investigate its technique. It is for this reason that some difficulties
are experienced in delving into their analyses. “That is a comic
misunderstanding” is the thought that comes to us. Yes, but how about
the technique of this joke? Obviously the technique lies in the double
meaning of the word _take_. In the first case the word is used in a
colorless idiomatic sense, while in the second it is the verb in its
full meaning. It is, therefore, a case where the same word is taken now
in the “full” and now in the “empty” sense (Group II, f). And if we
replace the expression “take a bath” by the simpler equivalent “bathed”
the wit disappears. The answer is no longer fitting. The joke,
therefore, lies in the expression “take a bath.”
This is quite correct, yet it seems that in this case, also, the
reduction was applied in the wrong place, for the joke does not lie in
the question, but in the answer, or rather in the counter question: “How
is that? Is there one missing?” Provided the same is not destroyed the
answer cannot be robbed of its wit by any dilation or variation. We also
get the impression that in the answer of the second Jew the overlooking
of the bath is more significant than the misconception of the word
“take.” However, here, too, things do not look quite clear and we will,
therefore, look for a third example.
Once more we shall resort to a Jewish joke in which, however, the Jewish
element is incidental only. Its essence is universally human. It is true
that this example, too, contains undesirable complications, but luckily
they are not of the kind so far which have kept us from seeing clearly.
_In his distress a needy man borrowed twenty-five dollars from a wealthy
acquaintance. The same day he was discovered by his creditor in a
restaurant eating a dish of salmon with mayonnaise. The creditor
reproached him in these words: “You borrow money from me and then order
salmon with mayonnaise. Is that what you needed the money for?” “I don’t
understand you,” responded the debtor, “when I have no money I can’t eat
salmon with mayonnaise. When I have money I mustn’t eat it. Well then,
when shall I ever eat salmon with mayonnaise?”_
Here we no longer discover any double meaning. Even the repetition of
the words “salmon with mayonnaise” cannot contain the technique of the
witticism, as it is not the “manifold application of the same material,”
but an actual, identical repetition required by the context. We may be
temporarily nonplussed in this analysis, and, as a pretext, we may wish
to dispute the character of the wit in the anecdote which causes us to
laugh. What else worthy of notice can be said about the answer of the
poor man? It may be supposed that the striking thing about it is its
logical character, but, as a matter of fact, the answer is illogical.
The debtor endeavors to justify himself for spending the borrowed money
on luxuries and asks, with some semblance of right, when he is to be
allowed to eat salmon. But this is not at all the correct answer. The
creditor does not blame him for eating salmon on the day that he
borrowed the money, but reminds him that in his condition he has no
right to think of such luxuries at all. The poor _bon vivant_ disregards
this only possible meaning of the reproach, centers his answer about
another point, and acts as if he did not understand the reproach.
Is it possible that the technique of this joke lies in this deviation of
the answer from the sense of reproach? A similar changing of the
viewpoint—displacement of the psychic accent—may perhaps also be
demonstrated in the two previous examples which we felt were related to
this one. This can be successfully shown and solves the technique of
these examples. Soulié calls Heine’s attention to the fact that society
worships the “golden calf” in the nineteenth century just as the Jewish
nation once did in the desert. To this an answer from Heine like the
following would seem fit: “Yes, that is human nature. Centuries have
changed nothing in it;” or he might have remarked something equally
apposite. But Heine deviates in his manner from the instigated thought.
Indeed, he does not answer at all. He makes use of the double meaning
found in the phrase “golden calf” to go off at a tangent. He seizes upon
one of the components of the phrase, namely, “the calf,” and answers as
if Soulié’s speech placed the emphasis on it—“Oh, he is no longer a
calf, etc.”[30]
The deviation is much more evident in the bath joke. This example
requires a graphic representation. The first Jew asks, “Have you taken a
_bath_?” The emphasis lies upon the bath element. The second answers as
if the query were: “Have you _taken_ a bath?” The displacement would
have been impossible if the question had been: “Have you bathed?” The
witless answer would have been: “Bathed? What do you mean? I don’t know
what that means.” However, the technique of the wit lies in the
displacement of the emphasis from “to bathe” to “to take.”[31]
Let us return to the example “salmon with mayonnaise,” which is the
purest of its kind. What is new in it will direct us into various paths.
In the first place we have to give the mechanism of this newly
discovered technique. I propose to designate it as having _displacement_
for its most essential element. The deviation of the trend of thought
consists in displacing the psychic accent to another than the original
theme. It is then incumbent upon us to find out the relationship of the
technique of displacement to the expression of the witticism. Our
example (salmon with mayonnaise) shows us that the displacement
technique is absolutely independent of the verbal expression. It does
not depend upon words, but upon the mental trend, and to abrogate it we
are not helped by substitution so long as the sense of the answer is
adhered to. The reduction is possible only when we change the mental
trend and permit the gastronomist to answer directly to the reproach
which he eluded in the conception of the joke. The reduced conception
will then be: “What I like I cannot deny myself, and it is all the same
to me where I get the money for it. Here you have my explanation as to
why I happen to be eating salmon with mayonnaise to-day just after you
have loaned me some money.” But that would not be witticism but a
_cynicism_. It will be instructive to compare this joke with one which
is closely allied to it in meaning.
_A man who was addicted to drink supported himself in a small city by
giving lessons. His vice gradually became known and he lost most of his
pupils in consequence. A friend of his took it upon himself to admonish
him to reform. “Look here,” he said, “you could have the best scholars
in town if you would give up drinking. Why not do it?” “What are you
talking about?” was the indignant reply. “I am giving lessons in order
to be able to drink. Shall I give up drinking in order to obtain
scholars?”_
This joke, too, carries the stamp of logic which we have noted in the
case of “salmon with mayonnaise,” but it is no longer displacement-wit.
The answer is a direct one. The cynicism, which is veiled there, is
openly admitted here, “For me drink is the most important thing.” The
technique of this witticism is really very poor and cannot explain its
effect. It lies merely in the change in order of the same material, or
to be more exact, in the reversal of the means-and-end relationship
between drink and giving lessons or getting scholars. As I gave no
greater emphasis in the reduction to this factor of the expression the
witticism is somewhat blurred; it may be expressed as follows: “What a
senseless demand to make. For me, drink is the most important thing and
not the scholars. Giving lessons is only a means towards more drink.”
The wit is really dependent upon the expression.
In the bath wit, the dependence of the witticism upon the wording “have
you taken a bath” is unmistakable and a change in the wording nullifies
the joke. The technique in this case is quite complicated. It is a
combination of double meaning (sub-group f) and displacement. The
wording of the question admits a double meaning. The joke arises from
the fact that the answer is given not in the sense expected by the
questioner, but has a different subordinate sense. By making the
displacement retrogressive we are accordingly in position to find a
reduction which leaves the double meaning in the expression and still
does away with the wit.
_“Have you taken a bath?” “Taken what? A bath? What is that?”_ But that
is no longer a witticism. It is simply either a spiteful or playful
exaggeration.
In Heme’s joke about the “golden calf” the double meaning plays a quite
similar part. It makes it possible for the answer to deviate from the
instigated stream of thought—a thing which happens in the joke about
“salmon and mayonnaise”—without any such dependence upon the wording. In
the reduction Soulié’s speech and Heine’s answer would be as follows:
“It reminds one very much of the worship of the golden calf when one
sees the people throng around that man simply because he is rich.”
Heine’s answer would be: “That he is made so much of on account of his
wealth is not the worst part. You do not emphasize enough the fact that
his ignorance is forgiven on account of his wealth.” Thus, while the
double meaning would be retained the displacement-wit would be
eliminated.
Here we may be prepared for the objection which might be raised, namely,
that we are seeking to tear asunder these delicate differentiations
which really belong together. Does not every double meaning furnish
occasion for displacement and for a deviation of the stream of thought
from one sense to another? And shall we agree that a “double meaning”
and “displacement” should be designated as representatives of two
entirely different types of wit? It is true that a relation between
double meaning and displacement actually exists, but it has nothing to
do with our differentiation of the techniques of wit. In cases of double
meaning the wit contains nothing but a word capable of several
interpretations which allows the hearer to find the transition from one
thought to another, and which with a little forcing may be compared to a
displacement. In the cases of displacement-wit, however, the witticism
itself contains a stream of thought in which the displacement is brought
about. Here the displacement belongs to the work which is necessary for
its understanding. Should this differentiation not be clear to us we can
make use of the reduction method, which is an unfailing way for tangible
demonstration. We do not deny, however, that there is something in this
objection. It calls our attention to the fact that we cannot confuse the
psychic processes in the formation of wit (the wit-work) with the
psychic processes in the conception of the wit (the understanding-work).
The object of our present investigation will be confined only to the
former.[32]
Are there still other examples of the technique of displacement? They
are not easily found, but the following witticism is a very good
specimen. It also shows a lack of overemphasized logic found in our
former examples.
_A horse-dealer in recommending a saddle horse to his client said: “If
you mount this horse at four o’clock in the morning you will be in
Monticello at six-thirty in the morning.” “What will I do in Monticello
at six-thirty in the morning?” asked the client._
Here the displacement is very striking. The horse-dealer mentions the
early arrival in the small city only with the obvious intention of
proving the efficiency of the horse. The client disregards the capacity
of the animal, about which he evidently has no more doubts, and takes up
only the data of the example selected for the test. The reduction of
this joke is comparatively simple.
More difficulties are encountered by another example, the technique of
which is very obscure. It can be solved, however, through the
application of double meaning with displacement. The joke relates the
subterfuge employed by a “schadchen” (Jewish marriage broker). It
belongs to a class which will claim more of our attention later.
_The “schadchen” had assured the suitor that the father of the girl was
no longer living. After the engagement had been announced the news
leaked out that the father was still living and serving a sentence in
prison. The suitor reproached the agent for deceiving him. “Well,” said
the latter, “what did I tell you? Do you call that living?”_
The double meaning lies in the word “living,” and the displacement
consists in the fact that the “schadchen” avoids the common meaning of
the word, which is a contrast to “death,” and uses it in the colloquial
sense: “You don’t call that living.” In doing this he explains his
former utterance as a double meaning, although this manifold application
is here quite out of place. Thus far the technique resembles that of the
“golden calf” and the “bath” jokes. Here, however, another factor comes
into consideration which disturbs the understanding of the technique
through its obtrusiveness. One might say that this joke is a
“characterization-wit.” It endeavors to illustrate by example the
marriage agent’s characteristic admixture of mendacious impudence and
repartee. We shall learn that this is only the “show-side” of the façade
of the witticism, that is, its sense. Its object serves a different
purpose. We shall also defer our attempt at reduction.[33]
After these complicated examples, which are not at all easy to analyze,
it will be gratifying to find a perfectly pure and transparent example
of “displacement-wit.” _A beggar implored the help of a wealthy baron
for a trip to Ostend, where he asserted the physicians had ordered him
to take sea baths for his health. “Very well, I shall assist you,” said
the rich baron, “but is it absolutely necessary for you to go to Ostend,
which is the most expensive of all watering-places?” “Sir,” was the
reproving reply, “nothing is too expensive for my health.”_ Certainly
that is a proper attitude, but hardly proper for the supplicant. The
answer is given from the viewpoint of a rich man. The beggar acts as if
it were his own money that he was willing to sacrifice for his health,
as if money and health concerned the _same_ person.
_Nonsense as a Technical Means_
Let us take up again in this connection the instructive example of
“salmon with mayonnaise.” It also presents to us a side in which we
noticed a striking display of logical work and we have learned from
analyzing it that this logic concealed an error of thought, namely, a
displacement of the stream of thought. Henceforth, even if only by way
of contrast association, we shall be reminded of other jokes which, on
the contrary, present clearly something contradictory, something
nonsensical, or foolish. We shall be curious to discover wherein the
technique of the witticism lies. I shall first present the strongest and
at the same time the purest example of the entire group. Once more it is
a Jewish joke.
_Ike was serving in the artillery corps. He was seemingly an intelligent
lad, but he was unwieldy and had no interest in the service. One of his
superiors, who was kindly disposed toward him, drew him aside and said
to him: “Ike, you are out of place among us. I would advise you to buy a
cannon and make yourself independent.”_
The advice, which makes us laugh heartily, is obvious nonsense. There
are no cannon to be bought and an individual cannot possibly make
himself independent as a fighting force or establish himself, as it
were. One cannot remain one minute in doubt but that this advice is not
pure nonsense, but witty nonsense and an excellent joke. By what means
does the nonsense become a witticism?
We need not meditate very long. From the discussions of the authors in
the Introduction we can guess that sense lurks in such witty nonsense,
and that this sense in nonsense transforms nonsense into wit. In our
example the sense is easily found. The officer who gives the
artilleryman, Ike, the nonsensical advice pretends to be stupid in order
to show Ike how stupidly he is acting. He imitates Ike as if to say, “I
will now give you some advice which is exactly as stupid as you are.” He
enters into Ike’s stupidity and makes him conscious of it by making it
the basis of a proposition which must meet with Ike’s wishes, for if Ike
owned a cannon and took up the art of warfare on his own account, of
what advantage would his intelligence and ambition be to him? How would
he take care of the cannon and acquaint himself with its mechanism in
order to meet the competition of other possessors of cannon?
I am breaking off the analysis of this example to show the same sense in
nonsense in a shorter and simpler, though less glaring case of
nonsense-wit.
“_Never to be born would be best for mortal man._” “_But_,” added the
sages of the _Fliegende Blätter_, “_hardly one man in a hundred thousand
has this luck_.”
The modern appendix to the ancient philosophical saying is pure
nonsense, and becomes still more stupid through the addition of the
seemingly careful “hardly.” But this appendix in attaching itself to the
first sentence incontestably and correctly limits it. It can thus open
our eyes to the fact that that piece of wisdom so reverently scanned, is
neither more nor less than sheer nonsense. He who is not born of woman
is not mortal; for him there exists no “good” and no “best.” The
nonsense of the joke, therefore, serves here to expose and present
another bit of nonsense as in the case of the artilleryman. Here I can
add a third example which, owing to its context, scarcely deserves a
detailed description. It serves, however, to illustrate the use of
nonsense in wit in order to represent another element of nonsense.
_A man about to go upon a journey intrusted his daughter to his friend,
begging him to watch over her chastity during his absence. When he
returned some months later he found that she was pregnant. Naturally he
reproached his friend. The latter alleged that he could not explain this
unfortunate occurrence. “Where has she been sleeping?” the father
finally asked. “In the same room with my son,” replied the friend. “How
is it that you allowed her to sleep in the same room with your son after
I had begged you so earnestly to take good care of her?” remonstrated
the father. “Well,” explained the friend, “there was a screen between
them. There was your daughter’s bed and over there was my son’s bed and
between them stood the screen.” “And suppose he went behind the screen?
What then?” asked the parent. “Well, in that case,” rejoined the friend
thoughtfully, “it might be possible.”_
In this joke—aside from the other qualities of this poor witticism—we
can easily get the reduction. Obviously, it would read like this: “You
have no right to reproach me. How could you be so foolish as to leave
your daughter in a house where she must live in the constant
companionship of a young man? As if it were possible for a stranger to
be responsible for the chastity of a maiden under such circumstances!”
The seeming stupidity of the friend here also serves as a reflection of
the stupidity of the father. By means of the reduction we have
eliminated the nonsense contained in the witticism as well as the
witticism itself. We have not gotten rid of the “nonsense” element
itself, as it finds another place in the context of the sentence after
it has been reduced to its true meaning.
We can now also attempt the reduction of the joke about the cannon. The
officer might have said: “I know, Ike, that you are an intelligent
business man, but I must tell you that you are very stupid if you do not
realize that one cannot act in the army as one does in business, where
each one is out for himself and competes with the other. Military
service demands subordination and co-operation.”
The technique of the nonsense-witticisms hitherto discussed really
consists in advancing something apparently absurd or nonsensical which,
however, discloses a sense serving to illustrate and represent some
other actual absurdity and nonsense.
Has the employment of contradiction in the technique of wit always this
meaning? Here is another example which answers this affirmatively. On an
occasion when Phocion’s speech was applauded he turned to his friends
and asked: “_Did I say something foolish?_”
This question seems paradoxical, but we immediately comprehend its
meaning. “What have I said that has pleased this stupid crowd? I ought
really to be ashamed of the applause, for if it appealed to these fools,
it could not have been very clever after all.”
Other examples teach us that absurdity is used very often in the
technique of wit without serving at all the purpose of uncovering
another piece of nonsense.
_A well-known university teacher who was wont to spice richly with jokes
his rather dry specialty was once congratulated upon the birth of his
youngest son, who was bestowed upon him at a rather advanced age. “Yes,”
said he to the well-wishers, “it is remarkable what mortal hands can
accomplish.”_ This reply seems especially meaningless and out of place,
for children are called the blessings of God to distinguish them from
creations of mortal hands. But it soon dawns upon us that this answer
has a meaning and an obscene one at that. The point in question is not
that the happy father wishes to appear stupid in order to make something
else or some other persons appear stupid. The seemingly senseless answer
causes us astonishment. It puzzles us, as the authors would have it. We
have seen that the authors deduce the entire mechanism of such jokes
from the change of the succession of “clearness and confusion.” We shall
try to form an opinion about this later. Here we content ourselves by
remarking that the technique of this witticism consists in advancing
such confusing and senseless elements.
An especially peculiar place among the nonsense-jokes is assumed by this
joke of Lichtenberg.
“_He was surprised that the two holes were cut in the pelts of cats just
where their eyes were located._” It is certainly foolish to be surprised
about something that is obvious in itself, something which is really the
explanation of an identity. It reminds one of a seriously intended
utterance of Michelet (_The Woman_) which, as I remember it, runs as
follows: “_How beautifully everything is arranged by nature. As soon as
the child comes into the world it finds a mother who is ready to care
for it._” This utterance of Michelet is really silly, but the one of
Lichtenberg is a witticism, which makes use of the absurdity for some
purpose. There is something behind it. What? At present that is
something we cannot discuss.
_Sophistic Faulty Thinking_
We have learned from two groups of examples that the wit-work makes use
of deviations from normal thought, namely, _displacement_ and
_absurdity_, as technical means of presenting witty expressions. It is
only just to expect that other faulty thinking may find a similar
application. Indeed, a few examples of this sort can be cited.
_A gentleman entered a shop and ordered a fancy cake, which, however, he
soon returned, asking for some liqueur in its stead. He drank the
liqueur, and was about to leave without paying for it. The shopkeeper
held him back. “What do you want of me?” he asked. “Please pay for the
liqueur,” said the shopkeeper. “But I have given you the fancy cake for
it.” “Yes, but you have not paid for that either.” “Well, neither have I
eaten it.”_
This little story also bears the semblance of logic which we already
know as the suitable façade for faulty thinking. The error, obviously,
lies in the fact that the cunning customer establishes a connection
between the return of the fancy cake and its exchange for the liqueur, a
connection which really does not exist. The state of affairs may be
divided into two processes which as far as the shopkeeper is concerned
are independent of each other. He first took the fancy cake and returned
it, so that he owes nothing for it. He then took the liqueur, for which
he owes money. One might say that the customer uses the relation “for
it” in a double sense, or, to speak more correctly, by means of a double
sense he forms a relation which does not hold in reality.[34]