The preceding chapter has dealt with the affairs of the post-Alexandrian
epoch, with chief reference to the outlying territories of the disrupting
empire. We must now take up the trend of affairs in Greece proper, and
from the Grecian standpoint. Something of this has necessarily been dealt
with incidentally in the preceding chapter, but a certain amount of
repetition is essential to clearness. We are now back in Greece, and are
to witness the effect produced at Athens by the death of Alexander.
THE LAMIAN WAR
[Sidenote: [323 B.C.]]
We have seen that the report of the great conqueror’s demise was at
first disbelieved. The hearers hoped, but doubted. When the report
was confirmed, the effect was electric.[a] At once there was an end
of hesitation and secrecy. The popular feeling burst forth, like a
flood long pent up. Phocion, and the orators of the Macedonian party,
endeavoured in vain to stem it. Their influence was gone--as Demades,
before long, experienced to his cost. None were listened to but those
who recommended the most decided and vigorous measures. It was resolved
without delay to send a supply of arms and money to Leosthenes for his
levies at Tænarus, with directions no longer to make a secret of the
object for which they were destined. The remainder of the treasure of
Harpalus, and the penalties which had been recovered, furnished the means.
It was very important, now that a prospect was once more opened of a
general confederacy among the Greeks for a national cause, that Athens
should immediately make her determination known as widely as possible. By
another decree, the people declared itself ready to assert the liberty
of Greece, and to deliver the cities which were held by Macedonian
garrisons; for this purpose a fleet was to be equipped of forty trireme
galleys, and two hundred of the larger size, with four banks of oars.
All the citizens under forty years of age were to arm: those of seven
tribes to prepare for foreign service, the rest to remain at home for
the defence of Attica. Lastly, envoys were appointed to the principal
states of Greece, to announce that Athens was again, as in the days of
her ancient glory, about to place herself in the front of the battle with
the common enemy, and to set her last resources, men, money, and ships,
on the venture; and to exhort all who wished for independence, to follow
her example.
The success of the Athenian negotiations appears not to have been so
great in Peloponnesus as in the northern states, though these were
exposed to the enemy’s first attacks. Sparta, Arcadia, and Achaia kept
aloof from the struggle to the end--whether restrained by jealousy of
Athens, or by the remembrance of the last unfortunate contest with
Macedonia. Messene, Elis, Sicyon, Phlius, Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Argos
joined the confederacy; but even of these, several appear to have held
back until they were encouraged by the first success of the other allies.
In northern Greece, Leosthenes himself was one of the most active and
successful envoys. As soon as he had completed the equipment of his
levies at Tænarus, leaving them, it seems, under the command of an
inferior officer, he went over to Ætolia. He found the Ætolians, who had
been alarmed and incensed by Alexander’s threats about Œniadæ, heartily
inclined to the national cause, and obtained a promise of seven thousand
men. He then proceeded to solicit aid from Locris, Phocis, and others of
the neighbouring states. Almost everywhere, from the borders of Macedonia
to Attica, a good spirit prevailed. The Dolopians, the mountaineers
of Œta, all the towns of Doris, Carystus in Eubœa, the Locrians and
Phocians, many of the tribes in the western valleys of Pindus, as the
Ænianians, Alyzæans, and Athamantians, the Leucadians, and a part at
least, it seems, of the Acarnanians, sent their contingents. Even from
beyond the borders of Greece, the allies received some auxiliaries: from
the Molossian chief, Aryptæus, who, however, afterwards deserted and
betrayed them, and in very small number from Illyria and Thrace. But the
policy by which Thebes had been destroyed, and its territory divided
among the Bœotian towns, was now attended with an effect more disastrous
to Greece than the conqueror could have foreseen. It was known that the
success of the Greeks would be followed by the restoration of Thebes--the
Theban exiles probably formed a strong body in the Greek army; and
hence the Bœotians, though surrounded on all sides by the forces of the
confederacy, zealously adhered to the Macedonian cause, which was that of
their private interest, and their inveterate hatred to the fallen city.
Antipater received the tidings of Alexander’s death--to him no mournful
event--nearly at the same time with those of the movements in Greece.
His situation was one of great difficulty and danger. The whole force
immediately at his disposal was small, and, if he marched against
Greece, it would be necessary to leave a part of it for the protection
of Macedonia. Nevertheless Antipater determined not to wait for
reinforcements nor to remain on the defensive, but to seek the enemy.
The force which he was able to bring into the field amounted to no more
than thirteen thousand foot, and six hundred horse. It might seem that
he, rather than the Athenians, was acting rashly, when, with so small an
army, he ventured to invade Greece: and perhaps he relied somewhat too
confidently on the superiority of the Macedonian discipline and tactics,
and on the recollection of his victory over Agis. It must however be
observed, that he calculated on the support of the Thessalians, and
probably of some other northern states; and he might hope by a rapid
movement to crush the confederacy, before it had collected its forces, or
at least to prevent it from receiving fresh accessions of strength. He
had also ordered Sippas, whom he left to supply his place in Macedonia,
to levy troops with the utmost diligence, and may have expected to be
speedily reinforced by these recruits. His coffers were well filled, for
he had received a large supply of treasure from Alexander; and the fleet
which had brought it over, consisting of 110 galleys, remained with him,
and was now ordered to attend the operations of the army.
Leosthenes was elected commander-in-chief, not more in honour of Athens
than on account of the confidence which was reposed in his abilities.
The Athenians could spare no more than five thousand infantry, and five
hundred cavalry, of Attic troops; to these they added two thousand
mercenaries. But now the Bœotians, encouraged perhaps by the tidings of
Antipater’s approach, collected their forces to oppose the passage of
this little army, and encamped near Platæa, no doubt in very superior
numbers, to watch the passes of Cithæron. Leosthenes, apprised of their
movement, hastened with a division of his troops to the relief of his
countrymen, effected a junction with them, and gave battle to the enemy.
He gained a complete victory, raised a trophy, and returned, with this
happy omen of more important success, to his camp.
Antipater was joined on his march by a strong body of Thessalian cavalry,
under Menon of Pharsalus, which gave him, in this arm, a decided
advantage over the allies. He drew up his forces, it seems, in the vale
of the Sperchius, and offered battle. Leosthenes did not wait to be
attacked. It is possible that he may have had a secret understanding with
the Thessalian general. But his army was thirty thousand strong, and it
may have been the sight of his superior force that fixed Menon’s wavering
inclination. The fortune of the day was decided by the Thessalian
cavalry, which went over in the heat of the battle to the Greeks. We are
not informed what loss Antipater suffered, but he did not think it safe
to attempt to retreat through Thessaly. He looked about for the nearest
place of refuge, and threw himself into the town of Lamia--which stood in
a strong position on the south side of Mount Othrys, about three miles
from the sea--began to repair the fortifications, and laid in a supply of
arms and provisions furnished perhaps by the fleet. His only remaining
hope was that he might be able to sustain a siege, until succours should
arrive. Leosthenes immediately proceeded to fortify a camp near the town,
and after having in vain challenged the enemy to a fresh engagement, made
several attempts to take it by assault. But the place was too strong, the
garrison too numerous: the assailants were repulsed with the loss of many
lives; and at length he found himself obliged to turn the siege into a
blockade.
It was the first advantage that had been gained for many years over the
Macedonian arms, which were beginning perhaps to be thought invincible;
and it had certainly reduced an enemy, late the master of Greece, to
a state of extreme distress and danger. The confidence of the people
was raised to its utmost height by an embassy from Antipater, by which
he sued for peace. We are not informed what terms he proposed, but his
overtures were probably treated as a sign of despair. The people looked
upon him as already in their power, and demanded that he should surrender
at discretion. Yet they did not relax their efforts, but made use of the
advantage they had gained to procure additional strength for the common
cause. Polyeuctus was sent with other envoys into Peloponnesus, to rouse
the states which had hitherto remained neutral, to action. Here he was
opposed by some of the traitors whom Athens had lately cast out from
her bosom; but he was seconded by the voluntary exertions of his old
colleague Demosthenes.
As soon as Alexander’s death released the Athenians from the restraint
which his power had imposed on them, the orators of the Macedonian party
sank under the contempt and indignation of the people, and several of
them paid the penalty of their former insolence and baseness. Demades
was perhaps most mildly treated in proportion to his offences. Yet he
was brought to trial on several indictments--among others, as the author
of the decree which conferred divine honours on Alexander, for which he
was condemned to a fine of ten talents [£2000 or $10,000]. But he was
partially disfranchised, so as to be made incapable of taking part in
public affairs. The bronze statues also, with which he had been honoured,
and the city disgraced, were melted down, and applied to purposes the
most expressive of contempt and loathing for the original. He however
remained at Athens in the enjoyment of his ill-gotten wealth, waiting
till the accomplishment of Phocion’s denunciations should raise him once
more out of his ignominious obscurity, and should compel the people
to listen to his voice. The time-serving Pytheas, the prosecutor of
Demosthenes, and the witty glutton Callimedon, who had been accused by
Demosthenes of a treasonable correspondence with the exiles at Megara,
were also convicted, we know not on what charges, and were obliged,
either by sentence of banishment, or to escape worse evils, to quit
Athens. They now threw aside the mask, openly entered into the service of
Macedonia, and were employed by Antipater to counteract the influence of
the Athenian envoys in Peloponnesus with all the power of their oratory.
RETURN OF DEMOSTHENES; DEATH OF LEOSTHENES
[Sidenote: [323-322 B.C.]]
Demosthenes had not resigned himself so contentedly as Æschines to
perpetual exile. It was perhaps a weakness, but one which does not lower
him in our esteem, that he met the thought of it with less courage
than that of death. But when he heard of the successes of Leosthenes,
when he learned that an Athenian embassy was making the circuit of
Peloponnesus to advocate the cause of national independence, and that
it was thwarted at every step by Antipater’s hirelings, his despondency
and resentment vanished; he quitted his retreat, joined the envoys, and
accompanied them to the end of their mission. To him it owed its most
important results. Sicyon, Argos, and even Corinth are mentioned among
the states which were brought over to the league by his eloquence. His
kinsman Demon took advantage of the general feeling to propose a decree
for his recall. It was passed, and not in the form of an act of grace,
but of a respectful invitation. A vessel was sent by public authority,
to bring him over from the place of his sojourn. When it returned with
him to Piræus, a solemn procession, headed by the magistrates and the
priests, came down to greet him, and to escort him back to the city. He
now again raised his hands--perhaps to the goddess whom he had unjustly
reproached--and congratulated himself on a return so much happier than
that of Alcibiades, as it was the effect of the free good will of his
fellow-citizens, not extorted from their fears. It was indeed a day of
glory so pure--not to be effaced by a thousand scandalous anecdotes--that
he might gladly have consented to the price which he afterwards paid
for it. The penalty to which he had been condemned still remained to be
discharged, and it was one of those obligations which it seems could not
be legally cancelled. But Demon carried a decree by which fifty talents
were assigned to Demosthenes from the treasury, nominally to defray the
cost of an altar which was annually adorned at the public expense for one
of the festivals.
But these bright gleams of joy and hope were soon to be overcast.
Antipater’s fortune had sunk to the lowest point; it was now to be
gradually gaining the ascendant. The first disaster which befell the
Greek cause was the death of Leosthenes. Antipater had directed a sally
against the besiegers, who were employed in the work of circumvallation.
A sharp combat took place; and Leosthenes, hastening up to the support
of his men, was struck on the head by a stone from an engine, fell
senseless, and was carried back to the camp, where he died, the third day
after.
It remained to be considered, who should take the place of Leosthenes.
The choice, we find, was left without dispute to Athens. Antiphilus,
a young man who had acquired high reputation for courage and military
skill, received the command.
LEONNATUS
[Sidenote: [322 B.C.]]
[Illustration: WATER CARRIER]
But in the meanwhile succours were approaching for the relief of
Antipater. Leonnatus had come down to take possession of his satrapy,
with instructions from Perdiccas, to aid Eumenes in the conquest of
Cappadocia. But, if he was ever in earnest about this enterprise, he was
soon diverted from it by other projects. He had entered into a secret
correspondence with Olympias, who, being in open enmity with Antipater,
and very much dissatisfied with the recent arrangements, desired to
form an alliance, through her daughter Cleopatra, the widowed queen of
Epirus, with some one powerful enough to protect her interests. The
history of such negotiations is seldom accurately known; it only appears
that Leonnatus received a letter from Cleopatra, in which she promised
him her hand--if he came to Pella with a sufficient force, it must be
supposed, to overpower Antipater, and to secure the throne of Macedonia
for himself. He was a man of sanguine temper, as well as of towering
ambition, and eagerly grasped at the offer. While he was occupied with
this scheme, he received a message from Antipater, now blocked up in
Lamia, to implore his speediest succour. Antipater’s envoy was empowered
to offer the hand of one of Antipater’s daughters to Leonnatus. Eumenes
endeavoured to dissuade Leonnatus from compliance with this request,
and professed to consider his own life as in danger from the enmity of
Antipater and Hecatæus. Leonnatus therefore thought he might safely trust
him with the secret, let him see Cleopatra’s letters, and assured him
that his intentions were nothing less than friendly to Antipater. But the
project did not at all suit the views of Eumenes, who saw that he should
probably forfeit his satrapy with the patronage of Perdiccas, and felt no
confidence in the impetuous character of Leonnatus. He therefore made his
escape by night, accompanied only by three hundred horse and two hundred
armed slaves, with his treasure, which amounted to five thousand talents,
and fled to Perdiccas, whose favour he secured by this proof of fidelity.
Leonnatus had now no choice left. It was in Macedonia alone that he could
hope to establish himself. But it seems that he thought it necessary for
his own sake, first to quell the insurrection of the Greeks, and then
to rid himself of Antipater. He therefore crossed over to Europe, and
marched towards the theatre of war. In Macedonia, he added a large body
of troops to his army, which then numbered no less than twenty thousand
foot and twenty-five hundred horse. When Antiphilus heard of the approach
of this formidable force, he immediately perceived that the siege must be
raised; and he seems to have taken his measures with great judgment and
energy. He fired his camp, sent the baggage and all his useless people
to Melitæa, a town on the Enipeus, which lay near his road, and himself,
crossing the chain of Othrys, advanced with his unencumbered troops to
meet Leonnatus, before he could be joined by Antipater.
DEATH OF LEONNATUS; NAVAL WAR; WAR IN THESSALY
Leonnatus charged with his wonted valour; but after a sharp combat, his
troops were broken, and put to flight, and driven into the marsh, where
he himself fell, pierced with many wounds. The Greeks remained masters of
the field, and erected their trophy, the third which they had won since
the beginning of the war.
To Antipater however the loss which he suffered through the defeat of
Leonnatus was more than compensated by the advantage he gained from the
death of a formidable rival; though he may not have known the whole
extent of his danger. He had followed the march of the Greeks, and it
seems was at no great distance when the battle took place; for the next
day he effected a junction with the army of Leonnatus, which immediately
acknowledged him as its chief. He now saw himself at the head of a force,
before which the allies, but for the superiority of their cavalry, would
not have been able to stand. Still, such was the terror inspired by the
Thessalian horse, that he did not venture to descend into the plain;
and he had probably already received intelligence of the approach of
Craterus. He therefore advanced along the higher ground on the skirts of
the plain towards the borders of Macedonia. Antiphilus and Menon could
only watch his movements, and made no attempt to obstruct them; but
remained in the central vale of Thessaly.
In the meanwhile the Athenians, who had undertaken the whole burden of
the war on the sea, had been defeated on what they were used to consider
as their own element. The Macedonian admiral Clitus, with his 240 sail,
gained two victories over the Athenians, who were commanded by Eetion,
and destroyed a great number of their ships. Soon after, when the
Macedonians had become masters of the sea, a squadron was sent, with a
strong body of troops, Macedonians as well as mercenaries, under the
command of Micion, to invade Attica. Phocion led as strong a force as
could be mustered to meet the enemy, who had landed on the eastern coast,
not far from Marathon, and was overrunning the country. But the enemy was
defeated, and driven back to his ships with great loss, and Micion was
left among the slain. So that even this naval war, though it probably
inflicted a severe injury on the Athenians, terminated in a manner which
reminded them of better days.
Not long after, the aspect of affairs in Thessaly was again changed
by the arrival of Craterus. He had brought, beside the veterans, four
thousand heavy-armed, one thousand Persian bowmen and slingers, and
fifteen hundred cavalry. He probably entered Thessaly by one of the
western passes, as this was the direction which Antipater had taken. When
they had joined their forces, Craterus resigned the supreme command to
his colleague. They then marched down into the plain, where the allies
were posted, and encamped near the banks of the Peneus. The Macedonian
army now amounted to between forty thousand and fifty thousand heavy
infantry, three thousand light troops, and five thousand cavalry. The
Greeks were little more than half as numerous; for the Ætolians had not
returned to the camp. It became evident to Antiphilus and Menon that they
must hazard a battle or soon be deserted by the greater part of their
troops. The engagement took place on the plain of Crannon, a little to
the west of the road between Larissa and Pharsalus, not far from the
foot of a range of low hills which stretch across from the Enipeus to the
Peneus. It began, as before, with the cavalry. That of the Macedonians
was probably commanded by Craterus, but it was still unable to cope
with the Thessalians; and the event of the day might have been similar
to that in which Leonnatus fell, if the Macedonians had not now had the
advantage of two able and experienced generals. Antipater, who was at
the head of the phalanx, when he saw his horse giving way, fell upon the
enemy’s infantry. They were quite unable to sustain the shock, but still
were so ably commanded that they retreated in good order to the adjacent
high ground, and there took up a position from which the Macedonians
vainly attempted to dislodge them. We seem to collect from this fact that
Alexander was still more fortunate in his enemies than in his officers.
But Menon, perceiving the retreat of his infantry, did not venture to
prolong the combat, in which he was on the point of gaining a decided
victory; he drew off his troops, and the Macedonians remained everywhere
masters of the field.
DISSOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE
The Greeks had not lost more than five hundred men; but though the
loss was trifling, it was the result of a defeat; and this, in such
circumstances, was inevitably fatal to their cause. Antiphilus and Menon
thought themselves forced to negotiate. Antipater at once saw that an
opportunity was presented to him of dissolving the confederacy without
another blow. When the Greek heralds came to him with proposals of peace,
he declared that he would enter into no treaty with the confederacy,
but was willing to receive envoys from the allied states separately. He
knew that this would be an irresistible temptation to each to renounce
the common cause, that it might make the better terms for itself. But
to hasten their resolution, he and Craterus laid siege to some of the
Thessalian towns, among the rest to Pharsalus, which the allies were
compelled to abandon to their fate. This proof of weakness, and the
danger which extorted it, overpowered all reluctance in the inferior
states of the confederacy. One after another sent its envoys to the
Macedonian camp, and submitted to the terms dictated by Antipater, which
were unexpectedly mild. Their lenity attracted those who still hesitated,
and in a short time all had laid down their arms.
The two states which had excited and guided the insurrection, now
remained exposed to the conqueror’s vengeance, unable to afford any
help to one another--unable, had their forces been united, to offer any
resistance to him. Phocion now had the melancholy pleasure of exerting
the influence he had gained by his long connection with the enemies of
his country, in her behalf. For the readiness he showed on this occasion,
we may well forgive his gentle reproach--that if she had followed his
counsels, she would not have needed his aid; as in truth if she had
followed those of Lycidas in the Persian War, she would not have become
an object of envy and hatred, and would perhaps never have been subject
to a Macedonian master. The honour of his mediation he shared with
Demades, to whom the eyes of all were first turned in this emergency.
While the storm of war was rolling towards the frontiers of Attica,
Demades sat aloof, like Achilles, an unconcerned spectator, brooding over
his dishonour, and could only be induced to interpose by entreaties and
gifts. He was a disfranchised man, who had no right to offer his advice.
But he was not inexorable; and when his franchise was restored to him,
proposed a decree, which was immediately carried, to send envoys, Phocion
and himself in the number, with full powers to Antipater. They found the
Macedonian army encamped on the site of Thebes, and preparing to invade
Attica. Antipater would be satisfied with nothing but absolute submission.
The terms finally granted were, that they should deliver up a number of
their obnoxious orators, including Demosthenes and Hyperides; that they
should limit their franchise by a standard of property; that they should
receive a garrison in Munychia, and pay a sum of money for the cost of
the war. All the articles were accepted by the plenipotentiaries, and
ratified by the people; and soon after the Macedonian garrison marched
into Munychia, to settle the interpretation of those which had not been
precisely defined.
THE CAPITULATION
We conclude that the Athenians had been induced to expect a revival of
the ancient limited democracy, perhaps as it existed in the time of
Solon; by which the poorest would indeed have been excluded from several
offices, but not from the privileges which they exercised in the assembly
and the courts of justice. Hopeless as the condition of the people was,
it seems doubtful whether they would have ratified the treaty, if they
had known beforehand how Antipater understood it on this point. The new
regulation which he decreed sounded very moderate, if not necessary or
just; but its practical effect was that nearly two-thirds of the citizens
were disfranchised, and many transported out of Greece. It provided that
a qualification of two thousand drachmæ should be required from every
citizen, and this has been commonly understood as the entire amount of
property of every kind to be possessed by each. If this was the case, it
remains an inexplicable mystery that out of twenty-one thousand persons
then exercising the franchise, no more than nine thousand could be found
possessing that sum [£80 or $400].
To the disfranchised citizens Antipater offered a town and district in
Thrace. A great number of a higher class were formally banished.
It seems that the contribution which had been mentioned in the treaty was
not immediately exacted; perhaps was purposely reserved as an additional
security for their good behaviour. The question about Samos was referred
to the king’s council, and, by order of Perdiccas, the Athenian colonists
were soon after expelled from their possessions. The republic, it
appears, was also deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros.
THE END OF DEMOSTHENES
Demosthenes and his partners in misfortune had retired from the city
before the Macedonian garrison arrived, yet hardly so soon as it was
heard that Antipater was on his march against Athens. Demades proposed
a decree condemning Antipater’s victims to death. They had certainly
escaped, before they could be arrested under this decree; and their first
place of refuge was Ægina.
As the danger grew more pressing, the friends parted, seeking separate
asylums. Aristonicus and Himeræus took shelter in the Æaceum. Hyperides,
it seems, first sought refuge at the altar of Poseidon in the same
island, but afterwards passed over to Peloponnesus, and fled to the
temple of Demeter at Hermione, once deemed a shrine of awful sanctity.
Demosthenes chose the sanctuary of Poseidon in the isle of Calaurea near
Trœzen. There remained no hope of safety for the fugitives, but in the
protection of the gods. But Antipater had taken his measures to render
even this safeguard unavailing.
It was not in Athens alone that Antipater pursued the friends of liberty
to death. To carry out his purpose, he had engaged the services of a
band of men, who, from their infamous occupation, acquired the title
of the Exile-Hunters. The leader of this pack was an Italian Greek of
Thurii, named Archias. He had been a player, and afterwards, it seems,
had studied, perhaps practised, rhetoric; but we find no trace that
he was connected with any political party in Greece--where indeed, as
a foreigner, he could scarcely have been admitted into one. He served
probably for nothing but his hire; yet he displayed as much zeal in
his commission, as if he had been instigated by private enmity. He
was attended on his circuit by a guard of Thracians, and with their
assistance dragged most of the Athenian exiles--whom, as the prey for
which his master most longed, he had undertaken to seize himself--from
the altars to which he found them clinging. Aristonicus, Himeræus, and
Hyperides were conveyed to Antipater, who was then at Corinth or Cleonæ,
and the first two at least were immediately put to death. Hyperides,
according to the more authentic report, was reserved to be executed in
Macedonia. But all seem to have agreed that Antipater was not satisfied
with his blood, but ordered his tongue to be first cut out, and his
remains to be cast to the dogs. His bones however were secretly rescued
by one of his kinsmen, and carried to Athens, where they were buried in
the grave of his fathers.
Demosthenes calmly awaited the coming of Archias in the temple at
Calaurea, well knowing that he would not be sheltered by the sanctity
of the place, and prepared for his end. He had dreamed, it is said, the
night before, that he was contending with Archias in a tragic part; that
the judgment of the spectators was in his favour, but that he lost the
prize, because he had not been furnished with the outward requisites of
the exhibition--an apt illustration at least of his failure in the real
contest, which was the task of his life. When Archias came to the door of
the temple with his satellites, he found Demosthenes seated. He at first
addressed him in the language of friendly persuasion, to inveigle him out
of his retreat, and offered to intercede with Antipater in his behalf.
Demosthenes listened for a time in silence to his bland professions, but
at length replied: “Archias, you never won me by your acting, nor will
you now by your promises.” When the player found that he was detected, he
flung away the mask, and threatened in earnest. “Now,” said Demosthenes,
“you speak from the Macedonian tripod; before you were only acting: wait
a little, till I have written a letter to my friends at home.” And he
took a roll, as to write, and as was his wont, when he was engaged in
composition, put the end of the reed to his mouth, and bit it; he then
covered his face with his robe, and bowed his head. According to another
report, he was seen to take something out of a piece of linen, and put
it into his mouth; the Thracians imagined that it was gold. In one way
or other, he had swallowed a poison which he had kept for this use. When
he had remained some time in this attitude the barbarians, thinking that
he was lingering through fear, began to taunt him with cowardice; and
Archias, going up to him, urged him to rise, and repeated his offers of
mediation.
Demosthenes now felt the poison in his veins; he uncovered his face,
rose, and fixing his eyes on the dissembler, said, “It is time for you,
Archias, to finish the part of Creon, and to cast my body to the dogs. I
quit thy sanctuary, Poseidon, still breathing; though Antipater, and the
Macedonians, have not spared even it from pollution.” So saying, he moved
with faltering step towards the door, but had scarcely passed the altar,
when he fell with a groan, and breathed his last.
His end would undoubtedly have been more truly heroic, though not in the
sight of his own generation, if he had braved the insults and torture
which awaited him. But he must not be judged by a view of life which had
never been presented to him; according to his own, it must have seemed
base to submit to the enemy whom he had hitherto defied, for the sake of
a few days more of ignominious wretchedness. And even on the principles
of a higher philosophy he might think that the gods, who were not able to
protect him, had discharged him from their service, and permitted him to
withdraw from a post which he could no longer defend.
The ancients saw the finger of Heaven in the fate of the vile instruments
of his destruction. That of Demades will be afterwards related; Archias
ended his days in extreme indigence, under the weight of universal
contempt. It was later before Athens was permitted to do justice to the
services of her great citizen, who indeed had never lost her esteem. The
time at length came when his nephew Demochares might safely propose a
decree, by which the honours of the prytaneum and of the foremost seat
at public spectacles, were granted to his descendants, and a bronze
statue was erected in the agora to himself. It bore an inscription,
corresponding in its import to the dream which he was said to have had
at Calaurea: “Had but the strength of thy arm, Demosthenes, equalled
thy spirit, never would Greece have sunk under the foreigner’s yoke.”
The statue itself was believed in Plutarch’s time to have confirmed the
general persuasion of his innocence as to the only charge which ever
threw a shade on the purity of his political character.[42] The honours
paid to his memory were not confined to Athens. A monument was erected
to him in the sanctuary where he died, and both at Calaurea and in other
parts of Greece he continued, down to the age of Hadrian and probably as
long as the memory of the past survived there, to receive marks of public
reverence approaching to the worship of a hero.[b]
[Illustration: THE DEATH OF DEMOSTHENES]
GROTE’S ESTIMATE OF DEMOSTHENES
The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement
and deportation of the Athenian demos, the suppression of the public
dicasteries, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and
of Greece generally by Macedonian Exile-Hunters--are events belonging
to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction
of the autonomous Hellenic world. Of Hyperides as a citizen we know
only the general fact, that he maintained from first to last, and with
oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenes, a strenuous opposition
to Macedonian dominion over Greece; though his prosecution of Demosthenes
respecting the Harpalian treasure appears (so far as it comes before us)
discreditable. Of Demosthenes, we know more--enough to form a judgment of
him both as citizen and statesman. At the time of his death he was about
sixty-two years of age, and we have before us his first _Philippic_,
delivered thirty years before (352-351 B.C.). We are thus sure that even
at that early day he took a sagacious and provident measure of the danger
which threatened Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of
Philip. He impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger, at a time
when the older and more influential politicians either could not or
would not see it; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal
service and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the
artifices of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only
entailed unpopularity upon himself. At the period when Demosthenes first
addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before the fall
of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable, might have been
kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia and Thrace; and would
probably have been so kept, had Demosthenes possessed in 351 B.C. as much
public influence as he had acquired ten years afterwards.
Throughout the whole career of Demosthenes as a public adviser, down
to the battle of Chæronea, we trace the same combination of earnest
patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy. During the three years’
war which ended with the battle of Chæronea, the Athenians in the main
followed his counsel; and disastrous as were the ultimate military
results of that war, for which Demosthenes could not be responsible,
its earlier periods were creditable and successful, its general scheme
was the best that the case admitted, and its diplomatic management
universally triumphant. But what invests the purposes and policy of
Demosthenes with peculiar grandeur, is, that they were not simply
Athenian, but in an eminent degree Panhellenic also. It was not Athens
only that he sought to defend against Philip, but the whole Hellenic
world. In this he towers above the greatest of his predecessors for half
a century before his birth--Pericles, Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epaminondas;
whose policy was Athenian, Spartan, Theban, rather than Hellenic. He
carries us back to the time of the invasion of Xerxes and the generation
immediately succeeding it, when the struggles and sufferings of the
Athenians against Persia were consecrated by complete identity of
interest with collective Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenes
appeals throughout his numerous orations are those of the noblest and
largest patriotism--trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment of an
autonomous Hellenic world, as the indispensable condition of a dignified
and desirable existence; but inculcating at the same time that these
blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion of
fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.
[Illustration: DECORATION, FROM A VASE]
From the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 B.C., to the Lamian
War after his death, the policy of Athens neither was nor could be
conducted by Demosthenes. But condemned as he was to comparative
inefficacy, he yet rendered material service to Athens, in the Harpalian
affair of 324 B.C. If, instead of opposing the alliance of the city with
Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly as Hyperides, the exaggerated
promises of the exile might probably have prevailed, and war would have
been declared against Alexander. The Lamian War was not of his original
suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw
himself into it with unreserved ardour, and was greatly instrumental
in procuring the large number of adhesions with it obtained from so
many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was, like
the battle of Chæronea, a glorious effort for the recovery of Grecian
liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair chance of
success. There was no excessive rashness in calculating on distractions
in the empire left by Alexander; on mutual hostility among the principal
officers and on the probability of having only to make head against
Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no reinforcement from Asia.
Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately proved, yet the risk was one
fairly worth incurring, with so noble an object at stake; and could the
war have been protracted another year, its termination would probably
have been very different. We shall see this presently when we come to
follow Asiatic events. After a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free
speech in Greece, and dispersing the Athenian demos to distant lands,
Demosthenes himself could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two,
to prolong his existence as a fugitive beyond sea.
Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally
also for himself, before the dicastery, and of the numerous stimulating
and admonitory harangues on the public affairs of the moment, which
he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few remain for the
admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us, not only as
evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but as one of the
chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate the last phase of
free Grecian life, as an acting and working reality.
ANTIPATER IN GREECE
[Sidenote: [322-319 B.C.]]
The death of Demosthenes, with its tragical circumstances, is on the
whole less melancholy than the prolonged life of Phocion, as agent of
Macedonian supremacy in a city half depopulated, where he had been born
a free citizen, and which he had so long helped to administer as a free
community. The dishonour of Phocion’s position must have been aggravated
by the distress in Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of
one-half of its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the
Athenian settlers from Samos--which island was now taken from Athens,
after she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian
people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdiccas in the
name of Arrhidæus. Occupying this obnoxious elevation, Phocion exercised
authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting himself to guard
the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the part of the garrison
of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse with its commander Menyllus,
though refusing all presents both from him and from Antipater.
Throughout Peloponnesus, Antipater purged and remodelled the cities,
Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens; installing
in each an oligarchy of his own partisans--sometimes with a Macedonian
garrison--and putting to death, deporting, or expelling hostile, or
intractable, or democratical citizens. Having completed the subjugation
of Peloponnesus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf to attack the
Ætolians, now the only Greeks remaining unsubdued. It was the purpose
of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and rude people, but
to transport them in mass across into Asia, and march them up to the
interior deserts of the empire. His army was too powerful to be resisted
on even ground, so that all the more accessible towns and villages fell
into his hands. But the Ætolians defended themselves bravely, withdrew
their families into the high towns and mountain tops of their very
rugged country, and caused serious loss to the Macedonian invaders.
Nevertheless, Craterus, who had carried on war of the same kind with
Alexander in Sogdiana, manifested so much skill in seizing the points
of communication, that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced
them to extreme distress, amidst the winter which had now supervened.
The Ætolians, in spite of bravery and endurance, must soon have been
compelled to surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected
arrival of Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Antipater and
Craterus, as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia,
with a view to the crossing of the Hellespont and operating in Asia.
They concluded a pacification with the Ætolians--postponing till a
future period their design of deporting that people--and withdrew into
Macedonia; where Antipater cemented his alliance with Craterus by giving
to him his daughter Phila in marriage.
Another daughter of Antipater, named Nicæa, had been sent over to Asia
not long before, to become the wife of Perdiccas. That general, acting
as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander’s family (who
are now spoken of in the plural number, since Roxane had given birth to
a posthumous son, called Alexander, and made king jointly with Philip
Arrhidæus), had at first sought close combination with Antipater,
demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views were presently opened
to him by the intrigues of the princess at Pella (Olympias, with
her daughter Cleopatra, widow of the Molossian Alexander)--who had
always been at variance with Antipater, even throughout the life of
Alexander--and Cynane (daughter of Philip by an Illyrian mother, and
widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander, but slain by Alexander’s
order) with her daughter Eurydice. It has been already mentioned that
Cleopatra had offered herself in marriage to Leonnatus, inviting him to
come over and occupy the throne of Macedonia; he had obeyed the call, but
had been slain in his first battle against the Greeks, thus relieving
Antipater from a dangerous rival. The first project of Olympias being
thus frustrated, she had sent to Perdiccas proposing to him a marriage
with Cleopatra. Perdiccas had already pledged himself to the daughter
of Antipater; nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would
not be better served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new
proposition. To this step he was advised by Eumenes, his ablest friend
and coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family, and
withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas,
represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly and immediately
the wrath of Antipater. Accordingly Perdiccas resolved to accept Nicæa
for the moment, but to send her away after no long time, and take
Cleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him were conveyed by Eumenes.
Cynane also (daughter of Philip and widow of his nephew Amyntas), a
warlike and ambitious woman, had brought into Asia her daughter Eurydice
for the purpose of espousing the king Philip Arrhidæus. Being averse
to this marriage, and probably instigated by Olympias also, Perdiccas
and Alcetas put Cynane to death. But the indignation excited among the
soldiers by this deed was so furious as to menace their safety, and they
were forced to permit the marriage of the king with Eurydice.
All these intrigues were going on through the summer of 322 B.C., while
the Lamian War was still effectively prosecuted by the Greeks. About
the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called Monophthalmus), the satrap of
Phrygia, detected these secret intrigues of Perdiccas; who, for that and
other reasons, began to look on him as an enemy, and to plot against his
life. Apprised of his danger, Antigonus made his escape from Asia into
Europe to acquaint Antipater and Craterus with the hostile manœuvres of
Perdiccas; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning
the Ætolian War, withdrew their army from Greece for the more important
object of counteracting Perdiccas in Asia.
In the spring of 321 B.C., Antipater and Craterus, having concerted
operations with Ptolemy governor of Egypt, crossed into Asia and began
their conflict with Perdiccas; who himself, having the kings along with
him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy.
By the death of Perdiccas, and the defection of his soldiers, complete
preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater, Ptolemy, and
Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army, now consisting of
the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdiccas united. He was there invested
with the guardianship of the persons of the kings, and with the sort
of ministerial supremacy previously held by Perdiccas. He was however
exposed to much difficulty, and even to great personal danger, from the
intrigues of the princess Eurydice, who displayed a masculine boldness
in publicly haranguing the soldiers; and from the discontents of the
army, who claimed presents, formerly promised to them by Alexander,
which there were no funds to liquidate at the moment. At Triparadisus
in Syria, Antipater made a second distribution of the satrapies of the
empire; somewhat modified, yet coinciding in the main with that which
had been drawn up shortly after the death of Alexander. To Ptolemy was
assured Egypt and Libya, to Antigonus the Greater Phrygia, Lycia, and
Pamphylia--as each had had before.
Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in
Asia, to crush Eumenes and the other chief adherents of Perdiccas; most
of whom had been condemned to death by a vote of the Macedonian army.
After a certain interval, Antipater himself, accompanied by the kings,
returned to Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed demand on the
part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The war of Antigonus,
first against Eumenes in Cappadocia, next against Alcetas and the other
partisans of Perdiccas in Pisidia, lasted for many months, but was at
length successfully finished. Eumenes, beset by the constant treachery
and insubordination of the Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of
the field. He took refuge with a handful of men in the impregnable and
well-stored fortress of Nora in Cappadocia, where he held out a long
blockade, apparently more than a year, against Antigonus.
THE DEATHS OF ANTIPATER AND OF DEMADES
[Sidenote: [319 B.C.]]
Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close,
Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell into sickness, and presently
died. One of his latest acts was to put to death the Athenian orator
Demades, who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to solicit the removal
of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Antipater had promised, or
given hopes, that if the oligarchy which he had constituted at Athens
maintained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he would withdraw the
garrison. The Athenians endeavoured to prevail on Phocion to go to
Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfilment of this promise; but he
steadily refused. Demades, who willingly undertook the mission, reached
Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself. The papers of the
deceased Perdiccas had come into possession of his opponents; and among
them had been found a letter written to him by Demades, inviting him
to cross over and rescue Greece from her dependence “on an old and
rotten warp”--meaning Antipater. This letter gave great offence to
Antipater--the rather, as Demades is said to have been his habitual
pensioner--and still greater offence to his son Cassander; who caused
Demades with his son to be seized, first killed the son in the immediate
presence and even embrace of the father, and then slew the father
himself, with bitter invective against his ingratitude. All the accounts
which we read depict Demades, in general terms, as a prodigal spendthrift
and a venal and corrupt politician. We have no ground for questioning
this statement; at the same time, we have no specific facts to prove it.
POLYSPERCHON AND CASSANDER
Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of
Alexander’s veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full
powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his own
son Cassander only the second place, as chiliarch, or general of the
bodyguard. He thought that this disposition of power would be more
generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon was older and
of longer military service than any other among Alexander’s generals.
Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of letting dominion fall into
the hands of the princesses; all of whom--Olympias, Cleopatra, and
Eurydice--were energetic characters; and the first of the three (who had
retired to Epirus from enmity towards Antipater) furious and implacable.
[Illustration: PROMONTORY OF SUNIUM]
[Sidenote: [319-318 B.C.]]
But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning, because
Cassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate Polysperchon
as his superior. Immediately after the death of Antipater, but before it
became publicly known, Cassander despatched Nicanor with pretended orders
from Antipater to supersede Menyllus in the government of Munychia. To
this order Menyllus yielded. But when after a few days the Athenian
public came to learn the real truth, they were displeased with Phocion
for having permitted the change to be made--assuming that he knew the
real state of the facts, and might have kept out the new commander.
Cassander, while securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed
partisan, affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and
to occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same
time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places in
furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance with
Antigonus in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. His envoys being generally
well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly, and went to
concert measures with Antigonus in Asia. It suited the policy of Ptolemy,
and still more that of Antigonus, to aid him against Polysperchon and
the imperial dynasty. On the death of Antipater, Antigonus had resolved
to make himself the real sovereign of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire,
possessing as he did the most powerful military force within it.
Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather than
a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference shown to
Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession of Cassander,
placed all the real great powers in active hostility against the dynasty.
Polysperchon and his friends were not blind to the difficulties of their
position. The principal officers in Macedonia having been convened to
deliberate, it was resolved to invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she
might assume the tutelage of her grandson Alexander (son of Roxane);
to place the Asiatic interests of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenes,
appointing him to the supreme command; and to combat Cassander in Europe,
by assuring of themselves the general good will and support of the
Greeks. This last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks
general enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies
and military governments now paramount throughout the cities.
OLYMPIAS AND EUMENES
The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander’s empire in Asia,
against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers--who were
steadily tending to divide and appropriate it--now lay in the fidelity
and military skill of Eumenes. At his disposal Polysperchon placed the
imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially the brave, but
faithless and disorderly Argyraspides. Olympias also addressed to him a
pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the only friend and saviour to
whom the imperial family could now look. Eumenes replied by assuring them
of his devoted adherence to their cause. But he at the same time advised
Olympias not to come out of Epirus into Macedonia; or if she did come, at
all events to abstain from vindictive and cruel proceedings. Both these
recommendations, honourable as well to his prudence as to his humanity,
were disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the
management of affairs; and although her imposing title--of mother to the
great conqueror--raised a strong favourable feeling, yet her multiplied
executions of the Antipatrian partisans excited fatal enmity against a
dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenes, though his advice had
been disregarded, devoted himself in Asia with unshaken fidelity to the
Alexandrine family, resisting the most tempting invitations to take part
with Antigonus against them. His example contributed much to keep alive
the same active sentiment in those around him; indeed, without him, the
imperial family would have had no sincere or commanding representative
in Asia. His gallant struggles for two years against the greatly
preponderant forces of Ptolemy, Antigonus, and Seleucus, and against the
never-ceasing treachery of his own officers and troops are among the most
memorable exploits of antiquity. While even in a military point of view,
they are hardly inferior to the combinations of Alexander himself, they
evince, besides, a flexibility and aptitude such as Alexander neither
possessed nor required, for overcoming the thousand difficulties raised
by traitors and mutineers around him. To the last, Eumenes remained
unsubdued; he was betrayed to Antigonus by the base and venal treachery
of his own soldiers, the Macedonian Argyraspides.
IMPERIAL EDICT RECALLING EXILES
On learning the death of Antipater, most of the Greek cities had sent
envoys to Pella. To all the governments of these cities, composed as they
were of his creatures, it was a matter of the utmost moment to know what
course the new Macedonian authority would adopt. Polysperchon, persuaded
that they would all adhere to Cassander, and that his only chance of
combating that rival was by enlisting popular sympathy and interests in
Greece, or at least by subverting these Antipatrian oligarchies--drew up
in conjunction with his counsellors a proclamation which he issued in the
name of the dynasty.
This proclamation directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the
subversion of all the oligarchies, established by Antipater after
the Lamian War. It ordered the recall of the host of exiles then
expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death of
Alexander--which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an aggregate
of macedonising oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian garrisons. To
the existing Antipatrian oligarchies, however, it was a death-blow;
and so it must have been understood by the Grecian envoys--including
probably deputations from the exiles, as well as envoys from the civic
governments--to whom Polysperchon delivered it at Pella. Not content with
the general edict, Polysperchon addressed special letters to Argos and
various other cities, commanding that the Antipatrian leading men should
be banished with confiscation of property, and in some cases put to
death; the names being probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly,
as it was clear that such stringent measures could not be executed
without force--the rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by
Cassander from without--Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military
force into Greece; sending thither first, however, a considerable
detachment, for immediate operations, under his son Alexander.
To Athens, as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed special
letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recall of the exiles.
At Athens, such change was a greater revolution than elsewhere, because
the multitude of exiles and persons deported had been the greatest. To
the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens, it was doubtless odious
and alarming; while to Phocion, with the other leading Antipatrians,
it threatened not only loss of power, but probably nothing less than
the alternative of flight or death. The state of interests at Athens,
however, was now singularly novel and complicated. There were the
Antipatrians and the nine thousand qualified citizens, there were the
exiles, who, under the new edict, speedily began re-entering the city,
and reclaiming their citizenship as well as their property. Polysperchon
and his son were known to be soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly,
there was Nicanor, who held Munychia with a garrison, neither for
Polysperchon, nor for the Athenians, but for Cassander; the latter being
himself also expected with a force from Asia. Here then were several
parties--each distinct in views and interests from the rest, some
decidedly hostile to each other.
CONTEST AT ATHENS
The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nicanor respecting
Munychia; which they required him to evacuate, pursuant to the recent
proclamation. Nicanor on his side returned an evasive answer, promising
compliance as soon as circumstances permitted, but in the meantime
entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with Cassander, as they
had been with his father Antipater. He seems to have indulged hopes of
prevailing on them to declare in his favour--and not without plausible
grounds, since the Antipatrian leaders and a proportion of the nine
thousand citizens could not but dread the execution of Polysperchon’s
edict. And he had also what was of still greater moment--the secret
connivance and support of Phocion: who put himself in intimate relation
with Nicanor, as he had before done with Menyllus--and who had greater
reason than any one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon.
Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nicanor had been
secretly introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia. Presently, making an
unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, he took Piræus by surprise,
placed both the town and harbour under military occupation, and cut off
its communication with Athens by a ditch and palisade. On this palpable
aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms. But Phocion as general damped
their ardour, and even declined to head them in an attack for the
recovery of Piræus before Nicanor should have had time to strengthen
himself in it.
[Illustration: GREEK PEASANT
(After Hope)]
The occupation of Piræus in addition to Munychia was a serious calamity
to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had been even under
Antipater. Piræus, rich, active, and commercial, containing the Athenian
arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was in many respects more valuable
than Athens itself--for all purposes of war, far more valuable. Cassander
had now an excellent place of arms and base, which Munychia alone would
not have afforded, for his operations in Greece against Polysperchon;
upon whom therefore the loss fell hardly less severely than upon the
Athenians. Now Phocion, in his function as general, had been forewarned
of the danger, might have guarded against it, and ought to have done
so. This was a grave dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any
other explanation except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that
Phocion, foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the triumph
of Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favouring
the seizure of Piræus by Nicanor, as a means of constraining Athens to
adopt the alliance with Cassander; which alliance indeed would probably
have been brought about, had Cassander reached Piræus by sea sooner
than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phocion was here guilty,
at the very least, of culpable neglect, and probably of still more
culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both Polysperchon
and the Athenians; a fact which we must not forget, when we come to read
presently the bitter animosity exhibited against him.
The news that Nicanor had possessed himself of Piræus, produced a strong
sensation. Presently arrived a letter addressed to him by Olympias
herself, commanding him to surrender the place to the Athenians, upon
whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. But Nicanor declined obedience
to her order, still waiting for support from Cassander. The arrival of
Alexander (Polysperchon’s son) with a body of troops, encouraged the
Athenians to believe that he was come to assist in carrying Piræus by
force, for the purpose of restoring it to them. Their hopes, however,
were again disappointed. Though encamped near Piræus, Alexander made
no demand for the Athenian forces to co-operate with him in attacking
it; but entered into open parley with Nicanor, whom he endeavoured to
persuade or corrupt into surrendering the place. When this negotiation
failed, he resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was
already on his march towards Attica with the main army.
INTRIGUES OF PHOCION
[Sidenote: [318 B.C.]]
It was Phocion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander
to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Piræus for
the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phocion, the
reconstitution of autonomous Athens--with its democracy and restored
exiles, and without any foreign controlling force--was an assured
sentence of banishment, if not of death. Not having been able to
obtain protection from the foreign force of Nicanor and Cassander, he
and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of Alexander
and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered Attica,
represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a military
position as Piræus, while the war was yet unfinished, and offered to
co-operate with him for this purpose, by proper management of the
Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions, accepted
Phocion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens, and looked
upon Piræus as a capture to be secured for himself. Numerous returning
Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander’s army. It seems that Phocion was
desirous of admitting the troops, along with the exiles, as friends and
allies into the walls of Athens, so as to make Alexander master of the
city; but that this project was impracticable in consequence of the
mistrust created among the Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with
Nicanor.
The strategic function of Phocion, however--so often conferred and
re-conferred upon him--and his power of doing either good or evil, now
approached its close. As soon as the returning exiles found themselves
in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision of the list of state
officers, and for the re-establishment of the democratical forms. They
passed a vote to depose those who had held office under the Antipatrian
oligarchy, and who still continued to hold it down to the actual
moment. Among these Phocion stood first: along with him were his
son-in-law Charicles, the Phalerean Demetrius, Callimedon, Nicocles,
Thudippus, Hegemon, and Philocles. These persons were not only deposed,
but condemned--some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of
property. Demetrius, Charicles, and Callimedon sought safety by leaving
Attica; but Phocion and the rest merely went to Alexander’s camp,
throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of the recent
understanding. Alexander not only received them courteously, but gave
them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting safety and protection
for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who were still eager to
do all in their power to support him. Armed with these letters, Phocion
and his companions went through Bœotia and Phocis to meet Polysperchon on
his march southward. They were accompanied by Dinarchus and by a Platæan
named Solon, both of them passing for friends of Polysperchon.
The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the
recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander
had espoused the cause of Phocion and had recommended the like policy
to his father. It was possible that Polysperchon might seek, with his
powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Piræus, and might
avail himself of Phocion (like Antipater after the Lamian War) as a
convenient instrument of government. It seems plain that this was the
project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phocion as a ready auxiliary
in both. Now the restored democrats, though owing their restoration to
Polysperchon, were much less compliant towards him than Phocion had
been. Not only would they not admit him into the city, but they would
not even acquiesce in his separate occupation of Munychia and Piræus. On
the proposition of Agnonides and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to
Polysperchon accusing Phocion and his comrades of high treason; yet at
the same time claiming for Athens the full and undiminished benefit of
the late regal proclamation--autonomy and democracy, with restoration of
Piræus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.
As the sentiment now prevalent at Athens evinced clearly that Phocion
could not be again useful to him as an instrument, Polysperchon heard his
defence with impatience, interrupted him several times, and so disgusted
him that he at length struck the ground with his stick, and held his
peace. Hegemon, another of the accused, was yet more harshly treated. The
sentence could not be doubtful. Phocion and his companions were delivered
over as prisoners to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from
the king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that
he left them to be judged by the Athenians--now restored to freedom and
autonomy.
PHOCION’S DISGRACE
The Macedonian Clitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as
prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered the
city; being carried along the Ceramicus in carts, through sympathising
friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached the theatre,
wherein the assembly was to be convened.
The common feeling of antipathy against him burst out into furious
manifestations. Agnonides the principal accuser, supported by Epicurus
and Demophilus, found their denunciations welcomed and even anticipated,
when they arraigned Phocion as a criminal who had lent his hand to the
subversion of the constitution, to the sufferings of his deported
fellow-citizens, and to the holding of Athens in subjection under a
foreign potentate; in addition to which, the betrayal of Piræus to
Nicanor constituted a new crime--fastening on the people the yoke of
Cassander, when autonomy had been promised to them by the recent imperial
edict. After the accusation was concluded, Phocion was called on for
his defence; but he found it impossible to obtain a hearing. Attempting
several times to speak, he was as often interrupted by angry shouts;
several of his friends were cried down in like manner; until at length he
gave up the case in despair, and exclaimed:
“For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce against myself the
sentence of death for my political conduct; but why are you to sentence
these men near me, who are not guilty?”
[Illustration: GREEK TERRA-COTTA JAR
(In the British Museum)]
“Because they are your friends, Phocion,” was the exclamation of those
around. Phocion then said no more; while Agnonides proposed a decree,
to the effect that the assembled people should decide by show of
hands, whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not; and that
if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present
cried out that the penalty of torture ought to precede death: but this
savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in respect to
citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonides than by the Macedonian
officer Clitus. The decree was then passed; after which the show of
hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly was held up in
condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make the effect more
imposing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths in token of triumph.
After sentence, the five condemned persons, Phocion, Nicocles, Thudippus,
Hegemon, and Pythocles, were consigned to the supreme magistrates of
Police, called the Eleven, and led to prison for the purpose of having
the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile bystanders ran
alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said that one man
planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phocion; who turned to the
public officers and exclaimed, “Will no one check this indecent fellow?”
This was the only emotion which he manifested; in other respects, his
tranquillity and self-possession were resolutely maintained, during this
soul-subduing march from the theatre to the prison, amidst the wailings
of his friends, the broken spirit of his four comrades, and the fiercest
demonstrations of antipathy from his fellow-citizens generally. One ray
of comfort presented itself as he entered the prison. It was the day
on which the Knights celebrated their festal procession with wreaths
on their heads in honour of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in
passing, took off their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the
gratings of the prison.
Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phocus, Phocion
replied: “I tell him emphatically, not to hold evil memory of the
Athenians.” The draught of hemlock was then administered to all five--to
Phocion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were not buried
in Attica; nor were Phocion’s friends allowed to light a funeral pile
for the burning of his body; which was carried out of Attica into the
Megarid, by a hired agent named Conopion, and there burned by fire
obtained at Megara. The wife of Phocion, with her maids, poured libations
and marked the spot by a small mound of earth; she also collected the
bones and brought them back to Athens in her bosom, during the secrecy of
night. She buried them near her own domestic hearth, with this address:
“Beloved Hestia, I confide to thee these relics of a good man. Restore
them to his own family vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to
their senses.”[43]
After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did thus
come to their senses. They discovered that Phocion had been a faithful
and excellent public servant, repented of their severity towards him,
celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense, erected a statue
in his honour, and put to death Agnonides by public judicial sentence;
while Epicurus and Demophilus fled from the city and were slain by
Phocion’s son.
These facts are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice the
real explanation of them. Within two or three months after the death of
Phocion, Cassander, already in possession of Piræus and Munychia, became
also master of Athens; the oligarchical or Phocionic party again acquired
predominance; Demetrius the Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed
to administer the city under Cassander, as Phocion had administered it
under Antipater.
We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of an
old man above eighty,--personally brave, mild, and superior to all
pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration was
concerned,--perishing under an intense and crushing storm of popular
execration. But when we look at the whole case--when we survey, not
merely the details of Phocion’s administration, but the grand public
objects which those details subserved, and towards which he conducted
his fellow-citizens--we shall see that this judgment is fully merited.
In Phocion’s patriotism--for so doubtless he himself sincerely conceived
it--no account was taken of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or
self-management of the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference
to foreign kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had
neither the Panhellenic sentiment of Aristides, Callicratidas, and
Demosthenes, nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the devotion of
Agesilaus to Sparta, and of Epaminondas to Thebes. To Phocion it was
indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate of autonomous cities, with
Athens as first or second among them, or one of the satrapies under the
Macedonian kings. Now this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian
public man.
It was precisely during the fifty years of Phocion’s political and
military influence, that the Greeks were degraded from a state of
freedom, into absolute servitude. In so far as this great public
misfortune can be imputed to anyone man--to no one was it more ascribable
than to Phocion. He was strategus during most of the long series of years
when Philip’s power was growing; it was his duty to look ahead for the
safety of his countrymen, and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard
the warnings of Demosthenes, and he possessed exactly those qualities
which were wanting to Demosthenes--military energy and aptitude. Had he
lent his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the
inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the kings of
Macedon might have been kept within their own limits, and the future
history of Greece might have been altogether different. Unfortunately,
he took the opposite side. He acted with Æschines and the Philippisers;
without receiving money from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip
desired--by nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenes and
the other active politicians. After the battle of Chæronea, Phocion
received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterwards, marks of
esteem not shown towards any other Athenian. This was both the fruit
and the proof of his past political action--anti-Hellenic as well as
anti-Athenian.
Having done much, in the earlier part of his life, to promote the
subjugation of Greece under the Macedonian kings, he contributed
somewhat, during the latter half, to lighten the severity of their
dominion; and it is the most honourable point in his character that
he always refrained from abusing their marked favour towards himself,
for purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his
fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even during
the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful friendship, but
tendered to him the largest presents--at one time the sum of one hundred
talents [£20,000 or $100,000]; at another time the choice of four towns
on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxes gave to Themistocles. He even
expressed his displeasure when Phocion, refusing everything, consented
only to request the liberation of three Grecian prisoners confined at
Sardis. The intense and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an
instructive, though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against
the man or the administrator--for in both characters Phocion had been
blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nicanor in the seizure
of the Piræus--but against his public policy. It was the last protest of
extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the tomb in a voice of
thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust, inertia, self-seeking,
and corruption, which had betrayed the once autonomous Athens to a
foreign conqueror.[e]
FOOTNOTES
[42] [Plutarch[c] tells this story: “A certain soldier being sent for to
come unto his captain, did put such pieces of gold as he had into the
hands of Demosthenes’ statue, which had both his hands joined together:
and there grew hard by it a great plane tree, divers leaves whereof either
blown off by wind by chance, or else put there of purpose by the soldier,
covered so this gold, that it was there a long time, and no man found
it: until such time as the soldier came again, and found it as he left
it. Hereupon this matter running abroad in every man’s mouth, there were
divers wise men that took occasion of this subject to make epigrams in the
praise of Demosthenes, who in his life was never corrupted.” But the same
story was told of other statues.]
[43] Plutarch, _Phocion_, 36, 37. Two other anecdotes are recounted by
Plutarch, which seem to be of doubtful authenticity. Nicocles entreated
that he might be allowed to swallow his potion before Phocion; upon which
the latter replied: “Your request, Nicocles, is sad and mournful; but as I
have never yet refused you anything throughout my life, I grant this also.”
After the first four had drunk, all except Phocion, no more hemlock was
left; upon which the jailer said that he would not prepare any more,
unless twelve drachmæ of money were given to him to buy the material. Some
hesitation took place, until Phocion asked one of his friends to supply
the money, sarcastically remarking that it was hard if a man could not
even die _gratis_ at Athens.[c]
[Illustration]