CHAPTER XLIX. THE TRIUMPHS OF PHILIP

DEMOSTHENES, THE ORATOR

The trite proverb that “the pen is mightier than the sword,” like all

other proverbs, expresses hardly half the truth. Never was there a

more definite combat between the two sharp instruments than in the

history of Greece at this period, for that history becomes hardly more

than a pitched battle between a splendid organiser of armies and a

splendid captain of arguments, and the parallel is the closer inasmuch

as Demosthenes, though commonly thought of as an orator, was much more

distinctly a writer; for he was decidedly inferior as a speaker to his

great rival Æschines, and his orations are chiefly valuable for their

logic and their cautious reasoning. Unlike the perishable glories of the

art of oratory pure and simple, the art of Demosthenes has come down to

us in considerable completeness, and forms a text-book whose eloquence

is little appreciated by the students that reluctantly unravel its

close-knit fabric.

As this duel between the king of Macedonia and the manufacturer’s son

of Athens was so nearly a combat of equals, it will be well to cast a

brief look at the biography of Demosthenes, since we have given so much

attention to the formation of Philip’s character.[a]

The father of this great orator was an Athenian by birth, and exercised

the trade of an armourer, by which he acquired considerable wealth.

He married the daughter of one Gylon who had settled upon the borders

of the Euxine Sea and contracted an alliance with a rich heiress of

the country.[15] At the age of seven Demosthenes was deprived of his

father, who left him a fortune which entitled him to rank with the

wealthiest citizens. Though guardians had been appointed to manage his

estate and direct his education, they seem to have dilapidated the one,

and neglected the other. Left at an early age entirely to himself, he

launched out into expenses with all the extravagance and vanity of

youth, acted as choregus or president of theatrical entertainments, and

equipped a ship of war for the service of the republic. He spent the

first part of his life without any fixed purpose or aim, indulging in

such a state of indolence and effeminacy, as to have his name stigmatised

by a term of reproach [Batalos]. But the seeds of genius, being either

allowed to shoot up in wild luxuriance or to lie dormant through

neglect, were soon to spring up with amazing vigour. He determined

thenceforth to devote himself wholly to the study of eloquence. At that

time learning of all kinds, but particularly philosophy and the art of

rhetoric, was cultivated with great eagerness by the Athenian youth.

Plato had established his school in the Academy, and was attended by a

vast concourse. Demosthenes attended it with great assiduity, as well

as that of Isæus the rhetorician. After these preparatory studies, he

tried his strength against his guardians, whom he obliged to refund a

part of his property. Emboldened by this success, he mounted the tribunal

to harangue the people upon the state of affairs, but was heard with

very little attention, and no signs of approbation. Not discouraged by

this unfavourable reception, he made a second attempt and was equally

unsuccessful.

As he retired, exceedingly depressed by his ill-success, and determined

in his mind to relinquish a pursuit for which nature seemed to have

rendered him unfit, by denying him the free use of the organs of speech,

and a sufficient quantity of breath to articulate distinctly a sentence

of moderate length, he was met by one of his friends, a comedian, who

exhorted him to conquer the natural and acquired defects under which

he laboured. He instantly set about correcting, with the greatest

perseverance and most extraordinary means, his rapid and inarticulate

pronunciation, ungraceful and awkward gestures in declaiming, and several

natural defects under which he laboured.[c]

The anecdotes of Demosthenes’ struggle with his defects are remembered

by many people to whom the very name of King Philip is obscure. These

anecdotes rest upon the orator’s own authority. The reader need hardly be

reminded of the hours he spent talking with his mouth full of pebbles,

shouting against the roar of the stormy ocean, practising his gestures

before a mirror, expanding his lungs by running and by declaiming as he

climbed the steep hills of which Greece is made, shaving half his head

to compel himself to keep indoors at his studies, and shutting himself

up for months at a time in an underground room where he copied all

Thucydides eight times, and polished his own phrases to incandescence.

Thus prepared, he undertook a losing battle in defence of that system

of municipal isolation and jealousy which he thought of as freedom, but

which had brought on Greece innumerable crimes and sorrows and kept the

little peninsula always under the shadow of complete disaster before a

larger foe. In a sense, Demosthenes may be compared with the advocates

of States’ Rights in the United States before the Civil War, except that

the Americans never dreamed of carrying their theories to such an extent.

To put the two instances on a par, it would be necessary to imagine the

Southerners of America demanding not merely that the states have no

federation whatsoever, but that even the smallest town of each state

should go its own petty way.

ÆSCHINES, THE RIVAL OF DEMOSTHENES

Heroic as the figure of Demosthenes is in many respects one must not

forget to do justice to the opposition he met, not only from Macedonia

but from within his own city. Posterity is likely to generalise too

vigorously, and Æschines has suffered more than his due from the fact

that he happened to be the opponent of Demosthenes. It is customary to

think of Æschines as a traitor, a hypocrite, and the paid attorney of

Philip in Athens. Yet it might be well to remember that if his advice had

been taken and the Macedonians treated with welcome instead of warfare

as preached by Demosthenes, the result would have been exactly the same

except that much bloodshed would have been saved and a loathsome amount

of intrigue and villainy avoided. When Demosthenes is praised for his

determination and persistence in his one idea, Æschines must be praised

for the same to the same degree. When sympathy is felt for Demosthenes

in the enmity he met, it must be remembered that Æschines suffered

exile and suffered it with dignity. Æschines was never proved guilty

of accepting money from Macedonia, while Demosthenes gloated over the

poverty of Æschines and boasted of his own riches. On the other hand it

is known that Demosthenes accepted money from Persia. And, if one may be

permitted to distinguish between degrees of guilt in bribery, one might

feel that Persian money was far dirtier for a Grecian to handle than the

semi-Grecian gold of Macedonia, coming from the hand of a king whose

great ambition was to organise Greece into a federated monarchy and lead

her against Persia.

Æschines claimed to have been of distinguished blood, and, while

Demosthenes declared him to be of the lowest possible origin, and

that dishonest, he certainly represented the aristocratic party. His

friendship for Philip’s cause cannot be imputed to a cowardly desire

for peace at any price, since he proved himself a brave soldier, while

Demosthenes threw away his shield and fled from the very battle-ground

of Chæronea to which his eloquence had summoned the Greeks. Æschines was

a writer of great skill and the three of his orations still extant are

rated almost as high as those of Demosthenes. Æschines seems to have

had a far better voice and presence than the effeminate student whom

posterity thinks of as a majestic thunderer. The good and ill in the

character of the latter have been nowhere more briskly summarised than by

Prévost-Paradol[d]:

THE UNPOPULARITY OF DEMOSTHENES

“Demosthenes was never entirely popular. He had nothing grand in him

but his eloquence and will. Dignity of character was wanting. Is it

to be said that the highest virtues were necessary in Athens for the

popularity of a political man? By no means. Virtue was a title, but

the contrary of virtue had also its influence when it was joined to

elegance. For Demosthenes, who owed a ridiculous surname [Batalos] to

hidden debauches, and who devoted the rest of his youth to an ungrateful

work, had neither the graces of vice nor the dignity of virtue. He was

neither Aristides nor Alcibiades. Nor had he the easy levity of Cleon and

many other demagogues. He was a man of anxiety and toil. He had not the

good-natured and happy insolence of a popular orator, who plays with the

people and himself, and enlivens the tribune: neither did he possess that

which was the contrary, that is to say, natural dignity, the majestic

calm which made Pericles the organ of divine reason, a kind of medium

between Athens and its destiny, between the people and the spirit of the

republic. Demosthenes was violent and laborious. His discourses smelt of

oil, but smoothness was absent from them. It was premeditated vehemence,

the result of art as much as of inspiration. In short, the people had

seen this orator raise himself slowly from mediocrity, and buy his power

with long night studies; he inoculated himself patiently with genius.

They had hissed at Demosthenes and had seen him come back stronger;

they had hissed again and he had returned all-powerful. The mob is wrong

in rarely pardoning such marvels. The mob, with eternal injustice, more

willingly gives its approbation to the idleness of genius than to the

fertile preparation of work; it adds its partiality in favour of destiny,

and the glory which gives itself is more brilliant in its eyes than

that which must be conquered. The conduct of Demosthenes, as haughty as

his eloquence, would often have irritated a less suspicious democracy.

This energetic spirit, nourished by contests, which struggle and effort

had alone rendered fruitful, never distrusted its natural impetuosity.

Demosthenes applied to political difficulties the same violence he had so

happily used against his natural difficulties; he treated his adversaries

like the obstacles which had prevented his becoming eloquent. One day

an accomplice of Philip, Antiphon, arraigned before the assembly of the

people, is sent away acquitted. Demosthenes snatched away the benefit

of the popular sentence, arraigned him before the Areopagus, and never

rested until he was condemned to death. When has a democracy patiently

allowed itself to be thus defended against itself and its judgments

broken?

“Demosthenes was of the aristocracy; the aristocracy of money, it is

true, but it is sufficient to read Aristophanes to feel that this

aristocracy was the heaviest to bear, when one had the misfortune to

belong to it. Demosthenes was rich, the son of riches, and he boasted

about it with perilous intemperance. In the _Discourse on the Crown_

he opposed his fortune to the poverty of Æschines, with a disgust and

hardness contrary to the Athenian spirit.

“Add to so many causes of unpopularity, the natural inconsistency of the

people, the sacrifices Demosthenes claimed from them, the dangers and the

reverses of his politics, and one will be surprised at the lasting power

of this great man. The explanation thereof is entirely in the strength

and clearness of his wonderful genius. Every day he showed his prodigious

eloquence, which consisted in raising his audience above its ordinary

intelligence, communicated for a moment to the crowd the generosity of

a great soul and the divination of a superior mind. He made the people

capable of feeling what was noble in politics, and understanding what

was necessary. He showed them in this policy the natural result of the

Athenian destiny. He identified his work with the work of that superior

power against which all complaint is useless and all anger ridiculous,

the work of Necessity.”

But perhaps the most satisfactory claim Demosthenes has on the memory

of all time is to be found in that inevitable beauty which surrounds

a losing battle fought to the end. Professor Jebb[e] has said, “As a

statesman, Demosthenes needs no epitaph but his own words in the speech

_On the Crown_: ‘I say that, if the event had been manifest to the whole

world beforehand, not even then ought Athens to have forsaken this

course, if Athens had any regard for her glory, or for her past, or for

the ages to come.’”

PHILIP’S BETTER SIDE

But finally, while we are endeavouring to be judicial, it is appropriate

to think of the better side of King Philip. He, too, had obstacles to

overcome, and he suffers from the pathetic consequences of success;

for we forgive the weaknesses and vices and the underhand measures of

the one who fails, but we are prone to impute the success of the man

who succeeds, purely to the evil of his ways. Once more we may quote

Prévost-Paradol[d]:

“Philip had closely observed Greece, with its incurable and daily

augmenting weaknesses, and he had foreseen, as a magnificent future,

the reunion of these powerless and divided people, under his sovereign

authority. He had understood that the Grecian empire, defended by

mercenaries and void of citizens, belonged to those who could put in the

ranks the greatest number of trained soldiers, and that patriotism had

no longer any part to play in this supreme struggle. The instinct and

passion of craftiness, patience, the art of bribery, made him eminently

suitable for those corrupting and lying manœuvres, which divide the

enemy and prepare victory. And to these precious gifts were added an

unrestrained ambition, sufficiently strong so as not to draw back in

the face of any danger, sufficiently enlightened only to seek opportune

contests, and to become great only through success. It is because Philip

always saw ahead of his actions, and hoped for great things, that they

were always appropriate and useful, and that he did them with such

terrible activity. He gave himself up entirely to intrigues, to battles,

to the formation of his army, to the subjection of Greece, and to vast

hopes.

“It is with a sort of terror that Demosthenes saw and described him as

being consumed by desires always greater, and carried away by a hidden

strength from enterprise to enterprise. ‘I saw Philip with one eye put

out, one shoulder broken, a crippled hand, a wounded thigh, abandon to

fortune without ceremony or hesitation all that it wished to take of

his body, provided the rest remained powerful and honoured.’ Who does

not see that his unchecked activity followed a more elevated aim than

the submission of Greece and that this great man, in a hurry to have

finished, was afraid of seeing life suddenly fail his ambition? What

could Greece do to such a genius, sustained by such a character?”

[Illustration: RUINS OF THE GATE OF THE PROPYLEA OF ATHENS]

Professor Bury[f] is even more direct in Philip’s praise and in blame

for Demosthenes: “To none of the world’s great rulers has history done

less justice than to Philip. The overwhelming greatness of a son greater

than himself has overshadowed him and drawn men’s eyes to achievements

which could never have been wrought but for Philip’s life of toil.” He

also notes that we have no information of Philip’s stupendous conquest

of Thrace, and that what we know of him at all has come through Athenian

mouths and chiefly from “the malignant eloquence” of Demosthenes, on

which account the Greek history of Philip’s time has often been regarded

“as little more than a biography of Demosthenes,” whose policy Professor

Bury finds retrograde and retarding, unrelieved by any new ideas. The

time needed an Athenian statesman of adaptability and judgment. In the

long look, Æschines was more nearly that man than Demosthenes.[a]

THE SACRED WAR

[Sidenote: [359-351 B.C.]]

Alexander, the tyrant of Pheræ, was assassinated in 359 by his

brothers-in-law, at the instigation of his wife, Thebe, she having

taken care to deprive him of his sword while he slept and to remove the

dogs which guarded the entrance to his chamber. She then introduced her

brothers, and on their hesitating to deal the blow she threatened to

awake her husband. The murderers assumed Alexander’s tyranny, and one of

them, Lycophron, was on the throne when Philip was summoned to oppose

him by the powerful family of the Aleuadæ of Larissa, who, like the

Macedonian kings, pretended to descend from Hercules. Philip was then

besieging Methone, the only city of the Thermaic Gulf which still formed

part of the Athenian federation. After having received a wound which

cost him one eye, he took the city, razed it to the ground, and seized

the occasion which then offered to enter Thessaly. Lycophron having made

an alliance with the Phocians, Phayllus, brother of Onomarchus, came

to his aid with seven thousand men. Philip defeated Phayllus, but was

himself defeated by Onomarchus, who forced him back into Macedonia while

he, Onomarchus, returned to Bœotia to gain possession of Coronea. But

Philip reappeared shortly with a new army: his forces united to those

of Thessaly amounted to twenty thousand men and three thousand horses.

Against the Phocians, who had stolen the treasure of the temple of

Delphi, he appeared as an avenger of Apollo, and all his soldiers wore

crowns made of laurel leaves from Tempe.

The encounter took place near the Gulf of Pagasæ, where was stationed an

Athenian fleet. Philip obtained a complete victory, due principally to

the Thessalian cavalry. The Phocians lost six thousand men; of those made

prisoners three thousand were cast into the sea as being sacrilegious,

but many of them were able to reach the Athenian vessels by swimming.

Onomarchus had been killed in battle, and his body crucified. Lycophron

obtained by bribes permission to retire to the Peloponnesus with his

troops, delivering the city of Pheræ over to Philip, who seized the port

of Pagasæ and the fleet constructed by Alexander. Philip caused to be

paid over to him by his Thessalian allies, as war indemnity, a large part

of the revenues of the country. He wished to penetrate farther, and under

pretext of entering Phocia marched towards Thermopylæ in order to take up

his position on a spot that was the key to all Greece. But an Athenian

corps commanded by Diophantus occupied the pass, and Philip was obliged

to turn back (352).

THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

[Sidenote: [351 B.C.]]

[Illustration: DEMOSTHENES]

It was at this epoch that Demosthenes pronounced, before the people

of Athens, his first Philippic. So absorbed had been the Greeks by

their private rivalries that they had paid no heed to the rapid and

increasing progress made by the Macedonian monarchy. One man alone saw

the danger; he had no other arms than his patriotism and his eloquence,

but with these he fought valiantly, and though he could not preserve

to his country liberty, he at least preserved its honour. The unequal

conflict which was about to take place between Demosthenes and Philip was

not alone a duel between the ablest of politicians and the greatest of

orators; it was a duel to the death between two principles, monarchism

and republicanism. These two principles had once before, in the reign

of Xerxes, been arrayed against each other; but at that time the Greeks

were able to forget their private differences in the common danger, and

to superiority of numbers they had opposed, not alone heroism, which does

not always suffice to conquer, but military tactics. Now conditions were

different; Philip had borrowed of the Greeks their tactics, which he

brought to perfection, and he managed to turn to his own advantage the

condition of the land, now more than ever divided. It was never again

to have that unity of military command so necessary in the face of the

enemy. The hegemony of Sparta which Athens nobly accepted in the Median

War was forever destroyed, and Sparta, which struggled vainly under its

double burden, Megalopolis and Messene, took no notice of the progress of

Philip. Thebes, which had broken Sparta’s power, was not strong enough

to take its place, and foolishly inviting the approach of the enemy,

repented too late and died in expiation of its fault. Athens remained,

but how fallen from its former condition of active energy. In vain

Demosthenes tried to awaken it; it asked but to sleep the long sleep of

worn-out races. “When, Athenians,” cried the great demagogue, “will you

rouse and do your duty? What new event, what pressing need, do you await?

What contingency more urgent for free men than the danger of dishonour?

Will you always assemble in the public squares to ask each other, ‘Well,

what is new?’ What can be newer than a man from Macedonia making himself

victor of Athens and master over all Greece? Is Philip dead? No, he is

only ailing. But what matter to you if he be sick or dead; if heaven were

to deliver you from him to-day, to-morrow you would cause another Philip

to arise, for his victorious advance is far less a result of his own

power than of your inertia.”

The war of the allies had exhausted Athens’ principal source of revenue,

and, as frequently happens in the case of spendthrifts who are obliged

to economise, the city preferred to do without necessities rather than

deny itself the superfluous; the sovereign people refused absolutely

to curtail its civil list. Pericles in instituting the public funds

could not foresee that the day was to come when the Athenians would

prefer amusement to the preservation of the nation’s safety. “Why be

surprised at Philip’s success,” asks Demosthenes, “when all the sums

formerly allotted to defray the cost of war are now squandered in useless

festivity, a decree, furthermore, menacing with pain of death any one

who undertakes to restore them to their former purpose?” He reverts

frequently to this incurable propensity of Athenian dilettantism, citing

the extreme punctuality with which public feast days were observed as

against the tardiness of the administration in all that concerned marine

matters, or war. “Tell me why your pompous feasts of Panathenæa or of

Dionysia, which cost more than the armament of a fleet, are always

celebrated on the day set, while your fleets, as at Methone, Pagasæ,

and Potidæa, arrive too late? In the observance of your feasts all has

been regulated by law; each of you knows in advance the choregus, the

gymnasiarch of his tribe; he knows just what he is to receive and the

exact moment when he is to receive it; nothing is uncertain, unexpected,

neglected. In time of war, with all the preparations war demands,

there is no order, no foresight, nothing but confusion on all sides.

At the first alarm trierarchs are named, exchanges are made, subsidies

are demanded. Then, to the ships are summoned first the metœci, then

the freedmen, then the citizens, then--but pending all this work of

preparation, that which our fleet should save has perished. All this,

citizens, is doubtless very disagreeable to hear, but if in leaving out

of a discourse all that offends we exclude the matter itself, what need

to speak save for the mere pleasure of your ears?” And this was virtually

true; the people listened to Demosthenes because he spoke well, then went

to hear the orators of the opposite side, and in the enjoyment of this

fine oratorical display were as royally amused as though they had visited

the theatre or the Odeum.

PHILIP AND ATHENS

[Sidenote: [351-349 B.C.]]

Philip endeavoured by apparent inaction to make the Athenians forget

the attack on Thermopylæ by which he justified Demosthenes’ fears.

But his time was not wasted; he employed it in making partisans, even

drawing around himself certain of the pillagers of the Delphic temple.

He received their money in trust, thus attaching them firmly to his

interests. He had established or was maintaining tyrants in the island

of Eubœa, two of whom, feigning treachery to him, called the Athenians

to their aid, only to betray them as soon as they had responded to this

appeal; it was with difficulty that Phocion could save the Athenian

army from destruction. To obtain possession of Amphipolis, Philip had

caused the Olynthians to withdraw from the Athenian alliance by ceding

to them Potidæa; they, however, regretted this step as soon as they saw

their independence menaced. Philip accused them of having given refuge

to Macedonian conspirators, and took successively several cities of

the Olynthian federation, Apollonia, Stagira, Mecyberna, Torone. The

Olynthians asked help of Athens, and Demosthenes, in support of their

appeal, delivered three of his most celebrated discourses called the

_Olynthiacs_. The first showed the Athenians the danger they were in,

since if Philip were to become master of Olynthus he would not fail to

fall upon Athens with all his forces. He then indicated the remedy: a

better use of public moneys. Unable to attack the Theorica directly, he

evaded the difficulty by demanding a reform in the laws governing its use.

“Be not surprised, Athenians, if I speak contrary to the opinion of the

majority. Establish nomothetes, not to create new laws, but to abolish

such as work you harm, and these I will designate clearly. They are the

laws regulating the theatre and military service. One set sacrifices to

the idlers of the town the funds set apart for war, the other assures

impunity to cowards. We stood formerly without a rival, rulers at home,

arbiters in foreign lands. Sparta was crushed, Thebes occupied abroad,

confronting us was no power that could dispute our empire. What have

we done? We have lost our provinces, and uselessly dissipated fifteen

hundred talents. War restored to us our allies; in time of peace wise

counsellors caused us to lose them, and our enemy has waxed great and

powerful. Can any one deny that it is through us that Philip has risen?

Undoubtedly you will reply, things on the outside are not favourable to

us, but within, what marvels have been accomplished! Name them! Walls

restored, roads repaired, fountains rebuilt, and a hundred other trifling

matters. Look upon the authors of these splendid works; formerly poor,

they are now rich, and in proportion to the rise in their fortunes has

been the decline of the state’s. The power to pardon is in their hands,

nothing is accomplished save through them; and you, Athenians, suffer

everything to be taken from you, allies as well as money. Great in

numbers, you are treated like menials, happy when your masters throw you

your daily pittance, the price of admission to the theatre. The shame of

such a condition! They give you your own, and you render thanks as though

for a mercy shown you! I know well that it may cost me dear to place your

disgrace so clearly before you; but dearer still will it cost those who

have brought that disgrace about.”

[Sidenote: [349-347 B.C.]]

Only in a democracy could a ruler be found who would accept reproaches

so severe. The Athenians knew that Demosthenes was right, but to give

up the theatre--that was very hard; to reform the administration of the

finances--that would take a long, long time! The most urgent need was

attended to first: two armies were sent to succour the Olynthians, who

were struggling bravely in their own defence. But these armies were

formed of mercenaries, commanded by Chares, an indifferent general who

was in the pay of every land. The presence of such troops had for effect

to create disturbance among the besieged without rendering them the

slightest aid. It was finally decided to send an army of citizens; but

it was already too late; two traitors had delivered over the city to the

enemy (347).

There was stupefaction in Athens and in all Greece when it was learned

that Philip had destroyed Olynthus and sold its inhabitants. But pity was

of short duration: “Each people,” says Demosthenes, “seemed to look upon

as gained the time spent by Philip in destroying another.” Nevertheless

the possession of Chalcidice made him master over the Ægean Sea and

brought him nearer to the Thracian Chersonesus, ceded to the Athenians by

the king, Cersobleptes. His fleet, already greater than that of Athens,

threatened Imbros, Scyros, Lemnos, and Eubœa, made a descent on Attica,

carried off the Paralian galley, and tore down the trophies at Marathon.

The Athenians, tired of carrying on the struggle alone, tried to form

against Philip a general alliance, but his liberality had created for

him a numerous faction. Even at Athens little was spoken of but the good

intentions of the king. Among those who upheld him were many who had been

bought over, notably the orator Demades, possibly also Æschines; but

some of the dupes were honest, among them the rhetorician Isocrates, who

was dazzled by Philip’s success, and many resembling Phocion, who always

looked on the dark side, preaching peace because he believed victory

impossible, although he was the best general Athens possessed. “Have

military greatness,” he advised the Athenians, “or make those who have

it your friends.” When Demosthenes saw this man arise to reply to him,

“There,” he said, “is the axe of my discourse.”

[Sidenote: [352-346 B.C.]]

The Sacred War still continued. After the death of Onomarchus his brother

Phayllus succeeded him in command. With the aid of the Delphic treasure

he got together a large army of mercenaries. The Spartans furnished him

one thousand men, the Achæans two thousand, the Athenians five thousand

and four hundred horses; thus Sparta and Athens participated indirectly

in the pillage, Phayllus paying for the maintenance of the troops sent

to him. He invaded Bœotia and took the greater part of the cities of

Epicnemidian Locris; but falling ill he died and his place was taken by

Phalæcus, son of Onomarchus. The command of this army of bandits came to

be a sort of hereditary royalty. Phalæcus being still very young a tutor

was given him in the person of Mnaseas, who was shortly after killed.

Phalæcus continued the war; but ten thousand talents, the last of the

treasure of Delphi, had been expended and the Phocians were clamouring

for a reckoning. The Thebans were also at the end of their resources, in

spite of the three hundred talents they had obtained from the king of

Persia. They called on Philip for assistance, but he not being willing

to risk again finding the pass of Thermopylæ, guarded by Athenians, they

were obliged to drop out of the contest. The Athenians were in reality

glad to discontinue a war which had lasted ten years without bringing

them any profit, and desired a reconciliation with the Thebans.

It even seemed possible to establish a general peace among the Grecian

states, for all were equally tired of the long and fruitless war. Philip

indirectly gave the Athenians to understand that he was disposed to treat

for peace. It being difficult to divine their motive these advances

were looked upon as suspicious. Still at Philocrates’ proposal it was

voted to send off ten ambassadors, among whom was Philocrates himself,

the rival orators, Demosthenes and Æschines, and the actor Aristodemus.

Æschines later reproached Demosthenes with having failed in eloquence

before Philip, a fact which had in it nothing extraordinary, since

only Alcibiades or Lysander could compete with Philip in guile, and

Demosthenes was used to speaking his thoughts openly to a free people.

He was at least, contrary to many of his colleagues, proof against fine

speeches, banquets, and gifts.

A TREATY OF PEACE

The ambassadors returned without having obtained anything from Philip

save a vague promise to respect the Athenian possessions in Thrace.

Three Macedonian envoys followed them; the terms of a treaty of peace

were decided upon and another embassy, similar probably to the first,

was charged to obtain Philip’s signature. Contrary to the advice of

Demosthenes, this embassy travelled by short stages on land, and waited a

month for Philip at Pella, giving him time to wage war upon the king of

Thrace, Athens’ ally. He at last returned and persuaded the ambassadors

to accompany him as far as Pheræ, under the pretext of desiring their

mediation between two Thessalian cities. At Pheræ he signed the treaty

but refused to inscribe upon it the name of the Phocians. The ambassadors

having left he marched rapidly upon Thermopylæ and took possession of the

pass which this time he found unguarded. This had been the aim of all his

hesitation and delay. The Athenians were outwitted, and their ambassadors

either dupes or accomplices; later Demosthenes even accused Æschines of

having sold himself to Philip.

Phalæcus’ treason is still more apparent. Before peace was concluded he

had refused the assistance first of the Athenians, then of the Spartans,

who offered to occupy the fortresses. The Phocians were left to their

fate. Philip presented himself and the fortresses were delivered up

to him on the sole condition that Phalæcus be permitted to retire

to Peloponnesus with ten thousand mercenaries. In such fashion this

chieftain of a robber band, finding nothing more to steal at Delphi,

abandoned without a struggle his country to the enemy. The Phocians were

at the mercy of Philip who delivered them over to the hatred of the

Thebans.[b]

The king occupied the country without striking a blow and then summoned

the Amphictyonic council to Delphi, that he might hold a trial of the

Phocians and their allies and re-order the affairs of the national

sanctuary.

PUNISHMENT OF THE PHOCIANS

[Sidenote: [346 B.C.]]

The sentence was sufficiently severe. The court, attended only by

representatives of the peoples which, like the Thebans, Locrians, and

Thessalians, had taken part in the Sacred War, followed the dictates

of revenge and passion. The Phocians, as being accursed, were expelled

from the Amphictyonic league and the two votes which they had hitherto

possessed were transferred to Philip and his successors; all the towns,

twenty-two in number, were (with the exception of Abæ) to be destroyed

and the inhabitants to settle in villages of not more than fifty

inhabitants. The fugitives were to be accursed and outlawed wherever

they were encountered; those who remained were to pay Apollo a yearly

tribute of fifty talents [£10,000 or $50,000] and to be despoiled of

their arms and horses until the stolen treasure should be made up. Philip

was in future to preside at the Pythian games. The desire for vengeance

went so far that the Œtæans even made a suggestion that the whole male

population, exclusive of the boys and the old men, should be thrown

down from the rock as temple robbers: an inhuman proposal which Philip

rejected with anger. In contrast with such unbridled fury the Macedonian

king, who had little mercy for his own enemies, appeared as a mild ruler.

The execution of the sentence was undertaken with relentless severity;

ancient towns like Hyampolis, Panopeus, Daulis, Lilæa disappear

henceforth from history; their former inhabitants either wandered

homeless in foreign countries or lived out their days in mournful

servitude. Many joined the bands of mercenaries which Timoleon the

Corinthian conducted to Syracuse in the following year; others passed

over with Phalæcus into Crete, where some time afterwards the leader

met his death at the siege of Cydonia. All the Phocians who had taken

part in the robbing of the temple met with a fearful end, but the lot of

those who remained behind was not more enviable. Some years later, when

Demosthenes went to Delphi, he beheld a picture of misery: “houses torn

down, walls in ruins, the country emptied of men of vigorous age, and

a few mourning women and children and old people; such wretchedness as

admits of no description in words.”

THE ATTITUDE OF THE ATHENIANS

The tidings of these events fell on the betrayed Athenians like a

thunderbolt out of a clear sky. Relying on the royal grace and mercy,

they had delivered the Phocians to their enemies with their hands tied,

and how had that trust been rewarded! In Athens consequently, no one

joined in the songs of rejoicing which pealed through Delphi when the

Amphictyonic council and the Greek envoys who hailed Philip as the

protector of the venerable sanctuary were entertained by him at a banquet

and sacrifices, and libations and prayers were offered in favour of

Apollo; on the contrary there was great excitement among the citizens

and a mingled feeling of sorrow, indignation, and fear. Men fancied that

they already saw the Macedonian king in Attica. On the suggestion of

Callisthenes they decided to bring the women and children into the city

from the country, to hide their possessions and make preparations for

defence. In defiance of the Amphictyonic ban the fugitive Phocians were

assured of welcome and protection.

Still when Philip, by an embassy of his own, unfolded his peaceful

intentions, but at the same time remained in the neighbourhood with his

army in readiness, the position began to be considered more calmly.

Nevertheless in the first assembly the people clamoured so that the

orators could not make themselves heard, and Æschines called out to

Philip’s messengers: “The criers are many, the fighters few.” But when in

view of the pressure of circumstances, even Demosthenes raised his voice

“for the peace,” and warned the general assembly against inconsiderate

action, since it would after all be “foolish and sheer nonsense” to

engage in a general war over the “shadow at Delphi,” they submitted to

the inevitable and recognised the _fait accompli_. A new embassy, with

Æschines at its head, carried to the Macedonian ruler the consent of

Athens to the decision of the Amphictyons and to her own entrance into

the temple union. Satisfied with this result, the king now arranged

for the Pythian games with unusual magnificence, and then returned to

Macedonia, leaving a garrison behind him in Phocis.

THE MACEDONIAN PARTY

During the years which followed while Philip made his hereditary kingdom

more compact and extended its borders by successful contest with the

Illyrians and Triballians, with the Epirots and Molossians, and with the

eastern Thracians, and while the land of Hellas lay ruined and broken,

the Athenians made use of the time to revive their trade, strengthen and

equip their fleet, and erect new and magnificent buildings for public

purposes. But the civil breach became more and more clearly apparent,

and prevented the lasting healing and cure of the sick commonwealth

from the severe wounds of the past years. Since the fraudulent embassy

the Macedonian faction which adhered to Æschines and Philocrates and

the patriots who honoured Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and Hyperides as their

leaders had occupied a hostile position towards one another.

If Æschines had at first placed himself on Philip’s side from a natural

inclination because he was dazzled by the royal personality, and he was

able to deceive himself concerning his intentions, he was now on personal

grounds the warmest supporter of the king, since the latter had called

him his friend and enriched him with presents. He who had once made so

poor and modest an appearance, now carried his head proudly, walked about

in long flowing garments, and showed by his liberal expenditures the

alteration in the means at his disposal. The man of practical wisdom had

long since recognised the Macedonian’s deceitful game, but he continued

to “tread the bridge for him.”

Philocrates flaunted his dishonour still more shamelessly. He openly

acknowledged that Philip had royally rewarded him, and his prodigality,

his dissolute life, and the careless fashion in which he abandoned

himself to sensual pleasures and vices were evidence of the great

gifts of his wealthy patron. But among all the partisans of Macedon the

greatest zeal was shown by Demades, the son of a poor mariner whose rough

wit and popular style of eloquence still revealed the ex-sailor. Round

these men, to whom must be added the clever but unprincipled Pytheas,

swarmed the mass of people who desired peace at any price that they might

enjoy life in ease and comfort and such base spirits as set gold and

pleasures above honour and their native country.

THE PATRIOTIC PARTY

[Sidenote: [346-343 B.C.]]

This party had its roots and its support in the selfish and

pleasure-loving nature of the multitude, and in proportion as it gained

in power and adherents the greater was the merit of the men whom no

favours and no profit could shake in their fidelity to their country, who

looked with suspicious eyes on all Philip’s undertakings and intrigues

and recognised the preservation of the liberty they had received from

their fathers as the worthy aim of all struggle and effort. Amongst these

men, besides Demosthenes, who in these years developed a marvellous

activity, sought to thwart Philip’s plans in every direction, and in

especial endeavoured to prevent the intriguing interference of Macedonia

in the Peloponnesus by pacification and reconciliation, the noble orator

Lycurgus was distinguished in the first rank of the patriots by his

unassuming simplicity and austerity. Like Socrates and Phocion an enemy

to all sensual pleasures and effeminacy, he effected more through his

worth and noble disposition than through his somewhat awkward eloquence.

Hyperides was a frank and energetic defender of the interests of his

country, but also much addicted to the joys of this world, the pleasures

of the table, and fair women. His love affair with the charming courtesan

Phryne was notorious. Talented, sprightly, and cultivated, he enchained

his listeners by the fresh and natural charm of his oratory. Moreover the

“curly-headed” Hegesippus and Timarchus belonged to the patriotic party,

but they damaged it in the eyes of the people by their ill repute.

The position of parties was first revealed in the action against

Timarchus who in union with Demosthenes had brought before the court of

auditors (logistæ) an accusation against Æschines on the subject of the

fraudulent embassy (344). To defeat this accusation Æschines endeavoured

to represent that Timarchus was absolutely disqualified from taking

such proceedings by his shameless life and notorious character, and he

demonstrated this so effectually that his adversary was punished with

the loss of civil rights while his own integrity was shown in a most

favourable light. If Æschines had taken up arms in moral indignation at

his opponent’s vicious conduct, we could only approve his action; but far

from appearing as a defender of virtue he treats vice and the prevailing

immorality with the greatest leniency and only lifts the veil as much as

may serve his party aims. A more successful accusation was that which

Hyperides brought in the next year against Philocrates. Conscious of his

guilt, the accused went into exile even before judgment was pronounced.

Demosthenes might feel encouraged by this result to launch a second

documentary accusation against Æschines respecting the treachery and

bribery in connection with the fraudulent embassy; but thanks to the

skilful defence of the accused and the support of the peace-party, this

famous contest also ended with the acquittal of the orator (343).

PHILIP’S INTRIGUES AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

[Sidenote: [344-341 B.C.]]

Philip employed the deceitful peace to form alliances for himself by

means of bribery and intrigues in all the Hellenic states; and to acquire

partisans and supporters and nourish the civil divisions. He took

especial pains to make his own profit out of the internal dissensions

in the Peloponnesian states and the irreconcilable hatred of Arcadians,

Messenians, and Argeians against Sparta; to win a reputation for himself

as the protector of the weal and thus gradually to bring the power of

chief arbitrator into his own hands. The fact that these intrigues were

not completely successful and that the Athenians, forewarned and filled

with distrust, rendered the task of the Macedonian negotiators much more

difficult, may be considered as an effect of the _Second Philippic_ of

Demosthenes. Philip’s ill will was consequently especially directed

against the Athenians, in whom he recognised the sole opponents of his

thirst for dominion, and he sought to damage them in every way without

directly violating the peace.

He expelled the pirates from the Attic island of Halonesus and retained

the isle as his own property, and when the Athenians complained, he

offered it to them as his personal gift; with his newly created naval

power he injured Athenian trade and also brought the dominion of the sea

more and more into his own hands, and instead of his restoring Eubœa to

the Athenians, as had once been hoped, he strengthened his own power by

maintaining a secret understanding with his partisans to secure them the

supremacy in Eretria and Oreus; in Thessaly he abolished the office of

tagus, or chief of the confederation, and set over the four districts

four tetrarchs on whom he could rely, a government which was calculated

“to break all efforts at union and make the divided forces of the country

completely subservient to his aims.”

Above all a great stir was created among the Athenians when Philip again

turned his arms against the princes Cersobleptes and Teres, with whom

they were on friendly terms. In this it was evidently his intention to

secure himself a passage into Asia by the subjection of the Thracian

coast lands and at the same time to cut the main arteries of Athenian

maritime trade, namely the entrance to the Pontus. A royal document with

some conciliatory proposals and the offer to lay the disputed points

before an impartial tribunal, was designed to divert the attention of the

Athenians from their possessions on the Chersonesus, but its suggestions

and demands were opposed by Demosthenes or, as the newer criticism has

convincingly shown, by Hegesippus, in the _Speech On Halonesus_. And in

order to cover their Thracian possessions with the old and new cleruchs,

the Athenians sent the general Diopeithes with a squadron and mercenary

troops. By two successful campaigns Philip now overcame the Thracians in

several encounters after a brave resistance and dethroned their princes;

he took one town after another on the Middle Hebrus where his soldiers

wintered in earth-holes (in “mud-pits”), and secured his new dominions by

planting several colonies (Philippopolis, Berœa, Cabyle, etc.); meantime

Diopeithes cruised in the Pontic waters, compelled the cities to purchase

a safe voyage for their merchant vessels either by a tribute or, as

the commander of the fleet expressed it, of good will, and undertook a

military expedition in the Macedonian coasts along the Propontis.

When Philip lodged complaints at Athens at this breach of the peace,

and threatened reprisals, the Macedonian party was of opinion that they

ought to endeavour to conciliate the king by the recall and punishment

of the general. Then Demosthenes demonstrated, in the sublime speech

_The Affairs of the Chersonesus_, that the peace had actually been broken

long ago by Philip himself, and that the Athenians, instead of punishing

their bold leader, as the corrupt servants of the king and the cowardly

advocates of peace demanded, ought to supply him with new troops and

munitions of war before Philip could bring all his plans to maturity and

fall upon Athens herself.

THE THIRD PHILIPPIC

[Sidenote: [341 B.C.]]

After this “act in words,” which had the desired effect, Demosthenes

in the _Third Philippic_, made clear to the Athenians the necessity

of concluding an alliance with the rest of the Hellenic towns for the

furnishing of mutual aid so that a check might be given to the insolent

and mischievous disposition of the Macedonian, who was perpetrating acts

of war and violence under cover of a pretended peace.

[Illustration: GREEK MIRROR

(In the British Museum)]

“In former days, when any Hellenes abused their power for the oppression

of others,” so ran this remarkable, wise, and energetic speech, “all

Hellas rose to guard the right, and now we permit a ‘good-for-nothing

Macedonian,’ a ‘barbarian of the most abandoned character,’ to destroy

Greek cities and hold the Pythian games, or cause them to be held by his

servants. The Hellenes look on this and do nothing, ‘as a man regards

a shower of hail, praying it may not hit him’; his power is allowed

to continue growing, no step being taken against it, each reckoning

the moment at which another is shipwrecked to his own gain instead of

thinking how to save the existence of Hellas and being active in its

cause, though none can help knowing that the evil will attain even the

most remote. Once the man who allowed himself to be corrupted by the

ambitious and malevolent enemies of his country, fell a victim to the

general hate, and was visited with the severest punishment as a grievous

criminal; now all this is as it were done away and in its stead is

introduced that of which Greece lies sick unto death, jealousy of him to

whom aught has been given, laughter when he confesses to it, hatred of

whoever shall rebuke.”

In the _Third Philippic_ Demosthenes rebukes the indolence and degeneracy

of the people with more cutting sarcasm; and although all faith had not

disappeared from his soul, yet it is not without reason that the piece

has been called “a study in shadows, in whose gloomy colours is revealed

a saddened spirit and far from joyful anticipations, whilst through the

speech on the Chersonesus, which was written under the influence of

bright hopes, there breathes a fresher air.”

The tempestuous eloquence of the _Third Philippic_ made a powerful

impression. Now at the eleventh hour the assembly was roused to decisive

action; it placed the conduct of business for a time chiefly in the hands

of the patriotic party and made energetic preparations for defence.

Whilst Hyperides brought the islands of Chios and Rhodes over to the side

of Athens, Demosthenes went himself to the scene of the war, persuaded

Byzantium, abandoning her ancient jealousy, to reconcile herself with

Athens and conclude an offensive and defensive alliance (341), and

acquired Abydos and with it the undisturbed navigation of the Hellespont.

Meanwhile the Persian governors, who for a long time past had looked

with anxiety and uneasiness on the rise and extension of the Macedonian

kingdom, were requested to give assistance, and several states in the

Peloponnesus were induced to join in “the Hellenic alliance against

Philip.” This was a free confederation under the leadership of Athens,

with fixed contributions in money and men. Eubœa was also won over to the

alliance after the Macedonian governors in Eretria and Oreus had been,

the one killed, the other expelled by Phocion. In recognition of these

services a golden wreath was awarded to Demosthenes and set on his head

in the theatre at the Dionysia.

To make the members of the alliance more ready for sacrifices Athens

herself set a magnanimous example of patriotic devotion. It was not only

that, on Demosthenes’ suggestion, a change had been effected in the

organisation of the trierarchy and thus the less wealthy were secured

from oppressive tradition and the rich constrained to make greater

efforts in proportion to their resources; the people also agreed that

the sums which it had hitherto been customary to apply to festival

expenses, entertainments, and dramatic representations should be utilised

for military operations. “The people,” says Niebuhr, “whose poverty

was dominant in the assembly and refused the gifts by which alone they

obtained the luxury of eating meat on certain festival days since all

the rest of the year they ate only olives, cabbages, and onions with dry

bread and salt fish,--they who made this sacrifice to provide for the

honour of their country; this people has my whole heart and my deepest

veneration.”

PHILIP RETURNS TO THE FRAY

[Sidenote: [341-340 B.C.]]

The warlike impulse in Athens did not long remain unknown to the

Macedonian king. He concealed his anger so long as the Thracian War was

still in progress; but when he had destroyed the once powerful Odrysian

kingdom and secured the Thracian districts by means of colonies and

garrisons, when he had led his army across the Hæmus to the Getæ and had

won over the colonies on the western shore of the Pontus by conciliation

or force, he proceeded to send the Athenians a defiant letter, full

of complaints and accusations, and added to them such insults by

marching into their possessions on the Chersonesus and seizing Athenian

merchantmen, that the assembly of the people declared the peace to have

been violated, threw down the peace column, and took measures to furnish

substantial aid to the Byzantines whom Philip was even then threatening

with a siege.

There was no delusion in Athens as to the importance of the step. When

Hegesippus recommended the refusal of Philip’s last proposals, there

was a cry “Thou art bringing war upon us,” whereupon he answered: “Not

war alone, but early death and mourning garments and public burials

and funeral orations if ye will give yourselves in earnest to free the

Hellenes and win back the hegemony which your fathers maintained.”

Thus ended the hollow Peace of Philocrates which had lasted seven

years, and although from the aspect of affairs and the previous course

of events there could be no hope of a successful struggle of divided

Hellas against the advancing power of the Macedonian kingdom, now in

the youthful vigour of its military strength; yet we cannot but feel

the deepest respect for the manly impulse, the resolution which defied

death, and preferred to fall gloriously and honourably under the feet

of hostile armies, rather than be any longer a prey to the deceitful

trickery of the king and his purchased satellites, or hover any longer

in the undignified and ruinous state between war and peace. It was not a

question of preserving “a piece of finery which had grown old-fashioned,”

but of saving liberty and the popular government handed down from

their forefathers, of passing on unimpaired to their successors the

institutions and political forms for which former generations had staked

their property and their blood, and of avoiding the break with the great

historical past as long as possible.

SIEGE OF PERINTHUS AND BYZANTIUM

[Sidenote: [340-339 B.C.]]

And that there was still strength and courage in the Greek people, Philip

to his great chagrin soon received sensible evidence before Perinthus, a

maritime city, built in terrace fashion on the high ridge of a tongue of

land on the Propontis, with rows of houses crowded thickly together and

which he failed to take after a long siege by land and sea. Supported

by the Byzantines and the Persian governor, the brave citizens repelled

storm and attack with spirit. And now encouraged by the example of the

Perinthians, and with the co-operation of the Athenians who sent first

Chares, then Phocion, with ships and men to the aid of their hard-pressed

ally, the Byzantines offered a manful resistance; so that here too Philip

had to raise the siege and it was only by a stratagem that he succeeded

in bringing off his fleet from the Black Sea through the Bosporus and the

Hellespont.

The feeble Byzantines would hardly have held out so long against the

siege which Philip conducted in similar fashion with battering-rams,

machines for flinging projectiles and saps, but Chares, the Athenian, and

his squadron drove the Macedonian fleet to the Pontus in a victorious

combat, and from his advantageous position at Chrysopolis protected the

entrance to the sea, while the valiant Phocion did his utmost to aid

in the defensive measures of the Byzantine commander Leon, whom he had

previously known in Plato’s school. So here too Philip failed to attain

his object, in spite of the skill of his engineers and the bravery of his

troops, who once even won an entrance into the town on a rainy, moonless

night, but were beaten back in a hot fight by the citizens, who ran up

hastily, considerably aided by the appearance of an aurora borealis.

DECLINE OF PHILIP’S PRESTIGE; THE SCYTHIAN EXPEDITION

The golden wreath and votes of gratitude with which the rescued

Perinthians and Byzantines and the Attic cleruchs on the Chersonesus

expressed their thanks to the Athenian state, were especially due to the

orator Demosthenes, who by his disinterested and patriotic activity had

been mainly instrumental in bringing about this revival of energy. On the

news of Philip’s failures at Perinthus and Byzantium, the national party

reared its head more proudly. Relying on Athens--whose ships again ruled

the Pontus as far as Thessaly, barred the coasts and impeded Macedonian

trade and maritime commerce--the patriotic party, in which the spirit

of independence, freedom, and national honour was not yet extinct, again

bestirred itself in all the Hellenic cities. Even at Thebes evidences

appeared which showed how great was the indignation and suspicion against

Philip. The partisans of Macedon and the supporters of the peace were

thrust into the background; the Hellenic alliance received new members

and adherents. Philip’s consideration was manifestly on the wane, the

more as during this time he was with his army in the distant regions of

the Danube. For in order to compensate his troops for their fruitless

toil by means of a raiding expedition and restore his military reputation

by a brilliant feat, Philip led his army from Byzantium against the

Scythians on the Lower Danube. Here he did indeed win the victory in a

great pitched battle, took many prisoners, and made spoil of a number

of valuable horses and live stock; but on the return march through the

country of the Triballi the greater part of this booty was lost; it was

only with great difficulty, and when he himself had been sorely wounded,

that he led back the army through the pass of Hæmus to his own country.

THE CRUSADE AGAINST AMPHISSA

[Sidenote: [339-338 B.C.]]

Nothing but a brilliant feat of arms could restore Philip his declining

prestige in Hellas, and to this his partisans paved the way. They

contrived to kindle fresh dissensions amongst the Hellenes and managed so

skilfully that Philip was afforded an excuse for the invasion of Greece

and could hide his personal objects under an honourable pretext. He was

able to appear a second time as the protection of the Pythian sanctuary

and to overthrow his adversaries.

The Locrians of Amphissa had utilised considerable portions of that

accursed “Crissæan plain” as corn and meadow land, had set up brick

kilns and farmyards and in the walled haven had erected a toll house

where pilgrims journeying to the place of the holy oracle had to pay an

impost for shelter and guidance. The Delphians had left the Amphissians

in peace to do as they would, especially as the latter paid the usual

tithe for the ground they occupied, as well as a ground rent. After the

Phocian War, in which the Locrians exhibited so much zeal for the honour

of the temple, they would not be likely to become more neglectful in the

fulfilment of their tasks; and probably also, as a suitable reward for

their services, they acquired new tracts of land which they cultivated.

But the sanctuary itself probably now stood in a different position as

regards the Hellenic people, since a foreign king had assumed the office

of its protector and the Pythia was credited with “philippising.”

Æschines, as assistant Athenian deputy (Pylagoras), was at Delphi for the

spring meeting of the Amphictyonic council. He had a grudge against the

Amphissians because they sided with the patriotic party and he now made

use of their position to bring an accusation against them. Pointing, from

the height on which the sitting was held, at the harbour and cultivated

ground, he made a solemn address to the assembly, and threw it into such

a state of excitement by reciting the ancient statutes and oaths, that

the envoys, seized with an extravagant religious zeal, marched next

morning into the Crissæan plain, accompanied by the citizens and slaves

of Delphi, destroyed the harbour, set fire to the houses, and demolished

the works. Furious at a proceeding so sudden and carried into effect

without any inquiry, the Amphissians fell on the “crusaders” with arms

in their hands, and wounded some while others saved themselves by a hasty

flight to Delphi.

Here a meeting of the council and the citizens, under the presidency of

Cottyphus of Pharsalus, passed a resolution that at the next regular

meeting to be held at Pylæ the punishment of the Amphissians for their

crime against the god and the sacred plain should be determined on, and

for this purpose the deputies were to obtain special powers from their

states.

When Æschines made his report to the Athenian people, Demosthenes cried

out to him: “Thou bringest war into Attica--an Amphictyonic war”; and

his warning words were of force enough to restrain the Athenians from

sending delegates to the appointed tribunal. The Thebans also held aloof,

although Timolaus, “the greatest slave of his pleasures” and others of

Philip’s partisans zealously bestirred themselves. However, the assembly

was held, a heavy money-fine was imposed on the Amphissians and when they

refused payment it was resolved to make war against them. But the small

army which Cottyphus himself led against them effected nothing; there was

so little zeal that several tribes did not send their contingents, and

the others went to work very sluggishly. Consequently at the next autumn

meeting the leaders of the Macedonian party were able to make use of the

to elect the Macedonian king as commander in the Sacred War.

[Illustration: GREEK WAR CHARIOT]

Philip had returned from the Scythian expedition only a short time

before, but he did not long delay. With an army which gradually increased

to thirty thousand foot and twenty thousand horsemen, he broke into

Phocis through the pass of Thermopylæ, won possession by a stratagem of

the defiles at Parnassus which had been occupied by the generals Chares

and Proxenus, and, after some brief contests with the mercenaries, took

Amphissa. The city was razed to the ground, the inhabitants expelled,

and the consecrated land restored to the Delphian sanctuary. When Philip

had further conquered Naupactus and handed it over to the Ætolians, he

went back across the mountains, occupied the Phocian frontier town of

Elatea in the fertile plain of the Cephisus valley which, commanding the

entrance to Locris and Bœotia, offered an excellent base for further

operations. When Elatea had been hastily fortified by a stockade and

provided with a strong garrison, it became a military camp which

threatened immediate danger to Bœotia and Attica.

Demosthenes has painted in lively colours the impression made on the

council and citizens of Athens by the news of the occupation of Elatea:

“It was evening when a messenger came to the prytanes with the

announcement that Elatea was taken. They immediately rose from table;

some drove the market people from their booths and lighted the trellis

work in order by this fiery signal to summon the people from the country

to the town; others sent to the generals and had the alarm sounded: and

the city was in the greatest excitement. At daybreak the next morning the

prytanes summoned the great council to the council house; the citizens

gathered in the popular assembly, and before the council had consulted

and come to a decision the whole community was assembled on the Pnyx. And

when the council appeared and the prytanes repeated the news received and

had introduced the messenger and the latter had communicated his report,

the herald asked: ‘Who will speak?’ but no one came forward; and as often

as the herald repeated the question none rose although all the strategi

were present and all the public orators.”

Then Demosthenes arose and first opposed the idea that Philip was acting

in accordance with an understanding with Thebes:

“Whoever indulges in an exaggerated anxiety as though Philip were sure of

the Thebans, mistakes the position, for I am convinced that if it were

so we should not hear that he is at Elatea but on our frontiers. But

it is quite true that in taking this step he had the design of winning

Thebes for himself. He has already brought many over to his side by money

and craft, but those who have withstood him from the beginning he will

not now be able to win. In what intention has he now occupied Elatea?

In order that by displaying his power in the neighbourhood and by the

threatening aspect of his weapons he may encourage his friends to a bold

stroke and intimidate his enemies, so that they will yield from fear or

be coerced by the rest. If then we now remember our former quarrels with

the Thebans and then distrust them, we shall first of all accomplish

Philip’s dearest wish and then drive those who have hitherto been his

adversaries over to his side, and there will be a general attack on

Attica in conjunction with him.”

To avoid this Demosthenes made the following suggestions to his

fellow-citizens: first to banish this present terror, and next to fear

for the Thebans, since they were much nearer the object of dread and it

was to them that the danger was most threatening; then they should march

to Eleusis with their whole forces and with the cavalry, to show that

they were themselves under arms, and by this means the party of liberty

in Thebes would be encouraged to make a stand for the right, as those

sold to Philip had a supporter at Elatea; finally they might choose ten

envoys who in conjunction with the strategi should make the necessary

arrangements for the march, and then going to Thebes declare there that

the Athenians were ready with assistance if the Thebans wished and

demanded it.

“If they accept the offer and join us we shall have attained our end

without compromising the dignity of our state; if we are not successful

the Thebans will have only themselves to blame if they meet with

misfortune, but we shall have done nothing shameful or base.”

ALLIANCE BETWEEN ATHENS AND THEBES

The words of the patriot were a ray of light in the gloom of confusion

and uncertainty. His suggestions were adopted without a dissentient word

and himself placed at the head of an embassy which was to negotiate

the alliance with the Thebans and arrange with the generals as to the

measures needed for the war. Demosthenes and his companions set out

immediately whilst the army took up its post at Eleusis. When the envoys

reached Thebes they immediately encountered those of Philip and his

Thessalian allies who, aided by the Macedonian party, were zealously

endeavouring by the most seductive promises to persuade the Thebans to

conclude a military alliance with the king, or at least to remain neutral

and allow his troops a passage to Attica. The witty, eloquent Python of

Byzantium showed much skill in enumerating all the acts of benevolence

which the king had performed for their city, and in exhibiting the

advantages to Thebes which a united attack on Attica would bring in

its train, and reminding the people of all the injuries and acts of

hostility which Athens had ever inflicted upon them and for which they

might now take vengeance. Nor did he forget the participation in the

spoils of victory in case of their joining their arms with Macedon and

the sufferings and horrors of the war if they stood by Athens. The Theban

assembly wavered. But when Demosthenes implored the meeting to forget for

the moment all former dissensions and injuries, and only think of saving

their native Hellas and preserving liberty and honour; when he made it

clear to them that the common danger could only be averted by their

firm cohesion--then all doubts vanished before his fiery words. In the

enthusiasm with which his speech filled them, they forgot self interest,

fear, and favour; they determined to renounce the king and to make an

offensive and defensive alliance with Athens. It was the last flicker

of the fire which had shone so bravely in the days of the Persian War.

At this time Demosthenes’ opinion was decisive, not less in the newly

erected confederate council at Thebes than before the popular assembly at

Athens.

The provisions of the treaty are not positively known. Thebes was

recognised as the head of Bœotia, each side secured in its possessions,

and the restoration of the Phocian commonwealths determined on.

Two-thirds of the cost of the war was to be borne by Athens, one-third

by Thebes On the other hand the assertion of Æschines that Thebes was to

have the sole command by land, and by sea was to share it with Athens,

lies under justifiable suspicion.

The newly awakened military spirit and the union of the arms of the two

most powerful Hellenic states, by no means promised well for Philip’s

enterprises. He therefore again had recourse to negotiation. His friends

and ambassadors protested that he had no hostile intentions against

Greece, he had only come to fulfil the decrees of the Amphictyons. Even

in Thebes and Athens there were notable men whose voices counselled

peace, appealing to the evil signs and presages which were forthcoming in

great numbers.

“The Pythia announced heavy misfortunes and old Sibylline utterances were

in circulation which pointed to unfortunate battles and bloody fields

of corpses, a prey to ravens and vultures: the vanquished weeps, ruin

strikes the victor.”

It required all the energy and decision of Demosthenes to overcome these

impressions. He went himself to Thebes and confirmed the Bœotarchs and

the assembly of the people in their resolution; in Athens, where even

Phocion spoke against the war, he is said to have threatened, to “drag

into a cell by the hair of his head the first man who suggested peace

with Philip.” Demosthenes carried his point. His popularity ran so high

that the Athenians honoured him with the award of a golden crown twice in

one year.

In the first days of spring the citizen army of Athens set out for

Thebes and encamped before the city; but the Thebans brought them in and

entertained them in their houses until the two allied armies marched

together into the Phocian country. The two first encounters with the

Macedonian troop at the Cephisus and in the “wintry” mountain country

were favourable to the Hellenes. In Thebes and Athens thanks were

rendered to the gods with sacrifices and solemn processions for the

successful “river and winter battles.” The Athenian army had especially

distinguished itself by its discipline, equipment, and military ardour.

Such men in Phocis as were capable of bearing arms joined the allies who

now occupied the defiles leading into Bœotia. In order to drive them from

this advantageous position and open a passage for himself, Philip again

had recourse to a stratagem. He sent a division of his army into Bœotia

by another mountain road and caused the villages and hamlets to be set

on fire. This determined the Bœotian leaders to leave their position and

protect their own country. Philip had been waiting for this; he quickly

recalled that division and then marched through the passes with his whole

army on Chæronea in the plain of the Cephisus, where the wide level

offered a favourable battle-field.

THE ARMIES IN THE PLAIN OF CHÆRONEA

[Sidenote: [338 B.C.]]

Here he was met by the army of the Hellenic allies. To the Thebans and

Athenians who formed the kernel, the Eubœans, Megarians, Corinthians,

Achæans, and Corcyræans had added their manhood, so that on the whole

the Greeks had perhaps the advantage in numbers over their opponent.

On the other hand they were far behind him in everything else. Their

hastily summoned troops, composed of various nationalities, were no

match either in training and discipline or in the use of weapons and

military experience for the well-equipped and seasoned hosts of the

Macedonians--who had lately been through the Thracian War, crossed the

Hæmus and fought with the Scythians and Triballi in the steppes of the

Danube--or for the Thessalian horsemen, who were renowned and feared

throughout antiquity. And this efficient, practised force was guided

by a single will of acknowledged mastery, and led into the battle by

experienced generals like Antipater and others; whilst on the side of the

Greeks there was no commander of name and consideration. The Athenian

Stratocles and the Theban Theagenes were brave and conscientious, but

in no way distinguished leaders; and the two other Athenian generals,

Lysicles and Chares, the profligate and little regarded captain of

mercenaries, could not in any way be compared with Philip.

Under these circumstances it was to be expected that the battle of

Chæronea would end in a defeat of the Greeks. But they fought and fell

with honour. It was the last test of the strength of the Hellenic people;

only a few hired soldiers were to be found in the ranks, the great

majority consisting of citizen levies. The heavy infantry of the Thebans,

amongst whom the “Sacred Band” of the Three Hundred occupied the place

of honour, maintained the reputation for bravery and discipline which

they had borne since the days of Epaminondas; and the Athenians, in whose

ranks Demosthenes served with the hoplites as a common soldier, were no

unworthy members of the league. They formed the left wing whilst the

Thebans fought on the right; the rest of the Hellenes and the mercenaries

filled the centre. Philip, recognising the importance of the battle, made

his dispositions with great wariness. He himself took command of the wing

opposite to the Athenians; the other he entrusted to his son Alexander, a

youth of eighteen, who, surrounded by the most experienced warriors, was

consumed with eagerness to begin his heroic career of fame and victory in

this decisive battle. The oak-tree on the left bank of the Cephisus where

his tent stood was still pointed out in Plutarch’s time.[n]

It is among the accusations urged by Æschines against Demosthenes, that

in levying mercenary troops he wrongfully took the public money to pay

men who never appeared; and further, that he placed at the disposal of

the Amphissians a large body of ten thousand mercenary troops, thus

withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Bœotian army; whereby Philip

was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries separately, while the entire

force, if kept together, could never have been defeated. Æschines affirms

that he himself strenuously opposed this separation of forces, the

consequences of which were disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause.

[Illustration: GREEK CATAPULT]

It was in August, 338 B.C., that the allied Grecian army met Philip near

Chæronea, the last Bœotian town on the frontiers of Phocis. He seems to

have been now strong enough to attempt to force his way into Bœotia, and

is said to have drawn down the allies from a strong position into the

plain by laying waste the neighbouring fields. His numbers are stated by

Diodorus at thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse; he doubtless

had with him Thessalians and other allies from northern Greece, but

not a single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to

him, the total is not known. We can therefore make no comparison as to

numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in organisation

is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents were those of Athens,

under Lysicles and Chares, and of Thebes, commanded by Theagenes;

there were, besides, Phocians, Achæans, and Corinthians--probably also

Eubœans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians, Messenians, Arcadians, Eleans,

and Argives, took no part in the war. All of them had doubtless been

solicited on both sides, by Demosthenes as well as by the partisans of

Philip. But their jealousy and the fear of Sparta led the last four

states rather to look towards Philip as a protector against her, though

on this occasion they took no positive part.

The command of the army was shared between the Athenians and the Thebans,

and its movements were determined by the joint decision of their

statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of Demosthenes

at least insured to them sound and patriotic counsel powerfully set

forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit for an emergency

so grave and terrible. It was the misfortune of Greece that, at this

crisis of her liberty, when everything was staked on the issue of the

campaign, neither an Epaminondas nor an Iphicrates was at hand. Phocion

was absent as commander of the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the

Ægean. Portents were said to have occurred, oracles and prophecies were

in circulation, calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenes,

animated by the sight of so numerous an army, hearty and combined in

defence of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the same

indifference as Epaminondas had shown before the battle of Leuctra, and

accused the Delphian priestess of philippising. Nay, so confident was

he in the result (according to the statement of Æschines), that when

Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared to offer terms of peace, and

the Bœotarchs inclined to accept them, Demosthenes alone stood out,

denouncing as a traitor anyone who should broach the proposition of

peace, and boasting that if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the

Athenians desired nothing better than a free passage through Bœotia to

attack Philip single-handed.

THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEA

In the field of battle near Chæronea, Philip himself commanded a chosen

body of troops on the wing opposed to the Athenians; while his youthful

son Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded against the

Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the battle, we are

scarcely permitted to know anything.[16] It is said to have been so

obstinately contested that for some time the result was doubtful. The

Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion of the Theban phalanx,

exhausted all their strength and energy in an unavailing attempt to bear

down the stronger phalanx and multiplied pikes opposed to them. The

youthful Alexander here first displayed his great military energy and

ability. After a long and murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were

all overpowered and perished in their ranks, while the Theban phalanx was

broken and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided

conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been so

impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army; insomuch

that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, “Let us pursue them even

to Macedonia.” It is farther said that Philip on his side simulated a

retreat, for the purpose of inducing them to pursue and to break their

order. We read another statement--more likely to be true; that the

Athenian hoplites, though full of energy at the first shock, could not

endure fatigue and prolonged struggle like the trained veterans in the

opposite ranks. Having steadily repelled them for a considerable time,

Philip became emulous on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled

his efforts: so as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was

thus put to flight with severe loss.

The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organised by Philip, was sixteen

deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at Leuctra.

It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete training in its

front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior to the Sacred Band,

who formed the Theban front rank. But its great superiority was in the

length of the Macedonian pike or sarissa, in the number of these weapons

which projected in front of the foremost soldiers, and the long practice

of the men to manage this impenetrable array of pikes in an efficient

manner. The value of Philip’s improved phalanx was attested by his

victory at Chæronea.

But the victory was not gained by the phalanx alone. The military

organisation of Philip comprised an aggregate of many sorts of troops

besides the phalanx--the bodyguards, horse as well as foot; the

hypaspistæ, or light hoplites; the light cavalry, bowmen, slingers, etc.

One thousand Athenian citizens perished in this disastrous field; two

thousand more fell into the hands of Philip as prisoners. The Theban

loss is said also to have been terrible, as well as the Achæan. But we

do not know the numbers; nor have we any statement of the Macedonian

loss. Demosthenes, himself present in the ranks of the hoplites, shared

in the flight of his defeated countrymen. He is accused by his political

enemies of having behaved with extreme and disgraceful cowardice; but we

see plainly from the continued confidence and respect shown to him by

the general body of his countrymen, that they cannot have credited the

imputation. The two Athenian generals, Chares and Lysicles, both escaped

from the field. The latter was afterwards publicly accused at Athens by

the orator Lycurgus. Lysicles was condemned to death by the dicastery.

What there was to distinguish his conduct from that of his colleague

Chares--who certainly was not condemned, and is not even stated to have

been accused--we do not know.

Unspeakable was the agony at Athens on the report of this disaster, with

a multitude of citizens as yet unknown left on the field or prisoners,

and a victorious enemy within three or four days’ march of the city.

The whole population, even old men, women, and children, were spread

about the streets in all the violence of grief and terror, interchanging

effusions of distress and sympathy, and questioning every fugitive as he

arrived about the safety of their relatives in the battle. The flower

of the citizens of military age had been engaged; and before the extent

of loss had been ascertained, it was feared that none except the elders

would be left to defend the city. At length the definite loss became

known: severe indeed and terrible--yet not a total shipwreck, like that

of the army of Nicias in Sicily.

As on that trying occasion, so now: amidst all the distress and alarm,

it was not in the Athenian character to despair. The mass of citizens

hastened unbidden to form a public assembly, wherein the most energetic

resolutions were taken for defence. Decrees were passed enjoining every

one to carry his family and property out of the open country of Attica

into the various strongholds; directing the body of the senators, who

by general rule were exempt from military service, to march down in

arms to Piræus, and put that harbour in condition to stand a siege;

placing every man without exception at the disposal of the generals, as

a soldier for defence, and imposing the penalties of treason on every

one who fled; enfranchising all slaves fit for bearing arms, granting

the citizenship to metics under the same circumstances, and restoring

to the full privilege of citizens those who had been disfranchised by

judicial sentence. This last-mentioned decree was proposed by Hyperides;

but several others were moved by Demosthenes, who, notwithstanding the

late misfortune of the Athenian arms, was listened to with undiminished

respect and confidence. Not only he, but also most of the conspicuous

citizens and habitual speakers in the assembly, came forward with large

private contributions to meet the pressing wants of the moment. Every

man in the city lent a hand to make good the defective points in the

fortification. Materials were obtained by felling the trees near the

city, and even by taking stones from the adjacent sepulchres--as had

been done after the Persian War when the walls were built under the

contrivance of Themistocles. The temples were stripped of the arms

suspended within them, for the purpose of equipping unarmed citizens.

By such earnest and unanimous efforts, the defences of the city and of

Piræus were soon materially improved. At sea Athens had nothing to fear.

Her powerful naval force was untouched, and her superiority to Philip

on that element incontestable. Envoys were sent to Trœzen, Epidaurus,

Andros, Ceos, and other places, to solicit aid and collect money; in one

or other of which embassies Demosthenes served, after he had provided for

the immediate exigences of defence.

PHILIP TAKES THEBES

Such were the precautions taken at Athens after this fatal day. But

Athens lay at a distance of three or four days’ march from the field

of Chæronea; while Thebes, being much nearer, bore the first attack

of Philip. Of the behaviour of that prince after his victory, we have

contradictory statements. According to one account, he indulged in the

most insulting and licentious exultation on the field of battle, jesting

especially on the oratory and motions of Demosthenes; a temper from which

he was brought round by the courageous reproof of Demades, then his

prisoner as one of the Athenian hoplites.[17] At first he even refused to

grant permission to inter the slain, when the herald came from Lebadea to

make the customary demand. According to another account, the demeanour

of Philip towards the defeated Athenians was gentle and forbearing.

However the fact may have stood as to his first manifestations, it is

certain that his positive measures were harsh towards Thebes and lenient

towards Athens. He sold the Theban captives into slavery; he is said

also to have exacted a price for the liberty granted to bury the Theban

slain--which liberty, according to Grecian custom, was never refused,

and certainly never sold, by the victor. Whether Thebes made any further

resistance, or stood a siege, we do not know. But presently the city fell

into Philip’s power, who put to death several of the leading citizens,

banished others, and confiscated the property of both. A council of

Three Hundred--composed of philippising Thebans, for the most part just

recalled from exile--was invested with the government of the city, and

with powers of life and death over every one. The state of Thebes became

much the same as it had been when the Spartan Phœbidas, in concert with

the Theban party headed by Leontiades, surprised the Cadmea. A Macedonian

garrison was now placed in the Cadmea, as a Spartan garrison had been

placed then. Supported by this garrison, the philippising Thebans were

uncontrolled masters of the city; with full power, and no reluctance, to

gratify their political antipathies. At the same time, Philip restored

the minor Bœotian towns--Orchomenos, and Platæa, probably also Thespiæ

and Coronea--to the condition of free communities instead of subjection

to Thebes.

At Athens also, the philippising orators raised their voices loudly and

confidently, denouncing Demosthenes and his policy. New speakers, who

would hardly have come forward before, were now put up against him. The

accusations however altogether failed; the people continued to trust him,

omitting no measure of defence which he suggested. Æschines, who had

before disclaimed all connection with Philip, now altered his tone, and

made boast of the ties of friendship and hospitality subsisting between

that prince and himself. He tendered his services to go as envoy to the

Macedonian camp; whither he appears to have been sent, doubtless with

others, perhaps with Xenocrates and Phocion. Among them was Demades also,

having been just released from his captivity. Either by the persuasions

of Demades, or by a change in his own dispositions, Philip had now become

inclined to treat with Athens on favourable terms. The bodies of the

slain Athenians were burned by the victors, and their ashes collected

to be carried to Athens; though the formal application of the herald,

to the same effect, had been previously refused. Æschines (according

to the assertion of Demosthenes) took part as a sympathising guest in

the banquet and festivities whereby Philip celebrated his triumph over

Grecian liberty. At length Demades with the other envoys returned to

Athens, reporting the consent of Philip to conclude peace, to give back

the numerous prisoners in his hands, and also to transfer Oropus from the

Thebans to Athens.

PEACE OF DEMADES

Demades proposed the conclusion of peace to the Athenian assembly,

by whom it was readily decreed. To escape invasion and siege by the

Macedonian army was doubtless an unspeakable relief; while the recovery

of the two thousand prisoners without ransom was an acquisition of great

importance, not merely to the city collectively but to the sympathies

of numerous relatives. Lastly, to regain Oropus--a possession which

they had once enjoyed, and for which they had long wrangled with the

Thebans--was a further cause of satisfaction. Such conditions were

doubtless acceptable at Athens. But there was a submission to be made on

the other side, which to the contemporaries of Pericles would have seemed

intolerable, even as the price of averted invasion or recovered captives.

The Athenians were required to acknowledge the exaltation of Philip to

the headship of the Grecian world, and to promote the like acknowledgment

by all other Greeks, in a congress to be speedily convened. They were to

renounce all pretensions to headship, not only for themselves, but for

every other Grecian state; to recognise not Sparta nor Thebes, but the

king of Macedon, as Panhellenic chief; to acquiesce in the transition

of Greece from the position of a free, self-determining, political

aggregate, into a provincial dependency of the kings of Pella and Ægæ.

It is not easy to conceive a more terrible shock to that traditional

sentiment of pride and patriotism, inherited from forefathers who, after

repelling and worsting the Persians, had first organised the maritime

Greeks into a confederacy running parallel with and supplementary to

the non-maritime Greeks allied with Sparta; thus keeping out foreign

dominion and casting the Grecian world into a system founded on native

sympathies and free government. Such traditional sentiment, though it

no longer governed the character of the Athenians nor impressed upon

them motives of action, had still a strong hold upon their imagination

and memory, where it had been constantly kept alive by the eloquence of

Demosthenes and others. The Peace of Demades, recognising Philip as chief

of Greece, was a renunciation of all this proud historical past, and the

acceptance of a new and degraded position, for Athens as well as for

Greece generally.

If Philip had not purchased the recognition of Athens, he might have

failed in trying to extort it by force. For though, being master of the

field, he could lay waste Attica with impunity, and even establish a

permanent fortress in it like Decelea--yet the fleet of Athens was as

strong as ever, and her preponderance at sea irresistible. Under these

circumstances, Athens and Piræus might have been defended against him,

as Byzantium and Perinthus had been, two years before; the Athenian

fleet might have obstructed his operations in many ways; and the siege

of Athens might have called forth a burst of Hellenic sympathy, such as

to embarrass his further progress. We may see therefore that, with such

difficulties before him if he pushed the Athenians to despair, Philip

acted wisely in employing his victory and his prisoners to procure her

recognition of his headship. His political game was well played, now

as always; but to the praise of generosity bestowed by Polybius he has

little claim.

Besides the recognition of Philip as chief of Greece, the Athenians, on

the motion of Demades, passed various honorary and complimentary votes

in his favour; of what precise nature we do not know. Immediate relief

from danger, with the restoration of two thousand captive citizens, was

sufficient to render the peace generally popular at the first moment;

moreover, the Athenians, as if conscious of failing resolution and

strength, were now entering upon that career of flattery to powerful

kings which we shall hereafter find them pushing to disgraceful

extravagance. It was probably during the prevalence of this sentiment,

which did not long continue, that the youthful Alexander of Macedon,

accompanied by Antipater, paid a visit to Athens. Meanwhile the respect

enjoyed by Demosthenes among his countrymen was noway lessened. Though

his political opponents thought the season favourable for bringing many

impeachments against him, none of them proved successful.

[Illustration: GREEK MARBLE CHAIR]

PHILIP IN PELOPONNESUS

Having thus subjugated and garrisoned Thebes, having reconstituted the

anti-Theban cities in Bœotia, having constrained Athens to submission and

dependent alliance, and having established a garrison in Ambracia, at

the same time mastering Acarnania, and banishing the leading Acarnanians

who were opposed to him, Philip next proceeded to carry his arms into

Peloponnesus. He found little positive resistance anywhere, except in

the territory of Sparta. The Corinthians, Argives, Messenians, Eleans,

and many Arcadians, all submitted to his dominion; some even courted

his alliance, from fear and antipathy against Sparta. Philip invaded

Laconia with an army too powerful for the Spartans to resist in the

field. He laid waste the country, and took some detached posts; but he

did not take, nor do we know that he even attacked, Sparta itself. The

Spartans could not resist; yet would they neither submit nor ask for

peace. It appears that Philip cut down their territory and narrowed

their boundaries on all the three sides; towards Argos, Messene,

and Megalopolis. We have no precise account of the details of his

proceedings; but it is clear that he did just what seemed to him good,

and that the governments of all the Peloponnesian cities came into the

hands of his partisans. Sparta was the only city which stood out against

him; maintaining her ancient freedom and dignity, under circumstances of

feebleness and humiliation, with more unshaken resolution than Athens.

POLITICAL SCHEMES; FAMILY BROILS

[Sidenote: [338-336 B.C.]]

Philip next proceeded to convene a congress of Grecian cities at Corinth.

He here announced himself as resolved on an expedition against the

Persian king, for the purpose both of liberating the Asiatic Greeks

and avenging the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. The general vote of the

congress nominated him leader of the united Greeks for this purpose,

and decreed a Grecian force to join him, to be formed of contingents

furnished by the various cities. The total of the force promised is

stated only by Justin, who gives it at two hundred thousand foot, and

fifteen thousand horse; an army which Greece certainly could not have

furnished, and which we can hardly believe to have been even promised.

The Spartans stood aloof from the congress, continuing to refuse all

recognition of the headship of Philip. The Athenians attended and

concurred in the vote; which was in fact the next step to carry out the

peace made by Demades. They were required to furnish a well-equipped

fleet to serve under Philip; and they were at the same time divested of

their dignity of chiefs of a maritime confederacy, the islands being

enrolled as maritime dependencies of Philip, instead of continuing to

send deputies to a synod meeting at Athens. For several years afterwards,

the naval force in the dockyards of Athens still continued large and

powerful; but her maritime ascendency henceforward disappears.

This scheme--the invasion of Persia--had now ceased to be an object of

genuine aspiration throughout the Grecian world. The Great King, no

longer inspiring terror to Greece collectively, might now be regarded as

likely to lend protection against Macedonian oppression. To emancipate

the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion would be in itself an enterprise

grateful to Grecian feeling, though all such wishes must have been

gradually dying out since the Peace of Antalcidas. But emancipation,

accomplished by Philip, would be only a transfer of the Asiatic Greeks

from Persian dominion to his. The synod of Corinth served no purpose

except to harness the Greeks to his car, for a distant enterprise

lucrative to his soldiers and suited to his insatiable ambition.

It was in 337 B.C. that this Persian expedition was concerted and

resolved. During that year preparations were made of sufficient magnitude

to exhaust the finances of Philip; who was at the same time engaged in

military operations, and fought a severe battle against the Illyrian king

Pleurias. In the spring of 336 B.C., a portion of the Macedonian army

under Parmenion and Attalus, was sent across to Asia to commence military

operations; Philip himself intending speedily to follow.

Such however was not the fate reserved for him. Not long before, he had

taken the resolution of repudiating, on the allegation of infidelity,

his wife Olympias; who is said to have become repugnant to him, from the

furious and savage impulses of her character. He had successively married

several wives, the last of whom was Cleopatra, niece of the Macedonian

Attalus. It was at her instance that he is said to have repudiated

Olympias; who retired to her brother, Alexander of Epirus. This step

provoked violent dissensions among the partisans of the two queens,

and even between Philip and his son Alexander, who expressed a strong

resentment at the repudiation of his mother. Amidst the intoxication of

the marriage banquet, Attalus proposed a toast and prayer, that there

might speedily appear a legitimate son, from Philip and Cleopatra, to

succeed to the Macedonian throne. Upon which Alexander exclaimed in

wrath, “Do you then proclaim me as a bastard?”--at the same time hurling

a goblet at him. Incensed at this proceeding, Philip started up, drew his

sword, and made furiously at his son; but fell to the ground from passion

and intoxication. This accident alone preserved the life of Alexander,

who retorted, “Here is a man, preparing to cross from Europe into Asia,

who yet cannot step surely from one couch to another.” After this violent

quarrel the father and son separated. Alexander conducted his mother

into Epirus, and then went himself to the Illyrian king. Some months

afterwards, at the instance of the Corinthian Demaratus, Philip sent for

him back, and became reconciled to him; but another cause of displeasure

soon arose, because Alexander had opened a negotiation for marriage

with the daughter of the satrap of Caria. Rejecting such an alliance as

unworthy, Philip sharply reproved his son, and banished from Macedonia

several courtiers whom he suspected as intimate with Alexander; while the

friends of Attalus stood high in favour.

THE DEATH OF PHILIP

[Sidenote: [336 B.C.]]

Such were the animosities distracting the court and family of Philip. A

son had just been born to him from his new wife Cleopatra. His expedition

against Persia, resolved and prepared during the preceding year, had been

actually commenced. But Philip foresaw that during his absence danger

might arise from the furious Olympias, bitterly exasperated by the recent

events, and instigating her brother Alexander, king of Epirus, with

whom she was now residing. He now deemed it essential to conciliate him

still further, by a special tie of alliance; giving to him in marriage

Cleopatra, his daughter by Olympias. For this marriage, celebrated at

Ægæ in Macedonia in August 336 B.C., Philip provided festivals of the

utmost cost and splendour, commemorating at the same time the recent

birth of his son by Cleopatra. Banquets, munificent presents, gymnastic

and musical matches, tragic exhibitions--among which Neoptolemus the

actor performed in the tragedy of Cinyras, etc., with every species of

attraction known to the age--were accumulated, in order to reconcile

the dissentient parties in Macedonia, and to render the effect imposing

on the minds of the Greeks; who, from every city, sent deputies for

congratulation. Statues of the twelve great gods, admirably executed,

were carried in solemn procession into the theatre; immediately after

them, the statue of Philip himself as a thirteenth god.

Amidst this festive multitude, however, there were not wanting

discontented partisans of Olympias and Alexander, to both of whom the

young queen with her new-born child threatened a formidable rivalry.

There was also a malcontent yet more dangerous--Pausanias, one of the

royal bodyguards, a noble youth born in the district called Orestis

in upper Macedonia, who, from causes of offence peculiar to himself,

nourished a deadly hatred against Philip. The provocation which he had

received is one which we can neither conveniently transcribe, nor indeed

accurately make out, amidst discrepancies of statement. It was Attalus,

the uncle of the new queen Cleopatra, who had given the provocation, by

inflicting upon Pausanias an outrage of the most brutal and revolting

character. Even for so monstrous an act, no regular justice could be

had in Macedonia against a powerful man. Pausanias complained to Philip

in person. According to one account, Philip put aside the complaint

with evasions, and even treated it with ridicule; according to another

account, he expressed his displeasure at the act, and tried to console

Pausanias by pecuniary presents. But he granted neither redress nor

satisfaction to the sentiment of an outraged man. Accordingly Pausanias

determined to take revenge for himself. Instead of revenging himself

on Attalus--who indeed was out of his reach, being at the head of the

Macedonian troops in Asia--his wrath fixed upon Philip himself, by whom

the demand for redress had been refused. That the vindictive Olympias

would positively spur on Pausanias to assassinate Philip, is highly

probable. Respecting Alexander, though he also was accused, there is no

sufficient evidence to warrant a similar assertion;[18] but that some

among his partisans--men eager to consult his feelings and to insure his

succession--lent their encouragements, appears tolerably well established.

Unconscious of the plot, Philip was about to enter the theatre, already

crowded with spectators. As he approached the door, clothed in a white

robe, he felt so exalted with impressions of his own dignity, and so

confident in the admiring sympathy of the surrounding multitude, that he

advanced both unarmed and unprotected, directing his guards to hold back.

At this moment Pausanias, standing near with a Gallic sword concealed

under his garment, rushed upon him, thrust the weapon through his body,

and killed him. Having accomplished his purpose, the assassin immediately

ran off, and tried to reach the gates, where he had previously caused

horses to be stationed. Being strong and active, he might have succeeded

in effecting his escape--like most of the assassins of Jason of Pheræ

under circumstances very similar--had not his foot stumbled amidst some

vine-stocks. The guards and friends of Philip were at first paralysed

with astonishment and consternation. At length, however, some hastened

to assist the dying king, while others rushed in pursuit of Pausanias.

Leonnatus and Perdiccas overtook him and slew him immediately.

In what way, or to what extent, the accomplices of Pausanias lent him

aid, we are not permitted to know. It is possible that they may have

posted themselves artfully so as to obstruct pursuit, and favour his

chance of escape; which would appear extremely small, after a deed of

such unmeasured audacity. Three only of the reputed accomplices are

known to us by name--three brothers from the Lyncestian district of

upper Macedonia, Alexander, Heromenes, and Arrhibæus, sons of Æropus;

but it seems that there were others besides. The Lyncestian Alexander

whose father-in-law, Antipater, was one of the most conspicuous and

confidential officers in the service of Philip, belonged to a good family

in Macedonia, perhaps even descendants from the ancient family of the

princes of Lyncestis. It was he who, immediately after Pausanias had

assassinated Philip, hastened to salute the prince Alexander as king,

helped him to put on his armour, and marched as one of his guards to take

possession of the regal palace.[g]

A SUMMING UP OF PHILIP’S CHARACTER

His character was always to be without character in disposition and

action; his principles, to have no principles and everywhere to dissemble

his aims; his habits, to accustom himself to nothing, but solely to

follow the inspirations of the moment; his strength, to remain master

of himself in every condition and proceeding, and, in a thousand other

causes and consequences of weakness, to follow his chief plan unchanged,

and to lead everything around him, whilst to the short-sighted he

appeared to be led by all.

He possessed wit, sagacity, and eloquence, and made use of them. He

was insinuating and condescending when it was a question of winning or

deluding; merciful when he hated; irritating when he loved; compassionate

when he himself had dealt the wounds; ready to comfort, when he had

decided to strike the heart more deeply; poor, so as to soften the rage

of the plundered rich, so as to reward his helpers; liberal with promises

when he saw the people were credulous; full of respect for the gods only

when he had a mind to; unconcerned as to the lawfulness of the means,

provided they led to the end.

“Philip,” says Pausanias, “accomplished the greatest deeds of all the

Macedonian kings who reigned before and after him, and also broke more

oaths and violated more covenants.”

The new politics which Philip established, arose entirely out of his

genius, and the master understood his work and knew how to use it. When

Philip as a statesman formed something new with cleverness and vigour,

the old must therefore have succumbed to it. The old methods were no

longer suitable; the means failed the end, the roads no longer led to the

goal; danger then took another form, and was threatened on another side.

That which could have saved the Greeks from imitating the new methods of

the opponent, and of seizing the spirit of them, and throwing themselves

quickly into another kind of transaction, they were no longer capable

of. By the side of politics he placed an improved war department, but

one spirit drifted into both. Philip possessed the talents especially

required by a general. In the greatest danger, full of presence of mind,

he never doubted his safety; his most terrible deliberation in the field

was quiet deliberation and stratagem. The Bœotians learned this when they

had cut him off and already thought him caught, and the Chalcidonians

whose cleverly contrived perfidy was wrecked by his cunning. He

anticipated all his enemies; they admitted that on this account he always

had advantage over them.

Demosthenes says to the Athenians: “You wage war with Philip in the same

way as the barbarians carry on a boxing match; when some one is hit he

tries to protect the place, and if he is struck on another part his

hands go to it; but to prevent the blow or to foresee it, they cannot

and will not. It is thus with you; when you hear Philip is in Chæronea,

you decide to send an army there, when in Pydna, also there, so that he

is truly your commanding officer.” He maintained a standing army and

was therefore always ready to strike; this gave him a great superiority,

because as monarch he could at once use his fighting forces, without

losing time in consultation.

When he attacked the Greeks, his army had already been trained through

fighting the surrounding barbarians; it had to learn how useful and

necessary it was, and realise to what purpose he made them persevere in

peace. He often made them march three hundred stadia encumbered with

their weapons, with helmet, shield, and splints, and in addition to

this, food and clothing and utensils. They had to observe the strictest

discipline. A distinguished Tarentine was dismissed from the service

because he had helped himself to a warm bath; Æropus and Damasippus were

dismissed because they brought singers into the camp. In the same manner

as Epaminondas, in whose school Philip had learned, beat the Lacedæmonian

mora by a new formation of the army and deprived them of the efficiency

of their firm, quiet movements--so Philip formed the Macedonian phalanx.

Even Æmilius Paulus acknowledged that nothing ever terrified them. They

stood the test at Chæronea, where the sacred troops of the Thebans were

defeated, and the Athenians, also in the last fight for their freedom,

did not prevail against them.[j]

GROTE’S ESTIMATE OF PHILIP

Thus perished the destroyer of freedom and independence in the Hellenic

world, at the age of forty-six or forty-seven, after a reign of

twenty-three years. Our information about him is signally defective.

Neither his means, nor his plans, nor the difficulties which he overcame,

nor his interior government, are known to us with exactness or upon

contemporary historical authority. But the great results of his reign,

and the main lines of his character, stand out incontestably. At his

accession, the Macedonian kingdom was a narrow territory round Pella,

excluded partially, by independent and powerful Grecian cities, even

from the neighbouring sea coast. At his death Macedonian ascendency was

established from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian Sea,

and the Ambracian, Messenian, and Saronic gulfs. Within these boundaries,

all the cities recognised the supremacy of Philip; except only Sparta,

and mountaineers like the Ætolians and others defended by a rugged home.

Good fortune had waited on Philip’s steps; but it was good fortune

crowning the efforts of a rare talent. Indeed the restless ambition,

the indefatigable personal activity and endurance, and the adventurous

courage of Philip were such as, in a king, suffice almost of themselves

to guarantee success, even with abilities much inferior to his. That

among the causes of Philip’s conquests, one was corruption, employed

abundantly to foment discord and purchase partisans among neighbours

and enemies; that with winning and agreeable manners, he combined

recklessness in false promises, deceit and extortion even towards allies,

and unscrupulous perjury when it suited his purpose--this we find

affirmed, and there is no reason for disbelieving it. Such dissolving

forces smoothed the way for an efficient and admirable army, organised,

and usually commanded, by himself. Its organisation adopted and enlarged

the best processes of scientific warfare employed by Epaminondas and

Iphicrates. Begun as well as completed by Philip, and bequeathed as an

engine ready-made for the conquests of Alexander, it constitutes an

epoch in military history. But the more we extol the genius of Philip as

a conqueror, formed for successful encroachment and aggrandisement at

the expense of all his neighbours--the less can we find room for that

mildness and moderation which some authors discover in his character. If,

on some occasions of his life, such attributes may fairly be recognised,

we have to set against them the destruction of the thirty-two Greek

cities in Chalcidice, and the wholesale transportation of reluctant and

miserable families from one inhabitancy to another.

Besides his skill as a general and politician, Philip was no mean

proficient in the Grecian accomplishments of rhetoric and letters.

Isocrates addresses him as a friend of letters and philosophy; a

reputation which his choice of Aristotle as instructor of his son

Alexander tends to bear out. Yet in Philip, as in the two Dionysii of

Syracuse and other despots, these tastes were not found inconsistent

either with the crimes of ambition or the licenses of inordinate

appetite. The contemporary historian Theopompus, a warm admirer of

Philip’s genius, stigmatises not only the perfidy of his public dealings,

but also the drunkenness, gambling, and excesses of all kinds in which

he indulged--encouraging the like in those around him. His Macedonian

and Grecian bodyguard, eight hundred in number, was a troop in which

no decent man could live; distinguished indeed for military bravery

and aptitude, but sated with plunder, and stained with such shameless

treachery, sanguinary rapacity, and unbridled lust, as befitted only

centaurs and Læstrygons. The number of Philip’s mistresses and wives

was almost on an oriental scale; and the innumerable dissensions thus

introduced into his court through his offspring by different mothers,

were fraught with mischievous consequences.

In appreciating the genius of Philip, we have to appreciate also

the parties to whom he stood opposed. His good fortune was nowhere

more conspicuous than in the fact, that he fell upon those days of

disunion and backwardness in Greece (indicated in the last sentence of

Xenophon’s _Hellenics_) when there was neither leading city prepared to

keep watch, nor leading general to take command, nor citizen-soldiers

willing and ready to endure the hardships of steady service. Philip

combated no opponents like Epaminondas, or Agesilaus, or Iphicrates.

How different might have been his career, had Epaminondas survived the

victory of Mantinea, gained only two years before Philip’s accession!

To oppose Philip, there needed a man like himself, competent not only

to advise and project, but to command in person, to stimulate the zeal

of citizen-soldiers, and to set the example of braving danger and

fatigue. Unfortunately for Greece, no such leader stood forward. In

counsel and speech Demosthenes sufficed for the emergency. Twice before

the battle of Chæronea--at Byzantium and at Thebes--did he signally

frustrate Philip’s combinations. But he was not formed to take the lead

in action, nor was there any one near him to supply the defect. In the

field, Philip encountered only that “public inefficiency,” at Athens and

elsewhere in Greece, of which even Æschines complains; and to this decay

of Grecian energy, not less than to his own distinguished attributes,

the unparalleled success of his reign was owing. We shall find during

the reign of his son Alexander the like genius and vigour exhibited on

a still larger scale, and achieving still more wonderful results; while

the once stirring politics of Greece, after one feeble effort, sink yet

lower, into the nullity of a subject province.[g]

FOOTNOTES

[15] [This made Demosthenes part Scythian.]

[16] [Niebuhr,[h] commenting on our scant information, says, “It is as if

the muse of Greece had grown dumb on the death-day of Greek liberty, and

had thrown her veil over the death blow.” Later he notes the remarkable

coincidence that the battle of Chæronea was fought in the same year in

which Rome conquered the Volscians and Latins “and laid the foundation of

her sovereignty over all Italy.”]

[17] [According to Diodorus,[i] he said, “Since Fortune, O King, has

represented thee like Agamemnon, art thou not ashamed to act the part of

Thersites?” With this sharp reproof Philip was so startled, they say, that

he wholly changed his former course, and with admiration released the man

that had reprehended him and advanced him to places of honour.]

[18] [But Niebuhr[h] is less negative. He exclaims, “Alexander was no

doubt deeply implicated in this murder. A jury would have condemned

him as an accomplice. But he was prudent enough to make away with the

participators in the conspiracy, who might have betrayed him.”]

[Illustration]