WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS
BY
PROFESSOR DR. SIGMUND FREUD, LL.D.
Authorized English Edition, with Introduction by
A. A. BRILL, PH.B., M.D.
Lecturer in Psychoanalysis and Abnormal Psychology, New York University;
former Chief of Clinic of Psychiatry, Columbia University
[Illustration: [Logo]]
NEW YORK
MOFFAT, YARD AND COMPANY
1916
Copyright, 1916, BY
MOFFAT, YARD AND COMPANY
NEW YORK
_All Rights Reserved_
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE
In 1908 when it was agreed between Professor Freud and myself that I
should be his translator, it was decided to render into English first
the following five works: _Selected Papers on Hysteria and
Psychoneuroses_,[1] _Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex_,[2] _The
Interpretation of Dreams_,[3] _Psychopathology of Everyday Life_,[4] and
the present volume. These works were selected because they represent the
various stages of development of Professor Freud’s Psychoanalysis,[5]
and also because it was thought that they contain the material which one
must master before one is able to judge correctly the author’s theories
or apply them in practice. This undertaking, which was fraught with many
linguistic and other difficulties, has finally been accomplished with
the edition of the present volume, and it is therefore with a sense of
great satisfaction that the translator’s preface to this work is
written. But although the original task is finished the translator’s
work is only beginning. Psychoanalysis has made enormous strides. On the
foundation laid by Professor Freud there developed a literature rich in
ideas and content which has revolutionized the science of nervous and
mental diseases, and has thrown much light on the subject of dreams,
sex, mythology,[6] the history of civilization and racial psychology,[7]
philology,[8] æsthetics,[9] child psychology and pedagogics,[10]
philology,[11] and mysticism and occultism. With the _Interpretation of
Dreams_ and _Psychopathology of Everyday Life_, Professor Freud has
definitely bridged the gulf between normal and abnormal mental states by
demonstrating that dreams and faulty acts like some forms of forgetting,
slips of the tongue, slips of reading, writing, etc., are closely allied
to psychopathological states and represent the prototypes of such
abnormal mental conditions as neurotic symptoms, hallucinations, and
deliria. He also shows that all these productions are senseful and
purposive, and that their strange and peculiar appearance is due to
distortions produced by various psychic processes. These views are
confirmed in the present volume, where it is demonstrated that wit,
which belongs to æsthetics, is subject to the same laws, shows the same
mechanism, and serves the same tendencies as the other psychic
productions. With his wonted profundity and ingenuity the author adds
the solution of wit to those of the neuroses, dreams, and
psychopathological acts.
I take great pleasure in tendering my thanks to Mr. Horatio Winslow, who
has read the manuscript and has given me valuable suggestions in the
choice of expressions and in the selection of substitutes for those
witticisms that could not be translated.
A. A. BRILL.
_May, 1916._
CONTENTS
A. ANALYSIS OF WIT
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION 3
II. THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT 15
III. THE TENDENCIES OF WIT 127
B. SYNTHESIS OF WIT
IV. THE PLEASURE MECHANISM AND THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF WIT 177
V. THE MOTIVES OF WIT AND WIT AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 214
C. THEORIES OF WIT
VI. THE RELATION OF WIT TO DREAMS AND TO THE UNCONSCIOUS 249
VII. WIT AND THE VARIOUS FORMS OF THE COMIC 288
A. ANALYSIS
WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS
I
INTRODUCTION
Whoever has had occasion to examine that part of the literature of
æsthetics and psychology dealing with the nature and affinities of wit,
will, no doubt, concede that our philosophical inquiries have not
awarded to wit the important rôle that it plays in our mental life. One
can recount only a small number of thinkers who have penetrated at all
deeply into the problems of wit. To be sure, among the authors on wit
one finds the illustrious names of the poet Jean Paul (Fr. Richter), and
of the philosophers Th. Vischer, Kuno Fischer, and Th. Lipps. But even
these writers put the subject of wit in the background while their chief
interest centers around the more comprehensive and more alluring
problems of the comic.
In the main this literature gives the impression that it is altogether
impractical to study wit except when treated as a part of the comic.
_Presentation of the Subject by Other Authors_
According to Th. Lipps (_Komik und Humor_, 1898[12]) wit is “essentially
the subjective side of the comic; i.e., it is that part of the comic
which we ourselves create, which colors our conduct as such, and to
which our relation is that of Superior Subject, never of Object,
certainly not Voluntary Object” (p. 80). The following comment might
also be added:—In general we designate as wit “every conscious and
clever evocation of the comic, whether the comic element lies in the
viewpoint or in the situation itself” (p. 78).
K. Fischer explains the relation between wit and the comic by the aid of
caricature, which, according to his exposition, comes midway between the
two (_Über den Witz_, 1889). The subject of the comic is the hideous
element in any of its manifestations. “Where it is concealed it must be
disclosed in the light of the comic view; where it is not at all or but
slightly noticeable it must be rendered conspicuous and elucidated in
such a manner that it becomes clear and intelligible. Thus arises
caricature” (p. 45). “Our entire psychic world, the intellectual realm
of our thoughts and conceptions, does not reveal itself to us on
superficial consideration. It cannot be visualized directly either
figuratively or intuitively, moreover it contains inhibitions, weak
points, disfigurements, and an abundance of ludicrous and comical
contrasts. In order to bring it out and to make it accessible to
æsthetic examination, a force is necessary which is capable not only of
depicting objects directly, but also of reflecting upon these
conceptions and elucidating them—namely, a force capable of clarifying
thought. This force is nothing but judgment. The judgment which produces
the comic contrast is wit. In caricature wit has played its part
unnoticed, but only in judgment does it attain its own individual form
and the free domain of its evolution.”
As can be seen Lipps assigns the determining factor which classifies wit
as part of the comic, to the activity or to the active behavior of the
subject, whereas K. Fischer characterizes wit by its relation to its
object, in which characterization he accentuates the hidden hideous
element in the realm of thought. One cannot put to test the cogency of
these definitions of wit; one can, in fact, hardly understand them
unless one studies the text from which they were taken. One is thus
forced to work his way through the author’s descriptions of the comic in
order to learn anything about wit. From other passages, however, one
discovers that the same authors attribute to wit essential
characteristics of general validity in which they disregard its relation
to the comic.
K. Fischer’s characterization of wit which seems to be most satisfactory
to this author runs as follows: “Wit is a _playful_ judgment” (p. 51).
For an elucidation of this expression we are referred to the analogy:
“How æsthetic freedom consists in the playful contemplation of objects”
(p. 50). In another place (p. 20) the æsthetic attitude towards an
object is characterized by the condition that we expect nothing from
this object—especially no gratification of our serious needs—but that we
content ourselves with the pleasure of contemplating the same. In
contrast to labor the æsthetic attitude is _playful_. “It may be that
from æsthetic freedom there also results a kind of judgment, freed from
the conventional restrictions and rule of conduct, which, in view of its
genesis, I will call the _playful_ judgment. This conception contains
the first condition and possibly the entire formula for the solution of
our problem. ‘Freedom begets wit and wit begets freedom,’ says Jean
Paul. Wit is nothing but a free play of ideas” (p. 24).
Since time immemorial a favorite definition of wit has been the ability
to discover similarities in dissimilarities, i.e., to find hidden
similarities. Jean Paul has jocosely expressed this idea by saying that
“wit is the disguised priest who unites every couple.” Th. Vischer adds
the postscript: “He likes best to unite those couples whose marriage the
relatives refuse to sanction.” Vischer refutes this, however, by
remarking that in some witticisms there is no question of comparison or
the discovery of similarities. Hence with very little deviation from
Jean Paul’s definition he defines wit as the skill to combine with
surprising quickness many ideas, which through inner content and
connections are foreign to one another. K. Fischer then calls attention
to the fact that in a large number of these witty judgments one does not
find similarities, but contrasts; and Lipps further remarks that these
definitions refer to the wit that the humorist possesses and not to the
wit that he produces.
Other viewpoints, in some measure connected with one another, which have
been mentioned in defining and describing wit are: “the _contrast of
ideas_,” “_sense in nonsense_,” and “_confusion and clearness_.”
Definitions like those of Kraepelin lay stress upon the contrast of
ideas. Wit is “the voluntary combination or linking of two ideas which
in some way are contrasted with each other, usually through the medium
of speech association.” For a critic like Lipps it would not be
difficult to reveal the utter inadequacy of this formula, but he himself
does not exclude the element of contrast—he merely assigns it elsewhere.
“The contrast remains, but is not formed in a manner to show the ideas
connected with the words, rather it shows the contrast or contradiction
in the meaning and lack of meaning of the words” (p. 87). Examples show
the better understanding of the latter. “A contrast arises first through
the fact that we adjudge a meaning to its words which after all we
cannot ascribe to them.”
In the further development of this last condition the antithesis of
“sense in nonsense” becomes obvious. “What we accept one moment as
senseful we later perceive as perfect nonsense. Thereby arises, in this
case, the operation of the comic element” (p. 85). “A saying appears
witty when we ascribe to it a meaning through psychological necessity
and, while so doing, retract it. It may thus have many meanings. We lend
a meaning to an expression knowing that logically it does not belong to
it. We find in it a truth, however, which later we fail to find because
it is foreign to our laws of experience or usual modes of thinking. We
endow it with a logical or practical inference which transcends its true
content, only to contradict this inference as soon as we finally grasp
the nature of the expression itself. The psychological process evoked in
us by the witty expression which gives rise to the sense of the comic
depends in every case on the immediate transition from the borrowed
feeling of truth and conviction to the impression or consciousness of
relative nullity.”
As impressive as this exposition sounds one cannot refrain from
questioning whether the contrast between the senseful and senseless upon
which the comic depends does not also contribute to the definition of
wit in so far as it is distinguished from the comic. Also the factor of
“confusion and clearness” leads one deeply into the problem of the
relation of wit to the comic. Kant, speaking of the comic element in
general, states that one of its remarkable attributes is the fact that
it can delude us for a moment only. Heymans (_Zeitschr. f. Psychologie_,
XI, 1896) explains how the mechanism of wit is produced through the
succession of confusion and clearness. He illustrates his meaning by an
excellent witticism from Heine, who causes one of his figures, the poor
lottery agent, Hirsch-Hyacinth, to boast that the great Baron Rothschild
treated him as an equal or quite FAMILLIONAIRE. Here the word which acts
as the carrier of the witticism appears in the first place simply as a
faulty word-formation, as something incomprehensible, inconceivable, and
enigmatic. It is for these reasons that it is confusing. The comic
element results from the solution of the enigma and from the
understanding of the word. Lipps adds that the first stage of
enlightenment, showing that the confusing word means this or that, is
followed by a second stage in which one perceives that this nonsensical
word has first deluded us and then given us the true meaning. Only this
second enlightenment, the realization that it is all due to a word that
is meaningless in ordinary usage—this reduction to nothingness produces
the comic effect (p. 95).
Whether or not either the one or the other of these two conceptions may
seem more clear we are brought nearer to a definite insight through the
discussion of the processes of confusion and enlightenment. If the comic
effect of Heine’s _famillionaire_ depends upon the solution of the
seemingly senseless word, then the wit would have to be attributed to
the formation of this word and to the character of the word so formed.
In addition to the associations of the viewpoints just discussed there
is another characteristic of wit which is recognized as peculiar to it
by all authors. “Brevity alone is the body and soul of wit,” declares
Jean Paul (_Vorschule der Aesthetik_, I, 45), and modifies it with a
speech of the old tongue-wagger, Polonius, from Shakespeare’s _Hamlet_
(Act II, Scene 2):
“Therefore, since brevity is the soul of wit,
And tediousness the limbs and outward flourishes,
I will be brief.”
Lipps’s description (p. 90) of the brevity of wit is also significant.
He states that wit says what it does say, not always in few, but always
in too few words; that is: “It expresses itself in words that will not
stand the test of strict logic or of the ordinary mode of thought and
expression. In fine it can express itself by leaving the thing unsaid.”
That “wit must unearth something hidden and concealed”—to quote K.
Fischer (p. 51)—we have already been taught from the grouping of wit
with caricature. I re-emphasize this determinant because it also has
more to do with the nature of wit than with its relation to the comic.
I am well aware that the foregoing scanty quotations from the works of
the authors on wit cannot do justice to the excellence of these works.
In view of the difficulties that confront one in reproducing clearly
such complicated and such delicately shaded streams of thought I cannot
spare inquiring minds the trouble of searching for the desired
information in the original sources. However, I do not know whether they
will return fully satisfied. For the criteria and attributes of wit
mentioned by these authors, such as—activity, the relation of the
content of wit to our thoughts, the character of the playful judgment,
the union of dissimilarities, contrasting ideas, “sense in nonsense,”
the succession of confusion and clearness, the sudden emergence of the
hidden, and the peculiar brevity of wit, seem to us, at first glance, so
very pertinent and so easily demonstrable by examples that we cannot
succumb to the danger of underestimating the value of such ideas. But
they are only disjointed fragments which we should like to see welded
into an organic whole. In the end they contribute no more to the
knowledge of wit than a number of anecdotes teach us of the true
characteristics of a personality whose biography interests us. We do not
at all understand the connection that is supposed to exist between the
individual conditions; for instance, what the brevity of wit may have to
do with that side of wit exhibited in the playful judgment; besides we
do not know whether wit must satisfy all or only some of these
conditions in order to form real wit; which of them may be replaced and
which ones are indispensable. We should also like a grouping and
classification of wit in respect to its essential attributes. The
classification as given by the authors is based, on the one hand, on the
technical means, and on the other hand, on the utilization of wit in
speech (sound-wit, play on words, the wit of caricature,
characterization wit, and witty repartee).
Accordingly we should not find ourselves in a dilemma when it comes to
pointing out goals for a further effort to explain wit. In order to look
forward to success we must either introduce new viewpoints into the
work, or try to penetrate further by concentrating our attention or by
broadening the scope of our interest. We can prescribe for ourselves the
task of at least not permitting any lack along the latter lines. To be
sure, it is rather remarkable how few examples of recognized witticisms
suffice the authors for their investigations and how each one accepts
the ones used by his predecessors. We need not shirk the responsibility
of analyzing the same examples which have already served the classical
authors, but we contemplate new material besides to lay a broader
foundation for our deductions. It is quite natural that we should select
such examples of wit as objects for our investigation as have produced
the deepest impression upon our own lives and which have caused us the
greatest amount of laughter.
Some may inquire whether the subject of wit is worthy of such effort. In
my opinion there is no doubt about it, for even if I disregard the
personal motives to be revealed during the development of this theme
(the motives which drove me to gain an insight into the problem of wit),
I can refer to the fact that there is an intimate connection between all
psychic occurrences; a connection which promises to furnish a
psychological insight into a sphere which, although remote, will
nevertheless be of considerable value to the other spheres. One may also
be reminded what a peculiar, overwhelmingly fascinating charm wit offers
in our society. A new joke operates almost as an event of universal
interest. It is passed on from one person to another just like the news
of the latest conquest. Even prominent men who consider it worth while
relating how they attained fame, what cities and countries they have
seen, and with what celebrated persons they have consorted, do not
disdain to dwell in their autobiographies upon this and that excellent
joke which they have heard.[13]
II
THE TECHNIQUE OF WIT
We follow the beckoning of chance and take up as our first example of
wit one which has already come to our notice in the previous chapter.
In that part of the _Reisebilder_ entitled “Die Bäder von Lucca,” Heine
introduces the precious character, Hirsch-Hyacinth, the Hamburg lottery
agent and curer of corns, who, boasting to the poet of his relationship
with the rich Baron Rothschild, ends thus: “And as true as I pray that
the Lord may grant me all good things I sat next to Solomon Rothschild,
who treated me just as if I were his equal, quite _famillionaire_.”
It is by means of this excellent and very funny example that Heymans and
Lipps have illustrated the origin of the comic effect of wit from the
succession of “confusion and clearness.” However, we shall pass over
this question and put to ourselves the following inquiry: What is it
that causes the speech of Hirsch-Hyacinth to become witty? It can be
only one of two things; either it is the thought expressed in the
sentence which carries in itself the character of the witticism; or the
witticism adheres to the mode of expression which clothes the thought.
On whichever side the nature of the wit may lie, there we shall follow
it farther and endeavor to elucidate it.
In general a thought may be expressed in different forms of speech—that
is, in different words—which may repeat it in its original accuracy. In
the speech of Hirsch-Hyacinth we have before us a definite form of
thought expressed which seems to us especially peculiar and not very
readily comprehensible. Let us attempt to express as exactly as is
possible the same thought in other words. Lipps, indeed, has already
done this and has thus, to some degree, elucidated the meaning of the
poet. He says (p. 87), “We understand that Heine wishes to say that the
reception was on a familiar basis, that is, that it was of the friendly
sort.” We change nothing in the sense when we assume a different
interpretation which perhaps fits better into the speech of
Hirsch-Hyacinth: “Rothschild treated me quite as his equal, in a very
_familiar_ way; that is, as far as this can be done by a _millionaire_.”
We would only add, “The condescension of a rich man always carries
something embarrassing for the one experiencing it.”[14]
Whether we shall remain content with this or with another equivalent
formulation of the thought, we can see that the question which we have
put to ourselves is already answered. The character of the wit in this
example does not adhere to the thought. It is a correct and ingenious
remark that Heine puts into the mouth of Hirsch-Hyacinth—a remark of
indubitable bitterness, as is easily understood in the case of the poor
man confronted with so much wealth; but we should not care to call it
witty. Now if any one who cannot forget the poet’s meaning in the
interpretation should insist that the thought in itself is also witty,
we can refer him to the definite fact that the witty character is lost
in the interpretation. It is true that Hirsch-Hyacinth’s speech made us
laugh loudly, but though Lipps’s or our own accurate rendering may
please us and cause us to reflect, yet it cannot make us laugh.
But if the witty character of our example does not belong to the
thought, then it must be sought for in the form of expression in the
wording. We have only to study the peculiarity of this mode of
expression to realize what one may term word- or form-technique. Also we
may discover the things that are intimately related to the very nature
of wit, since the character as well as the effect of wit disappears when
one set of expressions is changed for others. At all events we are in
full accord with our authors when we put so much value upon the verbal
form of the wit. Thus K. Fischer (p. 72) says: “It is, in the first
place, the naked form which is responsible for the perception of wit,
and one is reminded of a saying of Jean Paul’s which affirms and proves
this nature of wit in the same expression. ‘Thus the mere position
conquers, be it that of warriors or of sentences.’”
_Formation of Mixed Words_
Now wherein lies the “technique” of this wit? What has occurred to the
thought, in our own conception, that it became changed into wit and
caused us to laugh heartily? The comparison of our conception with the
text of the poet teaches us that two processes took place. In the first
place there occurred an important abbreviation. In order to express
fully the thought contained in the witticism we had to append to the
words “Rothschild treated me just as an equal, on a familiar basis,” an
additional sentence which in its briefest form reads: i.e., so far as a
millionaire can do this. Even then we feel the necessity of an
additional explanatory sentence.[15] The poet expresses it in terser
terms as follows: “Rothschild treated me just like an equal, quite
_famillionaire_.” The entire restriction, which the second sentence
imposes on the first thus verifying the familiar treatment, has been
lost in the jest. But it has not been so entirely lost as not to leave a
substitute from which it can be reconstructed. A second change has also
taken place. The word “familiar” in the witless expression of the
thought has been transformed into “_famillionaire_” in the text of the
wit, and there is no doubt that the witty character and ludicrous effect
of the joke depends directly upon this word-formation. The newly formed
word is identical in its first part with the word “familiar” of the
first sentence, and its terminal syllables correspond to the word
“millionaire” of the second sentence. In this manner it puts us in a
position to conjecture the second sentence which was omitted in the text
of the wit. It may be described as a composite of two constituents
“familiar” and “millionaire,” and one is tempted to depict its origin
from the two words graphically.
FAMIL I A R
MILLIONAIRE
—————————————
FAMILLIONAIRE
The process, then, which has carried the thought into the witticism can
be represented in the following manner, which, although at first rather
fantastic, nevertheless furnishes exactly the actual existing result:
“Rothschild treated me quite familiarly, i.e., as well as a millionaire
can do that sort of thing.”
Now imagine that a compressing force is acting upon these sentences and
assume that for some reason or other the second sentence is of lesser
resistance. It is accordingly forced toward the vanishing point, but its
important component, the word “millionaire,” which strives against the
compressing power, is pushed, as it were, into the first sentence and
becomes fused with the very similar element, the word “familiar” of this
sentence. It is just this possibility, provided by chance to save the
essential part of the second sentence, which favors the disappearance of
the other less important components. The jest then takes shape in this
manner: “Rothschild treated me in a very
famillionaire way.”
/ (mili) (aire)
Apart from such a compressing force, which is really unknown to us, we
may describe the origin of the wit-formation, that is, the technique of
the wit in this case, as a _condensation with substitutive formation_.
In our example the substitutive formation consists in the formation of a
mixed word. This fused word “famillionaire,” incomprehensible in itself
but instantly understood in its context and recognized as senseful, is
now the carrier of the mirth-provoking stimulus of the jest, whose
mechanism, to be sure, is in no way clearer to us through the discovery
of the technique. To what extent can a linguistic process of
condensation with substitutive formation produce pleasure through a
fused word and force us to laugh? We make note of the fact that this is
a different problem, the treatment of which we can postpone until we
shall find access to it later. For the present we shall continue to busy
ourselves with the technique of wit.
Our expectation that the technique of wit cannot be considered an
indifferent factor in the examination of the nature of wit prompts us to
inquire next whether there are other examples of wit formed like Heine’s
“famillionaire.” Not many of these exist, but enough to constitute a
small group which may be characterized as the blend-word formations or
fusions. Heine himself has produced a second witticism from the word
“millionaire” by copying himself, as it were, when he speaks of a
“millionarr” (_Ideen_, Chap. XIV). This is a visible condensation of
“millionaire” and “narr” (fool) and, like the first example, expresses a
suppressed by-thought. Other examples of a similar nature are as
follows.
During the war between Turkey and the Balkan States, in 1912, _Punch_
depicted the part played by Rumania by representing the latter as a
highwayman holding up the members of the Balkan alliance. The picture
was entitled: _Kleptorumania_. Here the word is a fusion of Kleptomania
and Rumania and may be represented as follows:
KLEPTOMANIA
RUMANIA
—————————————
KLEPTORUMANIA
A naughty jest of Europe has rebaptized a former potentate, Leopold,
into _Cleopold_ because of his relation to a lady surnamed Cleo. This is
a clear form of condensation which by the addition of a single letter
forever vividly preserves a scandalous allusion.
In an excellent chapter on this same theme Brill gives the following
example.[16]
“De Quincey once remarked that old persons are apt to fall into
‘anecdotage.’” The word _Anecdotage_, though in itself incomprehensible,
can be readily analyzed to show its original full sense; and on analysis
we find that it is made up of two words, _anecdote_ and _dotage_. That
is, instead of saying that old persons are apt to fall into dotage and
that old persons are fond of telling anecdotes, De Quincey fuses the two
words into a neologism, _anecdotage_, and thus simultaneously expresses
both ideas. The technique, therefore, lies in the fusion of the two
words. Such a fusion of words is called condensation. Condensation is a
substitutive formation, i.e., instead of _anecdote_ and _dotage_ we have
_anecdotage_.
“In a short story which I have recently read, one of the characters, a
‘sport,’ speaks of the Christmas season as the _alcoholidays_. By
reduction it can be easily seen that we have here a compound word, a
combination of _alcohol_ and _holidays_ which can be graphically
represented as follows:
alcoHOL
HOLidays
————————————
ALCOHOLIDAYS
“Here the condensation expresses the idea that holidays are conducive to
alcoholic indulgence. In other words, we have here a fused word, which,
though strange in appearance, can be easily understood in its proper
context. The witticism may be described as a condensation with
substitution.
“The same mechanism is found in the following: A dramatic critic,
summarizing three paragraphs to the effect that most plays now produced
in New York City are violently emotional and hysterical, remarks:
‘Thespis has taken up his home in Dramatteawan.’ The last word is a
condensation of _drama_ and _Matteawan_. The substitution not only
expressed the critic’s idea that most of the plays at present produced
in New York are violent, emotional and hysterical, that is insane, but
it also contains a clever allusion to the nature of the problem
presented by most of these plays. Matteawan is a state hospital for
criminal insane. Most of the plays are not only insane, but also
criminal since they treat of murders, divorces, robberies, scandals,
etc.”
When Flaubert published his famous romance _Salammbo_, which treats of
life in ancient Carthage, it was scoffingly referred to by Sainte-Beuve
as _Carthaginoiserie_ on account of its tedious detailed descriptions.
Carthaginoiserie
chinoiserie
During a conversation with a lady I unintentionally furnished the
material for a jest. I spoke to her about the great merits of an
investigator whom I considered unjustly ignored. She remarked, “But the
man really deserves a monument.” “Perhaps he will get one some day,” I
answered, “but at the moment his success is very limited.” “Monument”
and “moment” are contrasts. The lady then united these contrasts and
said: “Well, let us wish him a _monumentary_ success.”
If at this stage the reader should become displeased with a viewpoint
which threatens to destroy his pleasure in wit without explaining the
source of this pleasure I must beg him to be patient for a while,
because we are now confronted with the technique of wit, the examination
of which promises many revelations if only we enter into it far enough.
Besides the analysis of the examples thus far cited, which show simply a
process of condensation, there are others in which the changed
expressions manifest themselves in other ways.
_Condensation with Modification and Substitution_
The following witticisms of Mr. N. will serve as illustrations.
“I was driving with him tête-à-bête.” Nothing is simpler than the
reduction of this jest. Evidently it can only mean: I was driving
tête-à-tête with Mr. X. and X. is a stupid ass (beast).
Neither of these two sentences is witty nor is there any wit if one
combines them into this one: “I was out driving tête-à-tête with that
stupid ass (beast).” The wit appears when the words “stupid ass” are
omitted and when, as a substitute for them, the first “t” of the second
“tête” is changed to “b.” This slight modification brings back to
expression the suppressed “bête.” The technique of this group of
witticisms may be described as “condensation with a slight
modification.” And it would seem that the more insignificant the
substitutive modification, the better is the wit.
Quite similar, although not without its complications, is the technique
of another form of witticism. During a discussion about a person in whom
there was something to praise and much to criticise, N. remarked: “Yes,
vanity is one of his four heels of Achilles.”[17] This modification
consists in the fact that instead of the one vulnerable heel which was
attributed to Achilles we have here four heels. Four heels means four
feet and that number is only found on animals. The two thoughts
condensed in the witticism are as follows: Except for his vanity he is
an admirable fellow; still I do not care for him, for he is more of an
animal than a human being.[18]
A similar but simpler joke I heard _statu nascendi_ in a family circle.
One of two brothers who were attending college was an excellent scholar
while the other was only an average student. It so happened that the
model boy had a setback in school. The mother discussed this matter and
expressed her fear lest this event be the beginning of a lasting
deterioration. The boy who until then had been overshadowed by his
brother willingly grasped this opportunity to remark: “Yes, Carl is
going backward on all-fours.”
Here the modification consists in a small addition as an assurance that
in his judgment his brother is going backward. This modification
represents and takes the place of a passionate plea for his own cause
which may be expressed as follows: After all, you must not think that he
is so much cleverer than I am simply because he has more success in
school. He is really a stupid ass, i.e., much more stupid than I am.
A good illustration of condensation with slight modification is
furnished by a well-known witty jest of Mr. N., who remarked about a
character in public life that he had a “_great future behind him_.” The
butt of this joke was a young man whose ancestry, rearing, and personal
qualities seemed to destine him for the leadership of a great party and
the attainment of political power at its head. But times changed, the
party became politically incompetent, and it could readily be foreseen
that the man who was predestined to become its leader would come to
nothing. The briefest reduction of the meaning by which one could
replace this joke would be: The man has had a great future before him,
but that is now past. Instead of “has had” and the appended afterthought
there is a small change in the main sentence in which “before” is
replaced by its opposite “behind.”[19]
Mr. N. made use of almost the same modification in the case of the
nobleman who was appointed minister of agriculture for no other reason
than that he was interested in agriculture. Public opinion had an
opportunity to find out that he was the most incompetent man who had
ever been intrusted with this office. When, however, he had relinquished
his portfolio and had withdrawn to his agricultural pursuits Mr. N. said
of him: “_Like Cincinnatus of Old he has returned to his place in front
of the plough._”
That Roman, who was likewise called to his office from his farm,
returned to his place behind the plough. In those days, just as in the
present time, in front of the plough walked—the ox.
We could easily increase these examples by many others, but I am of the
opinion that we are in need of no more cases in order to grasp
thoroughly the character of the technique of this second
group—condensation with modification. If we now compare the second group
with the first, the technique of which consisted in condensation with a
mixed word-formation, we readily see that the differences are not vital
and that the lines of demarcation are indistinct. The mixed
word-formation, like the modification, became subordinated to the idea
of substitutive formation, and if we desire we can also describe the
mixed word-formation as a modification of the parent word through the
second elements.
We may make our first pause here and ask ourselves with what known
factor in the literature of wit our first result, either in whole or in
part, coincides. It obviously agrees with the factor of brevity which
Jean Paul calls the soul of wit (_supra_, p. 11). But brevity alone is
not wit or every laconism would be witty. The brevity of wit must be of
a special kind. We recall that Lipps has attempted to describe more
fully the peculiarity of the brevity of wit (_v. s._, p. 11). Here our
investigation started and demonstrated that the brevity of wit is often
the result of a special process which has left a second trace—the
substitutive formation—in the wording of the wit. By applying the
process of reduction, which aims to cause a retrogression in the
peculiar process of condensation, we find also that wit depends only
upon the verbal expression which was produced by the process of
condensation. Naturally our entire interest now centers upon this
peculiar and hitherto almost neglected mechanism. Furthermore, we cannot
yet comprehend how it can give origin to all that is valuable in wit;
namely, the resultant pleasure.
_Condensation in Dreams_
Have processes similar to those here described as the technique of wit
already been noted in another sphere of our psychic life? To be sure, in
one apparently remote sphere. In 1900 I published a book which, as
indicated by its title (_The Interpretation of Dreams_[20]), makes the
attempt to explain the riddle of the dream and to trace the dream to
normal psychic operations. I had occasion to contrast there the manifest
and often peculiar dream-content with the latent but altogether real
thoughts of the dream from which it originated, and I took up the
investigation of the processes which make the dream from the latent
dream-thought. I also investigated the psychological forces which
participated in this transposition. The sum of the transforming
processes I designated as the dream-work and, as a part of this
dream-work, I described the process of condensation. This process has a
striking similarity to the technique of wit and, like the latter, it
leads to abbreviations and brings about substitutive formations of like
character.
From recollections of his own dreams the reader will be familiar with
the compositions of persons and objects that appear in them; indeed, the
dream makes similar compositions of words which can then be reduced by
analysis (e.g., Autodidasker—Autodidakt and Lasker[21]). On other
occasions and even much more frequently, the condensation work of the
dream produces no compositions, but pictures which closely resemble an
object or person up to a certain addition or variation which comes from
another source, like the modifications in the witticisms of Mr. N. We
cannot doubt that in this case, as in the other, we deal with a similar
psychic process which is recognizable by identical results. Such a
far-reaching analogy between wit-technique and dream-work will surely
arouse our interest in the former and stimulate our expectation of
finding some explanation of wit from a comparison with the dream. We
forbear, however, to enter upon this work by bearing in mind that we
have investigated the technique of wit in only a very small number of
witty jests, so that we cannot be certain that the analogy, the workings
of which we wish to explore, will hold good. Hence we turn away from the
comparison with the dream and again take up the technique of wit,
leaving, however, at this place of our investigation a visible thread,
as it were, which later we shall take up again.
_Wit Formed by Word-division_
The next point we shall discuss is whether the process of condensation
with substitutive formation is demonstrable in all witticisms so that it
may be designated as a universal character of the technique of wit. I
recall a joke which has clung to my mind through certain peculiar
circumstances. One of the great teachers of my youth, whom we considered
unable to appreciate a joke—he had never told us a single joke of his
own—came into the Institute laughing. With an unwonted readiness he
explained the cause of his good humor. “I have read an excellent joke,”
he said. “_A young man who claimed to be a relative of the great J. J.
Rousseau, and who bore his name, was introduced into a Parisian
drawing-room. It should be added that he was decidedly red-headed. He
behaved in such an awkward manner that the hostess ventured this
criticism to the gentleman who had introduced him—‘Vous m’avez fait
connaître un jeune homme roux et sot, mais non pas un Rousseau.’_”
At this point our teacher started to laugh again. According to the
nomenclature of our authors this is sound-wit and a poor kind at that,
since it plays with a proper name.
But what is the technique of this wit? It is quite clear that the
character which we had perhaps hoped to demonstrate universally leaves
us in the lurch in the first new example. Here there is no omission and
scarcely an abbreviation. In the witticism the lady expresses almost
everything that we can ascribe to the thoughts. “You have made me look
forward to meeting a relative of J. J. Rousseau. I expected that he was
perhaps even mentally related to him. Imagine my surprise to find this
red-haired foolish boy, a _roux et sot_.” To be sure, I was able to add
and insert something, but this attempt at reduction does not annul the
wit. It remains fixed and attached to the sound similarity of
Rousseau.
————————
roux sot
This proves that condensation with substitution plays no part in the
production of this witticism.
With what else do we have to deal? New attempts at reduction taught me
that the joke will persistently continue until the name Rousseau is
replaced by another. If, e.g., I substitute the name Racine for it I
find that although the lady’s criticism is just as feasible as before it
immediately loses every trace of wit. Now I know where I can look for
the technique of this joke although I still hesitate to formulate it. I
shall make the following attempt: The technique of the witticism lies in
the fact that one and the same word—the name—is used in a twofold
application, once as a whole and once divided into its syllables like a
charade.
I can mention a few examples of identical technique. A witticism of this
sort was utilized by an Italian lady to avenge a tactless remark made to
her by the first Napoleon. Pointing to her compatriots at a court ball
he said: “_Tutti gli Italian danzano si male_” (all Italians dance so
badly). To which she quickly replied: _“Non tutti, ma buona parte”_ (Not
all, but a great many)—
Buona parte.[22]
————————————
Buonaparte.
Brill reports still another example in which the wit depends on the
twofold application of a name: “_Hood once remarked that he had to be a
lively Hood for a livelihood._”[23]
At one time when Antigone was produced in Berlin a critic found that the
presentation entirely lacked the character of antiquity. The wits of
Berlin incorporated this criticism in the following manner: “_Antique?
Oh, nay_” (Th. Vischer and K. Fischer).
_Manifold Application of the Same Material_
In these examples, which will suffice for this species of wit, the
technique is the same. A name is made use of twice; first, as a whole,
and then divided into its syllables—and in their divided state the
syllables yield a different meaning.[24] The manifold application of the
same word, once as a whole and then as the component syllables into
which it divides itself, was the first case that came to our attention
in which technique deviated from that of condensation. Upon brief
reflection, however, we must divine from the abundance of examples that
come to us that the newly discovered technique can hardly be limited to
this single means. Obviously there are any number of hitherto unobserved
possibilities for one to utilize the same word or the same material of
words in manifold application _in one sentence_. May not all these
possibilities furnish technical means for wit? It would seem so, judging
by the following examples.
“_Two witty statesmen, X and Y, met at a dinner. X, acting as
toastmaster, introduced Y as follows: ‘My friend, Y, is a very wonderful
man. All you have to do is to open his mouth, put in a dinner, and a
speech appears, etc.’ Responding to the speaker, Y said: ‘My friend, the
toastmaster, told you what a wonderful man I am, that all you have to do
is to open my mouth, put in a dinner, and a speech appears. Now let me
tell you what a wonderful man he is. All you have to do is open
anybody’s mouth, put in his speech, and the dinner appears.’_”[25]
In examples of this sort, one can use the same material of words and
simply change slightly their order. The slighter the change, the more
one gets the impression that different sense was expressed with the same
words, the better is the technical means of wit. And how simple are the
means of its production! “_Put in a dinner and a speech appears—put in a
speech and a dinner appears._” This is really nothing but an exchange of
places of these two phrases whereby what was said of Y becomes
differentiated from what is said of X. To be sure, this is not the whole
technique of the joke.[26]
Great latitude is afforded the technique of wit if one so extends the
“_manifold application of the same material_” that the word—or the
words—upon which the wit depends may be used first unchanged and then
with a slight modification. An example is another joke of Mr. N. He
heard a gentleman, who himself was born a Jew, utter a malicious
statement about Jewish character. “Mr. Councilor,” said he, “I am
familiar with your _antesemitism_, but your _antisemitism_ is new to
me.”
Here only one single letter is changed, the modification of which could
hardly be noticed in careless pronunciation. This example reminds one of
the other modification jokes of Mr. N., but it differs from them in
lacking the condensation. Everything that was to be said has been told
in the joke. “I know that you yourself were formerly a Jew, therefore I
am surprised that you should rail against the Jew.”
An excellent example of such wit modification is also the familiar
exclamation: “_Traduttore—Traditore_.”[27]
The similarity between the two words, almost approaching identity,
results in a very impressive representation of the inevitability by
which a translator becomes a transgressor—in the eyes of the author.
The manifoldness of slight modifications possible in these jokes is so
great that none is quite similar to the other. Here is a joke which is
supposed to have arisen at an examination for the degree of law. The
candidate was translating a passage from the Corpus juris, “_Labeo
ait_.” “‘I fall (fail),’ says he,” volunteered the candidate. “‘You fall
(fail),’ says I,” replied the examiner and the examination ended.
Whoever mistakes the name of the celebrated Jurist for a word to which
he attaches a false meaning certainly deserves nothing better. But the
technique of the witticism lies in the fact that the examiner used
almost the same words in punishing the applicant which the latter used
to prove his ignorance. Besides, the joke is an example of repartee
whose technique, as we shall see, is closely allied to the one just
mentioned.
Words are plastic and may be moulded into almost any shape. There are
some words which have lost their true original meaning in certain usages
which they still enjoy in other applications. In one of Lichtenberg’s
jokes just those conditions have been sought for in which the nuances of
the wordings have removed their basic meaning.
_“How goes it?” asked the blind of the lame one. “As you see,” replied
the lame one to the blind._