TO PRESIDENT STEYN AND GENERAL DE WET
I had felt very much discouraged on the farm of Mr. Salamon Raath. There
I had thought that all was lost--at any rate as far as the commandos
behind Nauwpoort were concerned. There is no doubt that the burghers
noticed it in my behaviour, and inferred it from my language.
There was indeed much to cause this melancholy state of mind: the
disposition of the burghers to retreat, the discouraging words of some
officers, the expressive silence of others; and when we heard at last
that matters had reached a climax in the unconditional surrender of
General Prinsloo, the _coup de grace_, so to speak, was given to my
hopes.
I of course attached no importance to the braggadocio of those who
loudly declared that Prinsloo ought to be shot, while they themselves
were the most unwilling to go into positions, or deserted those
positions on the bursting of the first shells there. They could not
rectify matters by boasting, nor did it give me any assurance of a
brighter future. But on the morning after I awoke at Harrismith I felt
more sanguine; and it grieved me that I, who had always spoken words of
encouragement, should have shown signs of despondency; and I felt now
that I ought to stand by those who wanted to continue the struggle, and
remain with them till the end, come what may. I recalled also what I
had written to the President not long before, namely, that it was my
intention to attach myself to those who would rally round him at the
last, if it became necessary. Now, as Olivier, Hasebroek, and others had
decided to go to the President and General de Wet in order to be
reorganised, I decided to go too. If the struggle had to be given up,
let our Government give it up.
In order to carry out this resolution, I rode away from Harrismith early
next morning, in order to proceed to Zwart Klip, the farm of General de
Villiers, and with him to accompany the commandos that had escaped, in
their search for the President and General de Wet. That morning I
reached the farm of Mr. Matheus Mare. As, however, the English did not
on that day arrive at Harrismith, I returned in the evening to spend
another night with my family. But this could not be, for I found there
were straggling bands from the commandos in town who were taking horses
out of the stables, whether they belonged to friend or enemy; and I saw
that if I wanted to make sure of a horse to ride, it would be better not
to trust to the chance of finding my horses in the stable at daybreak.
Therefore, when de Villiers and some others resolved to leave Harrismith
immediately, I determined to do the same and accompany them. So at
midnight between the 1st and 2nd of August 1900, I parted from my wife
and children, and proceeded to the farm of Mr. Stephanus Schoeman. On
the following day I obtained from Mr. Schoeman the loan of a strong pony
(on the previous day I had got an excellent horse from Mr. Adriaan
Dolebout); and we rode away.
On the way to Zwart Klip we passed the commandos, and heard that English
officers had followed the burghers with a white flag, and advised them
to surrender. These messengers were sent back with the answer that the
burghers had no intention whatever of doing any such thing. On the way I
met two of our principal men, who had hitherto been amongst the warmest
supporters of our cause, but whose names I shall not here record. They
were in no very hopeful mood, and it seemed to me that very little was
needed to induce them to go and lay down their arms.
This did not tend to cheer me; but I was encouraged somewhat when later
in the day I spoke to Jan Jacobsz, Louw Wepener, and others, and noticed
how firmly resolved they were to continue the struggle.
On the following day a meeting of Harrismith burghers was held at Molen
River bridge. At that meeting it was resolved to send the English
Generals a letter informing them that it was our opinion that, for the
reasons already stated, we regarded the action of General Marthinus
Prinsloo in surrendering himself with the whole of the force as illegal;
also that it was our firm resolve to continue the struggle. Further,
General de Villiers was enjoined to commandeer the Harrismith burghers
anew. This he did that same afternoon, and sent one "commandeer list"
with Mr. Jacob van Reenen to Field-Cornet Gert Pretorius, and another
with Piet Grabe to Assistant Field-Cornet Johannas Loots. In the evening
we heard that the enemy were at Glen Lennie on their way to Harrismith,
and that a patrol had already reached the town commonage. We then knew
that before the sun would set once more our town would be in possession
of the English. There remained, therefore, nothing for us to do but to
make the last preparations for taking our departure. Everything was made
ready that same evening, and early next morning we proceeded to join the
other commandos.
Here it must be noted that there were many in the district of
Harrismith who regarded these commandos with the greatest contempt, and
who indulged in very strong language regarding them. These commandos
were--so they said--very uncontrolled, taking everywhere what they
wanted from shops and farms.
It was further alleged that they thought of nothing but running away;
and it was argued that this was proved not only by the fact that they
had retreated from Nauwpoort, but also by their contriving to avoid the
enemy even after they had escaped from the mountains.
This was the excuse which many of the burghers of Harrismith gave for
surrendering a few days later. They were, they declared, unwilling to
accompany and act with a band of robbers; and thought it better to lay
down their arms immediately than to carry, and not fight with them.
The answer to this is not far to seek. That the commandos were
demoralised was evident; no one with his eyes open could doubt this. But
now they went to their President and Commander-in-Chief! Why? Was it not
for the sole and only purpose of getting breathing-time?--to get
reorganised? And was it not therefore the duty of everyone to join those
who were going to the Government for that purpose? Surely no burgher had
the right to turn his back upon his Government, whilst it was still in
existence, and whilst the road by which to reach it remained open.--By
not doing this they made themselves guilty of desertion.
This weighed heavily with me, and although I saw much in the burghers
that I most strongly disapproved of, and although I had myself not yet
wholly regained my former hopefulness, I could not regard the matter
from any other point of view than that, so long as the President had not
surrendered, I could not do so either, and that it was my duty to stay
with those who did not intend doing so. And thus it occurred that I
began a journey, which was to last twenty-one months, on Saturday, the
4th of August 1900.
I was one of a small company of which General de Villiers was the chief
person. He did not at that juncture enjoy a very high reputation,
because there was no lack of persons who declared that he had not acted
in good faith at Nauwpoort, and that he had been in league with the
enemy. I was convinced of the contrary, and remained in his company. I
had enjoyed his hospitality when all went well with him, and now I would
not desert him when his sky had become clouded.
We reached the commandos at Gwarri Kop, near Cornelius River, and we
learnt there that messengers from the British had again come to insist
upon our surrender.
How much trouble did the Generals to whom Prinsloo had surrendered not
take to induce us to desert! What noble work it was for warriors to do!
If the English had succeeded in this the war would have been brought to
an end, without their having the trouble of fighting any more. But what
would Lord Roberts have thought of it if our positions could have been
reversed, and if we had sent messenger upon messenger to his discouraged
and weary subordinates and soldiers to persuade them to be unfaithful to
their country and their flag? Our leaders were steadfast, and sent the
English officers back with the message, that not only had we no
intention of surrendering, but that we also did not wish to receive any
more messengers with similar proposals.
The following day, being Sunday, I held a service in the house of Mr.
David de Villiers, at Holspruit, and then rode to the commando to see if
I could be of any use there. But that faithful Free Stater, the student
MacDonald, was just busy holding service. I was greatly edified and
comforted by his interpretation of the words, "I will lift mine eyes to
the hills from whence cometh my help!"
During the week we heard from our President. His letter was in answer to
a report, despatched immediately after the Nauwpoort affair, informing
him of the state of affairs. He expressed himself deeply grieved at the
surrender, and appointed General P. Fourie as Acting Chief-Commandant.
He also mentioned that many burghers had taken up arms again, and urged
us to come to him as speedily as possible. A few days after this, Judge
Hertzog came to us. He said that he had been sent to lead us to the
President and the Chief-Commandant, and brought us the latest news from
the Transvaal.
We now travelled a long distance every night, halting during the day.
Our way of "trekking" was to begin at nightfall and to continue till
about midnight or two o'clock in the morning, and then to tie the oxen
to the yokes and hobble the horses. This "trekking" was not pleasant;
for the weather continued bitterly cold, and to remain in the saddle
almost the whole night with icy cold feet was certainly not enjoyable.
But it had to be done, and no one grumbled.
Our laager was by no means perfect, as may well be imagined. We
consisted of small numbers from almost every district of the Orange Free
State, and were not used to each other. Moreover, there were too many
officers. There were generals without commandants, and commandants with
hardly any men. Under these circumstances one can well understand that
there existed but little cohesion amongst us, and that the burghers
committed excesses of which they would not have been guilty had the
laager consisted solely of burghers from one district. It thus happened
that some wasted their ammunition by firing it away at game, and
through carelessness the veld was set on fire almost daily. This
continued until by stringent measures and heavy fines the delinquents
were deterred. One instance of a sad veld fire occurred on the 11th of
August. It began at a spot where a camp-fire had been lit, and might
have resulted in the destruction of a large portion of the laager. It
was quite calm when we rose that morning, but soon the wind began to
blow. The storm raged more and more fiercely, and somebody said that if
no order were given to put out all fires in the laager there was danger
for the veld. This had hardly been said when someone shouted, "The veld
is on fire!" Everything was now in commotion to leeward of the wind.
Tents were pulled down, and the burghers hurriedly removed their
saddles, bedding, and whatever they could, across the road to a place of
safety. Some dragged the waggons by hand out of danger, and others ran
about with sacks to extinguish the fire; but all did not assist in the
attempt to extinguish the flames--only those who were in danger--the
others looked on at the fire with colossal indifference, and went on
roasting their meat or doing whatever they were busy with, as if there
was no danger at the other end of the laager. But how great was the
danger there! Each burgher redoubled his energies and did his utmost.
All, however, would have been in vain, and a portion of the laager would
inevitably have been destroyed if there had not fortunately been a
narrow road between us and the fire. Besides, by a lucky chance there
was the hide of an ox which had been slaughtered that morning. This was
dragged across the fire, and wherever it was drawn it extinguished the
flames; and in this way the laager was saved from destruction. But it
was just as impossible to stop the conflagration as it is to stem the
strong current of a river in flood. The flames sped onward, and soon
all the veld to the east was black. Subsequently we heard of great
damage done by this fire, and that lives had even been lost. What
mischief had we not done by our unpardonable carelessness,--and we had
always taken it so much amiss when the British troops had set fire to
the veld!
The wind continued blowing all day, but died away in the evening. We
then inspanned according to custom, and "trekked" onward to the banks of
the spruit named Klip River, six miles east of Heilbron.
We now hoped to reach the laager of General de Wet shortly, as it had
been in the vicinity of this town when Judge Hertzog had left it.
The following day, being Sunday, Mr. MacDonald and I held religious
services in different parts of the laager.
We learnt in the course of the day that a considerable force of British
was barring our way. This forced us to draw back some distance. We
proceeded far into the night, and on Monday morning we were just as far
south of Heilbron as we had been east the day before. It then began to
seem doubtful if we should meet the President and General de Wet as
speedily as we had hoped, not only because the English were in our
front, but also because our scouts told us that we might expect a
British force in our rear, coming with the road from Bethlehem towards
Heilbron. Messages were, however, sent to General de Wet, and from him
also tidings were received from time to time.
On the following day, Tuesday, 14th of August, it appeared that we
should come in contact with the enemy. The force which was marching
along the road from Bethlehem to Heilbron was coming nearer and nearer,
and we came in collision with it not far from Vecht Kop of "voortrekker"
fame, where Sarel Celliers had frustrated the Matabeles in 1837 in their
attempt to take his laager.
The British trekked along between the ridges, where our men had taken up
positions, and this kop. At twelve o'clock our guns opened fire on the
enemy, which was fiercely responded to by the English cannon. Our
burghers held the positions they occupied till late in the afternoon;
but when the enemy's infantry advanced in strong force from the front,
and the burghers, who held a position on a pointed hillock to the right,
gave way, the men who fought in the centre were forced to retire. They
did this under a hail of bullets, and it is a miracle that many were not
killed. Only one was wounded there; but altogether we lost three dead
and seven wounded on that day.
We were not elated over this result, but according to what we heard a
month later, the loss of the English was greater than ours. It appeared
that the enemy's purpose was to reach Heilbron, for we were not pursued,
and after dark we proceeded in a south-westerly direction.
It now speedily became evident that we should not reach the President
for some time. Word had come that he and General de Wet had taken refuge
in the Transvaal, and that they were being pursued by an enormous force.
Our officers decided to act according to circumstances: to oppose the
enemy wherever it was practicable, or to retire whenever we were forced
to do so; but in all cases steadfastly to remain under arms. We had done
our utmost to reach our President and Chief-Commandant, and had failed.
But the short time of respite which had elapsed since the affair at
Nauwpoort had exerted a beneficial influence on all, for we were now
more and more convinced that, whether we reached the Chief of our State
or not, surrender was not to be thought of as long as our Government
existed.