The great conqueror is so much more of a cosmopolitan than a Greek
that it has been possible and advisable to trace his career as a unit
almost without alluding to the little territory his father had been so
anxious to acquire and appease. But Greece, never quiet, was not stagnant
during the absence of Alexander; and before taking up the tangle of the
successors of Alexander, it will be well to glance at the activities of
the Grecians and their futile restiveness.[a]
The springs of that policy among the Grecian republics, which produced
war against Alexander in Greece itself while he was prosecuting the
war of the Grecian confederacy against Persia--nowhere declared by
ancient writers, but seeming rather studiously involved in mist by some
of them--may nevertheless, by a careful examination of information
remaining, in a great degree be traced.
Nothing in ancient history remains more fully ascertained than that,
under the Macedonian supremacy, the Grecian republics enjoyed, not only
more liberty and independency than under the Athenian or Lacedæmonian
supremacy, but, as far as appears, all that could be consistent with the
connection of all as one people. Nor did it rest there; Demosthenes,
in the Athenian assembly, reviled the Macedonian monarchs, the allies
of his commonwealth, the heads of the Grecian confederacy, in a manner
that in modern times would be reckoned highly indecent towards an
enemy; and he avowed and even boasted of treasonable practices against
the general confederacy, of which his commonwealth was a member. “I,”
he said, “excited Lacedæmon against Alexander: I procured the revolt
against him in Thessaly and Perrhæbia.” In fact the government of Athens,
described, as we have formerly seen, by Xenophon and Isocrates as in
their time verging towards anarchy, is largely shown, in the extant works
of following orators, and especially in the celebrated contest between
Æschines and Demosthenes, to have been still advancing in corruption
and degradation. During the whole time that Alexander was in Asia, the
struggle of parties was violent--one, under Demosthenes, with the support
of Persia, contended ably and indefatigably for the mastery of Athens
and of Greece; the other, after Isocrates, looking to Phocion as their
leader, desired peace under the established supremacy of Macedonia,
and above all things dreaded the ascendency of Demosthenes and his
associates.
[Sidenote: [333-331 B.C.]]
Of the domestic politics of Lacedæmon information rarely comes to us
but through transactions with other states. Agis, the reigning king of
the Proclidean family, whom we have seen already active in enmity to
Macedonia, appears to have been a man of character to suit the purposes
of Demosthenes. Possibly he was not much grieved, nor perhaps was
Demosthenes, at the death of Memnon. Had Memnon lived, either could have
been but second of the Greeks of the party; which could no way maintain
itself but through the patronage of Persia. By Memnon’s death indeed
great advantages were lost, and a contest of far less hope for the party
altogether remained. But in that contest Demosthenes reckoned, by his
talents and his extensive political communication, to hold the first
importance among the Greeks, while Agis reckoned himself effectually
first, by his regal dignity and the old eminence of the Lacedæmonian
state; both trusting that they should still not fail of support from
Persia. Till the battle of Issus the hopes of both might reasonably run
high; and evidently they were not abandoned on the adverse event of that
battle.
Looking to facts acknowledged by all, we find the half-ruined state of
Lacedæmon never ceasing to avow a political opposition, at length growing
into open hostility to the confederacy of republics, constitutionally
established under the lead of Macedonia; as constitutionally, it appears,
as ever before under the lead of Lacedæmon, Athens, or Thebes. In Athens
itself an opposition to the Macedonian interest was always openly
maintained. Negotiation was carried on by Lacedæmon among the other
republics with avowed hostile purpose, and adverse intrigue from Athens
appears to have been no secret. Against this open political hostility no
interference of force has been even pretended to have been used; and,
in all appearance, hardly so much opposition of influence as honest
prudence might require. Negligence, inertness, short-sightedness, may
seem, with more reason, to be imputed; yet they never have been imputed
to Antipater, to whom the government of Macedonia and the protection
of the Macedonian party in Greece were committed. While then the
Macedonian supremacy, if not remissly, was liberally exercised, the party
interests in every Grecian state, the inveterate hatred everywhere of
fellow-citizens to fellow-citizens, and the generally active and restless
temper of the Grecian people afforded ground for that league against the
confederacy of the Greek nations acknowledging the lead of Macedonia,
which Demosthenes and Agis succeeded in forming.
CONFEDERACY AGAINST MACEDONIA
[Sidenote: [331-330 B.C.]]
It is beyond question that Persian gold, imputed by all writers,
greatly promoted the Persian interest. It appears to have been after
the disastrous battle of Arbela, when the Persian monarch’s hope even
of personal safety depended on opportunity to raise new enemies to
Alexander, that he found means to make remittances to Greece. Æschines,
uncontradicted by Demosthenes, stated before the assembled Athenian
people, as a matter publicly known and not to be gainsaid, that a
present to them of three hundred talents (about sixty thousand pounds)
was offered in the name of the king of Persia. The prevalence of
Phocion’s party however at the time sufficed to procure a refusal of the
disgraceful offer.
But in Peloponnesus the Persian party, under the lead of the king
of Lacedæmon, for whom there was no difficulty in taking subsidies
from the Persian court, obtained superiority. Argos and Messenia
were inveterately hostile to Lacedæmon, and were indeed neither by
bribes nor threats to be gained. But all Elis, all Arcadia, except
Megalopolis, and all Achaia, one small town only refusing, renounced
the confederacy under the lead of Macedonia, and joined Lacedæmon in
war, equally against Macedonia and all Grecian republics which might
adhere to the confederacy. Beyond the peninsula the opposite politics
generally prevailed; though in Athens Phocion’s party could do no more
than maintain nominal adherence to engagement, and a real neutrality;
the weight of the party of Demosthenes sufficing to prevent any exertion
against the Lacedæmonian league.
That league however was not of such extent that it could be hoped, with
the civic troops only of the several states, to support war against
the general confederacy under the lead of Macedonia; and those states
were not of wealth to maintain any considerable number of those, called
mercenaries, ready to engage with any party. Nevertheless mercenary
troops were engaged for that league, to the number, if the contemporary
orator Dinarchus should be trusted, of ten thousand--Persia supplying the
means, as Æschines, still uncontradicted by Demosthenes, affirms; and
another source is hardly to be imagined. With such preparation and such
support Agis ventured to commence offensive war. A small force of the
opposing Peloponnesian states was overborne and destroyed or dispersed;
siege was laid to the only adverse Arcadian city, Megalopolis, and its
fall was expected daily.
Alexander was then in pursuit of Darius. Accounts of him received in
Greece of course would vary: some reported him in the extreme north
of Asia; others in India. Meanwhile revolt in Thessaly and Perrhæbia,
excited by the able intrigues of Demosthenes, and, according to
Diodorus,[c] also in Thrace, distressed Antipater; while it was a most
imperious duty upon him, as vicegerent of the head of the Grecian
confederacy, to protect the members of that confederacy, apparently the
most numerous part of the nation, against the domestic enemy, supported
by the great foreign enemy who threatened them.
WAR IN GREECE
Accounts remaining, both of the circumstances of the Macedonian kingdom
at the time, and of following events, are very defective. But it appears
indicated that no Macedonian force, that could be spared for war
southward, would enable Antipater to meet Agis; and it was long before
he could excite the republican Greeks, adverse to the Lacedæmonian and
Persian interest, however dreading its prevalence, to assemble in arms
in sufficient numbers. His success however in quelling the disturbances
in Thessaly and Thrace, encouraging the zeal of that portion of the
Greek nation which dreaded republican empire, whether democratical under
Demosthenes or oligarchical under Agis, enabled him at length to raise
superior numbers.
Megalopolis had resisted beyond expectation. Antipater, entering
Peloponnesus to relieve that place, was met by Agis. A sanguinary battle
ensued. The Lacedæmonians are said to have fought with all the obstinacy
which their ancient institutions required, and which their ancient fame
was adapted to inspire. But they were overborne: Agis, fighting at
their head, with the spirit of a hero rather, apparently, than with the
skill of a general, received a wound which disabled him, so that it was
necessary to carry him out of the field. His troops, unable to resist
superior numbers, directed by superior skill, took to flight. Diodorus
relates that, pressed by the pursuing enemy, he peremptorily commanded
his attendants to save themselves, and leave him with his arms; and
that, disabled as he was, refusing quarter and threatening all who
approached him, he fought till he was killed.
The conduct of the victor then was what became the delegate of the
elected superintendent and protector of the liberties of Greece. The
Lacedæmonian government, feeling its inability to maintain the war in
which it was engaged, and the principal instigator being no more, sent a
deputation to Antipater to treat for peace. Antipater, as deputy of the
captain-general and vicegerent of the Greek nation, took nothing further
upon himself than to summon a congress of the several republics to
Corinth, to which he referred the Lacedæmonian ministers. There matters
were much debated and various opinions declared. The decision at last, in
the historian’s succinct account, appears not what might best become the
wisdom and dignity of a nation accustomed to appreciate its ascertained
privileges, or what ought to be such. Unable to agree upon a measure to
afford precedent for future times, the resource was to decree that the
Lacedæmonian state, submitting itself to the mercy of their great and
magnanimous captain-general, should send fifty principal Spartans into
Macedonia, as hostages to insure obedience to his decision. We owe to
Curtius the additional probable information that the assembly set a fine
of 120 talents [about £24,000 or $120,000] upon the Eleans and Achæans,
to compensate to the Megalopolitans the damages done in the hostile
operations against them.
It seems likely the Lacedæmonians rejoiced in a sentence which, in
so great a degree, secured them against the usual virulence of party
animosity among the Greeks, and the result of which they had reason to
hope would be liberal and mild. It does not appear that anything more
was required than to acknowledge error in hostile opposition to the
general council of the nation, and to send, thus late, the Lacedæmonian
contingent of troops for maintaining the Grecian empire, already
acquired, in Asia.[b]
This blow riveted the chains forged at Chæronea, which however were still
destined to be burst by more than one gallant struggle, though never to
be finally shaken off. Alexander, when he heard of Antipater’s success,
is said to have spoken contemptuously of “the battle of mice,” which his
lieutenant had been fighting, while he had been slaughtering myriads, and
overrunning kingdoms; and while the event continued unknown, it did not
in the slightest degree interfere with his operations. Yet Antipater’s
victory was perhaps not much less hardly won than either of his own over
Darius. But from the distance at which he now stood, Greece and Macedonia
began to appear very diminutive objects. His little kingdom was now
chiefly valuable to him as a nursery of soldiers; and the most important
advantage which he reaped from the establishment of his power in Greece,
was that it insured a constant succession of recruits for his army.
AFFAIRS AT ATHENS
It is rather surprising that when Agis--encouraged by the great distance
which separated Alexander from Europe, by perhaps exaggerated rumours of
the dangers that threatened him in Asia, and by the disasters which had
befallen the Macedonian arms at home--ventured on his ill-fated struggle
Athens remained neutral. It was afterward made a ground of accusation
against Demosthenes, that he had taken no advantage of this occasion to
display the hostility which he always professed towards Alexander. The
event proves that he took the most prudent course; but his motives must
remain doubtful. He was perhaps restrained, not by his opinion of the
hopelessness of the attempt, but by the disposition to peace, which he
found prevailing at home, whether the effect of fear or of jealousy, or
of any other cause. Had the people been ready to embark in the contest,
an orator probably would not have been wanting to animate them to it.
But Demosthenes may still have given secret encouragement and assistance
to the Peloponnesian confederates, and may have alluded to this, when,
according to his adversary’s report, he boasted that the league was
his work. The issue of that struggle, and the news which arrived soon
after, of the great victory by which Alexander had decided the fate
of the Persian monarchy at Gaugamela [Arbela], must have crushed all
hope at Athens, except one, which might have been suggested by domestic
experience, that the conqueror’s boundless ambition might still lead him
into some enterprise beyond his strength.
DEMOSTHENES AND ÆSCHINES
There was however a party there, which did not dissemble the interest
it felt in the success of the Macedonian arms. Before the battle of
Issus, when Alexander was commonly believed to be in great danger, and
Demosthenes was assured by his correspondents that he could not escape
destruction, Æschines says, that he was himself continually taunted
by his rival, who exultingly displayed the letters that conveyed the
joyful tidings, with the dejection he betrayed at the prospect of the
disaster which threatened his friends. Æschines was the active leader
of the macedonising party: all his hopes of a final triumph over his
political adversaries were grounded on the Macedonian ascendency. But
Phocion, though his motives were very different, added all the weight of
his influence to the same side. His sentiments were so well known, that
Alexander himself treated him as a highly honoured friend; addressed
letters to him from Asia, with a salutation which he used to no one
else except Antipater, and repeatedly pressed him to accept magnificent
presents. Phocion indeed constantly rejected them; and when Alexander
wrote that their friendship must cease if he persisted to decline all his
offers, was only moved to intercede in behalf of some prisoners, whose
liberty he immediately obtained.
[Illustration: URNS AND VASES]
[Sidenote: [337-325 B.C.]]
The disaster of Chæronea (337 B.C.) had held out a signal to the enemies
of Demosthenes at Athens, to unite their efforts against him. He had
been assailed in the period following that event until Philip’s death,
by every kind of legal engine that could be brought to bear upon him; by
prosecutions of the most various form and colour. All these experiments
had failed; the people had honoured him with more signal proofs of its
confidence than he had ever before received: he had never taken a more
active part, or exercised a more powerful sway, in public affairs. Yet
it seems that after the Macedonian arms had completely triumphed, both
in Asia and in Greece, Æschines thought the opportunity favourable for
another attempt of the same nature. This trial, the most celebrated of
ancient pleadings, the most memorable event in the history of eloquence
throughout all past ages, deserves mention here, chiefly for the light
it throws on the character and temper of the Athenian tribunals, at a
time when the people is supposed to have been verging towards utter
degeneracy, so as to be hardly any longer an object of historical
interest--a time, it must be remembered, when the rest of Greece was
quailing beneath the yoke of the stranger, and his will, dictated to the
so-called national congress at Corinth, was sovereign and irresistible.
The occasion of this prosecution arose out of two offices with which
Demosthenes had been entrusted, in the year, it seems, after that of the
battle of Chæronea. He had been appointed by his tribe to superintend
the repairs which, according to a decree proposed by himself, the city
walls were to undergo, the work being equally distributed among the ten
tribes. At the same time he filled another post--the treasurership of
the theoric fund, which involved a large share in the general control
and direction of the finances. In both offices he had made a liberal
contribution out of his own property to the service of the state. On
this ground, but more especially as a mark of approbation for his public
conduct on all occasions, a decree was passed, on the motion of his
friend Ctesiphon, that he should be presented with a golden crown. For
this decree Æschines had indicted Ctesiphon as having broken the law in
three points: first, because it was illegal to crown a magistrate before
he had rendered an account of his office; next, because it was forbidden
to proclaim such an honour, when bestowed by the people, in any other
place than the assembly-ground in the Pnyx, but particularly to proclaim
it, as Ctesiphon had proposed; and, lastly, because the reason assigned
in the decree, so far as related to the public conduct of Demosthenes,
was false, inasmuch as he had not deserved any reward. The question at
issue was, in substance, whether Demosthenes had been a good or a bad
citizen. Hence the prosecutor, after a short discussion of the dry legal
arguments, enters, as on his main subject, into a full review of the
public and private life of Demosthenes; and Demosthenes, whose interest
it was to divert attention from the points of law, which were not his
strong ground, can scarcely find room for them in his defence of his own
policy and proceedings, which, with bitter attacks on his adversary,
occupies almost the whole of his speech.
His boast is that throughout his political career he had kept one object
steadily in view: to strengthen Athens within and without, and to
preserve her independence, particularly against the power and the arts
of Philip. He owned that he had failed; but it was after he had done all
that one man in his situation--a citizen of a commonwealth--could do. He
had failed in a cause in which defeat was more glorious than victory in
any other, in a struggle not less worthy of Athens than those in which
her heroic citizens in past ages had earned their fame. In a word, the
whole oration breathes the spirit of that high philosophy which, whether
learned in the schools or from life, has consoled the noblest of our
kind in prisons, and on scaffolds, and under every persecution of adverse
fortune, but in the tone necessary to impress a mixed multitude with
a like feeling, and to elevate it for a while into a sphere above its
own. The effect it produced on that most susceptible audience can be but
faintly conceived. The result was that Æschines not only lost his cause,
but did not even obtain a fifth part of the votes, and consequently,
according to law, incurred a small penalty. But he seems to have felt it
insupportable to remain at the scene of his defeat, where he must have
lived silent and obscure. He quitted Athens, and crossed over to Asia,
with the view it is said of seeking protection from Alexander, through
whose aid alone he could now hope to triumph over his adversaries.
When this prospect vanished, he retired to Rhodes, where he opened a
school of oratory, which produced a long series of voluble sophists, and
is considered as the origin of a new style of eloquence, technically
called the Asiatic, which stood in a relation to the Attic not unlike
that of the composite capital to the Ionic volute, and was destined to
prevail in the East wherever the Greek language was spoken, down to
the fall of the Roman Empire. He died at Samos, about nine years after
Alexander, having survived both his great antagonist and his friend
Phocion.
DEIFICATION OF ALEXANDER; THE GOLD OF HARPALUS
[Sidenote: [325-324 B.C.]]
In the course of the year preceding Alexander’s death, the stillness and
obscurity of Athenian history were broken, partly by the new measures
adopted by the conqueror on his return from India with respect to Greece,
and partly by the adventures of Harpalus.
Alexander’s claim of divine honours could not be viewed in Greece with
the same feelings which it had excited among the victorious Macedonians.
To the people bowed down by irresistible necessity under a foreign
yoke, it was not a point of great moment under what form or title the
conqueror, in the plenitude of his power, chose to remind them of their
subjection. They might consider the demand as a wanton insult; but it
was in no other sense an injury. There might not be many base enough to
recommend it, but there were perhaps still fewer so unwise as to think it
a fit ground for resistance. It involved no surrender of religious faith,
even in those who were firmly attached to the popular creed; and the
ridicule for which it afforded so fair a mark was, with most, sufficient
revenge for its insolence. The Spartan answer to the king’s envoys was
perhaps the best: “If Alexander will be a god, let him.” At Athens there
was something more of debate on the question; yet it hardly seems that
opinions were seriously divided on it. It was opposed by a young orator,
named Pytheas. It was observed by the more practical statesmen, that he
was not yet of an age to give advice on matters of such importance. He
replied that he was older than Alexander, whom they proposed to make a
god. Lycurgus appears to have spoken, with the severity suited to his
character, of “the new god, from whose temple none could depart without
need of purification.” But it does not follow that he wished to see the
demand rejected. At least Demades and Demosthenes were agreed on the main
point, and their language, as far as it is reported, seems to have been
very similar. Demades warned the people not to lose earth while they
contested the possession of heaven; and Demosthenes advised them not to
contend with Alexander about celestial honours. The assembly acquiesced
in the king’s demand.[40]
But the order relating to the return of the exiles awakened very much
stronger feelings, partly of fear, and partly of indignation. It appears
that Alexander, before he set out on his expedition, when it was his
object to conciliate the Greeks, had engaged by solemn compact with the
national congress at Corinth--perhaps only confirming one before made
by Philip--not to interfere with the existing institutions of any Greek
state, but to preserve them inviolate. The tendency of Alexander’s new
measure was to effect a revolution, wherever Macedonian influence was
not yet completely predominant, throughout Greece. Nicanor, a Stagirite,
had been sent down by Alexander to publish his decree during the games
at Olympia. There were some thousands of the exiles and their friends
collected there, who listened to the proclamation with joy. It was in the
form of a letter addressed to them in a style of imperial brevity: “King
Alexander to the exiles from the Greek cities. We were not the author of
your exile, but we will restore you to your homes, all but those who are
under a curse [for sacrilege or murder]. And we have written to Antipater
on the subject, that he may compel those cities which are unwilling to
receive you.”
Great alarm ensued at Athens among those who had reason to dread the
execution of the decree. The people would not comply with it, but still
did not venture openly to reject it. A middle course was taken, by which
time at least was gained. An embassy was sent to Alexander, to deprecate
his interference; and at Babylon the Athenian envoys met those of several
other Greek states, who had come on the same business. In the meanwhile
there prevailed at home not only great anxiety about the issue of the
embassy, but fears for the immediate safety of the city.
[Sidenote: [324-323 B.C.]]
Such was the state of affairs at Athens, when the appearance of Harpalus
gave rise to fresh perplexity and uneasiness. The precise time when he
arrived on the coast of Attica is difficult to ascertain. But it seems
most probable that it was after the return of Demosthenes from Olympia.
Harpalus, as we have seen, carried away some five thousand talents, and
had collected about six thousand mercenaries. He must therefore have
crossed the Ægean with a little squadron; and it is probable that the
rumour of his approach reached Athens at least some days before him. He
had reason to hope for a favourable reception. He came with his Athenian
mistress, for whose sake he had conferred a substantial benefit on
her native city; and he had already gained at least one friend there,
on whose influence he may have founded great expectations: Charicles,
Phocion’s son-in-law, who had descended so low as to undertake the
erection of the monument in honour of Pythionice, and had received
thirty talents by way of reimbursement. He might calculate still more
confidently on the force of the temptation which his treasure and his
troops held out to the people, if they were already disposed to risk an
open quarrel with Alexander, and on the ample means of corruption he
possessed. These hopes were disappointed, and at first he certainly met
with a total repulse. It seems most probable--though our authors leave
this doubtful--that his squadron was not permitted to enter Piræus. We
know that a debate took place on his first arrival, that Demosthenes
advised the people not to receive him, and that Philocles, the general
in command at Munychia, was ordered to prevent his entrance. Philocles
indeed appears afterwards to have disobeyed this order; but it is
probable that he did not immediately allow Harpalus to land. The fullest
account we have of the proceedings of Harpalus on his first appearance in
the roads of Munychia, is contained in the few words of Diodorus; that,
“finding no one to listen to him, he left his mercenaries at Tænarus, and
with a part of his treasure came himself to implore the protection of the
people.” The sum which he brought with him was a little more than 750
talents: enough certainly to buy the greater part of the venal orators;
and many yielded to the temptation.
Whether Demosthenes was one of those who accepted a bribe from Harpalus,
has been a disputed point from his own day to ours. It will appear from
the following narrative that the evidence cannot be considered as quite
conclusive on either side; all that can be proved in his favour is that,
the more fully the facts of the case are stated, the more glaring are the
absurdities and contradictions involved in the suppositions of his guilt,
while the few facts which tend that way may be very easily reconciled
with the supposition of his innocence.
The part which he took in the public debates on the affair, is known from
good authority--mostly from that of his contemporaries and accusers. It
is universally admitted that he was one of those who at the first opposed
the reception of Harpalus. After the return of Harpalus to Athens, when
he had gained over several of the orators to his side, envoys came from
several quarters--from Antipater, from Olympias, and it seems also from
Philoxenus, a Macedonian, who filled a high office in Asia Minor--to
require that he should be given up. Demosthenes and Phocion both resisted
this demand; and Demosthenes carried a decree, by which it was directed,
that the treasure should be lodged in the citadel, to be restored to
Alexander, and he himself was empowered to receive it. Its amount was
declared by Harpalus himself; but, out of the 750 talents no more than
308 remained in his possession. It was clear that nearly 450 had found
their way into other hands. Demosthenes now caused another decree to be
passed, by which the Areopagus was directed to investigate the case, and
he proposed that instead of the ordinary penalty--tenfold the amount
of the bribe--capital punishment should be inflicted on the offenders.
A very rigid inquiry was instituted; the houses of all suspected
persons--with the single exception of one who had been just married--were
searched: the Areopagus made its report against several, and among them
was Demosthenes himself. He was the first who was brought to trial, was
found guilty, and condemned to pay fifty talents. Being unable to raise
this sum, he was thrown into prison, but soon after made his escape and
went into exile.
One point is indisputably clear: that Demosthenes, whether bribed or
not, did not change sides. Harpalus, notwithstanding the efforts of
Demosthenes and Phocion in his behalf, was committed to prison, to await
Alexander’s pleasure. He however made his escape, returned to Tænarus,
and thence crossed over with his troops, and the rest of his treasure,
to Crete. Here he was assassinated by Thimbron, one of his confidential
officers. His steward fled to Rhodes, where he was seized by order of
Philoxenus, and forced to disclose the names of those who had accepted
bribes from his master. The list was sent to Athens, and the name
of Demosthenes--though Philoxenus is said to have been his personal
enemy--did not appear in it.
It is a question, which the meagre accounts that have been preserved
leave in great obscurity, whether any preparations for war had actually
been made at Athens before Alexander’s death. It can hardly be supposed
that any such measures were taken until the envoys who had been sent
to remonstrate with him returned from Babylon; and the interval
between their return and the arrival of the news of his death, cannot
have been very long. Yet that in this interval at least something was
done with a view to a war which was believed to be impending, may be
regarded as nearly certain. For it was at this time that a division of
the mercenaries who had been disbanded by the satraps, in compliance
with Alexander’s orders, was brought over to Europe by the Athenian
Leosthenes. Leosthenes himself had been for a time in Alexander’s
service, and though still young, had gained a high reputation: but it
seems that he had quitted it in disgust, and had already returned to
Athens, and that he went over to Asia, to collect as many as he could
of the disbanded troops, whom he landed at Cape Tænarus. It can hardly
be supposed that he did this without some ulterior object; and his
connection with Hyperides--the chief of the anti-Macedonian party after
Demosthenes had withdrawn--and his subsequent proceedings, scarcely leave
room to doubt that the object was to have a force in readiness to resist
Antipater, if he should attempt to enforce Alexander’s edict.
When the news of Alexander’s death reached Athens, Phocion and Demades
professed to disbelieve the report. Demades bade the people not to
listen to it: such a corpse would long before have filled the world with
its odour. Phocion desired them to have patience; and when many voices
asseverated the truth of the report, replied, “If he is dead to-day, he
will still be dead to-morrow, and the next day, so that we may deliberate
at our leisure, and the more securely.” But their remonstrances were
disregarded. The council of Five Hundred held a meeting with closed
doors; and Leosthenes was commissioned immediately to engage the troops
at Tænarus, about eight thousand men, but secretly, and in his own name,
that Antipater might not suspect the purpose, and that the people might
have the more time for other preparations. Confirmation of the fact was
received shortly after from the mouth of eye-witnesses, who had been
present at Babylon when it took place.[e]
FOOTNOTES
[40] [We insert here a defence of Alexander’s act from the pen of his
chief biographer, Droysen:[d] “Neither sacred history nor dogma were
grounded on the firm basis of doctrinal writings, revealed once for
all as of divine origin; for religious things there was no other rule
or form than the experience and opinion of men as it was and developed
itself in life, also perhaps the instructions of the oracles and the many
interpretations of signs. If the oracle of Zeus Ammon, although ridiculed,
in the end still designated the king as Zeus’ son; if Alexander, sprung
of the race of Hercules and Achilles, had conquered and reorganised a
world; if in reality he had accomplished greater things than Hercules and
Dionysus; if the long established enlightening of minds disaccustomed to
the deepest religious wants had left from the honour and feasts of the
gods only the diversions, the outer ceremonies, and the calendar;--then
one can realise that for Greece, the thoughts of divine honour and
deification of man did not lie too far off. Alexander was only the first
to claim for himself that which after him the most miserable princes and
the most infamous men could justly receive from Hellenes and Greeks, above
all from Athenians.” The apotheosis of Alexander must then be regarded
as a move not altogether due to vanity, and of political rather than
religious or personal meaning.]
[Illustration: GREEK SEALS]
[Illustration]