CHAPTER I

Transcriber's note: Italic font is indicated by _underscores_.

Bolded and underlined words are indicated by =equals=.

BISMARCK

SOME SECRET PAGES OF HIS HISTORY

[Illustration]

BISMARCK

SOME SECRET PAGES OF HIS HISTORY

BEING A DIARY KEPT BY

DR. MORITZ BUSCH

DURING TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE

INTERCOURSE WITH THE GREAT CHANCELLOR

_IN THREE VOLUMES_

VOL. I

=London=

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1898

_All rights reserved_

RICHARD CLAY AND SONS, LIMITED,

LONDON AND BUNGAY.

_Copyright in the United States of America._

NOTE

The English edition of Dr. Busch’s work which we publish to-day has

been translated from the original German text in the possession of the

publishers. A few passages have, however, been omitted as defamatory,

or otherwise unsuitable for publication. Dr. Busch contemplated

incorporating bodily in the first volume a reproduction of his earlier

work: _Prince Bismarck and his People during the Franco-German War_;

but while the many valuable additions which he made to it have been

preserved, such portions as would no longer have presented any special

interest for English readers have been considerably abridged.

PREFACE

The work which I now present to the German people contains a

complete[1] account of all the events of which I was a witness during

my intercourse of over twenty years with Prince Bismarck and his

entourage. Part of it is not entirely new, as I have embodied in it

portions of the book published by me in 1878, under the title: _Prince

Bismarck and his People during the Franco-German War_. I have, however,

restored the numerous passages which it was then deemed expedient to

omit, and I have also dispensed with the many modifications by which,

at that time, certain asperities of language had to be toned down.

The bulk of the present work consists of a detailed narrative of the

whole period of my intercourse with the Prince both before and after

the French campaign. I collected and noted down all these particulars

respecting Prince Bismarck and his immediate supporters and assistants,

in the first place for my own use, and secondly as a contribution to

the character and history of the Political Regenerator of Germany.

The sole object of the diary which forms the basis of this work was

to serve as a record of the whole truth so far as I had been able to

ascertain it with my own eyes and ears. Any other object was out of

the question, as it was impossible that I could desire to deceive

myself. Subsequently, when I thought of publishing my notes, I was

fully conscious of my responsibility towards history, the interests

of which could not be promoted by material that had been coloured or

garbled for party purposes. I wished neither to be an eulogist nor a

censor. To my mind, panegyric was superfluous, and fault-finding was

for me an impossibility. A tendency to the sensational is foreign to my

nature, and I leave the pleasure to be derived from grand spectacular

shows to lovers of the theatre. I desired to record the mental and

other characteristics which our first Chancellor presented to me under

such and such circumstances, thus helping to complete, and at times to

rectify, the conception of his whole nature that has been formed in

the public mind from his political activity. The profound reverence

which I feel for the genius of the hero, and my patriotic gratitude

for his achievements, have not deterred me from communicating numerous

details which will be displeasing to many persons. These particulars,

however, are part of the historic character of the personality whom I

am describing. The gods alone are free from error, passion, and changes

of disposition. They alone have no seamy side and no contradictions.

Even the sun and moon show spots and blemishes, but notwithstanding

these they remain magnificent celestial orbs. The picture produced

out of the materials which I have here brought together may present

harsh and rough features, but it has hardly a single ignoble trait.

Its crudeness only adds to its truth to nature, its individuality, and

its clearness of outline. This figure does not float in an ethereal

atmosphere, it is firmly rooted in earth and breathes of real life,

yet it conveys a sense of something superhuman. It must furthermore be

remembered that many of the bitter remarks, such as those made previous

to March, 1890, were the result of temporary irritation, while others

were perfectly justified. The strong self-confidence manifested in

some of these utterances, and the angry expression of that need for

greater power and more liberty of action, common to all men of genius

and energetic character, arose from the consciousness that, while he

alone knew the true object to be pursued and the fitting means for its

achievement, his knowledge could not be applied because the right of

final decision on all occasions belonged by hereditary privilege to

more or less mediocre and narrow minds.

I will allow the Prince himself to answer the question as to my

authority for communicating to others without any reserve all that

I ascertained during my intercourse with him. “Once I am dead you

can tell everything you like, absolutely everything you know,” said

Prince Bismarck to me in the course of a conversation I had with him

on the 24th of February, 1879. I saw clearly in the way in which

he looked at me that, in addition to the permission I had already

received on previous occasions, he wished that I should then consider

myself entirely free and expressly released from certain former

engagements, some of which had been assumed by myself, while others

had been imposed upon me. Since then my knowledge increased owing to

his growing confidence in me, while his authorisation and the desire

that I should use what I knew to the advantage of his memory remained

undiminished. On the 21st of March, 1891, during one of my last visits

to Friedrichsruh, the Prince--apparently prompted by a notice which he

had read in the newspapers--remarked, “Little Busch (Büschlein) will

one day, long after my death, write the secret history of our time

from the best sources of information.” I answered “Yes, Prince; but it

will not be a history, properly speaking, as I am not capable of that.

Nor will it be _long_ after your death--which we naturally pray to be

deferred as long as possible--but on the contrary very soon after,

without any delay. In these corrupt times, the truth cannot be known

too soon.” The Prince made no answer, but I understood his silence

to indicate approval. Finally, in the preceding year he had affirmed

the absolutely unrestricted character of my authority. On the 15th

of March, 1890, when the measures for his dismissal were already in

progress, and he himself was engaged in packing up a variety of papers

preparatory to his journey (a work in which I was allowed to assist

him), he asked me to copy a number of important documents for him and

to retain the originals and copies in my possession. On his remarking

that I could get these documents copied, I called his attention to the

fact that a stranger might betray their contents to third parties. He

replied, “Oh, I am not afraid of that! He can if he likes! I have no

secrets amongst them--absolutely none.” That statement, “I have no

secrets,” gave me liberty, at least for a later time, to publish those

State papers the contents of which I had hitherto kept secret, as he

must unquestionably have known better than I or the rest of the world

who may have held other views on the subject.

So far respecting the essential point. That he whom I honour as the

first of men sanctioned my undertaking is entirely sufficient for me.

I do not ask whether others give it their blessing. The great majority

of those referred to have since departed from this life and taken

their places in the domain of history, where the claim for indulgent

treatment is no longer valid. Those who are still with us may believe

me when I assure them that in now publishing these pages I have no

thought of causing them pain or of injuring them in any way. I simply

consider that I am not at liberty to preserve silence on those matters

which may prove unpleasant to them in view both of my own duty to tell

the whole truth, and of the desire expressed by the Chancellor (to

whom I still feel myself bound in obedience) that nothing should be

concealed. The diplomatic world, in particular, must be represented

here as it really is. In that respect this book may be described as a

mirror for diplomatists.

I must leave the reader to form his own opinion as to my capacity

for observation and the discovery of the truth. I may, however, be

allowed to say that several long journeys in America and the East, a

lengthy tour in Schleswig-Holstein during the Danish rule, undertaken

for the purpose of reconnoitring that country, and a period of rather

confidential intercourse with the Augustenburg Court at Kiel were

calculated to sharpen my wits. A mission which I filled at Hanover

during the year of transition, and, above all, my position in the

Foreign Office in Berlin and the intimate relations in which I stood

towards its Chief during the war with France, together with the

renewal of that intercourse from 1877 onwards, gave me exceptional

opportunities of developing both my memory and power of observation.

For several years I was acquainted with everything that went on in the

Central Bureau of the German Foreign Office, and later, in addition to

what I ascertained through the confidence of the Prince, I obtained not

a little information from Lothar Bucher which remained a secret, not

only for private persons, but often for high officials of the Ministry.

The diary on which my work is based, and which is often reproduced

literally, gives the truest possible account of the events and

expressions which I have personally seen and heard in the presence

and immediate vicinity of the Prince. The latter is everywhere the

leading figure around which all the others are grouped. The task I

set myself, as a close observer and chronicler who conscientiously

sifted his facts, was to give a true account of what I had been

commissioned to do as the Prince’s Secretary in connection with press

matters, and to describe how he and his entourage conducted themselves

during the campaign in France, how he lived and worked, the opinions

he expressed at the dinner and tea table, and on other occasions,

respecting persons and things of that time, what he related of his

past experiences, and finally, after our return from the great war,

what I ascertained respecting the progress of diplomatic negotiations

from the despatches which were then exchanged and of which I was at

liberty to make use either immediately or at a later period. I was

assisted in the fulfilment of this task by my faculty of concentration,

which my reverence for the Prince and the practice which I had in the

course of my official duties rendered gradually more intense, and

by a memory which although not naturally above the average was also

developed by constant exercise to such a degree that in a short time

it enabled me to retain all the main points of long explanations and

stories, both serious and humorous, from the Chancellor’s lips almost

literally, until such time as I could commit them to paper--that is to

say, unless anything special intervened, a mishap which I was usually

able to avert. The particulars here given were accordingly, almost

without exception, written down within an hour after the conversations

therein referred to occurred. For the most part they were jotted down

immediately on small slips of paper, only the points and principal

catchwords being noted, but which made it easy, however, to complete

the whole entry later on.

This sharp ear and faithful memory, joined with a quick eye, stood me

in good stead in the years of welcome service which I undertook as a

private individual for the Prince. To these and to the habit of putting

all that I had experienced, seen, and heard in black on white without

delay, I owe the accurate accounts of the memorable conversation of the

11th of April, 1877, of the visit to Varzin and the statements made by

the Chancellor on that occasion, as well as the long list of detailed

reports of pregnant and characteristic conversations that I had with

him from the year 1878 up to 1890 in the palace and garden at Berlin

when, at times of crisis or under other circumstances, I was either

invited by the Prince or called on him without invitation for the

purpose of obtaining news for the _Grenzboten_ or foreign newspapers.

I kept up the same habit of committing everything of moment to paper

during my various visits of shorter or longer duration between the

years 1883 and 1889 to Friedrichsruh, where in the year last mentioned

I was engaged for several weeks in arranging the Prince’s private

letters and other documents. This custom also served me well in that

ever memorable week in March, 1890, when I spent some of the darkest

days of that period in the Prince’s immediate vicinity, nor did it fail

me when I again greeted him in the Sachsenwald in 1891 and 1893, and

was able to convince myself that in the interval his confidence in me

had as little diminished as had my loyalty towards him.

Whoever is familiar with the style in which the Prince was accustomed

to express his thoughts when in the company of his intimate associates

will be at once impressed with the genuineness of the instructions,

conversations and anecdotes communicated in the following pages. He

will find them almost without exception literally reproduced. In the

anecdotes and stories, in particular, he will nearly always observe

the characteristic ellipses, the unexpressed pre-suppositions, and

the manner in which the Prince was apt to jump from point to point

in his narratives, reminding one of the style of the old ballads. He

will also at times note a humorous vein running through the Prince’s

remarks and frequently become conscious of a thread of semi-naïve self

irony. All these features were characteristic of the Chancellor’s

manner of speaking. It is therefore hardly necessary for me to add

that my reports, with all their roughness and sturdy ruggedness, are

photographs that have not been retouched. In other words, I believe

that I have not only been quick to observe, but I also feel that I

have not intentionally omitted anything that was worth reproducing. I

have neither blurred any features nor brought others into too sharp

relief. I have put in no high lights, and above all I have added

nothing of my own, nor tried to secure a place in history for my own

wisdom by palming it off as Bismarck’s. Any omissions that now remain

(there can hardly be more than a dozen in all of any importance) are

indicated by dots or dashes. In cases where I have not quite understood

a speaker, attention is called to the fact. Should any contradiction

be discovered between earlier and later statements _my_ memory must

not be held responsible for them. If I am blamed for the fragmentary

character of my recital then all memoirs must be rejected. If I am

reproached with not having produced a work of art, I believe I have

already made it sufficiently clear that I never intended anything of

the kind. I desired, on the contrary, so far as it was in my power, to

serve the truth, and that alone. Nevertheless, my work may not only

be utilised by historians, but may also possibly inspire a dramatist

or a poet. Such a writer must, however, be no sentimentalist, and no

idealist. It would be wise for him and for others to let themselves

be guided by some counsels of experience which will be useful as a

warning against certain misunderstandings both as to the sources of

my information and the degree of my credulity. These counsels have

always been present to my mind, although, perhaps, through a sense of

politeness towards the public, or even, it may be, a real confidence

in their common sense, I have rarely thought it necessary to call

attention to the fact. This advice I propose to repeat here in a

general form and without any special application. In the first place,

then, there are people who sometimes really believe that they have

actually said or done that which it was their duty to say or do in

certain circumstances. Others, again, frequently leave their hearers

to judge whether their remarks are meant to be sarcastic or serious.

Furthermore, _inter pocula_ and in foraging for news, the meanings

of words must not be taken in altogether too literal a sense, if one

does not wish to make a fool of himself. Although truth may be found

in the bowl, it usually contains more alcohol than accuracy; and the

scribblers of the press very often thoughtlessly accept appearances for

realities when they come from “well-informed circles.” Finally, even

those who wilfully mislead serve the truth in so far as they enable the

experienced to detect their falsehood.

A good deal of what I report and describe will appear to many persons

trivial and external. My view of the matter, however, is this. The

trifles with which the prætor does not trouble himself often illustrate

the character of a man or his temper for the time being more clearly

than fine speeches or great exploits. Now and then very unimportant

occurrences and situations have been, as it were, the spark which

lit up the mind and revealed a whole train of new and fruitful ideas

pregnant with great consequences. In this connection I may recall the

accidental, and apparently insignificant, origin of many epoch-making

inventions and discoveries, such as the fall of an apple from a tree

that gave Newton the first impulse towards his theory of gravitation,

the greatest discovery of the eighteenth century; the steam from

the boiling kettle which raised its lid and ultimately led to the

transformation of the world by the locomotive; the brilliant reflection

of the sun on a tin vessel which transported Jacob Boehme into a

transcendental vision; and the spot of grease upon our table-cloth at

Ferrières which formed the starting-point of one of Prince Bismarck’s

most remarkable conversations. The morning hours affect nervous

constitutions differently to the evening, and changes of weather

depress or raise the spirits of persons subject to rheumatism. Indeed

it must be remembered that learned theories have been formed which,

expressed in a plain and direct way, amount roughly to this--that a man

is what he eats. However odd that may sound, we really cannot say how

far such ideas are wrong. Finally, it appears to me that everything is

of interest and should receive attention which has any relation to the

prominent central figure of the great movement which resulted in the

political regeneration of our country--to that powerful personality

who, like the angel mentioned in the Scriptures, stirred the stagnant

pool, and gave health and life after the lethargy and decay of

centuries. I followed the Chancellor’s career with the eyes of a future

generation. At great epochs trifles appear smaller than they actually

are. In later decades and centuries the contrary is the case. The great

events of the past bulk still larger in men’s minds, while things which

were regarded as unimportant become full of significance. It is then

often a matter for regret that it is impossible to form as clear and

lifelike a picture of a personality or an event as one could wish for

want of valuable material originally cast aside as of no account. There

was no eye to see and no hand to collect and preserve those materials

while it was yet time. Who would not now be glad to have fuller

details respecting Luther in the great days and hours of his life?

In a hundred years the memory of Prince Bismarck will take a place in

the minds of our people next to that occupied by the Wittenberg doctor.

The liberator of our political life from dependence upon foreigners

will stand by the side of the reformer who freed our consciences from

the oppression of Rome--the founder of the German State by the side

of him who created German Christianity. Our Chancellor already holds

this place in the hearts of many of his countrymen; his portrait adorns

their walls, and they inspire the growing generation with the reverence

which they themselves feel. These will be followed by the masses, and

therefore I imagine I may safely take the risk of being told that I

have preserved, not only the pearls, but also the shells in which they

were found.

Many of the Chancellor’s expressions respecting the French may be

regarded as unfair and even occasionally inhuman. It must not be

forgotten, however, that ordinary warfare is calculated to harden the

feelings, and that Gambetta’s suicidal campaign, conducted with all

the passionate ardour of his nature, the treacherous tactics of his

franctireurs, and the bestiality of his Turcos, was bound to raise a

spirit in our camp in which leniency and consideration could have no

part. Of course, in reproducing and in adding other and still more

bitter instances of this feeling, now that all these things have long

ago passed away, there can be no intention to hurt any one’s feelings.

They are merely vivid contributions to the history of the campaign,

denoting the momentary temper of the Chancellor, who was at that time

sorely tried and deeply wounded by these and other incidents.

I trust my reasons for including a number of newspaper articles will

commend themselves to the reader I do so in the first place to show the

gradual development and change which certain political ideas underwent,

and the forms which they assumed at various times. Furthermore the

greater part of them were directly inspired by Prince Bismarck, and

some were even dictated by him. By mentioning the latter articles I

hope to do the newspapers in question a pleasure in so far as they will

now learn that they once had the honour of having the most eminent

statesman of the century as a contributor. All these articles furnish

material for forming an opinion upon the journalistic activity of the

Prince, which hitherto only Wagener of the _Kreuzzeitung_, Zitelmann,

the Prince’s amanuensis during the years he spent as Ambassador at

Frankfurt, and Lothar Bucher were in a position to do. On the 22nd

of January, 1871, the Chancellor himself remarked, referring to the

importance of the press for historians: “One learns more from the

newspapers than from official despatches, as, of course, Governments

use the press in order frequently to say more clearly what they

really mean. One must, however, know all about the connections of the

different papers.” This knowledge will in great part be found in the

present work.

The reason for reproducing certain portions of my previous writings

in this book is that they are essential for the purpose of completing

the character portrait given in the diary. Without them it would

be deficient in some parts, and unintelligible in others. The

reproductions referred to are in almost every instance considerably

altered and supplemented with additional matter, and they now occupy a

more suitable position in the work than before.

MORITZ BUSCH.

LEIPZIG, _July 30, 1898_.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

MY APPOINTMENT AS AN OFFICIAL IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AND MY

FIRST AUDIENCE WITH BISMARCK--WORK AND OBSERVATIONS UP

TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE 1

CHAPTER II

DEPARTURE OF THE CHANCELLOR FOR THE SEAT OF WAR--I FOLLOW

HIM, AT FIRST TO SAARBRÜCKEN--JOURNEY FROM THERE TO THE

FRENCH FRONTIER--THE FOREIGN OFFICE FLYING COLUMN 64

CHAPTER III

FROM THE FRONTIER TO GRAVELOTTE 76

CHAPTER IV

COMMERCY--BAR LE DUC--CLERMONT EN ARGONNE 103

CHAPTER V

WE TURN TOWARDS THE NORTH--THE CHANCELLOR OF THE CONFEDERATION

AT REZONVILLE--THE BATTLE AND BATTLEFIELD OF BEAUMONT 126

CHAPTER VI

SEDAN--BISMARCK AND NAPOLEON AT DONCHERY 141

CHAPTER VII

FROM THE MEUSE TO THE MARNE 163

CHAPTER VIII

BISMARCK AND FAVRE AT HAUTE-MAISON--A FORTNIGHT IN ROTHSCHILD’S

CHÂTEAU 191

CHAPTER IX

THE JOURNEY TO VERSAILLES--MADAME JESSE’S HOUSE, AND OUR LIFE

THERE 227

CHAPTER X

AUTUMN DAYS AT VERSAILLES 235

CHAPTER XI

THIERS AND THE FIRST NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE AT VERSAILLES 274

CHAPTER XII

GROWING DESIRE FOR A DECISION IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS 310

CHAPTER XIII

REMOVAL OF THE ANXIETY RESPECTING THE BAVARIAN TREATY IN THE

REICHSTAG--THE BOMBARDMENT FURTHER POSTPONED 330

CHAPTER XIV

THE PROSPECTS OUTSIDE PARIS IMPROVE 373

CHAPTER XV

CHAUDORDY AND THE TRUTH--OFFICERS OF BAD FAITH--FRENCH

GARBLING--THE CROWN PRINCE DINES WITH THE CHIEF 392

CHAPTER XVI

FIRST WEEK OF THE BOMBARDMENT 427

CHAPTER XVII

LAST WEEKS BEFORE THE CAPITULATION OF PARIS 460

CHAPTER XVIII

DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING THE CAPITULATION OF PARIS 492

CHAPTER XIX

FROM GAMBETTA’S RESIGNATION TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE PRELIMINARIES

OF PEACE 553

BISMARCK

SOME SECRET PAGES OF HIS HISTORY

CHAPTER I

MY APPOINTMENT AS AN OFFICIAL IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AND MY FIRST

AUDIENCE WITH BISMARCK--WORK AND OBSERVATIONS UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF

THE WAR WITH FRANCE

On February 1st, 1870, while living in Leipzig and engaged in literary

work, I received--quite unexpectedly--from Dr. Metzler, Secretary in

the Foreign Office of the North German Confederation, who was at that

time occupied principally with press matters and with whom I had been

in communication since 1867, a short note requesting me to come to

Berlin in order to have a talk with him. On my arrival I ascertained,

to my great surprise, that Dr. Metzler had recommended me to Herr von

Keudell, Councillor of Embassy, who was then in charge of personal and

finance matters in the Foreign Office, for a confidential position

under the Chancellor of the Confederation, which he, Metzler himself,

had previously held, and in which my chief duty would be to carry out

the instructions of the Chancellor in press matters. I was to be in

immediate communication with the Chancellor. My position for the time

being would be what was called “diätarisch,” that is to say without

any claim to a pension and without a title. Further details were to be

arranged with Herr von Keudell on his return from his honeymoon. For

the moment I was only required to declare my readiness in general to

accept the offer, and later on I was to formulate my wishes and lay

them in writing before Herr von Keudell.

This I did in a letter dated February 4th, in which I emphasised as

the most important condition that I should be entirely independent of

the Literary or Press Bureau, and that if my capacity for the position

should not prove equal to the expectations formed of it I should not be

appointed an official in that department. On February 19th I heard from

Metzler that my conditions had been in the main agreed to, and that no

objections had been raised with regard to that respecting the Literary

Bureau. I was to discuss the further arrangements with Keudell himself,

and to be prepared to enter upon my duties at once. On February 21st I

had a satisfactory interview with the latter, in the course of which

we came to an understanding as to terms. On the 23rd I was informed by

Keudell that the Chancellor had agreed to my conditions, and that he

had arranged for me to call upon Bismarck on the following evening.

Next day I took the official oath, and on the same evening, shortly

after 8 o’clock, I found myself in the presence of the Chancellor,

whom I had only seen at a distance once before, namely, from the Press

Gallery of the Reichstag. Now, two years later, I saw him again as

he sat in a military uniform at his writing table with a bundle of

documents before him. I was quite close to him this time, and felt as

if I stood before the altar.

He gave me his hand, and motioned me to take a seat opposite him. He

began by saying that although he desired to have a talk with me, he

must for the moment content himself with just making my acquaintance,

as he had very little time to spare. “I have been kept in the Reichstag

to-day longer than I expected by a number of lengthy and tiresome

speeches; then I have here (pointing to the documents before him)

despatches to read, also as a rule not very amusing; and at 9 o’clock

I must go to the palace, and that is not particularly entertaining

either. What have you been doing up to the present?” I replied that I

had edited the _Grenzboten_, an organ of practically National Liberal

views, which I left, however, on one of the proprietors showing a

disposition to adopt a Progressist policy on the Schleswig-Holstein

question. The Chancellor: “Yes, I know that paper.” I then went on to

say that I had at the instance of the Government taken a position at

Hanover, where I assisted the Civil Commissioner, Herr von Hardenberg,

in representing Prussian interests in the local press during the year

of transition. I had subsequently, on instructions received from the

Foreign Office, written a number of articles for different political

journals, amongst others for the _Preussische Jahrbuecher_, to which

I had also previously contributed. Bismarck: “Then you understand our

politics and the German question in particular. I intend to get you

to write notes and articles for the papers from such particulars and

instructions as I may give you, for of course I cannot myself write

leaders. You will also arrange for others doing so. At first these

will naturally be by way of trial. I must have some one especially

for this purpose, and not merely occasional assistance as at present,

especially as I also receive very little useful help from the Literary

Bureau. But how long do you remain here?” and as he looked at his

watch I thought he desired to bring the conversation to a close. I

replied that I had arranged to remain in Berlin. Bismarck: “Ah, very

well then, I shall have a long talk with you one of these days. In the

meantime see Herr von Keudell, and also Herr Bucher, Councillor of

Embassy, who is well acquainted with all these matters.” I understood

that I was now at liberty to go, and was about to rise from my seat

when the Chancellor said: “Of course you know the question which was

before the House to-day?” I replied in the negative, explaining that

I had been too busy to read the reports in the newspapers. “Well,” he

said, “it was respecting the admission of Baden into the North German

Confederation. It is a pity that people cannot manage to wait, and

that they treat everything from a party standpoint, and as furnishing

opportunities for speech-making. Disagreeable business to have to

answer such speeches, not to say such twaddle! These eloquent gentlemen

are really like ladies with small feet. They force them into shoes that

are too tight for them, and push them under our noses on all occasions

in order that we may admire them. It is just the same with a man who

has the misfortune to be eloquent. He speaks too often and too long.

The question of German unity is making good progress; but it requires

time--one year perhaps, or five, or indeed possibly even ten years. I

cannot make it go any faster, nor can these gentlemen either. But they

have no patience to wait.” With these words he rose, and again shaking

hands I took leave of him for the time.

I was thus enlisted in the ranks of Bismarck’s fellow-workers. An

opportunity for the general instructions which he proposed to give me

never occurred. I had to enter upon my work at once. Next evening I

was twice called in to him to receive instructions for articles. Later

on I sometimes saw him still more frequently, and occasionally in the

forenoon also--now and then as often as five or even eight times in one

day. At these interviews I had to take good care to keep my ears well

open, and to note everything with the closest attention, so that two

pieces of information or two sets of instructions should not get mixed

up. However, I soon found myself equal to this unusually trying task,

as Bismarck’s opinions and instructions were always given in a striking

form, which it was easy to remember. Besides, he was accustomed to

repeat his principal points in other words. Then, again, I made myself

all ears, so that, through practice, I gradually succeeded in retaining

long sentences, and even whole speeches, practically without omissions,

until I had an opportunity of committing them to paper. Bismarck used

also to send me, by one of the messengers, documents and newspapers

marked with the letter V and a cross, signs which indicated “Press

Instructions.” When I found such papers on my desk I looked them

through, and subsequently obtained the Chancellor’s directions with

regard to them. Furthermore, when I had anything of importance to ask

or to submit for his approval, I was allowed to call upon him without

previous invitation. I thus practically occupied the position of a

“Vortragender Rath” (_i.e._, an official having direct access to the

Chancellor), excepting only that I had neither the title nor the sense

of infallibility common to all such Councillors.

The newspapers to which the articles thus prepared were supplied were

the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, then edited by Brass, which was

the semi-official organ, properly speaking; the _Spenersche Zeitung_,

and the _Neue Preussische Zeitung_. I also frequently sent letters to

the _Kölnische Zeitung_, expressing the Chancellor’s views. During the

first months of my appointment Metzler, who had previously contributed

to that paper, served as the medium for communicating these articles.

Subsequently they were sent direct to the editor, and were always

accepted without alteration. In addition to this work I saw one of the

writers from the Literary Bureau every forenoon, and gave him material

which was sent to the _Magdeburger Zeitung_ and some of the smaller

newspapers; while other members of his department furnished portions of

it to certain Silesian, East Prussian, and South German organs. I had

similar weekly interviews with other, and somewhat more independent,

writers. Amongst these I may mention Dr. Bock, who supplied articles

to the _Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung_, and a number of papers in

Hanover; Professor Constantine Roeszler, formerly Lecturer at Jena,

who subsequently assisted Richthofen at Hamburg and afterwards edited

the _Staatsanzeiger_; and finally Herr Heide, who had previously

been a missionary in Australia and was at that time working for the

_North German Correspondence_, which had been founded with a view to

influencing the English press.

In addition to this my duties also included the reading of masses of

German, Austrian and French newspapers, which were laid upon my table

three times daily, and the management and purchase of books for the

Ministerial Library. It will therefore be easily understood that while

the Chancellor remained in Berlin I had more than enough to attend

to. I was engaged not only on week-days, but also on Sundays, from

9 in the morning until 3 in the afternoon, and again from 5 till 10

and sometimes 11 o’clock at night. Indeed, it sometimes occurred that

a messenger from the Chancellor came at midnight to call me away

from a party of friends or out of my bed in order to receive pressing

instructions.

I reproduce here in the form in which they appear in my diary the

particulars of a number of more or less characteristic statements and

instructions which I received from the Chancellor at that period. They

show that the statesman whom I had the honour to serve thoroughly

understood the business of journalism, and they further throw a welcome

light upon many of the political events of that time.

Some days after the debate in the Reichstag respecting the entrance

of Baden into the North German Confederation, to which reference has

already been made, and while the matter was still occupying both the

attention of the press and of the Chancellor, I find the following

entry among my notes:--

_February 27th, evening._--Called to see the Minister. I am to

direct special attention to the nonsense written by the National

Liberal Press on the last sitting of the Reichstag. The Chancellor

said:--“The National Liberals are not a united party. They are merely

two fractions. Amongst their leaders Bennigsen and Forckenbeck are

sensible men, and there are also a couple of others. Miguel is inclined

to be theatrical. Loewe, with his deep chest notes, does everything

for effect. He has not made a single practical remark. Lasker is

effective in destructive criticism, but is no politician. It sounded

very odd to hear him declare that they were now too much occupied with

Rome in Paris and Vienna to interfere with us in connection with the

Baden affair. If it were possible to get those of really Progressist

views to act independently, it would make the situation much clearer.

Friedenthal’s speech was excellent. I must ask you also to emphasise

the following points:--1. The unfairness of the _National Zeitung_

in repeating misunderstandings which I explained and disposed of in

my speech. 2. The make-believe support given to my policy by men who

were elected for the express purpose of rendering me real assistance.

3. That such politicians either cannot see or intentionally overlook

my principal motive, viz., that to admit Baden into the Confederation

would bring pressure to bear upon Bavaria, and that it is therefore a

hazardous step. Attention should be paid to the situation in France,

so that nothing should be done which might endanger the Constitutional

evolution of that country, an evolution hitherto promoted in every way

from Berlin, as it signifies peace for us. The French Arcadians” (the

party that supported Napoleon through thick and thin) “are watching the

course of events in Germany, and waiting their opportunity. Napoleon is

now well disposed to us, but he is very changeable. We could now fight

France and beat her too, but that war would give rise to five or six

others; and while we can gain our ends by peaceful means, it would be

foolish, if not criminal, to take such a course. Events in France may

take a warlike or revolutionary turn, which would render the present

brittle metal there more malleable. There was an important point in my

speech, which, however, these good people failed to recognise. That was

the intimation that in certain circumstances we should pay no regard

either to the views of Austria respecting South Germany as a whole, nor

to those of France, who objected to the admission of any single South

German State into the North German Confederation. That was a feeler.

Further measures can only be considered when I know how that hint has

been received in Vienna and Paris.”

_March 1st._--Count Bismarck wishes me to get the following inserted in

the South German newspapers:--“The speech of von Freydorf, the Grand

Ducal Minister, in the Baden Diet on the Jurisdiction Treaty with the

North German Confederation, has been inspired by an absolutely correct

view of the situation. Particular attention should be paid to that

portion in which the Foreign Minister of the Grand Duchy declared the

policy of Baden to be in perfect accord with that of the Chancellor

of the North German Confederation, and also to the manner in which he

defined the position of the South German States towards the Treaty of

Prague. Through the dissolution of the old Germanic Confederacy, those

States have, as a matter of fact, become sovereign States. That treaty

_gives them liberty_ (to me: Underline those words!) to form a new

union amongst themselves, a South German Confederation, by means of

which they may take measures for bringing about a national union with

the united North. That treaty involves no prescription, engagement or

compulsion whatever to adopt such a course. Any insinuation of that

kind with respect to States whose sovereignty has been emphatically

recognised would be something absolutely unheard of. In the Swiss war

of the Sonderbund, and also in the late American civil war, States

were obliged against their own will to remain within a union which

they had previously joined, but no one ever saw a sovereign State or

Prince required to enter into confederation against their own judgment.

The South German States, including half of Hesse, have unquestionably

the right--acting either in concert or singly--to endeavour, in

co-operation with the North, to advance the cause of national unity.

The question is whether the present is a good time to choose. The

Chancellor of the North German Confederation answers this question

in the negative. But it is only possible by the most wilful garbling

of his expressions to maintain that his final aim is not the union of

Germany. Partition of German national territory! Calumny! Not a single

word of the Chancellor’s justifies that conclusion. As Herr Lasker

has not spoken at the instance of the Government of Baden, although

his speech would almost convey the impression that he was a Minister

of that State, it is difficult to understand where he got that idea.

Perhaps it was merely the conceit of the honourable member that led him

to make such a statement.”

_March 3rd._--The Minister wishes the _Kölnische Zeitung_ first, and

afterwards the South German newspapers, to advocate the organisation

into one great party of all men of national views in the South German

States, so as to get rid of the particularism which had hitherto

divided them. “The matter lies much more in their hands,” he said,

“than in those of the North German National Liberals. The North

German Governments will do all that is possible in a reasonable way

in support of the efforts of South Germany. But the South Germans who

wish to unite with us must act together and not singly. I want you to

reiterate this point again and again. The article must then be printed

in the _Spenersche Zeitung_ and in other newspapers to which we have

access, and it should be accompanied by expressions of deep regret at

the particularism which prevents the union of the various Southern

parties that gravitate towards North Germany. A union of the four

Southern States is an impossibility, but there is nothing to hinder the

formation of a Southern League composed of men of national sentiments.

The National party in Baden, the German party in Würtemberg, and the

Bavarian Progressist party are merely different names for the same

thing. These groups have to deal with different Governments, and some

persons maintain that they must consequently adopt different tactics.

Their aims are nevertheless identical in all important points. With

the best will in the world those three parties, while acting singly,

produce but a slight impression. If they desire to go ahead and become

an important factor in public affairs, they must combine to form

a great and homogeneous South German National party which must be

reckoned with on both sides of the Main.”

Read over to the Minister, at his request, an article which he

ordered yesterday and for which he gave me the leading ideas. It was

to be dated from Paris, and published in the _Kölnische Zeitung_. He

said:--“Yes, you have correctly expressed my meaning. The composition

is good both as regards its reasoning and the facts which it contains.

But no Frenchman thinks in such logical and well-ordered fashion, yet

the letter is understood to be written by a Frenchman. It must contain

more gossip, and you must pass more lightly from point to point. In

doing so you must adopt an altogether French standpoint. A Liberal

Parisian writes the letter and gives his opinion as to the position of

his party towards the German question, expressing himself in the manner

usual in statements of that kind.” (Finally Count Bismarck dictated

the greater part of the article, which was forwarded by Metzler in its

altered form to the Rhenish newspaper.)

In connection with this task the Minister said to me the day

before:--“I look at the matter in this way. A correspondent in Paris

must give his opinion of my quarrel with Lasker and the others over

the Baden question, and bring forward arguments which I did not think

it desirable to use at that time. He must say that no one could deem

it advisable in the present state of affairs in Bavaria, when the King

seems to be so well disposed, to do anything calculated on the one

hand to irritate him, and on the other to disturb the Constitutional

movement in France--which movement tended to preserve peace while it

would itself be promoted by the maintenance of peace. Those who desire

to advance the cause of liberty do not wish to go to war with us,

yet they could not swim against the stream if we took any action in

South Germany which public opinion would regard as detrimental to the

interests and prestige of France. Moreover, for the present the course

of the Vatican Council should not be interfered with, as the result for

Germany might possibly be a diversion. We must wait for these things,”

he added. “I cannot explain that to them. If they were politicians they

would see it for themselves. There are reasons for forbearance which

every one should be able to recognise; but Members of Parliament who

cross-question the Government do not usually regard that as their duty.”

The second portion of the article which the Minister dictated runs as

follows:--“Whoever has had an opportunity of observing here in Paris

how difficult the birth of the present Constitutional movement has

been, what obstacles this latest development of French political life

has to overcome if it is to strike deep roots, and how powerful are

the influences of which the guiding spirit only awaits some pretext

for smothering the infant in its cradle, will understand with what

anxiety we watch the horizon abroad and what a profoundly depressing

effect every little cloud there produces upon our hopes of a secure

and peaceful development of the new _régime_. It is the ardent wish of

every sincere adherent of the Constitutional cause in France that there

should now be no diversion abroad, no change on the horizon of foreign

politics, which might serve if not as a real motive at least as a

pretext for crying down the youthful Constitutionalism of France, while

at the same time directing public attention to foreign relations. We

believe that the Emperor is in earnest, but his immediate _entourage_,

and the creatures whom he has to employ, are watching anxiously for

some event which shall enable them to compel the Sovereign to abandon

a course which they resent. These people are very numerous, and have

during the eighteen years of the Emperor’s reign grown more powerful

than is perhaps believed outside France. Whoever has any regard for

the Constitutional development of the country can only hope that no

alteration, however slight, shall occur in the foreign relations of

France to serve as a motive or pretext for that reaction which every

opponent of the Constitution is striving to bring about.”

Between the directions for these articles, which I here bring together

as they relate to the same subject, I received others, some of which I

may also reproduce.

_March 4th._--The _Boersen Zeitung_ contained an article in which it

was alleged that in Germany only nobles were considered competent to

become Ministers. This the Count sent down to me to be refuted in a

short article, expressing surprise at such a statement. “An absurd

electioneering move!” the Chancellor said. “Whoever wishes to persuade

the world that in Prussia the position of Minister is only open to the

aristocracy, and that capable commoners have absolutely no chance of

attaining to it, must have no memory and no eyes. Say that under Count

Bismarck no less than three commoners have, on his recommendation, been

appointed Ministers within a short period, namely Delbrück, Leonhard

and Camphausen. Lasker, it is true, has not yet been appointed.”

I wrote this short article immediately; but the Chancellor was not

pleased with it. “I told you expressly,” he said, “to mention the names

of Delbrück, Leonhard and Camphausen, and that their appointments were

due to my personal influence. Go straight to the point, and don’t

wander round about it in that way! That is no use! A pointless article!

They are just the cleverest of the present Ministers. The attack on

Lasker is also out of place. We must not provoke people unnecessarily.

They are right when they complain of bullying.” The reference to Lasker

consisted merely of his own words as given above.

_March 5th._--The _Vossische Zeitung_ contained a bitter attack, which

culminated in the following remark: “Exceptional circumstances--and

such must be acknowledged to exist when working men are treated to

breech-loaders, and Ministers are hanged on street lamps--cannot be

taken as a rule for the regular conduct of affairs.” The Count received

this article from the Literary Bureau of the Ministry of State (where

extracts from the newspapers were made for him), although it might well

have been withheld, as not much importance attaches to the scoldings

of “Tante Voss.” The Count sent for me, read over the passage in

question, and observed: “They speak of times when Ministers were hanged

on street lamps. Unworthy language! Reply that such a thing never

occurred in Prussia, and that there is no prospect of its occurring. In

the meantime it shows towards what condition of affairs the efforts

of that newspaper are tending, which (under the auspices of Jacoby and

Company) supplies the Progressist middle classes of Berlin with their

politics.”

Called in again later to the Count. I am to go to Geheimrath Hahn

and call his attention to the question of capital punishment, which

in view of the approaching elections should be dealt with in the

_Provinzial-Correspondenz_ in accordance with the policy of the

Government, who desire its retention. The Minister said: “I am firmly

convinced that the majority of the population is opposed to its

abolition. Were it otherwise it would of course be possible to do away

with it. It is a mere theory--the sentimentality of lawyers in the

Reichstag--a party doctrine which has no connection with the life of

the people, although its advocates are constantly referring to the

people. Tell him that, but be cautious in dealing with him. He is

somewhat conceited--bureaucratic. Do it in a diplomatic way. You must

let him think that those are his own ideas. Otherwise we shall not get

anything useful out of him. Let me know afterwards what he says.”

_March 6th._--Have seen Hahn. He is of opinion that it is yet too

early to deal with this matter. It will probably end in a compromise,

capital punishment being only retained for murder. The attitude of the

Liberals in the elections can only be influenced after the decision in

the Reichstag. In the meantime he has instructed the Literary Bureau to

refute the article in the _National Zeitung_, and to show how sterile

the present Parliament would be if it allowed the long wished for

Criminal Code to be wrecked upon this question of capital punishment.

Report this to the Minister. He is of opinion that Hahn is mistaken.

“It is necessary to act in a diplomatic way in this case,” he observed.

“One must present an appearance of determination up to the last moment;

and if one wants to secure a suitable compromise, show no disposition

to give way; besides, Hahn must have no other policy than mine. I shall

speak to Eulenburg, and get him to set Hahn straight. This must be put

down at once. We must think in good time about the elections.”

_March 7th._--Sent Brass (_Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_) an article

written by Bucher under instructions from the Minister, showing that

the majority in the Reichstag does not represent public opinion nor

the will of the people, but only the opinions and desires of the

Parliamentary party.

Called to the Count in the evening, when he said: “I want you to secure

the insertion in the press of an article somewhat to the following

effect: For some time past vague rumours of war have been current

throughout the world for which no sufficient ground exists in fact,

or can be even suggested. The explanation is probably to be sought in

Stock Exchange speculation for a fall which has been started in Paris.

Confidential whispers are going about with regard to the presence of

Archduke Albrecht in the French capital which are calculated to cause

uneasiness; and then, naturally enough, these rumours are shouted aloud

and multiplied by the windbags of the Guelph press.”

_March 11th._--The Count wants an article in the _National Zeitung_ to

be answered in this sense: “The Liberals in Parliament always identify

themselves with the people. They maintain, like Louis XIV. with his

_L’état c’est moi_, that ‘We are the People.’ There could hardly be

a more absurd piece of boasting and exaggeration. As if the other

representatives, the Conservatives in the country, and the great

numbers who belong to no party, were not also part of the nation, and

had no opinions and interests to which regard should be paid!”

_Evening._--The Minister, referring to a statement in the _Norddeutsche

Allgemeine Zeitung_, remarked: “There is much ado about the decided

attitude taken up by Beust against the Curia. According to the

report published by Brass he has expressed himself very emphatically

respecting its latest action, in a note which the Ambassador read to

the Secretary of State. That must be refuted, weakened. Do it in a

letter from Rome to the _Kölnische Zeitung_. Say: ‘We do not know if

the analysis of the despatch in question (which has made the round

of the papers, and which was first published by _The Times_) is

correct,[2] but we have reason to doubt it.’ Trautmansdorf (the Austrian

Ambassador to the Holy See) has read no note and has received no

instructions to make any positive declaration, but is on the contrary

acting in accordance with his own convictions--and it is known that he

is very clerical and not at all disposed to radical measures. He has

communicated to Cardinal Antonelli such parts of the information that

reached him from Vienna as he thought proper, and he certainly made

that communication in as considerate a form as possible. It cannot

therefore have been very emphatic.”

_Later._--Attention is to be directed, at first in a paper which has no

connection with the Government, to the prolonged sojourn of Archduke

Albrecht in Paris as a suspicious symptom. In connection with it

rumours have been circulated in London of an understanding between

France and Austria. Our papers should afterwards reproduce these hints.

_March 12th._--In the afternoon Bucher gave me the chief’s instructions

to order the Spanish newspaper, _Imparcial_. (This is of some

importance, as it doubtless indicates that even then we had a hand

in the question of electing the new King. On several occasions

subsequently I secured the insertion in non-official German papers of

translations which Bucher brought me of articles in that newspaper

against the candidature of Montpensier.)

_March 13th._--The Chancellor wishes to have it said in one of the

“remote” journals (that is, not notoriously connected with the

Government) that the Pope has paid no regard to the representations

of France and Austria respecting the principal points which should

be decided by the Council. He would not have done so even if those

representations had been expressed in a more emphatic form than they

actually were. Neither Banneville nor Trautmansdorf was inclined to

heartily defend the cause of the State against the Ultramontanes. This

disposes of the news of the _Mémorial Diplomatique_ to the effect

that at the suggestion of Count Daru the Curia has already given an

affirmative answer. That report is absolutely false, as is nearly all

the news published by the paper in question. It is much the same with

Count Beust’s note to the Papal Government. (“Quote the word ‘note,’”

added the Minister.) It was only a despatch, and, doubtless, a very

tame one.

_March 16th, evening._--Called up to the Minister, who lay on the sofa

in his study. “Here,” he said (pointing to a newspaper). “They complain

of the accumulation of labour imposed upon Parliament. Already eight

months’ hard work! That must be answered. It is true that members of

Parliament have a great deal to do, but Ministers are still worse off.

In addition to their work in the two Diets the latter have an immense

amount of business to transact for the King and the country both while

Parliament is sitting and during the recess. Moreover, members have

the remedy in their own hands. If those who do not belong to the Upper

Chamber will abstain from standing for election both to the Prussian

and the Federal Diet they will lighten their task sufficiently. They

are not obliged to sit in both Houses.”

_March 21st._--I am to call attention in the semi-official organs

to the fact that the Reichstag is discussing the Criminal Code far

too minutely and slowly. “The speakers,” observed the Count, “show

too great a desire for mere talk, and are too fond of details and

hair-splitting. If this continues the Bills will not be disposed of

in the present Session, especially as the Budget has still to be

discussed. The President might well exercise stricter control. Another

unsatisfactory feature is that so many members absent themselves from

the sittings. Our newspapers ought to publish regularly lists of such

absentees. Please see that is done.”

Called up again later and commissioned to explain in the press the

attitude of Prussia towards those Prelates who oppose the Curia in

Rome. The Chancellor said: “The newspapers express a desire that the

Government should support the German Bishops on the Council. You

should ask if those writers have formed a clear idea as to how we

should set about that task. Should Prussia perhaps send a Note to the

Council, or to Antonelli, the Papal Minister, who does not belong

to that body? or is she to secure representation in that assembly of

Prelates, and protest (of course in vain) against what she objects to?

Prussia will not desert those Bishops who do not submit themselves to

the yoke, but it is for the Prelates in the first place to maintain a

determined attitude. We cannot take preventive measures, as they would

be of no value, but it is open to us to adopt a repressive policy in

case a decision is come to in opposition to our wishes. If, after that

decision has been arrived at, it should prove to be incompatible with

the mission and interests of the State, then existing legislation, if

found inadequate, can be easily supplemented and altered. The demand

that the Prussian Government should support the more moderate Bishops

is a mere empty phrase so long as no practical means of giving effect

to it can be discovered. Moreover, the course which I now indicate will

in any case be ultimately successful, although success may not at once

be completely achieved.”

_March 25th._--The Chief wishes Klaczko’s appointment in Vienna to

be discussed. He said to me: “Beust intends in that way to revive

the Polish question. Point to the journalistic activity of that

indefatigable agitator, and to his bitter hatred both of ourselves and

Russia. Quote Rechenberg’s confidential despatch of the 2nd of March

from Warsaw, where he says that the Polish secret political societies

which are engaged at Lemberg in preparing for a revolution, with the

object of restoring Polish independence, have sent a deputation to

Klaczko congratulating him on his appointment to a position where he

is in direct communication with the Chancellor of the Empire. Send the

article first to the _Kölnische Zeitung_, and afterwards arrange for

similar articles in the provincial newspapers. We must finally see

that this reaches Reuss (the Ambassador in St. Petersburg), in order

that he may get it reproduced in the Russian press. It can also appear

in the _Kreuzzeitung_, and it must be brought up again time after time

in another form.”

_Afternoon._--Geheimrath Abeken desires me, on the instructions of the

Minister, to take note of the following document, which is apparently

based on a despatch: “It is becoming more and more difficult to

understand the attitude of the Austrian Government towards the Council.

All the organs of public opinion are on the side of the Austrian

Bishops, who are making such a dignified and decisive stand in Rome.

The reports which the Government thought well to allow the press to

publish respecting the steps which they have taken in Rome were in

harmony with this attitude. The news from Rome, however, speaks only of

the tameness and indecision with which the Government’s policy is being

carried into execution. The most contradictory accounts are now coming

in. It is said that the Austrian Ambassador has supported the action of

the French Ambassador, which is known not to have been very effective.

Expressions have been attributed to Count Beust showing that, in his

opinion, the only effectual course would be for all the Powers to

take common or collective action. On the other hand, it is asserted

that he gave a negative answer, reciting different objections, to the

proposal of another Catholic State (Bavaria) to join it in a decisive

declaration in Rome. In presence of this indecision on the part of the

Catholic Powers the Bishops will doubtless be obliged to follow their

own consciences and decide for themselves what their course of action

is to be. We are convinced however that if the Prelates themselves

resolved to make a determined stand on behalf of their consciences the

situation would immediately undergo a change in their favour, and that

ultimately no Government would desert its own Bishops even if they were

in a minority.

“Bismarck has already explained to the Prussian Ambassador in Paris

that he is prepared to support every initiative taken on the Catholic

side in the matter of the Council. He at the same time discussed the

subject with Benedetti, expressing himself in a similar sense, but in

the meantime making no positive proposal. On the other hand, he asked

incidentally whether it might not be desirable to consider in a general

conference the attitude to be adopted by the various Governments

towards the Council. Benedetti replied that such a course would only

hasten the Council’s decision. Bismarck urged that a conference might

be useful, even were it no longer possible to influence the Council,

and were the question to be considered merely how far the injurious

effects of its decisions on the peace of Church and State could be

minimised.

“Benedetti sent a report of this informal conversation to Paris,

representing it as a proposal to hold a conference. Daru replied in a

despatch which pointed out the difficulty of carrying that idea into

execution. Who should take part in the conference? Russia maintained

such an unfriendly attitude towards the Catholic Church, and Italy

was so hostile to the Curia that they could hardly join in any common

action. Spain wished to confine herself to the repression of any

eventual breach of the laws of the country, and England ignored the

official declarations of the Roman Church. Many Powers had Concordats,

while others occupied a more independent position towards the Curia,

therefore, in that respect also, an understanding would be difficult.

Finally, Daru feared that Rome, on hearing of an intended conference,

would reply with a _fait accompli_. For these reasons he declined

the proposal. He would, however, like to afford the other Powers

an opportunity of supporting the measures taken by France on her

own initiative. In case he received a negative answer to his demand

that France should be represented on the Council he would officially

communicate to the other Governments his declaration to the Secretary

of State, Cardinal Antonelli, that the rights and interests of the

State would be defended against any encroachment on the part of the

Spiritual Power, and urge them to support his action in Rome. Bismarck

thanked Daru for this communication, and said that the Government at

Berlin (when it had satisfied itself that such a course on the part of

France was calculated to promote the interests of Prussian Catholics)

would endeavour to strengthen the impression made thereby; and that

further communications were awaited with interest.

“The French Government looks forward with anxiety to the consequences

of the Council, but hesitates to take any serious and decisive

measures, and is not disposed to enter upon any common action with

the other Powers. Bray, at Munich, seemed less disinclined to such

a course. He thought a declaration might possibly be made that the

Government considered the œcumenical and authoritative character

of the Council to be affected by the promulgation of the dogma of

infallibility notwithstanding the opposition of a minority of the

Bishops, as also the legal position assured to the Prelates under

the Concordats, and that the dogma in question was to be regarded as

null and void. Bray was anxious that Austria should join in this

declaration. Beust, however, would not consent, as he believed that

such a declaration would merely induce the Council to come to an

unanimous decision which would then be binding upon the Governments. An

unequivocal attitude of any kind is not to be expected from Vienna.

“If the Catholic Governments will not take the initiative the question

remains what course the Bishops themselves will adopt. We hold to the

principle of not acting directly and in our own name with the Roman

See, while at the same time powerfully and steadfastly supporting every

effort made by the Catholics themselves, and particularly by the German

Bishops to prevent illegal changes being made in the constitution

of the Catholic Church, and to preserve both Church and State from

a disturbance of the peace. We do not find ourselves called upon to

take up a prominent attitude towards the Council; but our readiness to

support energetically every well-meant effort of the Catholic Powers,

whose duty it is to intervene in the first place, or of the Bishops

within the Council, remains unaltered.”

_Evening._--I am to refer to England and the way in which the press is

treated there. “The Liberals always appeal to English example when they

want to secure some fresh liberty for the press. Such appeals, it is

well known, rest largely upon mistaken notions. It would be desirable

to examine more closely the Bill which has just been passed for the

preservation of order in Ireland. What would public opinion in Germany,

and particularly what would the people of Berlin say, if our Government

could proceed against any of our democratic journals, even against

the most violent, according to the following provisions, and that too

without even a state of minor siege? Then quote the provisions, and

add that the Bill was carried by a large majority.”[3]

_March 28th._--The Chancellor desires that the question of the Council

should be again dealt with somewhat to the following effect: “The

press has repeatedly expressed a desire to know what position will be

taken by Prussia towards the policy of the majority of the Council,

and several proposals have been made in this connection. In our

opinion the answer to that question is to be found in the character

of Prussia as a Protestant Power. In that capacity Prussia must leave

the initiative in this matter to the Catholic Governments who are more

directly threatened. If these do not take action the question remains

what course the Bishops who form the minority in the Council will

adopt, a question which will be answered by the immediate future. If

the Catholic Governments decide to take steps against the majority of

the Council, Prussia ought to join in that action if she considers it

to be in the interests of her Catholic subjects. But it is less the

duty of Prussia than of any other State to rush into the breach.... If

the Bishops defend the constitution of their Church, their episcopal

rights, and peace between Church and State in a fearless and determined

protest against the encroachments of the Ultramontane party in the

Council, it may then be confidently hoped that the Prussian Government

will extend to them a powerful support.”

Some of the last sentences repeated almost literally the conclusion of

the document brought to me by Abeken.

_March 30th._--The Count sent down a report from Rome for use in the

press. This report says: “The tourists who visited St. Peter’s on the

22nd instant were several times disturbed by a dull noise which rolled

through the aisles like a storm, proceeding from the direction of the

Council Chamber. Those who remained a little longer saw individual

Bishops, with anxious looks, hurriedly leave the church. There had

been a terrible scene amongst the reverend fathers. The theme _de

erroribus_, which was laid before the Council about three weeks ago

and then returned to the Commission, was again being discussed in an

amended form. This discussion had now lasted five or six (eight) days.

Strossmayer criticised one of the paragraphs of the Proemium which

characterised Protestantism as the source of all the evils which now

infect the world in the forms of pantheism, materialism, and atheism.

He declared that this Proemium contained historical untruths, as the

errors of our time were much older than Protestantism. The Humanist

movement, which had been imprudently protected by the highest authority

(Pope Leo X.) was in part responsible for them. The Proemium lacked the

charity due to Protestants. (First uproar.) It was, on the contrary,

amongst Protestants that Christianity had found its most powerful

defenders, such as Leibnitz and Guizot, whose meditations he should

wish to see in the hands of every Christian. (Renewed and increased

uproar, while closed fists are shown at the speaker, and cries are

heard of ‘_Hæreticus es! Taceas! Descendas! Omnes te condemnamus!_’

and now and then ‘_Ego eum non condemno!_’) This storm also subsided,

and Strossmayer was able to proceed to another point, namely, the

question to which the Bishops referred in their protest, that is to

say, that a unanimous vote is indispensable for decisions on dogma.

Strossmayer’s remarks on this theme caused the indignation of the

majority to boil over. Cardinal Capalti interrupted him. The assembly

raged like a hurricane. After a wordy war of a quarter of an hour’s

duration between the speaker and the Legates, Strossmayer retired,

three times repeating the words: ‘_Protestor non est concilium._’ It

is worthy of note that a Congregation has been held to-day at which

the Bishop of Halifax and others are understood to have expressed

views similar to those of Strossmayer and that no attempt was made

to interrupt them. It would therefore appear as if the storm raised

against the Bishop of Bosnia were a party manœuvre with the object of

ruining the most important of the Princes of the Church.”

_March 31st._--Commissioned by the Chief to tell Zitelmann (an official

of the Ministry of State in charge of press matters) that the newspaper

extracts which his office prepares for submission to the King (through

the Minister) should be better sifted and arranged. Those that are

suitable for the King are to be gummed on to separate sheets and

detached from those that are not suitable for him. Particularistic lies

and stupidities, such as those from Kiel of the 25th and Cassel of the

28th, belong to the latter category and must not be laid before him.

If he sees that kind of thing printed in black on white he is apt to

believe it. He does not know the character of those papers.

I am to secure the insertion in the press of the following particulars,

which have reference to a paragraph in a newspaper which the Minister

did not name to me. It is a well-known fact that Howard, the English

representative at Munich, although he is married to a Prussian lady

(Schulenberg), exercises, in opposition to the views of his own

Government, a decidedly anti-Prussian influence, not so much in a

pro-Austrian as in a Guelph sense. He was Minister at Hanover up to the

events of 1866.

_April 1st._--The Minister’s birthday. When I was called to him in

the evening his room was perfumed with flowers presented to him. He

lay on the sofa, booted and spurred, smoking a cigar, and reading

newspaper extracts. After receiving my instructions, I offered my

congratulations, for which he thanked me, reaching me his hand. “I

hope,” he said, “we shall remain together for a very long time.” I

replied that I hoped so too, that I could find no words to say how

happy I felt to be near him, and to be able to work for him. “Well,”

he answered, smiling, “it is not always so pleasant, but you must not

notice every little thing.”

My instructions referred to Lasker and Hoverbeck. They were as

follows:--“Just take Lippe and Lasker as your subject for once. Lasker

has, it is true, been taken to task for one of his latest utterances

by Bennigsen, the chief of his fraction, but it can do no harm to deal

with the affair once more in the press--and repeatedly. He, like Lippe,

wants the Constitution to be placed above our national requirements.

_Les extrêmes se touchent._ Lippe is the representative of the

Particularistic Junkers with the tendency to absolutism, Lasker that

of the Parliamentary Junkers with Particularistic leanings. Vincke,

who was just such another, succeeded, with his eternal dogmatism,

in ruining and nearly destroying a great party in a few months,

notwithstanding favourable circumstances. Please send the article to

the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ for publication, and let it be

afterwards reproduced in another form by the Literary Bureau.” (...)

_April 4th._--It was well that I carried out the Minister’s orders

at once. On being called to him this morning he received me with the

words: “I asked you recently to write an article on the subject of

Lippe and Lasker. Have you done so?” I replied “Yes, Excellency, and it

has already appeared. I did not submit it to you as I know that you see

the _Norddeutsche_ daily.” He then said, “I have had no time as yet, I

will look it up immediately.”

In a quarter of an hour I was again sent for, and on appearing before

him the Minister said: “I have now read the article--it was amongst

the extracts. It is excellent, exactly what I wished. Let it now be

circulated and reproduced in the provincial journals. In doing so it

may be further remarked that if Count Bismarck were to charge Lasker

and his fraction with Particularism--I do not mean all the National

Liberals, but principally the Prussians, the Lasker group--the

accusation would be well founded. Lippe has also laid down the

principle that the Prussian Diet is independent of the Federal Diet.”

The Minister then continued: “Here is the _Kölnische Zeitung_ talking

of excitability. It alleges that I have manifested an excitability

which recalls the period of ‘conflict.’ That is not true. I have

merely repelled passionate attacks in the same tone in which they were

delivered, according to the usual practice in Parliament. It was

not Bismarck but Lasker and Hoverbeck who took the initiative. They

began again with offensive personal attacks, and I begged of them in

a friendly way not to return to that style. Ask whether the writer

had not read the report of the sitting, as it showed that it was not

Count Bismarck who picked this quarrel. Apart from its pleadings on

behalf of the claims of Denmark, the _Kölnische Zeitung_ was a sensible

newspaper. What had Count Bismarck done to it that it should allow its

correspondents to send such a garbled account of the facts? Moreover,

Bennigsen had reprimanded Lasker. They now themselves recognised that

the tone they adopted was wrong, as Lasker came to me on Saturday to

excuse himself.”

_April 6th._--Under instructions from the Minister I dictated the

following paragraph to Doerr for circulation through the Literary

Bureau: “The position of the Bishops who form the opposition in the

Council does not appear to be satisfactory, if one may judge from the

attitude of the Catholic Governments and particularly of the Vienna

Cabinet. Probably Count Beust has not yet made up his mind in this

matter. He seems to have sent somewhat energetic remonstrances to the

Ambassador in Rome, but it is obvious that Count Trautmansdorf has

delivered them in a very diluted form. According to certain newspapers

the Austrian Chancellor has also endeavoured to bring about a common

action of the Powers, while others report an incident which renders

it doubtful whether any such attempt has been made. The French also

maintain an attitude of exceptional prudence and reserve, and the

Bishops would thus appear to stand well nigh alone.... The initiative

must come from the Bishops themselves.”

Between the 6th and the 10th of April I wrote an article on the

question of North Schleswig from the Minister’s instructions. This

attracted great attention on its publication in the _Norddeutsche

Allgemeine Zeitung_, principally on the ground that there seemed

to be no occasion for its appearance at a time when the political

horizon was absolutely clear. (It may possibly have arisen through a

Russian reminder and approval of the pretended claims of Denmark.)

The article was to the following effect: “It is a wilful falsehood to

maintain that according to the peace of Prague the population of North

Schleswig has to decide the question of the frontier. Prussia alone,

and no one else, is authorised to do that. Moreover, the Treaty of

Prague does not mention North Schleswig at all, but only refers, quite

vaguely, to the northern districts of Schleswig, which is something

quite different. The parties to the treaty were not called upon, and,

as the wording selected by them proves, never intended to deal with

any such conception as ‘North Schleswig,’ and have not even used that

term. But the Danes and their friends have so long and so persistently

endeavoured to make the world believe that paragraph 5 of the treaty

stipulated for the cession of North Schleswig, that they have come to

believe it themselves.

“The Prussians alone have to decide as to the extent of those

districts. Prussia has no further political interest in negotiating

with Denmark if the latter is not content with the concessions which

the former is prepared to make. Finally, only Austria has a right to

demand that the matter shall be settled in any form.... If Prussia

and Austria,” so concluded the Minister’s directions, “now come to an

understanding as to cancelling that paragraph of the treaty--probably

on the basis of further concessions on the part of Prussia--absolutely

no one has any right to object.” Two articles were to be written on

this subject, one for the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, in which

the reference to Austria was to be omitted, and one for the _Spenersche

Zeitung_, which was to contain it.

_April 12th._--The Count desires to have an article written for the

_Kölnische Zeitung_, part of which he dictated to me. It ran as

follows: “The _Constitutionnel_ speaks of the way in which French

manners are being corrupted by foreign elements, and in this connection

it mentions Princess Metternich and Madame Rimsky-Korsakow. It would

require more space than we can afford to this subject to show in its

true light all the ignorance and prejudice exhibited by the writer of

this article, who has probably never left Paris. Princess Metternich

would not act in Vienna as she is represented by the _Constitutionnel_

to have acted in Paris; and Madame Rimsky-Korsakow is not a leader of

society in St. Petersburg. The contrary must be the case. Paris must

be responsible if the two ladies so conduct themselves, and exercise

such an influence as the French journal asserts they do. As a matter

of fact the idea that Paris is the home and school of good manners is

now only to be met with in other countries, in old novels, and amongst

elderly people in the most remote parts of the provinces. It has

long since been observed, and not in European Courts alone, that the

present generation of Frenchmen do not know how to behave themselves.

In other circles it has also been remarked that the young Frenchman

does not compare favourably with the youth of other nations, or with

those few countrymen of his own who have, far from Paris, preserved

the traditions of good French society. Travellers who have visited the

country at long intervals are agreed in declaring that the forms of

polite intercourse, and even the conventional expressions for which the

French language so long served as a model, are steadily falling into

disuse. It is therefore quite conceivable that the Empress Eugénie,

as a sensitive Spaniard, has been painfully affected by the tone and

character of Parisian society, but it would show a lack of judgment

on her part if, as stated by the _Constitutionnel_, she sought for

the origin of that evil abroad. But we believe we are justified in

directly contradicting that statement, as we know that the Empress has

repeatedly recommended young Germans as models for the youth of France.

The French show themselves to be a decadent nation, and not least in

their manners. It will require generations to recover the ground they

have lost. Unfortunately, so far as manners are concerned, all Europe

has retrograded.”

From the 13th of April to the 28th of May I did not see the Minister.

He was unwell, and left for Varzin on Easter Eve. It was said at the

Ministry that his illness was of a bilious character, and was due

to the mortification he felt at the conduct of the Lasker fraction,

together with the fact that he had spoilt his digestion at a dinner at

Camphausen’s.

On the 21st of May the Minister returned to Berlin, but it was not

until seven days later that I was called to him. He then gave me the

following instructions: “Brass (the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_)

must not plead so strongly for the Austrians nor speak so warmly of

the Government of Napoleon. In the case of Austria we have to adopt a

benevolently expectant attitude, yet the appointment of Klaczko and

his connection with the Ministry is for us a suspicious symptom.

The appointment of Grammont to the French Foreign Office is not

exactly agreeable to us. The Czechs must be treated with all possible

consideration; but, on the other hand, we must deal with the Poles as

with enemies.”

I afterwards asked as to his health. He said he still felt weak, and

would not have left Varzin if things had not looked so critical in

Parliament. As soon as matters were once more in order there, he would

be off again, if possible on an early day, in order to undertake a cure

with Karlsbad water, going to some seaside resort.

On being called to the Count on Whit Sunday I found him highly

indignant at the statement of a correspondent of the _Kölnische

Zeitung_, who reported that there was a scarcity of labour in the

Spandau cartridge factory. “Therefore unusual activity in the

preparation of war material!” he said. “If I were to have paid two

visits to the King at Ems it would not cause so much anxiety abroad

as thoughtless reports of this kind. Please go to Wehrmann and let

him ascertain at the Ministry of War if they are responsible for

that article, and if possible get them to insert a correction in the

_Kölnische Zeitung_ or in the _Norddeutsche_, as it must appear in an

influential paper.”

A diary entry on an undated slip of paper, but written in May: “Bohlen

yesterday bantered Bucher about his ‘Easter mission,’ which appears to

have been to Spain.”

On the 8th of June the Minister again left Berlin for Varzin.

Immediately on the commencement of the difficulties with France

respecting the election to the Spanish throne of the Hereditary Prince

of Hohenzollern, letters and telegrams began to arrive which were

forwarded by Bucher under instructions from the Chief. These consisted

in part of short paragraphs and drafts of articles, as well as some

complete articles which only required to be retouched in the matter

of style, or to have references inserted with regard to matters of

fact. These directions accumulated, but owing to the spirit and energy

inspired by the consciousness that we were on the eve of great events,

and that it was an honour to co-operate in the work, they were promptly

dealt with, almost all being disposed of on the day of their arrival. I

here reproduce some of these instructions, the order of the words and

expressions in the deciphered telegrams being slightly altered, while

the remainder are given exactly as they reached me.

_July 7th, evening._--A telegram to me from Varzin: “The semi-official

organs should indicate that this does not seem to be the proper time

for a discussion of the succession to the Spanish throne, as the

Cortes, who are alone entitled to decide the question, have not yet

spoken. German Governments have always respected Spanish independence

in such matters, and will do so in future, as they have no claim or

authority to interfere and lay down regulations for the Spaniards.

Then, in the non-official press, great surprise should be expressed

at the presumption of the French, who have discussed the question

very fully in the Chamber, speaking as if that assembly had a right

to dispose of the Spanish throne, and apparently forgetting that

such a course was as offensive to Spanish national pride as it was

conducive to the encouragement of Republican tendencies. This may be

safely construed into a further proof of the false direction which the

personal _régime_ is taking. It would appear as if the Emperor, who has

instigated this action, wanted to see the outbreak of a new war of

succession.”

A letter from Bucher, which was handed to me on the evening of the 8th

of July, further developed the idea contained in the last sentence of

the foregoing telegram. This letter ran: “Previous to 1868 Eugénie

was pleased to play the part of an obedient subject to Isabella, and

since the September revolution that of a gracious protectress. She

unquestionably arranged the farce of the abdication, and now, in her

rage, she incites her consort and the Ministers. As a member of a

Spanish party she would sacrifice the peace and welfare of Europe to

the intrigues and aspirations of a corrupt dynasty.

“Please see that this theme, a new war of succession in the nineteenth

century, is thoroughly threshed out in the press. The subject is

inviting, especially in the hands of a correspondent disposed to draw

historical parallels, and more particularly parallels _ex averso_.

Have the French not had experience enough of Spain with Louis XIV. and

Napoleon, and with the Duc d’Angoulême’s campaign for the execution of

the decrees of the Verona Congress? Have they not excited sufficient

hatred by all those wars and by the Spanish marriage of 1846?

“Bring personal influence to bear as far as possible on the editors

who have been intimidated by the Stock Exchange, representing to them

that if the German press takes up a timid and hesitating attitude in

presence of the rhodomontades of the French, the latter will become

more insolent and put forward intolerable demands in other questions

affecting Germany still more closely. A cool and determined attitude,

with a touch of contempt for those excited gentlemen who would like to

slaughter somebody, but do not exactly know whom, would be the most

fitting means for putting an end to this uproar and preventing serious

complications.”

Bucher added: “Protestants were still sent to the galleys under the

Spanish Government which was overthrown in 1868.”

Another communication of Bucher’s from Varzin of the same date runs:

“The precedents furnished by Louis Philippe’s refusal of the Belgian

throne on behalf of the Duc de Nemours in 1831, on the ground that

it would create uneasiness, and by the protest which England would

have entered against the marriage of the Duc de Montpensier to the

sister of Queen Isabella, are neither of them very applicable, as the

Prince of Hohenzollern is not a son of King William, but only a remote

connection, and Spain does not border on Prussia.”

The following was a third subject received from Varzin on the same

day: “Is Spain to inquire submissively at the Tuileries whether the

King whom she desires to take is considered satisfactory? Is the

Spanish throne a French dependency? It has already been stated in the

Prussian speech from the throne that our sole desire in connection

with the events in Spain was that the Spanish people should arrive at

an independent decision for the maintenance of their own prosperity

and power. In France, where on other occasions so much is said of

national independence, the attempt of the Spanish people to decide for

themselves has immediately revived the old diplomatic traditions which

led to the Spanish war of succession 160 years ago.”

On the same day, the 8th of July, a telegram was also received from the

Chancellor by the Secretary of State, and it was handed to me for my

information. It was to the following effect: “I have now before me in

the despatch of Count Solms the official text of the Duc de Grammont’s

speech, and I find his language more brusque and presumptuous than I

had anticipated. I am in doubt whether that is due to stupidity or

the result of a decision taken beforehand. The probability of the

latter alternative seems to be confirmed by the noisy demonstrations

which will most likely render it impossible for them to draw back.

I am reluctant to protest officially against Grammont’s speech on

international grounds, but our press should attack it very severely,

and this should be done in as many newspapers as possible.”

_July 9th._--A telegram from Bucher to the Secretary of State, saying

that the direction to the press to deal with Grammont’s speech in

very strong language is not to apply to the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine

Zeitung_.

Another telegram of the same date to Thile, which he brought to me:

“Any one intending to summon a Congress to deal with a debatable

question ought not first to threaten a warlike solution in case the

opposite party should not agree to his wishes.”

Further, the Secretary of State handed me a telegram from Berlin to

the Chancellor, which was returned by the latter with comments. I was

to get these circulated in the non-official journals. The telegram was

to the effect that Grammont had stated, in reply to an interpellation

by Cochery, that Prim had offered the Spanish throne to the Hereditary

Prince of Hohenzollern, (Remark: “He can do nothing of the kind. Only

the Cortes,”) and that the Prince had accepted it. (Remark: “He will

only declare himself after he has been elected.”) The Spanish people

has not yet, however, expressed its wishes. (Remark: “That is the main

point.”) The French Government do not recognise the negotiations in

question. (Remark: “There are no negotiations excepting those between

Spain and the eventual candidates for the throne.”) Grammont therefore

begged that the discussion might be postponed, as it was purposeless

for the moment. (Remark: “Very.”) The French Government would maintain

the neutral attitude which they had observed up to the present, but

would not permit a foreign Power to place a Prince upon the Spanish

throne, (“Hardly any power entertains such an intention, except perhaps

France,”) and endanger the honour and dignity of France. They trusted

to the wisdom of the Germans, (Remark: “Has nothing to do with it,”)

and to the friendship of the Spanish people. (Remark: “That is the main

point.”) Should they be deceived in their hopes they would do their

duty without hesitation or weakness. (Remark: “We also.”)

Bucher sent me a whole packet of sketches for articles:--

1. “If Spain records her decision to establish a government which

shall be peaceful, and tolerant in religious matters, and which may

be expected to be friendly to Germany, who is also devoted to peace,

can it be in our interest to prevent the execution of that resolve,

and for that purpose to take measures of doubtful legality? Shall

we, because of a threat of war made in pursuit of an arbitrary and

dynastic object, take steps to frustrate a reorganisation of Spanish

affairs advantageous to Germany? Is it not rather an act of insolent

presumption on the part of France to address such a demand to Germany?

Obviously France lacks either the courage or the means to enforce her

views at Madrid; and it appears from Grammont’s speech of the 4th of

July that in her anger at what has happened in Spain she is prepared

to throw herself upon Germany in a blind fit of rage. That speech is

to a certain extent a declaration of war against the person of the

Prince of Hohenzollern, in case he should decide to accept the offer

of the Spanish people. France demands that Prussia shall undertake

the office of policeman in case a German Prince who has attained _his

majority_ shows a disposition to meet the wishes of the Spaniards. For

a North German Government to interfere with a citizen who should wish

to exercise his right to emigrate and adopt the Spanish nationality

would raise a very questionable point of law from a constitutional

standpoint. Even if such a power existed, the dignity of Germany would

demand that it should only be applied in her own interests. The calm

consideration of those interests is not in the least affected by the

warlike threats of a neighbouring State, which, instead of arguments,

appeals to its 400,000 soldiers. If France lays claim in this manner

to the guardianship of adjoining nations, the maintenance of peace can

for the latter be only a question of time, which may be decided at any

moment. On Grammont’s appointment to the French Foreign Office it was

feared in many quarters that the choice by the Emperor Napoleon of a

statesman who was only remarkable for his personal impetuosity and his

hostility to Germany indicated a desire to secure for himself greater

liberty in breaking the peace. Unfortunately the haughty and aggressive

tone of the Duke’s speech is not calculated to remove the apprehensions

entertained at that time. He is not a minister of peace, but rather the

instrument of a personal policy which shrinks from no responsibility.

In itself the question as to who is to be the ruler of Spain is not

one for which Germany would go to war. But the French demand that

the German Government, in opposition to its own interests, should put

artificial difficulties in the way of the Spaniards manifests a depth

of self-conceit which scarcely any government amongst the independent

States of Europe could submit to at the present day. We seek no

quarrel, but if any one tries to force one upon us he will find us

ready to go through with it to the bitter end.”

2. In another article (there was too much material to be disposed of in

one) the following considerations were to be developed. This was not to

be communicated to the official organs, but either to the _Kölnische

Zeitung_ or the _Spenersche Zeitung_, while it was to be given in a

curtailed form to Hahn’s _Literary Bureau_. “If the candidature of

Alphonso had up to the present any prospect of success in Spain, it

would have been most prejudicially affected by the foolish uproar

raised in France, which stamped it with a French official character. No

worse service could be done to that Prince than to represent him as a

French candidate. Montpensier had already suffered under the reproach

that he was a Frenchman. The Bourbons had formerly been imposed upon

the Spaniards, and had proved themselves no blessing. The manner in

which the succession to the throne is now discussed in France would

offend a nation even less proud than the Spaniards.”

3. “Between the years 1866 and 1868, and particularly before the fall

of Isabella, France schemed a great deal against Germany with Austria,

Italy, and also with Spain. Those intrigues were set at nought by the

Revolution of September, to which Count Bismarck referred when he said

at that time in Parliament that the danger of war, which had been very

imminent, had been dispelled by an unforeseen event. So long as France

maintains her warlike intentions towards Germany, she will desire

to see on the Spanish throne a dynasty favourable to those schemes,

possibly an Ultramontane one, as in case of an attack on Germany it

would make a difference of about 50,000 men to France whether she

had a benevolent, or at least a neutral neighbour on the other side

of the Pyrenees or one whose attitude might be suspected. It is true

that France has nothing to fear directly from Spain if the French,

who for the past eighty years have been unable to make up their own

minds, and who cannot govern themselves, would give up the attempt to

play the part of tutor to other nations. Let the period 1848-1850 in

France be compared with that of 1868-1870 in Spain, and the comparison

will not be to the advantage of the nation _qui marche à la tête de la

civilisation_.”

4. “England is accustomed to look upon the Peninsula as a dependency

of her own, and doubtless believes that her influence can be more

easily made to prevail in a state of insecurity than under the rule of

a powerful dynasty. It is not wise of the English to recall certain

incidents of Spanish history, a course in which they are followed by

the French newspapers. The Spanish version of the history of the wars

against the First Napoleon is very different to the English one. In

Buen Retiro every traveller is shown the site of a once prosperous

porcelain manufactory, which was needlessly burned to the ground by the

British allies of Spain.”

5. Still another subject. “Very pleased with the article in the

_Spenersche Zeitung_ (this was addressed to me). Please again call

attention in a somewhat similar manner to the impetuosity of Grammont

therein referred to. What is the real ground for all this alarm? A

paragraph in the _Agence Havas_ to the effect that the affair had been

settled without the concurrence of the Cortes. It is probable that

the French Government itself had this paragraph inserted, and it was,

moreover, concocted in complete ignorance of the Spanish Constitution

and of the laws governing the election of a King. This, which was

the only new feature, was a barefaced invention. It had already

been mentioned in all the papers that Prim’s speech of the 11th of

June referred to the Prince of Hohenzollern, and that had caused no

excitement in France. Is the present agitation then a _coup monté_?

Does the French Government insist upon a ‘row’? Has Louis Napoleon

chosen Grammont in order to pick a quarrel with us? At any rate he has

been unskilful in his treatment of this question. The general moral

to be drawn as often as possible is: the French Government is, after

all, not quite so shrewd as people believe. The French have succeeded

in many things with the assistance of 300,000 soldiers, and owing to

that success they are regarded as immensely clever. Is that really so?

Circumstances show that it is not.”

_July 10th, evening._--Received further series of sketches and

drafts for articles from Bucher, who acts as the mouthpiece of the

Chancellor’s views and intentions.

1. For the _Spenersche_ or _Kölnische_:--“Those foreign Powers that are

not concerned in the differences respecting the Spanish throne are as

desirous to maintain peace as Germany herself. Their influence will,

however, be neutralised by Grammont’s ill-considered threats. Should

the German Governments consider the security of our frontier to be

seriously threatened, they would scarcely come to a decision without

convoking Parliament.”

2. “The French are running amuck like a Malay who has got into a rage

and rushes through the streets dagger in hand, foaming at the mouth,

stabbing every one who happens to cross his path. If France is mad

enough to regard Germany as a fit object for a vicarious whipping,

nothing will restrain her, and the result will be that she will herself

receive a personal castigation.”

3. “The semi-official journals in Paris pretend that attention has been

attracted there by the numerous cipher despatches exchanged between

Berlin and Madrid, and that they have been clever enough to decipher

them. We do not know whether many despatches have passed between the

two capitals mentioned, but we remember a communication which was made

to Parliament some time ago by Count Bismarck, according to which

the cipher system of our Foreign Office is based on a vocabulary of

about 20,000 words, each one of which is represented by a group of

figures arbitrarily chosen. It is impossible to ‘decipher’ such a

system in the same way as those based on an altered alphabet and other

old methods. In order to read such a despatch, it is essential to

have the vocabulary. Does the cleverness on which the Parisians pride

themselves consist in having stolen the key to our ciphers? This would

be in contradiction with the original statement that the Prince of

Hohenzollern’s candidature first became known through a communication

from Prim. It would, therefore, appear that the official press wants

to clear the Government of the reproach of incapacity by a subsequent

invention, acting, on the maxim that it is better to be taken for a

rogue than a fool.”

4. “According to a private telegram from Paris to the _Berliner Boersen

Zeitung_, our Ambassador there, together with the second Secretary

of Embassy, left for Ems on receipt of a Note delivered to him

immediately after the Cabinet Council at Saint Cloud. We have made

inquiries in the proper quarter as to the accuracy of this report, and

have received the following answer: Note delivered. ‘Not a shadow of

truth. Werther’s journey was decided upon and announced in Paris long

before the agitation began.’”

5. “As was already known, Prim intended this year, as on previous

occasions, to visit Vichy. This would have led to a meeting between

himself and the Emperor Napoleon and a discussion of the succession

to the Spanish throne. It is also reported that the Prince of

Hohenzollern was not indisposed to try confidentially to bring about an

understanding with the Emperor. All this has been rendered impossible

by the abrupt tone of the Duc de Grammont. As Prim’s visit to Vichy has

long since been announced in the newspapers, and the near relationship

as well as the personal friendship which hitherto existed between the

Prince of Hohenzollern and the Emperor rendered both meetings probable,

it is hard to avoid the suspicion that the French Government, dreading

insurmountable domestic difficulties, desires to inflame French vanity

in favour of a war, which would at the same time promote the dynastic

views of the Empress Eugénie.”

_July 12th._--Received from Secretary Wollmann a note from Bucher in

Varzin which is intended for me. It has been sent to the Secretary

of State, in order that he should say whether there is any objection

to its being used in the press. He has no objection, and so it goes

to the newspapers. It runs as follows: “The _Imparcial_ publishes

a letter from Paris to the effect that the furious article in

the _Constitutionnel_ reproaching Prince Hohenzollern with his

relationship to Murat, has been revised by the Emperor himself.”

In the evening the Minister returned. He is dressed in plain clothes

and looks very well.

_July 13th._--Called early to the Chief. I am to wait until a statement

appears in the press to the effect that the renunciation of Prince

Hohenzollern was in consequence of pressure from Ems, and then to

contradict it. “In the meantime (said the Minister) the _Norddeutsche_

should only say that the Prince’s present decision has not been

altogether unexpected. When he accepted the throne which had been

offered to him he had obviously not foreseen that his decision would

occasion so much excitement in Paris. For more than thirty years past

the best relations existed between Napoleon and the Hohenzollern

family. Prince Leopold could not, therefore, have apprehended any

antipathy to his candidature on the part of the Emperor. As his

candidature suddenly became known after the Cortes had been adjourned

till November, it may well have been assumed that there would be time

enough in the interval to sound the Emperor as to his views. Now

that this assumption (here the Chancellor began to speak more slowly

as if he were dictating), which, up to the acceptance of the Crown

by the Prince, was still quite legitimate, had proved to be partly

erroneous, it was scarcely probable that the Prince would, on his

own responsibility, be disposed to cope single handed with the storm

which his decision had raised, and might yet raise, in view of the

apprehensions of war of the whole European world, and the influence

brought to bear upon him from London and Brussels. Even a portion of

the responsibility of involving the great European nations, not only in

one war, but possibly in a series of wars, would weigh very heavily

upon a man who could not claim to have assumed it as part of the duty

of the Royal office which he had already accepted. That was more

than could well be expected of a Prince who only occupied a private

position. It was the offensive tone of Grammont that alone prevented

Prussia from exercising her influence with the Prince.”

The following is to be published in other papers: “It cannot be denied

that a Spanish Government disposed to promote the cause of peace and to

abstain from conspiring with France would be of considerable value to

us. But if, some fourteen days ago, the Emperor Napoleon had addressed

himself confidentially to Berlin, or indicated that the affair was

attracting attention, Prussia, instead of adopting an indifferent

attitude, would have co-operated in pacifying public opinion in Paris.

The situation has been entirely altered through the aggressive tone of

Grammont’s speech, and the direct demands addressed to the King, who is

staying in privacy at Ems for the benefit of his health, unaccompanied

by a single Minister. His Majesty rightly declined to accede to these

demands. That incident has created so much indignation in Germany, that

many people feel disappointed at Prince Leopold’s renunciation. At any

rate, the confidence in the peaceful intentions of France has been so

thoroughly shaken that it will take a considerable time to restore it.

If commerce and trade have been injured by the evidence which has shown

us what a den of brigands we have to deal with in France, the people of

that country must fasten the responsibility on the personal _régime_

under which they at present live.”

The Minister also desires it to be incidentally remarked in the

non-official press that of the South German Courts those of Munich

and Carlsruhe had given the most satisfactory declarations in this

affair, while on the other hand that of Stuttgart had expressed itself

evasively.

Finally, I am to communicate to one of the local papers that Count

Bismarck has been sent for to Ems to consult with the King as to

summoning Parliament. Breaking off a cure which he was undergoing, the

Chancellor has remained in Berlin in order to await there the further

instructions of his Majesty, or ultimately to return to Varzin. The

Count then added: “Later on I will call for you several times, as there

is something more to be prepared for the _Norddeutsche_. We shall

now be shortly interrupted.” The Crown Prince arrived five minutes

afterwards and had a long interview with the Minister.

_July 14th._--Our newspapers to call attention to the loyal attitude

of Würtemberg, “which in consequence of a misunderstanding has been

represented in some journals as evasive.”

_July 15th._--I am to send the following _démenti_ to Wolf’s

Telegraphic Agency for circulation: “The news published by the

_Spenersche Zeitung_ respecting the opening of Parliament is not quite

accurate. It was proposed a week ago by the Chancellor while in Varzin

that it should be convoked as soon as the Government Bills were ready

for submission to it. His Majesty shares this view, and the Federal

Council has accordingly been summoned for to-morrow, Saturday, morning

to consider those measures.”

In the evening the Chancellor dictated an article for the

_Kreuzzeitung_ on the confusion by the public between personal and

private proceedings of the King and his official acts. It ran as

follows: “It appears from the Mazaredo pamphlet that the Hereditary

Prince of Hohenzollern informed the King at Ems of his acceptance of

the offer of the Spanish throne, probably towards the end of June.

His Majesty was then at Ems for the purpose of taking the waters, and

certainly not with the intention of carrying on business of State,

as none of his Ministers had been summoned thither. As a matter of

fact, only so much has become public respecting the King’s reply to

the communication of the Hereditary Prince (it was in the form of a

letter written in his Majesty’s own hand) that the Sovereign was not

pleased at the news, although he did not feel called upon to offer any

opposition. In the whole affair no State action of any kind has been

taken. This constitutional aspect of the situation does not appear to

have been properly appreciated up to the present in public discussions

of the question. The position of the King in his private correspondence

was confounded with his position as head of the State, and it was

forgotten that in the latter capacity, according to the Constitution,

the co-operation of the Ministry is necessary to constitute a State

action. It is only the French Cabinet that appears to have thoroughly

realised this distinction, inasmuch as it brought the whole force of

its diplomacy to bear upon the person of the Sovereign, who was staying

at a watering-place for the sake of his health, and whose private life

was not protected by the usual etiquette, in order to force him under

official pressure into private negotiations which might afterwards be

represented as arrangements with the Government.”

_July 19th._--About an hour after the opening of Parliament in the

Royal Palace (1.45 P.M.) Le Sourd, the French Chargé d’Affaires,

delivered Napoleon’s declaration of war at the Foreign Office.

Towards 5 o’clock in the evening I was called to the Minister, who was

in his garden. After searching for him for some time I saw him coming

through one of the long shady alleys to the left which led to the

entrance in the Königgrätzer Strasse. He was brandishing a big stick.

His figure stood out against the yellow evening sunshine like a picture

painted on a gold ground. He stopped in his walk as I came up to him,

and said: “I wish you to write something in the _Kreuzzeitung_ against

the Hanoverian nobles. It must come from the provinces, from a nobleman

living in the country, an Old Prussian--very blunt, somewhat in this

style: It is reported that certain Hanoverian nobles have endeavoured

to find pilots and spies in the North Sea for French men-of-war. The

arrests made within the last few days with the assistance of the

military authorities are understood to be connected with this affair.

The conduct of those Hanoverians is infamous, and I certainly express

the sentiments of all my neighbours when I put the following questions

to the Hanoverian nobles who sympathise with those traitors. Have they

any doubt, I would ask them, that a man of honour could not now regard

such men as entitled to demand honourable satisfaction by arms whether

their unpatriotic action was or was not undertaken at the bidding of

King George? Do they not, as a matter of course, consider that an

affair of honour with them is altogether out of the question, and

should one of them be impudent enough to propose such a thing, would

they not have him turned out of the house by the servants or eject

him _propriæ manu_ after having, of course, put on a pair of gloves

to handle him with? Are they not convinced that such miscreants can

only be properly described by the good old Prussian word _Hundsvott_

(scurvy, infamous rogues), and that their treason has branded their

posterity to the third and fourth generations with indelible disgrace?

I beg them to answer these questions.”

_Evening._--In an article in the _Liberté_ of the 18th instant, that

paper reminds Italy that she owes her liberation to France, and that

in 1866 it was France who brought about the Italian alliance with the

Berlin Cabinet. It then maintains that, in view of the seriousness

of approaching events, Victor Emmanuel, with truly chivalrous

sentiment, has not for a moment hesitated to assure the French of his

unconditional support. With reference to this article our papers should

observe: “Up to the present the French have played the part of masters

to the whole world, and Belgium, Spain, and the King of Prussia have

in turn experienced their arrogance. Their behaviour was somewhat like

that of the Sultan towards his Khedive, it was a kind of megalomania

based upon the bayonet. Their presumption is now beginning to waver, so

they court the assistance of those good friends whom they pretend to

have placed under obligations to them.”

The Minister subsequently dictated the following, to be worked up

for the German newspapers outside Berlin, such as the _Kölnische

Zeitung_, and for the English and Belgium journals: “According to

confidential communications from loyal Hanoverian circles, amongst

other decisive factors which led the French to the declaration of

war, were the reports sent to Paris by Colonel Stoffel, the Military

Plenipotentiary in Berlin. Stoffel’s information was, it appears, less

accurate than abundant, as none of those who supplied him with it

being prepared to forego the payments they received from him merely

because they had nothing to say, they occasionally invented the news

of which they warranted the correctness. The Plenipotentiary had, it

is said, been informed that the arming of the Prussian infantry, both

as regards rifles and ammunition, was at present undergoing a thorough

transformation, and that consequently a moment so favourable as the

present for attacking Prussia would hardly occur again, inasmuch as on

the completion of this change the Prussian armaments would have been

unassailable.”[4]

2. “It now appears to be beyond all doubt that the French Government

was aware of the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern for months

past, that they carefully promoted it and foolishly imagined it

would serve as a means of isolating Prussia and creating a division

in Germany. No trustworthy information has been received as yet as

to whether and how far Marshal Prim had prepared the way for this

intrigue, in agreement with the Emperor Napoleon. But doubtless

that point will ultimately be cleared up by history. The sudden

disappearance of Spain from the political field as soon as the

differences between France and Prussia broke out gives matter for

reflection and suspicion. It cannot but be regarded as strange that

after the zeal shown by the Spanish Government in the matter of the

Hohenzollern candidature had been raised to boiling point it should

have suddenly fallen below zero, and that the relations of Marshal Prim

to the French Cabinet should now appear to be of the most friendly

character, while the Spaniards seem no longer to feel any irritation at

the interference of France in their internal affairs.”

3. “Rumours were circulated this afternoon to the effect that the

former French Military Plenipotentiary, Baron Stoffel, had been

insulted in the street. On closer inquiry it was ascertained that

some individuals who knew Stoffel followed him in the street, and

on his reaching his house struck the door with their sticks. The

police intervened energetically on the first report of this matter

and have taken measures to prevent a repetition of such conduct and

to provide that Baron Stoffel shall not be interfered with on his

departure this evening. Excesses of this description are, however,

highly reprehensible, even when they are confined to words. The former

representatives of France are under the protection of international law

and of the honour of Germany until they have crossed the frontier.”

_July 21st._--Keudell asked me this morning if I knew Rasch, the

journalist, and if I could say where he was now to be found, in Berlin

or elsewhere. I replied that I had seen him in Schleswig in 1864,

afterwards at a table d’hôte at the Hotel Weissberg, in the Dessauer

Strasse, where he lodged at the end of February. I knew nothing more

about him, but had heard that he was extremely conceited, almost to

the point of madness--a political visionary who desired to convert the

whole world to republicanism. I was not aware of his whereabouts in

Berlin, but would make inquiries at Weissberg’s. Keudell told me to

hunt him up and ask him whether he would go to Garibaldi and urge him

to undertake an expedition against Rome, at the same time carrying him

money from us. I pointed out that Rasch was perhaps too vain to keep

his own counsel. Keudell consoled himself with the idea that he would

doubtless prove a good patriot. I declined to treat with Rasch in the

matter, as I could not speak to him in my own name but in that of the

Foreign Office, and that could be better done by some official of

higher rank, who would make a greater impression upon Rasch. Keudell

seemed to recognise the justice of this view. I made inquiries and

was able to report on the same evening that Rasch was staying at

Weissberg’s.

Called to the Minister in the evening. He showed me an extract from the

_National Zeitung_, and observed: “They say here that the English would

not allow the French to attack Belgium. Well and good, but how does

that help the Belgians if the protection comes too late? If Germany

were once defeated (which God forbid!) the English would not be able

to assist the Belgians in the least, but might, on the contrary, be

thankful if they themselves remained safe in London.”

I am further to call attention to the “manner in which France is

begging for help on all sides--that great warlike nation which makes

so much parade of its victories, representing them as having always

been won solely by the force of its own arms. They go begging (use

that expression) to Italy, to Denmark, to Sweden, and above all to

the German States, to whom they promise the same brilliant destiny

which they have already prepared for Italy--political independence and

financial ruin.”

Called up to the Minister again later. I am to secure the insertion

of the following in the non-official German papers and in the Belgian

and English press: “The English Government observe their neutrality

in connection with the war that has now broken out in a liberal and

conscientious spirit. They impartially permit both sides to purchase

horses and munitions of war in England. It is unfortunate, however,

that France alone can avail herself of this liberality, as will appear

from a glance at the geographical position of the two countries and

from the superiority of the French at sea. Then quote what Heffter (the

book must be in the library) has to say on this kind of neutrality,

and observe that the English jurists describe it more tersely as

‘fraudulent neutrality.’”

_July 23rd._--Called to the Minister five times to-day. The press

should urge the prosecution and seizure of Rothan, an Alsacian who

speaks German, hitherto French Chargé d’Affaires at Hamburg, who has

been a zealous spy and instrument of French intrigue in North Germany,

and who is now understood to be wandering along the coast between the

Elbe and Ems, as also that of the ex-Hanoverian officer, Adolf von

Kielmansegg, respecting whom further particulars are to be obtained

from the Ministry of the Interior. The Count further wants the press

to give a list of the names of the Bavarian members of Parliament who

voted for the neutrality of that State in the national war, mentioning

their professions but without any further remarks. “Give it first in

Brass,” (_i.e._, _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_,) he added. “You

will find such a list amongst the documents. The complaints as to the

manner in which England understands neutrality must be continually

renewed. The English Government does not forbid the export of horses,

though only France can avail herself of that facility. Colliers

are allowed to load at Newcastle and to supply fuel for the French

men-of-war cruising in the North Sea. English cartridge factories

are working for the French army under the eyes of the Government. In

Germany the painful feeling has become more and more widespread that,

under Lord Granville, England, while nominally maintaining neutrality,

favours France in the manner in which it is really observed.”

About 11 P.M. I was again called to the Minister. The reports

respecting the English coal ships to be at once sent by a Chancery

attendant to Wolf’s Telegraphic Agency for circulation to the

newspapers.

In this connection may be mentioned an Embassy report from London,

dated the 30th of July, to the following effect: Lord Granville had

asked the Ambassador if he had not stirred up the authorities in Berlin

against the English Government. The reply was in the negative. The

Ambassador had only carried out his instructions. Public opinion in

Germany influenced the Government, just as the German press influenced

public opinion. The manner in which neutrality was observed on the

part of England had excited the greatest indignation in Germany. The

action of the English Government, which indeed recognised that France

was in the wrong, but failed to give expression to that conviction,

was also bitterly resented there. Granville replied that once it had

been decided to remain neutral that neutrality must be maintained in

every respect. If the export of contraband of war were forbidden, the

French would regard it as an act of one-sided hostility, while at the

same time it would ruin English trade in the branches affected by such

prohibition, and favour American manufacturers. For the present, every

one in England approved of the maintenance of neutrality, and therefore

in a general way no change was possible in these matters. At the same

time, the English Government was ready, in case of complaints reaching

them in an official way respecting any acts of illegality, to institute

an inquiry into the facts and secure the punishment of the guilty

parties. It did not seem impossible to prevent the supply of English

coal to French men-of-war. Next Monday a Bill was to be submitted to

Parliament for the amendment of the laws regulating neutrality. The

report concluded as follows: “England is in many respects well disposed

towards us, but will for the present remain neutral. If we make further

attacks upon English public opinion through our official press in

connection with these grievances, it will serve no purpose but to

conjure up future difficulties. Granville is not what we might desire,

but he is not prejudiced against us. He may become so, however, if he

is further provoked by us. We can hardly succeed in overthrowing him,

and if we did his probable successor would in all likelihood be much

worse than himself.”

_July 24th._--I am instructed by the Count to send an article to the

_Kölnische Zeitung_ respecting the Dutch coal question. He gave me

the following information on this subject: “Holland asked us to again

permit the passage of Prussian coal down the Rhine, and requested

that a large transport of Rhenish coal intended for Holland should be

allowed to pass the frontier. It was only to be used in factories, and

the Government of the Netherlands would prohibit its re-exportation.

Prussia willingly agreed to this, but shortly afterwards it was

ascertained that foreign vessels were being loaded with coal in Dutch

ports, and the Government of the Netherlands subsequently informed us

that in promising to prevent the re-exportation they had overlooked

the circumstance that their treaty with France did not permit this.

Thereupon as a matter of course the export of Prussian coal to Holland

was prohibited. In the interval, however, they seem to have secured

a sufficient supply in Holland to provide the French fleet for a

considerable time. That is a very suspicious method of observing the

neutrality promised by the gentlemen at the Hague.”

Bucher brings me the following paragraph from the Chief, which is to

be inserted in the _Spenersche Zeitung_, or some other non-official

organ, and afterwards in the _North German Correspondence_: “In 1851

a literary _gamin_ in Paris was commissioned to conjure up the Red

Terror in a pamphlet, which proved very useful to the President Louis

Napoleon, enabling him to escape from a debtors’ prison and ascend the

Imperial throne. The Duc de Grammont now tries to raise the Spanish

Terror in order to save the Emperor from the necessity of accounting

for the hundred millions which he diverted from the State Treasury

into his private purse. The literary gentleman in question was made a

Prefect. What reward can Grammont have had in view?”

_Evening._--The Minister wishes an article to be prepared for

circulation in the German press describing the French and French policy

under the Emperor Napoleon. This is to be first sent to the _Spenersche

Zeitung_, while the Literary Bureau is to secure the insertion of the

principal points in a condensed form in the Magdeburg papers and a

number of the smaller journals to-morrow. The Count said (literally):

“The French are not so astute as people generally think. As a nation

they resemble certain individuals amongst our lower classes. They are

narrow-minded and brutal,--great physical force, boastful and insolent,

winning the admiration of men of their own stamp through their audacity

and violence. Here in Germany the French are also considered clever by

persons who do not think deeply, and their Ministers are regarded as

great statesmen because of their insolent interference in the affairs

of the whole world, and their desire to rule everywhere. Audacity

is always impressive. People think their success is due to shrewd

political calculation, but it is actually due to nothing else than the

fact that they always keep 300,000 soldiers ready to back up their

policy. That alone, and not their political intelligence, has enabled

them to carry things with such a high hand. We must get rid of this

fiction.... In political affairs the French are in the fullest sense

of the word a narrow-minded nation. They have no idea how things look

outside of France, and learn nothing about it in their schools. The

French educational establishments, for the greater glory of France,

leave their pupils in the crassest ignorance as to everything beyond

her frontiers, and so they have not the slightest knowledge of their

neighbours; that is the case with the Emperor, or at least he is not

much better, to say nothing of Grammont, who is an ass (_Rindvieh_).

Napoleon is ignorant at bottom, although he has been educated in

German schools. His ‘Cæsar’ was intended to conceal that fact. He has

forgotten everything. His policy was always stupid. The Crimean War

was against the interests of France, which demanded an alliance or

at least a good understanding with Russia. It was the same with the

war in Italy. There he created a rival in the Mediterranean, North

Africa, Tunis, &c., who may one day prove dangerous. The Italian people

are much more gifted than the French, only less numerous. The war in

Mexico and the attitude adopted in 1866 were blunders, and doubtless

in storming about as they do at present the French feel conscious that

they have committed another blunder.”

_July 25th._--At 11 o’clock this morning Count Bismarck and his family

took the Holy Communion at their residence. He asked whether any one

in our bureau desired to join them, but no one offered to do so. I was

for a moment tempted, but reconsidered the matter. It might look as if

I wished to recommend myself.

Copies of the Benedetti draft treaty are sent to Auber (the French

Press Agency) and Heide.

_July 27th._--It is to be stated either in the _Norddeutsche_ or

the _Spenersche Zeitung_ that secrecy respecting confidential

communications between great States is, as a rule, more carefully

observed and maintained than the public imagines. Nevertheless, the

French misrepresentation of Prussia’s attitude in the affair of the

candidature for the Spanish throne (in Grammont’s despatch of the 21st

of July) obliged the authorities here to disregard these considerations

of discretion. Benedetti’s proposal has therefore been published and it

may be followed by other documents of the same description. The Count

concluded his directions as follows: “We are at least entitled to tell

the truth with discretion in presence of such indiscreet lies.”

Bucher brings me from the Minister the following sketch of a paragraph

for the press: “The despatch of the Duc de Grammont, the full text

of which now lies before us, is a desperate attempt to prove that

the origin of the situation which they have themselves created was

the Hohenzollern candidature, and to conceal the motive which they

confessed on many other occasions--namely, the conquest by France of

the left bank of the Rhine and of Belgium. The inconsistency of the

whole assertion is made clear by the circumstance that the offer of

the Spanish throne to the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern was first

made in a letter dated the 14th of February of the present year.

Therefore, there can be no connection between this offer and the

conversations in March, 1869, between Benedetti and Von Thile, which

were the outcome of aspirations or proposals frequently ventilated in

the press (also with reference to Prince Frederick Charles). In 1851

the President Louis Napoleon succeeded in obtaining credence both at

home and abroad for certain fictions, so long as that was necessary for

the attainment of his object. The fiction which is now circulated, at a

somewhat late hour, to the effect that the Prince of Hohenzollern was

the candidate of Prussia is refuted in advance by the fact, which has

been well known for a long time, that the Prussian Government as well

as the officials of the Confederation, had absolutely no knowledge of,

or connection with, the Spanish proposal. It was resolutely opposed by

his Majesty the King, as the head of the Hohenzollern family, until

last June, when at Ems he reluctantly withdrew his opposition when it

was represented to him that otherwise Spain would fall into the hands

of the Republicans. We find it difficult to understand what interest

the French Government can have in circulating such lies now that war

has actually broken out. The attempt of the Duc de Grammont to conjure

up the spectre of a restoration of Charles V.’s monarchy can only be

explained by the complete isolation of the French mind. That apparition

had no sooner manifested itself than it vanished before the angry

contempt of public opinion, which resented being supposed capable of

such credulity.”

The Chancellor desires to see the following considerations reproduced

in the evening papers: “The Benedetti document is by no means the

only one dealing with the matter in question. Negotiations were also

carried on by others, as, for instance, by Prince Napoleon during his

stay in Berlin. Since French diplomacy was ignorant enough to believe

that a German Minister who followed a national policy could for a

moment think of entertaining such proposals, it had only itself to

thank if it was befooled with its own schemes so long as such fooling

appeared calculated to promote the maintenance of peace. Even those who

pursue the most ignorant and narrow-minded policy must ultimately come

to recognise that they have hoped for and demanded impossibilities.

The bellicose temper which now prevails in Paris dates from such

recognition. The hopes of German statesmen that they would be able to

befool the French until a peaceful _régime_ was established in France

by some transformation of her despotic constitution have unfortunately

not been realised. Providence willed it otherwise. Since we can no

longer maintain peace it is not necessary now to preserve silence. For

we preserved silence solely in order to promote the continuance, and,

if possible, the permanency, of peaceful relations.”... The Minister

concluded: “You can add, too, that the question of French Switzerland

was also mentioned in the negotiations, and that it was hinted that in

Piedmont they knew quite well where the French districts begin and the

Italian districts leave off.”

_July 28th._--I see the original of Benedetti’s draft treaty, and I am

to receive a photographic copy of it similar to that which has been

prepared for distribution amongst foreign Governments.

Bucher handed me the following sketch of an article, received by

him from the Minister, which is to be inserted in some organ not

apparently connected with the Government: “Those who now hold power

in Spain declare that they do not wish to interfere in the conflict

between Germany and France, because the latter might create internal

difficulties for them. They allow Bonaparte to prohibit their election

of the King of their own choice. They look on calmly with folded arms

while other nations go to war over a difference that has arisen out of

a question of Spanish domestic interest. We had formed quite another

opinion of the Castilian _gentilhomme_. The Spanish temper seems to

resemble that of Gil Blas, who wanted to fight a duel with the army

surgeon but observed that the latter had an unusually long rapier.”

_July 30th, 10 p.m._--The Minister desires that attention should be

again called to the manner in which the French are looking about for

foreign assistance, and he once more gives a few points: “France is

begging in all directions, and wants in particular to take Italy into

her pay. Here, as everywhere, she speculates upon the worst elements,

while the better elements will have nothing to do with her. How does

that harmonise with the greatness of the nation which ‘stands at the

head of civilisation,’ and whose historians always point out that it

was only defeated at Leipzig because its opponents were four to one?

At that time they had half Germany, Italy, Holland, and the present

Belgium on their side. To-day, when they stand alone, they go round

hat in hand to every door, and seek mercenaries to reinforce their own

army, in which they can therefore have but very little confidence.”

_July 31st._--This morning received from Roland one of the photographic

copies of the Benedetti draft.