procedure, it is scarcely decisive, but it does agree well with
our assumption that in wit-formation a stream of thought is dropped for
a moment and suddenly emerges from the unconscious as a witticism.
Witticisms also evince a peculiar behavior along the lines of
association of ideas. Frequently they are not at the disposal of our
memory when we look for them; on the other hand, they often appear
unsolicited and at places in our train of thought where we cannot
understand their presence. Again, these are only minor qualities, but
none the less they point to their unconscious origin.
Let us now collect the properties of wit whose formation can be referred
to the unconscious. Above all there is the peculiar brevity of wit
which, though not an indispensable, is a marked and distinctive
characteristic feature. When we first encountered it we were inclined to
see in it an expression of a tendency to economize, but owing to very
evident objections we ourselves depreciated the value of this
conception. At present we look upon it more as a sign of the unconscious
elaboration which the thought of wit has undergone. The process of
condensation which corresponds to it in dreams we can correlate with no
other factor than with the localization in the unconscious, and we must
assume that the conditions for such condensations which are lacking in
the foreconscious are present in the unconscious mental process.[58] It
is to be expected that in the process of condensation some of the
elements subjected to it become lost, while others which take over their
occupation energy are strengthened by the condensation or are built up
too energetically. The brevity of wit, like the brevity of dreams, would
thus be a necessary concomitant manifestation of the condensation which
occurs in both cases; both times it is a result of the condensation
process. The brevity of wit is indebted also to this origin for its
peculiar character which though not further assignable produces a
striking impression.
_The Unconscious and the Infantile_
We have defined above the one result of condensation—the manifold
application of the same material, play upon words, and similarity of
sound—as a localized economy, and have also referred the pleasure
produced by harmless wit to that economy. At a later place we have found
that the original purpose of wit consisted in producing this kind of
pleasure from words, a process which was permitted to the individual
during the stage of playing, but which became banked in during the
course of intellectual development or by rational criticism. Now we have
decided upon the assumption that such condensations as serve the
technique of wit originate automatically and without any particular
purpose during the process of thinking in the unconscious. Have we not
here two different conceptions of the same fact which seem to be
incompatible with each other? I do not think so. To be sure, there are
two different conceptions, and they demand to be brought in unison, but
they do not contradict each other. They are merely somewhat strange to
each other, and as soon as we have established a relationship between
them we shall probably gain in knowledge. That such condensations are
sources of pleasure is in perfect accord with the supposition that they
easily find in the unconscious the conditions necessary for their
origin; on the other hand, we see the motivation for the sinking into
the unconscious in the circumstance that the pleasure-bringing
condensation necessary to wit easily results there. Two other factors
also, which upon first examination seem entirely foreign to each other
and which are brought together quite accidentally, will be recognized on
deeper investigation as intimately connected, and perhaps may be found
to be substantially the same. I am referring to the two assertions that
on the one hand wit could form such pleasure-bringing condensations
during its development in the stage of playing, that is, during the
infancy of reason; and, on the other hand, that it accomplishes the same
function on higher levels by submerging the thought into the
unconscious. For the infantile is the source of the unconscious. The
unconscious mental processes are no others than those which are solely
produced during infancy. The thought which sinks into the unconscious
for the purpose of wit-formation only revisits there the old homestead
of the former playing with words. The thought is put back for a moment
into the infantile state in order to regain in this way childish
pleasure-sources. If, indeed, one were not already acquainted with it
from the investigation of the psychology of the neuroses, wit would
surely impress one with the idea that the peculiar unconscious
elaboration is nothing else but the infantile type of the mental
process. Only it is by no means an easy matter to grasp, in the
unconscious of the adult, this peculiar infantile manner of thinking,
because it is usually corrected, so to say, _statu nascendi_. However,
it is successfully grasped in a series of cases, and then we always
laugh about the “childish stupidity.” In fact every exposure of such an
unconscious fact affects us in a “comical” manner.[59]
It is easier to comprehend the character of these unconscious mental
processes in the utterances of patients suffering from various psychic
disturbances. It is very probable that, following the assumption of old
Griesinger, we would be in a position to understand the deliria of the
insane and to turn them to good account as valuable information, if we
would not make the demands of conscious thinking upon them, but instead
treat them as we do dreams by means of our art of interpretation.[60] In
the dream, too, we were able to show the “return of psychic life to the
embryonal state.”[61]
In discussing the processes of condensation we have entered so deeply
into the signification of the analogy between wit and dreams that we can
here be brief. As we know that displacements in dream-work point to the
influence of the censor of conscious thought, we will consequently be
inclined to assume that an inhibiting force also plays a part in the
formation of wit when we find the process of displacement among the
techniques of wit. We also know that this is commonly the case; the
endeavor of wit to revive the old pleasure in nonsense or the old
pleasure in word-play meets with resistance in every normal state, a
resistance which is exerted by the protest of critical reason, and which
must be overcome in each individual case. But a radical distinction
between wit and dreams is shown in the manner in which the wit-work
solves this difficulty. In the dream-work the solution of this task is
brought about regularly through displacements and through the choice of
ideas which are remote enough from the objectionable ones to secure
passage through the censor; the latter themselves are but offsprings of
those whose psychic energy they have taken upon themselves through full
transference. The displacements are therefore not lacking in any dream
and are far more comprehensive; they not only comprise the deviations
from the trend of thought but also all forms of indirect expression, the
substitution for an important but offensive element of one seemingly
indifferent and harmless to the censor which form very remote allusions
to the first, they include substitution also occurring through symbols,
comparisons, or trifles. It is not to be denied that parts of this
indirect representation really originate in the foreconscious thoughts
of the dream,—as, for example, symbolical representation and
representation through comparisons—because otherwise the thought would
not have reached the state of the foreconscious expression. Such
indirect expressions and allusions, whose reference to the original
thought is easily findable, are really permissible and customary means
of expression even in our conscious thought. The dream-work, however,
exaggerates the application of these means of indirect expression to an
unlimited degree. Under the pressure of the censor any kind of
association becomes good enough for substitution by allusion; the
displacement from one element to any other is permitted. The
substitution of the inner associations (similarity, causal connection,
etc.) by the so-called outer associations (simultaneity, contiguity in
space, assonance) is particularly conspicuous and characteristic of the
dream-work.
_The Difference between Dream-technique and Wit-technique_
All these means of displacement also occur as techniques of wit, but
when they do occur they usually restrict themselves to those limits
prescribed for their use in conscious thought; in fact they may be
lacking, even though wit must regularly solve a task of inhibition. One
can comprehend this retirement of the process of displacement in
wit-work when one remembers that wit usually has another technique at
its disposal through which it defends itself against inhibitions.
Indeed, we have discovered nothing more characteristic of it than just
this technique. For wit does not have recourse to compromises as does
the dream, nor does it evade the inhibition; it insists upon retaining
the play with words or nonsense unaltered, but thanks to the ambiguity
of words and multiplicity of thought-relations, it restricts itself to
the choice of cases in which this play or nonsense may appear at the
same time admissible (jest) or senseful (wit). Nothing distinguishes wit
from all other psychic formations better than this double-sidedness and
this double-dealing; by emphasizing the “sense in nonsense,” the authors
have approached nearest the understanding of wit, at least from this
angle.
Considering the unexceptional predominance of this peculiar technique in
overcoming inhibitions in wit, one might find it superfluous that wit
should make use of the displacement-technique even in a single case. But
on the one hand certain kinds of this technique remain useful for wit as
objects and sources of pleasure—as, for example, the real displacement
(deviation of the trend of thought) which in fact shares in the nature
of nonsense,—and on the other hand one must not forget that the highest
stage of wit, tendency-wit, must frequently overcome two kinds of
inhibitions which oppose both itself and its tendency (p. 147), and that
allusion and displacements are qualified to facilitate this latter task.
The numerous and unrestricted application of indirect representation, of
displacements, and especially of allusions in the dream-work, has a
result which I mention not because of its own significance but because
it became for me the subjective inducement to occupy myself with the
problem of wit. If a dream analysis is imparted to one unfamiliar with
the subject and unaccustomed to it, and the peculiar ways of allusions
and displacements (objectionable to the waking thoughts but utilized by
the dream-work) are explained, the hearer experiences an uncomfortable
impression; he declares these interpretations to be “witty,” but it
seems obvious to him that these are not successful jokes but forced ones
which run contrary to the rules of wit. This impression can be easily
explained; it is due to the fact that the dream-work operates with the
same means as wit, but in the application of the same the dream exceeds
the bounds which wit restricts. We shall soon learn that in consequence
of the rôle of the third person wit is bound by a certain condition
which does not affect the dream.
_Irony—Negativism_
Among those techniques which are common to both wit and dreams
representation through the opposite and the application of absurdity are
especially interesting. The first belongs to the strongly effective
means of wit as shown in the examples of “outdoing wit” (p. 98). The
representation through the opposite, unlike most of the wit-techniques,
is unable to withdraw itself from conscious attention. He who
intentionally tries to make use of wit-work, as in the case of the
“habitual wit,” soon discovers that the easiest way to answer an
assertion with a witticism is to concentrate one’s mind on the opposite
of this assertion and trust to the chance flash of thought to brush
aside the feared objection to this opposite by means of a different
interpretation. Maybe the representation through its opposite is
indebted for such a preference to the fact that it forms the nucleus of
another pleasurable mode of mental expression, for an understanding of
which we do not have to consult the unconscious. I refer to _irony_,
which is very similar to wit and is considered a subspecies of the
comic. The essence of irony consists in imparting the very opposite of
what one intended to express, but it precludes the anticipated
contradiction by indicating through the inflections, concomitant
gestures, and through slight changes in style—if it is done in
writing—that the speaker himself means to convey the opposite of what he
says. Irony is applicable only in cases where the other person is
prepared to hear the reverse of the statement actually made, so that he
cannot fail to be inclined to contradict. As a consequence of this
condition ironic expressions are particularly subject to the danger of
being misunderstood. To the person who uses it, it gives the advantage
of readily avoiding the difficulties to which direct expressions, as,
for example, invectives, are subject. In the hearer it produces comic
pleasure, probably by causing him to make preparations for
contradiction, which are immediately found to be unnecessary. Such a
comparison of wit with a form of the comical that is closely allied to
it might strengthen us in the assumption that the relation of wit to the
unconscious is the peculiarity that also distinguishes it from the
comical.[62]
In dream-work, representation through the opposite has a far more
important part to play than in wit. The dream not only delights in
representing a pair of opposites by means of one and the same composite
image, but in addition it often changes an element from the
dream-thoughts into its opposite, thus causing considerable difficulty
in the work of interpretation. In the case of any element capable of
having an opposite it is impossible to tell whether it is to be taken
negatively or positively in the dream-thoughts.[63]
I must emphasize that as yet this fact has by no means been understood.
Nevertheless, it seems to give indications of an important
characteristic of unconscious thinking which in all probability results
in a process comparable to “judging.” Instead of setting aside judgments
the unconscious forms “repressions.” The repression may correctly be
described as a stage intermediate between the defense reflex and
condemnation.[64]
_The Unconscious as the Psychic Stage of the Wit-work_
Nonsense, or absurdity, which occurs so often in dreams and which has
made them the object of so much contempt, has never really come into
being as the result of an accidental shuffling of conceptual elements,
but may in every case be proven to have been purposely admitted by the
dream-work. Nonsense and absurdity are intended to express embittered
criticism and scornful contradiction within the dream-thoughts.
Absurdity in the dream-content thus stands for the judgment: “It’s pure
nonsense,” expressed in dream-thoughts. In my work on the Interpretation
of Dreams, I have placed great emphasis on the demonstration of this
fact because I thought that I could in this manner most strikingly
controvert the error expressed by many that the dream is no psychic
phenomenon at all—an error which bars the way to an understanding of the
unconscious. Now we have learnt (in the analysis of certain
tendency-witticisms on p. 73) that nonsense in wit is made to serve the
same purposes of expression. We also know that a nonsensical façade of a
witticism is peculiarly adapted to enhance the psychic expenditure in
the hearer and hence also to increase the amount to be discharged
through laughter. Moreover, we must not forget that nonsense in wit is
an end in itself, since the purpose of reviving the old pleasure in
nonsense is one of the motives of the wit-work. There are other ways to
regain the feeling of nonsense in order to derive pleasure from it;
caricature, exaggeration, parody, and travesty utilize the same and thus
produce “comical nonsense.” If we subject these modes of expression to
an analysis similar to the one used in studying wit, we shall find that
there is no occasion in any of them for resorting to unconscious
processes in our sense for the purpose of getting explanations. We are
now also in a position to understand why the “witty” character may be
added as an embellishment to caricature, exaggeration, and parody; it is
the manifold character of the performance upon the “psychic stage”[65]
that makes this possible.
I am of the opinion that by transferring the wit-work into the system of
the unconscious we have made a distinct gain, since it makes it possible
for us to understand the fact that the various techniques to which wit
admittedly adheres are on the other hand not its exclusive property.
Many doubts, which have arisen in the beginning of our investigation of
these techniques and which we were forced temporarily to leave, can now
be conveniently cleared up. Hence we shall give due consideration to the
doubt which expresses itself by asserting that the undeniable relation
of wit to the unconscious is correct only for certain categories of
tendency-wit, while we are ready to claim this relation for all forms
and all the stages of development of wit. We may not shirk the duty of
testing this objection.
We may assume that we deal with a sure case of wit-formation in the
unconscious when it concerns witticisms that serve unconscious
tendencies, or those strengthened by unconscious tendencies, as, for
example, most “cynical” witticisms. For in such cases the unconscious
tendency draws the foreconscious thought down into the unconscious in
order to remodel it there; a process to which the study of the
psychology of the neuroses has added many analogies with which we are
acquainted. But in the case of tendency-wit of other varieties, namely,
harmless wit and the jest, this power seems to fall away, and the
relation of the wit to the unconscious is an open question.
But now let us consider the case of the witty expression of a thought
that is not without value in itself and that comes to the surface in the
course of the association of mental processes. In order that this
thought may become a witticism, it is of course necessary that it make a
choice among the possible forms of expression in order to find the exact
form that will bring along the gain in word-pleasure. We know from
self-observation that this choice is not made by conscious attention;
but the selection will certainly be better if the occupation energy of
the foreconscious thought is lowered to the unconscious. For in the
unconscious, as we have learnt from the dream-work, the paths of
association emanating from a word are treated on a par with associations
from objects. The occupation energy from the unconscious presents by far
the more favorable conditions for the selection of the expression.
Moreover, we may assume without going farther that the possible
expression which contains the gain in word-pleasure exerts a lowering
effect on the still fluctuating self-command of the foreconscious,
similar to that exerted in the first case by the unconscious tendency.
As an explanation for the simpler case of the jest we may imagine that
an ever watchful intention of attaining the gain in word-pleasure seizes
the opportunity offered in the foreconscious of again drawing the
investing energy down into the unconscious, according to the familiar
scheme.
I earnestly wish that it were possible for me on the one hand to present
one decisive point in my conception of wit more clearly, and on the
other hand to fortify it with compelling arguments. But as a matter of
fact it is not a question here of two failures, but of one and the same
failure. I can give no clearer exposition because I have no further
testimony on behalf of my conception. The latter has developed as the
result of my study of the technique and of comparison with dream-work,
and indeed from this one side only. I now find that the dream-work is
altogether excellently adapted to the peculiarities of wit. This
conception is now concluded; if the conclusion leads us not to a
familiar province, but rather to one that is strange and novel to our
modes of thought, the conclusion is called a “hypothesis,” and the
relation of the hypothesis to the material from which it is drawn is
justly not accepted as “proof.” The hypothesis is admitted as “proved”
only if it can be reached by other ways and if it can be shown to be the
junction point for other associations. But such proof, in view of the
fact that our knowledge of unconscious processes has hardly begun,
cannot be had. Realizing then that we are on soil still virgin, we shall
be content to project from our viewpoint of observation one narrow
slender plank into the unexplored region.
We shall not build a great structure on such a foundation as this. If we
correlate the different stages of wit to the mental dispositions
favorable to them we may say: The _jest_ has its origin in the happy
mood; what seems to be peculiar to it is an inclination to lower the
psychic static energies (_Besetzungen_). The jest already makes use of
all the characteristic techniques of wit and satisfies the fundamental
conditions of the same through the choice of such an assortment of words
or mental associations as will conform not only to the requirements for
the production of pleasure, but also conform to the demands of the
intelligent critic. We shall conclude that the sinking of the mental
energy to the unconscious stage, a process facilitated by the happy
mood, has already taken place in the case of the jest. The mood does
away with this requirement in the case of _harmless_ wit connected with
the expression of a valuable thought; here we must assume a particular
_personal adaptation_ which finds it as easy to come to expression as it
is for the foreconscious thought to sink for a moment into the
unconscious. An ever watchful tendency to renew the original resultant
pleasure of wit exerts thereby a lowering effect upon the still
fluctuating foreconscious expression of the thought. Most people are
probably capable of making jests when in a happy mood; aptitude for
joking independent of the mood is found only in a few persons. Finally,
the most powerful incentive for wit-work is the presence of strong
tendencies which reach back into the unconscious and which indicate a
particular fitness for witty productions; these tendencies might explain
to us why the subjective conditions of wit are so frequently fulfilled
in the case of neurotic persons. Even the most inapt person may become
witty under the influence of strong tendencies.
_Differences Between Wit and Dreams_