CHAPTER XVI.

France before 1830--Reign of Charles X.--Ministry of Martignac--Ministry of

Polignac--The Duke of Orleans--War in Algiers--The July Ordinances--

Revolution of July--Louis Philippe King--Nature and Effects of the July

Revolution--Affairs in Belgium--The Belgian Revolution--The Great

Powers--Intervention, and Establishment of the Kingdom of Belgium--Affairs

of Poland--Insurrection at Warsaw--War between Russia and Poland--Overthrow

of the Poles: End of the Polish Constitution--Affairs of Italy--

Insurrection in the Papal States--France and Austria--Austrian

Intervention--Ancona occupied by the French--Affairs of Germany--Prussia;

the Zollverein--Brunswick, Hanover, Saxony--The Palatinate--Reaction in

Germany--Exiles in Switzerland; Incursion into Savoy--Dispersion of the

Exiles--France under Louis Philippe: Successive Risings--Period of

Parliamentary Activity--England after 1830: The Reform Bill.

When the Congress of Vienna re-arranged the map of Europe after Napoleon's

fall, Lord Castlereagh expressed the opinion that no prudent statesman

would forecast a duration of more than seven years for any settlement that

might then be made. At the end of a period twice as long the Treaties of

1815 were still the public law of Europe. The grave had peacefully closed

over Napoleon; the revolutionary forces of France had given no sign of

returning life. As the Bourbon monarchy struck root, and the elements of

opposition grew daily weaker in France, the perils that lately filled all

minds appeared to grow obsolete, and the very Power against which the

anti-revolutionary treaties of 1815 had been directed took its place, as of

natural right, by the side of Austria and Russia in the struggle against

revolution. The attack of Louis XVIII. upon the Spanish Constitutionalists

marked the complete reconciliation of France with the Continental dynasties

which had combined against it in 1815; and from this time the Treaties of

Chaumont and Aix-la-Chapelle, though their provisions might be still

unchallenged, ceased to represent the actual relations existing between the

Powers. There was no longer a moral union of the Courts against a supposed

French revolutionary State; on the contrary, when Eastern affairs reached

their crisis, Russia detached itself from its Hapsburg ally, and definitely

allied itself with France. If after the Peace of Adrianople any one Power

stood isolated, it was Austria; and if Europe was threatened by renewed

aggression, it was not under revolutionary leaders or with revolutionary

watchwords, but as the result of an alliance between Charles X. and the

Czar of Russia. After the Bourbon Cabinet had resolved to seek an extension

of French territory at whatever sacrifice of the balance of power in the

East, Europe could hardly expect that the Court of St. Petersburg would

long reject the advantages offered to it. The frontiers of 1815 seemed

likely to be obliterated by an enterprise which would bring Russia to the

Danube and France to the Rhine. From this danger the settlement of 1815 was

saved by the course of events that took place within France itself. The

Revolution of 1830, insignificant in its immediate effects upon the French

people, largely influenced the governments and the nations of Europe; and

while within certain narrow limits it gave a stimulus to constitutional

liberty, its more general result was to revive the union of the three

Eastern Courts which had broken down in 1826, and to reunite the principal

members of the Holy Alliance by the sense of a common interest against the

Liberalism of the West.

[Government of Charles X., 1824-1827.]

In the person of Charles X. reaction and clericalism had ascended the

French throne. The minister, Villèle, who had won power in 1820 as the

representative of the Ultra-Royalists, had indeed learnt wisdom while in

office, and down to the death of Louis XVIII. in 1824 he had kept in check

the more violent section of his party. But he now retained his post only at

the price of compliance with the Court, and gave the authority of his name

to measures which his own judgment condemned. It was characteristic of

Charles X. and of the reactionaries around him that out of trifling matters

they provoked more exasperation than a prudent Government would have

aroused by changes of infinitely greater importance. Thus in a

sacrilege-law which was introduced in 1825 they disgusted all reasonable

men by attempting to revive the barbarous mediæval punishment of amputation

of the hand; and in a measure conferring some fractional rights upon the

eldest son in cases of intestacy they alarmed the whole nation by a

preamble declaring the French principle of the equal division of

inheritances to be incompatible with monarchy. Coming from a Government

which had thus already forfeited public confidence, a law granting the

emigrants a compensation of £40,000,000 for their estates which had been

confiscated during the Revolution excited the strongest opposition,

although, apart from questions of equity, it benefited the nation by for

ever setting at rest all doubt as to the title of the purchasers of the

confiscated lands. The financial operations by which, in order to provide

the vast sum allotted to the emigrants, the national debt was converted

from a five per cent, to a three per cent, stock, alienated all

stockholders and especially the powerful bankers of Paris. But more than

any single legislative act, the alliance of the Government with the

priestly order, and the encouragement given by it to monastic corporations,

whose existence in France was contrary to law, offended the nation. The

Jesuits were indicted before the law-courts by Montlosier, himself a

Royalist and a member of the old noblesse. A vehement controversy sprang up

between the ecclesiastics and their opponents, in which the Court was not

spared. The Government, which had lately repealed the law of censorship,

now restored it by edict. The climax of its unpopularity was reached; its

hold upon the Chamber was gone, and the very measure by which Villèle, when

at the height of his power, had endeavoured to give permanence to his

administration, proved its ruin. He had abolished the system of partial

renovation, by which one-fifth of the Chamber of Deputies was annually

returned, and substituted for it the English system of septennial

Parliaments with general elections. In 1827 King Charles, believing his

Ministers to be stronger in the country than in the Chamber, exercised his

prerogative of dissolution. The result was the total defeat of the

Government, and the return of an assembly in which the Liberal opposition

outnumbered the partisans of the Court by three to one. Villèle's Ministry

now resigned. King Charles, unwilling to choose his successor from the

Parliamentary majority, thought for a moment of violent resistance, but

subsequently adopted other counsels, and, without sincerely intending to

bow to the national will, called to office the Vicomte de Martignac, a

member of the right centre, and the representative of a policy of

conciliation and moderate reform (January 2, 1828).

[Ministry of Martignac, 1828-29.]

[Polignac Minister, Aug. 9, 1829.]

It was not the fault of this Minister that the last chance of union between

the French nation and the elder Bourbon line was thrown away. Martignac

brought forward a measure of decentralisation conferring upon the local

authorities powers which, though limited, were larger than they had

possessed at any time since the foundation of the Consulate; and he

appealed to the Liberal sections of the Chamber to assist him in winning an

instalment of self-government which France might well have accepted with

satisfaction. But the spirit of opposition within the Assembly was too

strong for a coalition of moderate men, and the Liberals made the success

of Martignac's plan impossible by insisting on concessions which the

Minister was unable to grant. The reactionists were ready to combine with

their opponents. King Charles himself was in secret antagonism to his

Minister, and watched with malicious joy his failure to control the

majority in the Chamber. Instead of throwing all his influence on to the

side of Martignac, and rallying all doubtful forces by the pronounced

support of the Crown, he welcomed Martignac's defeat as a proof of the

uselessness of all concessions, and dismissed the Minister from office,

declaring that the course of events had fulfilled his own belief in the

impossibility of governing in accord with a Parliament. The names of the

Ministers who were now called to power excited anxiety and alarm not only

in France but throughout the political circles of Europe. They were the

names of men known as the most violent and embittered partisans of

reaction; men whose presence in the councils of the King could mean nothing

but a direct attack upon the existing Parliamentary system of France. At

the head was Jules Polignac, then French ambassador at London, a man

half-crazed with religious delusions, who had suffered a long imprisonment

for his share in Cadoudal's attempt to kill Napoleon, and on his return to

France in 1814 had refused to swear to the Charta because it granted

religious freedom to non-Catholics. Among the subordinate members of the

Ministry were General Bourmont, who had deserted to the English at

Waterloo, and La Bourdonnaye, the champion of the reactionary Terrorists in

1816. [385]

[Prospects in 1830. The Orleanists.]

The Ministry having been appointed immediately after the close of the

session of 1829, an interval of several months passed before they were

brought face to face with the Chambers. During this interval the prospect

of a conflict with the Crown became familiar to the public mind, though no

general impression existed that an actual change of dynasty was close at

hand. The Bonapartists were without a leader, Napoleon's son, their natural

head, being in the power of the Austrian Court; the Republicans were

neither numerous nor well organised, and the fatal memories of 1793 still

weighed upon the nation; the great body of those who contemplated

resistance to King Charles X. looked only to a Parliamentary struggle, or,

in the last resort, to the refusal of payment of taxes in case of a breach

of the Constitution. There was, however, a small and dexterous group of

politicians which, at a distance from all the old parties, schemed for the

dethronement of the reigning branch of the House of Bourbon, and for the

elevation of Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, to the throne. The chief of

this intrigue was Talleyrand. Slighted and thwarted by the Court, the old

diplomatist watched for the signs of a falling Government, and when the

familiar omens met his view he turned to the quarter from which its

successor was most likely to arise. Louis Philippe stood high in credit

with all circles of Parliamentary Liberals. His history had been a strange

and eventful one. He was the son of that Orleans who, after calling himself

Égalité, and voting for the death of his cousin, Louis XVI., had himself

perished during the Reign of Terror. Young Louis Philippe had been a member

of the Jacobin Club, and had fought for the Republic at Jemappes. Then,

exiled and reduced to penury, he had earned his bread by teaching

mathematics in Switzerland, and had been a wanderer in the new as well as

in the old world. After awhile his fortunes brightened. A marriage with the

daughter of Ferdinand of Sicily restored him to those relations with the

reigning houses of Europe which had been forfeited by his father, and

inspired him with the hope of gaining a crown. During Napoleon's invasion

of Spain he had caballed with politicians in that country who were inclined

to accept a substitute for their absent sovereign; at another time he had

entertained hopes of being made king of the Ionian Islands. After the peace

of Paris, when the allied sovereigns and their ministers visited England,

Louis Philippe was sent over by his father-in-law to intrigue among them

against Murat, and in pursuance of this object he made himself acquainted

not only with every foreign statesman then in London but with every leading

English politician. He afterwards settled in France, and was reinstated in

the vast possessions of the House of Orleans, which, though confiscated,

had not for the most part been sold during the Revolution. His position at

Paris under Louis XVIII. and Charles X. was a peculiar one. Without taking

any direct part in politics or entering into any avowed opposition to the

Court, he made his home, the Palais Royale, a gathering-place for all that

was most distinguished in the new political and literary society of the

capital; and while the Tuileries affected the pomp and the ceremoniousness

of the old regime, the Duke of Orleans moved with the familiarity of a

citizen among citizens. He was a clever, ready, sensible man, equal, as it

seemed, to any practical task likely to come in his way, but in reality

void of any deep insight, of any far-reaching aspiration, of any profound

conviction. His affectation of a straightforward middle-class geniality

covered a decided tendency towards intrigue and a strong love of personal

power. Later events indeed gave rise to the belief that, while professing

the utmost loyalty to Charles X., Louis Philippe had been scheming to oust

him from his throne; but the evidence really points the other way, and

indicates that, whatever secret hopes may have suggested themselves to the

Duke, his strongest sentiment during the Revolution of 1830 was the fear of

being driven into exile himself, and of losing his possessions. He was not

indeed of a chivalrous nature; but when the Crown came in his way, he was

guilty of no worse offence than some shabby evasions of promises.

[Meeting and Prorogation of the Chambers, March, 1830.]

Early in March, 1830, the French Chambers assembled after their recess. The

speech of King Charles at the opening of the session was resolute and even

threatening. It was answered by an address from the Lower House, requesting

him to dismiss his Ministers. The deputation which presented this address

was received by the King in a style that left no doubt as to his

intentions, and on the following day the Chambers were prorogued for six

months. It was known that they would not be permitted to meet again, and

preparations for a renewed general election were at once made with the

utmost vigour by both parties throughout France. The Court unsparingly

applied all the means of pressure familiar to French governments; it

moreover expected to influence public opinion by some striking success in

arms or in diplomacy abroad. The negotiations with Russia for the

acquisition of Belgium were still before the Cabinet, and a quarrel with

the Dey of Algiers gave Polignac the opportunity of beginning a war of

conquest in Africa. General Bourmont left the War Office, to wipe out the

infamy still attaching to his name by a campaign against the Arabs; and the

Government trusted that, even in the event of defeat at the elections, the

nation at large would at the most critical moment be rallied to its side by

an announcement of the capture of Algiers.

[Polignac's project.]

While the dissolution of Parliament was impending, Polignac laid before the

King a memorial expressing his own views on the courses open to Government

in case of the elections proving adverse. The Charta contained a clause

which, in loose and ill-chosen language, declared it to be the function of

the King "to make the regulations and ordinances necessary for the

execution of the laws and for the security of the State." These words,

which no doubt referred to the exercise of the King's normal and

constitutional powers, were interpreted by Polignac as authorising the King

to suspend the Constitution itself, if the Representative Assembly should

be at variance with the King's Ministers. Polignac in fact entertained the

same view of the relation between executive and deliberative bodies as

those Jacobin directors who made the _coup-d'état_ of Fructidor, 1797;

and the measures which he ultimately adopted were, though in a softened

form, those adopted by Barras and Laréveillère after the Royalist elections

in the sixth year of the Republic. To suspend the Constitution was not, he

suggested, to violate the Charta, for the Charta empowered the sovereign to

issue the ordinances necessary for the security of the State; and who but

the sovereign and his advisers could be the judges of this necessity? This

was simple enough; there was nevertheless among Polignac's colleagues some

doubt both as to the wisdom and as to the legality of his plans. King

Charles who, with all his bigotry, was anxious not to violate the letter of

the Charta, brooded long over the clause which defined the sovereign's

powers. At length he persuaded himself that his Minister's interpretation

was the correct one, accepted the resignation of the dissentients within

the Cabinet, and gave his sanction to the course which Polignac

recommended. [386]

[Elections of 1830.]

The result of the general election, which took place in June, surpassed all

the hopes of the Opposition and all the fears of the Court. The entire body

of Deputies which had voted the obnoxious address to the Crown in March was

returned, and the partisans of Government lost in addition fifty seats. The

Cabinet, which had not up to this time resolved upon the details of its

action, now deliberated upon several projects submitted to it, and, after

rejecting all plans that might have led to a compromise, determined to

declare the elections null and void, to silence the press, and to supersede

the existing electoral system by one that should secure the mastery of the

Government both at the polling-booths and in the Chamber itself. All this

was to be done by Royal Edict, and before the meeting of the new

Parliament. The date fixed for the opening of the Chambers had been placed

as late as possible in order to give time to General Bourmont to win the

victory in Africa from which the Court expected to reap so rich a harvest

of prestige. On the 9th of July news arrived that Algiers had fallen. The

announcement, which was everywhere made with the utmost pomp, fell flat on

the country. The conflict between the Court and the nation absorbed all

minds, and the rapturous congratulations of Bishops and Prefects scarcely

misled even the blind _côterie_ of the Tuileries. Public opinion was

no doubt with the Opposition; King Charles, however, had no belief that the

populace of Paris, which alone was to be dreaded as a fighting body, would

take up arms on behalf of the middle-class voters and journalists against

whom his Ordinances were to be directed. The populace neither read nor

voted: why should it concern itself with constitutional law? Or why, in a

matter that related only to the King and the Bourgeoisie, should it not

take part with the King against this new and bastard aristocracy which

lived on others' labour? Politicians who could not fight were troublesome

only when they were permitted to speak and to write. There was force enough

at the King's command to close the gates of the Chamber of Deputies, and to

break up the printing-presses of the journals; and if King Louis XVI. had

at last fallen by the hands of men of violence, it was only because he had

made concessions at first to orators and politicians. Therefore, without

dreaming that an armed struggle would be the immediate result of their

action, King Charles and Polignac determined to prevent the meeting of the

Chamber, and to publish, a week before the date fixed for its opening, the

Edicts which were to silence the brawl of faction and to vindicate

monarchical government in France.

[The Ordinances, July 26, 1830.]

Accordingly, on the 26th of July, a series of Ordinances appeared in the

_Moniteur_, signed by the King and counter-signed by the Ministers.

The first Ordinance forbade the publication of any journal without royal

permission; the second dissolved the Chamber of Deputies; the third raised

the property-qualification of voters, established a system of

double-election, altered the duration of Parliaments, and re-enacted the

obsolete clause of the Charta confining the initiative in all legislation

to the Government. Other Ordinances convoked a Chamber to be elected under

the new rules, and called to the Council of State a number of the most

notorious Ultra-Royalists and fanatics in France. Taken together, the

Ordinances left scarcely anything standing of the Constitutional and

Parliamentary system of the day. The blow fell first on the press, and the

first step in resistance was taken by the journalists of Paris, who, under

the leadership of the young Thiers, editor of the _National_,

published a protest declaring that they would treat the Ordinances as

illegal, and calling upon the Chambers and nation to join in this

resistance. For a while the journalists seemed likely to stand alone. Paris

at large remained quiet, and a body of the recently elected Deputies, to

whom the journalists appealed as representatives of the nation, proved

themselves incapable of any action or decision whatsoever. It was not from

these timid politicians, but from a body of obscure Republicans, that the

impulse proceeded which overthrew the Bourbon throne. Unrepresented in

Parliament and unrepresented in the press, there were a few active men who

had handed down the traditions of 1792, and who, in sympathy with the

Carbonari and other conspirators abroad, had during recent years founded

secret societies in Paris, and enlisted in the Republican cause a certain

number of workmen, of students, and of youths of the middle classes. While

the journalists discussed legal means of resistance, and the Deputies

awaited events, the Republican leaders met and determined upon armed

revolt. They were assisted, probably without direct concert, by the

printing firms and other employers of labour, who, in view of the general

suspension of the newspapers, closed their establishments on the morning of

July 27, and turned their workmen into the streets.

[July 27.]

[July 28.]

Thus on the day after the appearance of the Edicts the aspect of Paris

changed. Crowds gathered, and revolutionary cries were raised. Marmont, who

was suddenly ordered to take command of the troops, placed them around the

Tuileries, and captured two barricades which were erected in the

neighbourhood; but the populace was not yet armed, and no serious conflict

took place. In the evening Lafayette reached Paris, and the revolution had

now a real, though not an avowed, leader. A body of his adherents met

during the night at the office of the _National_, and, in spite of

Thiers' resistance, decided upon a general insurrection. Thiers himself,

who desired nothing but a legal and Parliamentary attack upon Charles X.,

quitted Paris to await events. The men who had out-voted him placed

themselves in communication with all the district committees of Paris, and

began the actual work of revolt by distributing arms. On the morning of

Wednesday, July 28th, the first armed bands attacked and captured the

arsenals and several private depôts of weapons and ammunition. Barricades

were erected everywhere. The insurgents swelled from hundreds to thousands,

and, converging on the old rallying-point of the Commune of Paris, they

seized the Hôtel de Ville, and hoisted the tricolor flag on its roof.

Marmont wrote to the King, declaring the position to be most serious, and

advising concession; he then put his troops in motion, and succeeded, after

a severe conflict, in capturing several points of vantage, and in expelling

the rebels from the Hôtel de Ville.

[July 29.]

In the meantime the Deputies, who were assembled at the house of one of

their number in pursuance of an agreement made on the previous day, gained

sufficient courage to adopt a protest declaring that in spite of the

Ordinances they were still the legal representatives of the nation. They

moreover sent a deputation to Marmont, begging him to put a stop to the

fighting, and offering their assistance in restoring order if the King

would withdraw his Edicts. Marmont replied that he could do nothing without

the King's command, but he despatched a second letter to St. Cloud, urging

compliance. The only answer which he received was a command to concentrate

his troops and to act in masses. The result of this was that the positions

which had been won by hard fighting were abandoned before evening, and that

the troops, famished and exhausted, were marched back through the streets

of Paris to the Tuileries. On the march some fraternised with the people,

others were surrounded and disarmed. All eastern Paris now fell into the

hands of the insurgents; the middle-class, as in 1789 and 1792, remained

inactive, and allowed the contest to be decided by the populace and the

soldiery. Messages from the capital constantly reached St. Cloud, but the

King so little understood his danger and so confidently reckoned on the

victory of the troops in the Tuileries that he played whist as usual during

the evening; and when the Duc de Mortemart, French Ambassador at St.

Petersburg, arrived at nightfall, and pressed for an audience, the King

refused to receive him until the next morning. When morning came, the march

of the insurgents against the Tuileries began. Position after position fell

into their hands. The regiments stationed in the Place Vendôme abandoned

their commander, and marched off to place themselves at the disposal of the

Deputies. Marmont ordered the Swiss Guard, which had hitherto defended the

Louvre, to replace them; and in doing so he left the Louvre for a moment

without any garrison. The insurgents saw the building empty, and rushed

into it. From the windows they commanded the Court of the Tuileries, where

the troops in reserve were posted; and soon after mid-day all was over. A

few isolated battalions fought and perished, but the mass of the soldiery

with their commander fell back upon the Place de la Concorde, and then

evacuated Paris. [387]

The Duke of Orleans was all this time in hiding. He had been warned that

the Court intended to arrest him, and, whether from fear of the Court or of

the populace, he had secreted himself at a hunting-lodge in his woods,

allowing none but his wife and his sister to know where he was concealed.

His partisans, of whom the rich and popular banker, Laffitte, was the most

influential among the Deputies, were watching for an opportunity to bring

forward his name; but their chances of success seemed slight. The Deputies

at large wished only for the withdrawal of the Ordinances, and were wholly

averse from a change of dynasty. It was only through the obstinacy of King

Charles himself, and as the result of a series of accidents, that the Crown

passed from the elder Bourbon line. King Charles would not hear of

withdrawing the Ordinances until the Tuileries had actually fallen; he then

gave way and charged the Duc de Mortemart to form a new Ministry, drawn

from the ranks of the Opposition. But instead of formally repealing the

Edicts by a public Decree, he sent two messengers to Paris to communicate

his change of purpose to the Deputies by word of mouth. The messengers

betook themselves to the Hôtel de Ville, where a municipal committee under

Lafayette had been installed; and, when they could produce no written

authority for their statements, they were referred by this committee to the

general body of Deputies, which was now sitting at Laffitte's house. The

Deputies also demanded a written guarantee. Laffitte and Thiers spoke in

favour of the Duke of Orleans, but the Assembly at large was still willing

to negotiate with Charles X., and only required the presence of the Duc de

Mortemart himself, and a copy of the Decree repealing the Ordinances.

[July 30.]

It was now near midnight. The messengers returned to St. Cloud, and were

not permitted to deliver their intelligence until the King awoke next

morning. Charles then signed the necessary document, and Mortemart set out

for Paris; but the night's delay had given the Orleanists time to act, and

before the King was up Thiers had placarded the streets of Paris with a

proclamation extolling Orleans as the prince devoted to the cause of the

Revolution, as the soldier of Jemappes, and the only constitutional King

now possible. Some hours after this manifesto had appeared the Deputies

again assembled at Laffitte's house, and waited for the appearance of

Mortemart. But they waited in vain. Mortemart's carriage was stopped on the

road from St. Cloud, and he was compelled to make his way on foot by a long

circuit and across a score of barricades. When he approached Laffitte's

house, half dead with heat and fatigue, he found that the Deputies had

adjourned to the Palais Bourbon, and, instead of following them, he ended

his journey at the Luxemburg, where the Peers were assembled. His absence

was turned to good account by the Orleanists. At the morning session the

proposition was openly made to call Louis Philippe to power; and when the

Deputies reassembled in the afternoon and the Minister still failed to

present himself, it was resolved to send a body of Peers and Deputies to

Louis Philippe to invite him to come to Paris and to assume the office of

Lieutenant-General of the kingdom. No opposition was offered to this

proposal in the House of Peers, and a deputation accordingly set out to

search for Louis Philippe at his country house at Neuilly. The prince was

not to be found; but his sister, who received the deputation, undertook

that he should duly appear in Paris. She then communicated with her brother

in his hiding-place, and induced him, in spite of the resistance of his

wife, to set out for the capital. He arrived at the Palais Royale late on

the night of the 30th. Early the next morning he received a deputation from

the Assembly, and accepted the powers which they offered him. A

proclamation was then published, announcing to the Parisians that in order

to save the country from anarchy and civil war the Duke of Orleans had

assumed the office of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom.

[The Hôtel de Ville.]

But there existed another authority in Paris beside the Assembly of

Representatives, and one that was not altogether disposed to permit Louis

Philippe and his satellites to reap the fruits of the people's victory.

Lafayette and the Municipal Committee, which occupied the Hôtel de Ville,

had transformed themselves into a provisional government, and sat

surrounded by the armed mob which had captured the Tuileries two days

before. No single person who had fought in the streets had risked his life

for the sake of making Louis Philippe king; in so far as the Parisians had

fought for any definite political idea, they had fought for the Republic.

It was necessary to reconcile both the populace and the provisional

government to the assumption of power by the new Regent; and with this

object Louis Philippe himself proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville, accompanied

by an escort of Deputies and Peers. It was a hazardous moment when he

entered the crowd on the Place de Grève; but Louis Philippe's readiness of

speech stood him in good stead, and he made his way unhurt through the

throng into the building, where Lafayette received him. Compliments and

promises were showered upon this veteran of 1789, who presently appeared on

a balcony and embraced Louis Philippe, while the Prince grasped the

tricolor flag, the flag which had not waved in Paris since 1815. The

spectacle was successful. The multitude shouted applause; and the few

determined men who still doubted the sincerity of a Bourbon and demanded

the proclamation of the Republic were put off with the promise of an

ultimate appeal to the French people.

[Charles X.]

In the meantime Charles X. had withdrawn to Rambouillet, accompanied by the

members of his family and by a considerable body of troops. Here the news

reached him that Orleans had accepted from the Chambers the office of

Lieutenant-General. It was a severe blow to the old king, who, while others

doubted of Louis Philippe's loyalty, had still maintained his trust in this

prince's fidelity. For a moment he thought of retiring beyond the Loire and

risking a civil war; but the troops now began to disperse, and Charles,

recognising that his cause was hopeless, abdicated together with the

Dauphin in favour of his grandson the young Chambord, then called Duc de

Bordeaux. He wrote to Louis Philippe, appointing him, as if on his own

initiative, Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, and required him to proclaim

Henry V. king, and to undertake the government during the new sovereign's

minority. It is doubtful whether Louis Philippe had at this time formed any

distinct resolve, and whether his answer to Charles X. was inspired by mere

good nature or by conscious falsehood; for while replying officially that

he would lay the king's letter before the Chambers, he privately wrote to

Charles X. that he would retain his new office only until he could safely

place the Duc de Bordeaux upon the throne. Having thus soothed the old

man's pride, Louis Philippe requested him to hasten his departure from the

neighbourhood of Paris; and when Charles ignored the message, he sent out

some bands of the National Guard to terrify him into flight. This device

succeeded, and the royal family, still preserving the melancholy ceremonial

of a court, moved slowly through France towards the western coast. At

Cherbourg they took ship and crossed to England, where they were received

as private persons. Among the British nation at large the exiled Bourbons

excited but little sympathy. They were, however, permitted to take up their

abode in the palace of Holyrood, and here Charles X. resided for two years.

But neither the climate nor the society of the Scottish capital offered any

attraction to the old and failing chief of a fallen dynasty. He sought a

more congenial shelter in Austria, and died at Goritz in November, 1836.

[Louis Philippe made King, Aug. 7.]

The first public notice of the abdication of King Charles was given by

Louis Philippe in the Chamber of Deputies, which was convoked by him, as

Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, on the 3rd of August. In addressing the

Deputies, Louis Philippe stated that he had received a letter containing

the abdication both of the King and of the Dauphin, but he uttered no

single word regarding the Duc de Bordeaux, in whose favour both his

grandfather and his uncle had renounced their rights. Had Louis Philippe

mentioned that the abdications were in fact conditional, and had he

declared himself protector of the Duc de Bordeaux during his minority,

there is little doubt that the legitimate heir would have been peaceably

accepted both by the Chamber and by Paris. Louis Philippe himself had up to

this time done nothing that was inconsistent with the assumption of a mere

Regency; the Chamber had not desired a change of dynasty; and, with the

exception of Lafayette, the men who had actually made the Revolution bore

as little goodwill to an Orleanist as to a Bourbon monarchy. But from the

time when Louis Philippe passed over in silence the claims of the grandson

of Charles X., his own accession to the throne became inevitable. It was

left to an obscure Deputy to propose that the crown should be offered to

Louis Philippe, accompanied by certain conditions couched in the form of

modifications of the Charta. The proposal was carried in the Chamber on the

7th of August, and the whole body of representatives marched to the Palais

Royale to acquaint the prince with its resolution. Louis Philippe, after

some conventional expressions of regret, declared that he could not resist

the call of his country. When the Lower Chamber had thus disposed of the

crown, the House of Peers, which had proved itself a nullity throughout the

crisis, adopted the same resolution, and tendered its congratulations in a

similar fashion. Two days later Louis Philippe took the oath to the Charta

as modified by the Assembly, and was proclaimed King of the French.

[Nature of the Revolution of 1830.]

Thus ended a revolution, which, though greeted with enthusiasm at the time,

has lost much of its splendour and importance in the later judgment of

mankind. In comparison with the Revolution of 1789, the movement which

overthrew the Bourbons in 1830 was a mere flutter on the surface. It was

unconnected with any great change in men's ideas, and it left no great

social or legislative changes behind it. Occasioned by a breach of the

constitution on the part of the Executive Government, it resulted mainly in

the transfer of administrative power from one set of politicians to

another: the alterations which it introduced into the constitution itself

were of no great importance. France neither had an absolute Government

before 1830, nor had it a popular Government afterwards. Instead of a

representative of divine right, attended by guards of nobles and counselled

by Jesuit confessors, there was now a citizen-king, who walked about the

streets of Paris with an umbrella under his arm and sent his sons to the

public schools, but who had at heart as keen a devotion to dynastic

interests as either of his predecessors, and a much greater capacity for

personal rule. The bonds which kept the entire local administration of

France in dependence upon the central authority were not loosened;

officialism remained as strong as ever; the franchise was still limited to

a mere fraction of the nation. On the other hand, within the administration

itself the change wrought by the July Revolution was real and lasting. It

extinguished the political power of the clerical interest. Not only were

the Bishops removed from the House of Peers, but throughout all departments

of Government the influence of the clergy, which had been so strong under

Charles X., vanished away. The State took a distinctly secular colour. The

system of public education was regulated with such police-like

exclusiveness that priests who insisted upon opening schools of their own

for Catholic teaching were enabled to figure as champions of civil liberty

and of freedom of opinion against despotic power. The noblesse lost

whatever political influence it had regained during the Restoration. The

few surviving Regicides who had been banished in 1815 were recalled to

France, among them the terrorist Barrère, who was once more returned to the

Assembly. But the real winners in the Revolution of 1830 were not the men

of extremes, but the middle-class of France. This was the class which Louis

Philippe truly represented; and the force which for eighteen years kept

Louis Philippe on the throne was the middle-class force of the National

Guard of Paris. Against this sober, prosaic, unimaginative power there

struggled the hot and restless spirit which had been let loose by the

overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty, and which, fired at once with the

political ideal of a Republic, with dreams of the regeneration of Europe by

French armies, and with the growing antagonism between the labouring class

and the owners of property, threatened for awhile to overthrow the

newly-constituted monarchy in France, and to plunge Europe into war. The

return of the tricolor flag, the long-silenced strains of the Republic and

the Empire, the sense of victory with which men on the popular side

witnessed the expulsion of the dynasty which had been forced upon France

after Waterloo, revived that half-romantic military ardour which had

undertaken the liberation of Europe in 1792. France appeared once more in

the eyes of enthusiasts as the deliverer of nations. The realities of the

past epoch of French military aggression, its robberies, its corruption,

the execrations of its victims, were forgotten; and when one people after

another took up the shout of liberty that was raised in Paris, and

insurrections broke out in every quarter of Europe, it was with difficulty

that Louis Philippe and the few men of caution about him could prevent the

French nation from rushing into war.

[Affairs in Belgium.]

The State first affected by the events of July was the kingdom of the

Netherlands. The creation of this kingdom, in which the Belgian provinces

formerly subject to Austria were united with Holland to serve as an

effective barrier against French aggression on the north, had been one of

Pitt's most cherished schemes, and it had been carried into effect ten

years after his death by the Congress of Vienna. National and religious

incongruities had been little considered by the statesmen of that day, and

at the very moment of union the Catholic bishops of Belgium had protested

against a constitution which gave equal toleration to all religions under

the rule of a Protestant King. The Belgians had been uninterruptedly united

with France for the twenty years preceding 1814; the French language was

not only the language of their literature, but the spoken language of the

upper classes; and though the Flemish portion of the population was nearly

related to the Dutch, this element had not then asserted itself with the

distinctness and energy which it has since developed. The antagonism

between the northern and the southern Netherlands, though not insuperable,

was sufficiently great to make a harmonious union between the two countries

a work of difficulty, and the Government of The Hague had not taken the

right course to conciliate its opponents. The Belgians, though more

numerous, were represented by fewer members in the National Assembly than

the Dutch. Offices were filled by strangers from Holland; finance was

governed by a regard for Dutch interests; and the Dutch language was made

the official language for the whole kingdom. But the chief grievances were

undoubtedly connected with the claims of the clerical party in Belgium to a

monopoly of spiritual power and the exclusive control of education. The one

really irreconcilable enemy of the Protestant House of Orange was the

Church; and the governing impulse in the conflicts which preceded the

dissolution of the kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830 sprang from the same

clerical interest which had thrown Belgium into revolt against the Emperor

Joseph forty years before. There was again seen the same strange phenomenon

of a combination between the Church and a popular or even revolutionary

party. For the sake of an alliance against a constitution distasteful to

both, the clergy of Belgium accepted the democratic principles of the

political Opposition, and the Opposition consented for a while to desist

from their attacks upon the Papacy. The contract was faithfully observed on

both sides until the object for which it was made was attained. [388]

[Belgian Revolution, August, 1830.]

For some months before the Revolution of July, 1830, the antagonism between

the Belgians and their Government had been so violent that no great shock

from outside was necessary to produce an outbreak. The convulsions of Paris

were at once felt at Brussels, and on the 25th of August the performance of

a revolutionary opera in that city gave the signal for the commencement of

insurrection. From the capital the rebellion spread from town to town

throughout the southern Netherlands. The King summoned the Estates General,

and agreed to the establishment of an administration for Belgium separate

from that of Holland: but the storm was not allayed; and the appearance of

a body of Dutch troops at Brussels was sufficient to dispel the expectation

of a peaceful settlement. Barricades were erected; a conflict took place in

the streets; and the troops, unable to carry the city by assault, retired

to the outskirts and kept up a desultory attack for several days. They then

withdrew, and a provisional government, which was immediately established,

declared the independence of Belgium. For a moment there appeared some

possibility that the Crown Prince of Holland, who had from the first

assumed the part of mediator, might be accepted as sovereign of the

newly-formed State; but the growing violence of the insurrection, the

activity of French emissaries and volunteers, and the bombardment of

Antwerp by the Dutch soldiers who garrisoned its citadel, made an end of

all such hopes. Belgium had won its independence, and its connection with

the House of Orange could be re-established only by force of arms.

[France and the Belgian Revolution.]

[France and England.]

The accomplishment of this revolution in one of the smallest Continental

States threatened to involve all Europe in war. Though not actually

effected under the auspices of a French army, it was undoubtedly to some

extent effected in alliance with the French revolutionary party. It broke

up a kingdom established by the European Treaties of 1814; and it was so

closely connected with the overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy as to be

scarcely distinguishable from those cases in which the European Powers had

pledged themselves to call their armies into the field. Louis Philippe,

however, had been recognised by most of the European Courts as the only

possible alternative to a French Republic; and a general disposition

existed to second any sincere effort that should be made by him to prevent

the French nation from rushing into war. This was especially the case with

England; and it was to England that Louis Philippe turned for co-operation

in the settlement of the Belgian question. Louis Philippe himself had every

possible reason for desiring to keep the peace. If war broke out, France

would be opposed to all the Continental Powers together. Success was in the

last degree improbable; it could only be hoped for by a revival of the

revolutionary methods and propaganda of 1793; and failure, even for a

moment, would certainly cost him his throne, and possibly his life. His

interest no less than his temperament made him the strenuous, though

concealed, opponent of the war-party in the Assembly; and he found in the

old diplomatist who had served alike under the Bourbons, the Republic, and

the Empire, an ally thoroughly capable of pursuing his own wise though

unpopular policy of friendship and co-operation with England. Talleyrand,

while others were crying for a revenge for Waterloo, saw that the first

necessity for France was to rescue it from its isolation; and as at the

Congress of Vienna he had detached Austria and England from the two

northern Courts, so now, before attempting to gain any extension of

territory, he sought to make France safe against the hostility of the

Continent by allying it with at least one great Power. Russia had become an

enemy instead of a friend. The expulsion of the Bourbons had given mortal

offence to the Czar Nicholas, and neither Austria nor Prussia was likely to

enter into close relations with a Government founded upon revolution.

England alone seemed a possible ally, and it was to England that the French

statesman of peace turned in the Belgian crisis. Talleyrand, now nearly

eighty years old, came as ambassador to London, where he had served in

1792. He addressed himself to Wellington and to the new King, William IV.,

assuring them that, under the Government of Louis Philippe, France would

not seek to use the Belgian revolution for its own aggrandisement; and,

with his old aptness in the invention of general principles to suit a

particular case, he laid down the principle of non-intervention as one that

ought for the future to govern the policy of Europe. His efforts were

successful. So complete an understanding was established between France and

England on the Belgian question, that all fear of an armed intervention of

the Eastern Courts on behalf of the King of Holland, which would have

rendered a war with France inevitable, passed away. The regulation of

Belgian affairs was submitted to a Conference at London. Hostilities were

stopped, and the independence of the new kingdom was recognised in

principle by the Conference before the end of the year. A Protocol defining

the frontiers of Belgium and Holland, and apportioning to each State its

share in the national debt, was signed by the representatives of the Powers

in January, 1831. [389]

[Leopold elected King, June 4.]

Thus far, a crisis which threatened the peace of Europe had been surmounted

with unexpected ease. But the first stage of the difficulty alone was

passed; it still remained for the Powers to provide a king for Belgium, and

to gain the consent of the Dutch and Belgian Governments to the territorial

arrangements drawn up for them. The Belgians themselves, with whom a

connection with France was popular, were disposed to elect as their

sovereign the Duc de Nemours, second son of Louis Philippe; and although

Louis Philippe officially refused his sanction to this scheme, which in the

eyes of all Europe would have turned Belgium into a French dependency, he

privately encouraged its prosecution after a Bonapartist candidate, the son

of Eugène Beauharnais, had appeared in the field. The result was that the

Duc de Nemours was elected king on the 3rd of February, 1831. Against this

appointment the Conference of the Powers at London had already pronounced

its veto, and the British Government let it be understood that it would

resist any such extension of French influence by force. Louis Philippe now

finally refused the crown for his son, and, the Bonapartist candidate being

withdrawn, the two rival Powers agreed in recommending Prince Leopold of

Saxe-Coburg, on the understanding that, if elected King of Belgium, he

should marry a daughter of Louis Philippe. The Belgians fell in with the

advice given them, and elected Leopold on the 4th of June. He accepted the

crown, subject to the condition that the London Conference should modify in

favour of Belgium some of the provisions relating to the frontiers and to

the finances of the new State which had been laid down by the Conference,

and which the Belgian Government had hitherto refused to accept.

[Settlement of the Belgian frontier.]

The difficulty of arranging the Belgian frontier arose principally from the

position of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. This territory, though subject to

Austria before the French Revolution, had always been treated as distinct

from the body of the Austrian Netherlands. When, at the peace of 1814, it

was given to the King of Holland in substitution for the ancient

possessions of his family at Nassau, its old character as a member of the

German federal union was restored to it, so that the King of Holland in

respect of this portion of his dominions became a German prince, and the

fortress of Luxemburg, the strongest in Europe after Gibraltar, was liable

to occupation by German troops. The population of the Duchy had, however,

joined the Belgians in their revolt, and, with the exception of the

fortress itself, the territory had passed into possession of the Belgian

Government. In spite of this actual overthrow of Dutch rule, the Conference

of London had attached such preponderating importance to the military and

international relations of Luxemburg that it had excluded the whole of the

Duchy from the new Belgian State, and declared it still to form part of the

dominions of the King of Holland. The first demand of Leopold was for the

reversal or modification of this decision, and the Powers so far gave way

as to substitute for the declaration of January a series of articles, in

which the question of Luxemburg was reserved for future settlement. The

King of Holland had assented to the January declaration; on hearing of its

abandonment, he took up arms, and threw fifty thousand men into Belgium.

Leopold appealed to France for assistance, and a French army immediately

crossed the frontier. The Dutch now withdrew, and the French in their turn

were recalled, after Leopold had signed a treaty undertaking to raze the

fortifications of five towns on his southern border. The Conference again

took up its work, and produced a third scheme, in which the territory of

Luxemburg was divided between Holland and Belgium. This was accepted by

Belgium, and rejected by Holland. The consequence was that a treaty was

made between Leopold and the Powers; and at the beginning of 1832 the

kingdom of Belgium, as defined by the third award of the Conference, was

recognised by all the Courts, Lord Palmerston on behalf of England

resolutely refusing to France even the slightest addition of territory, on

the ground that, if annexations once began, all security for the

continuance of peace would be at an end. On this wise and firm policy the

concert of Europe in the establishment of the Belgian kingdom was

successfully maintained; and it only remained for the Western Powers to

overcome the resistance of the King of Holland, who still held the citadel

of Antwerp and declined to listen either to reason or authority. A French

army corps was charged with the task of besieging the citadel; an English

fleet blockaded the river Scheldt. After a severe bombardment the citadel

surrendered. Hostilities ceased, and negotiations for a definitive

settlement recommenced. As, however, the Belgians were in actual occupation

of all Luxemburg with the exception of the fortress, they had no motive to

accelerate a settlement which would deprive them of part of their existing

possessions; on the other hand, the King of Holland held back through mere

obstinacy. Thus the provisional state of affairs was prolonged for year

after year, and it was not until April, 1839, that the final Treaty of

Peace between Belgium and Holland was executed.

[Affairs of Poland.]

The consent of the Eastern Powers to the overthrow of the kingdom of the

United Netherlands, and to the establishment of a State based upon a

revolutionary movement, would probably have been harder to gain if in the

autumn of 1830 Russia had been free to act with all its strength. But at

this moment an outbreak took place in Poland, which required the

concentration of all the Czar's forces within his own border. The conflict

was rather a war of one armed nation against another than the insurrection

of a people against its government. Poland--that is to say, the territory

which had formerly constituted the Grand Duchy of Warsaw--had, by the

treaties of 1814, been established as a separate kingdom, subject to the

Czar of Russia, but not forming part of the Russian Empire. It possessed an

administration and an army of its own, and the meetings of its Diet gave to

it a species of parliamentary government to which there was nothing

analogous within Russia proper. During the reign of Alexander the

constitutional system of Poland had, on the whole, been respected; and

although the real supremacy of an absolute monarch at St. Petersburg had

caused the Diet to act as a body in opposition to the Russian Government,

the personal connection existing between Alexander and the Poles had

prevented any overt rebellion during his own life-time. But with the

accession of Nicholas all such individual sympathy passed away, and the

hard realities of the actual relation between Poland and the Court of

Russia came into full view. In the conspiracies of 1825 a great number of

Poles were implicated. Eight of these persons, after a preliminary inquiry,

were placed on trial before the Senate at Warsaw, which, in spite of strong

evidence of their guilt, acquitted them. Pending the decision, Nicholas

declined to convoke the Diet: he also stationed Russian troops in Poland,

and violated the constitution by placing Russians in all branches of the

administration. Even without these grievances the hostility of the mass of

the Polish noblesse to Russia would probably have led sooner or later to

insurrection. The peasantry, ignorant and degraded, were but instruments in

the hands of their territorial masters. In so far as Poland had rights of

self-government, these rights belonged almost exclusively to the nobles, or

landed proprietors, a class so numerous that they have usually been

mistaken in Western Europe for the Polish nation itself. The so-called

emancipation of the serfs, effected by Napoleon after wresting the Grand

Duchy of Warsaw from Prussia in 1807, had done little for the mass of the

population; for, while abolishing the legal condition of servitude,

Napoleon had given the peasant no vestige of proprietorship in his holding,

and had consequently left him as much at the mercy of his landlord as he

was before. The name of freedom appears in fact to have worked actual

injury to the peasant; for in the enjoyment of a pretended power of free

contract he was left without that protection of the officers of State

which, under the Prussian regime from 1795 to 1807, had shielded him from

the tyranny of his lord. It has been the fatal, the irremediable bane of

Poland that its noblesse, until too late, saw no country, no right, no law,

outside itself. The very measures of interference on the part of the Czar

which this caste resented as unconstitutional were in part directed against

the abuse of its own privileges; and although in 1830 a section of the

nobles had learnt the secret of their country's fall, and were prepared to

give the serf the real emancipation of proprietorship, no universal impulse

worked in this direction, nor could the wrong of ages be undone in the

tumult of war and revolution.

[Insurrection at Warsaw, Nov. 29.]

A sharp distinction existed between the narrow circle of the highest

aristocracy of Poland and the mass of the poor and warlike noblesse. The

former, represented by men like Czartoryski, the friend of Alexander I. and

ex-Minister of Russia, understood the hopelessness of any immediate

struggle with the superior power, and advocated the politic development of

such national institutions as were given to Poland by the constitution of

1815, institutions which were certainly sufficient to preserve Poland from

absorption by Russia, and to keep alive the idea of the ultimate

establishment of its independence. It was among the lesser nobility, among

the subordinate officers of the army and the population of Warsaw itself,

who jointly formed the so-called democratic party, that the spirit of

revolt was strongest. Plans for an outbreak had been made during the

Turkish war of 1828; but unhappily this opportunity, which might have been

used with fatal effect against Russia, was neglected, and it was left for

the French Revolution of 1830 to kindle an untimely and ineffective flame.

The memory of Napoleon's campaigns and the wild voices of French democracy

filled the patriots at Warsaw with vain hopes of a military union with

western Liberalism, and overpowered the counsels of men who understood the

state of Europe better. Revolt broke out on the 29th of November, 1830. The

Polish regiments in Warsaw joined the insurrection, and the Russian troops,

under the Grand Duke Constantine, withdrew from the capital, where their

leader had narrowly escaped with his life. [390]

[Attempted negotiation with the Czar.]

The Government of Poland had up to this time been in the hands of a Council

nominated by the Czar as King of Poland, and controlled by instructions

from a secretary at St. Petersburg. The chief of the Council was Lubecki, a

Pole devoted to the Emperor Nicholas. On the victory of the insurrection at

Warsaw, the Council was dissolved and a provisional Government installed.

Though the revolt was the work of the so-called democratic party, the

influence of the old governing families of the highest aristocracy was

still so great that power was by common consent placed in their hands.

Czartoryski became president, and the policy adopted by himself and his

colleagues was that of friendly negotiation with Russia. The insurrection

of November was treated not as the beginning of a national revolt, but as a

mere disturbance occasioned by unconstitutional acts of the Government. So

little did the committee understand the character of the Emperor Nicholas,

as to imagine that after the expulsion of his soldiers and the overthrow of

his Ministers at Warsaw he would peaceably make the concessions required of

him, and undertake for the future faithfully to observe the Polish

constitution. Lubecki and a second official were sent to St. Petersburg to

present these demands, and further (though this was not seriously intended)

to ask that the constitution should be introduced into all the Russian

provinces which had once formed part of the Polish State. The reception

given to the envoys at the frontier was of an ominous character. They were

required to describe themselves as officers about to present a report to

the Czar, inasmuch as no representatives of rebels in arms could be

received into Russia. Lubecki appears now to have shaken the dust of Poland

off his feet; his colleague pursued his mission, and was admitted to the

Czar's presence. Nicholas, while expressing himself in language of injured

tenderness, and disclaiming all desire to punish the innocent with the

guilty, let it be understood that Poland had but two alternatives,

unconditional submission or annihilation. The messenger who in the

meanwhile carried back to Warsaw the first despatches of the envoy reported

that the roads were already filled with Russian regiments moving on their

prey.

[Diebitsch invades Poland, Feb. 1831.]

Six weeks of precious time were lost through the illusion of the Polish

Government that an accommodation with the Emperor Nicholas was possible.

Had the insurrection at Warsaw been instantly followed by a general levy

and the invasion of Lithuania, the resources of this large province might

possibly have been thrown into the scale against Russia. Though the mass of

the Lithuanian population, in spite or several centuries of union with

Poland, had never been assimilated to the dominant race, and remained in

language and creed more nearly allied to the Russians than the Poles, the

nobles formed an integral part of the Polish nation, and possessed

sufficient power over their serfs to drive them into the field to fight for

they knew not what. The Russian garrisons in Lithuania were not strong, and

might easily have been overpowered by a sudden attack. When once the

population of Warsaw had risen in arms against Nicholas, the only

possibility of success lay in the extension of the revolt over the whole of

the semi-Polish provinces, and in a general call to arms. But beside other

considerations which disinclined the higher aristocracy at Warsaw to

extreme measures, they were influenced by a belief that the Powers of

Europe might intervene on behalf of the constitution of the Polish kingdom

as established by the treaty of Vienna; while, if the struggle passed

beyond the borders of that kingdom, it would become a revolutionary

movement to which no Court could lend its support. It was not until the

envoy returned from St. Petersburg bearing the answer of the Emperor

Nicholas that the democratic party carried all before it, and all hopes of

a peaceful compromise vanished away. The Diet then passed a resolution

declaring that the House of Romanoff had forfeited the Polish crown, and

preparations began for a struggle for life or death with Russia. But the

first moments when Russia stood unguarded and unready had been lost beyond

recall. Troops had thronged westwards into Lithuania; the garrisons in the

fortresses had been raised to their full strength; and in February, 1831,

Diebitsch took up the offensive, and crossed the Polish frontier with a

hundred and twenty thousand men.

[Campaign in Poland, 1831.]

[Capture of Warsaw, Sept. 8, 1831.]

The Polish army, though far inferior in numbers to the enemy which it had

to meet, was no contemptible foe. Among its officers there were many who

had served in Napoleon's campaigns; it possessed, however, no general

habituated to independent command; and the spirit of insubordination and

self-will, which had wrought so much ruin in Poland, was still ready to

break out when defeat had impaired the authority of the nominal chiefs. In

the first encounters the advancing Russian army was gallantly met; and,

although the Poles were forced to fall back upon Warsaw, the losses

sustained by Diebitsch were so serious that he had to stay his operations

and to wait for reinforcements. In March the Poles took up the offensive

and surprised several isolated divisions of the enemy; their general,

however, failed to push his advantages with the necessary energy and

swiftness; the junction of the Russians was at length effected, and on the

26th of May the Poles were defeated after obstinate resistance in a pitched

battle at Ostrolenka. Cholera now broke out in the Russian camp. Both

Diebitsch and the Grand Duke Constantine were carried off in the midst of

the campaign, and some months more were added to the struggle of Poland,

hopeless as this had now become. Incursions were made into Lithuania and

Podolia, but without result. Paskiewitch, the conqueror of Kars, was called

up to take the post left vacant by the death of his rival. New masses of

Russian troops came in place of those who had perished in battle and in the

hospitals; and while the Governments of Western Europe lifted no hand on

behalf of Polish independence, Prussia, alarmed lest the revolt should

spread into its own Polish provinces, assisted the operations of the

Russian general by supplying stores and munition of war. Blow after blow

fell upon the Polish cause. Warsaw itself became the prey of disorder,

intrigue, and treachery; and at length the Russian army made its entrance

into the capital, and the last soldiers of Poland laid down their arms, or

crossed into Prussian or Austrian territory. The revolt had been rashly and

unwisely begun: its results were fatal and lamentable. The constitution of

Poland was abolished; it ceased to be a separate kingdom, and became a

province of the Russian Empire. Its defenders were exiles over the face of

Europe or forgotten in Siberia. All that might have been won by the gradual

development of its constitutional liberties without breach with the Czar's

sovereignty was sacrificed. The future of Poland, like that of Russia

itself, now depended on the enlightenment and courage of the Imperial

Government, and on that alone. The very existence of a Polish nationality

and language seemed for a while to be threatened by the measures of

repression that followed the victory of 1831: and if it be true that

Russian autocracy has at length done for the Polish peasants what their

native masters during centuries of ascendency refused to do, this

emancipation would probably not have come the later for the preservation of

some relics of political independence, nor would it have had the less value

if unaccompanied by the proscription of so great a part of that class which

had once been held to constitute the Polish nation. [391]

[Insurrection in the Papal States, Feb., 1831.]

During the conflict on the banks of the Vistula, the attitude of the

Austrian Government had been one of watchful neutrality. Its own Polish

territory was not seriously menaced with disturbance, for in a great part

of Galicia the population, being of Ruthenian stock and belonging to the

Greek Church, had nothing in common with the Polish and Catholic noblesse

of their province, and looked back upon the days of Polish dominion as a

time of suffering and wrong. Austria's danger in any period of European

convulsion lay as yet rather on the side of Italy than on the East, and the

vigour of its policy in that quarter contrasted with the equanimity with

which it watched the struggle of its Slavic neighbours. Since the

suppression of the Neapolitan constitutional movement in 1821, the

Carbonari and other secret societies of Italy had lost nothing of their

activity. Their head-quarters had been removed from Southern Italy to the

Papal States, and the numerous Italian exiles in France and elsewhere kept

up a busy communication at once with French revolutionary leaders like

Lafayette and with the enemies of the established governments in Italy

itself. The death of Pope Pius VIII., on November 30, 1830, and the

consequent paralysis of authority within the Ecclesiastical States, came at

an opportune moment; assurances of support arrived from Paris; and the

Italian leaders resolved upon a general insurrection throughout the minor

Principalities on the 5th of February, 1831. Anticipating the signal,

Menotti, chief of a band of patriots at Modena, who appears to have been

lured on by the Grand Duke himself, assembled his partisans on February 3.

He was overpowered and imprisoned; but the outbreak of the insurrection in

Bologna, and its rapid extension over the northern part of the Papal

States, soon caused the Grand Duke to fly to Austrian territory, carrying

his prisoner Menotti with him, whom he subsequently put to death. The new

Pope, Gregory XVI., had scarcely been elected when the report reached him

that Bologna had declared the temporal power of the Papacy to be at an end.

Uncertain of the character of the revolt, he despatched Cardinal Benvenuti

northwards, to employ conciliation or force as occasion might require. The

Legate fell into the hands of the insurgents; the revolt spread southwards;

and Gregory, now hopeless of subduing it by the forces at his own command,

called upon Austria for assistance. [392]

[Attitude of France.]

The principle which, since the Revolution of July, the government of France

had repeatedly laid down as the future basis of European politics was that

of non-intervention. It had disclaimed any purpose of interfering with the

affairs of its neighbours, and had required in return that no foreign

intervention should take place in districts which, like Belgium and Savoy,

adjoined its own frontier. But there existed no real unity of purpose in

the councils of Louis Philippe. The Ministry had one voice for the

representatives of foreign powers, another for the Chamber of Deputies, and

another for Lafayette and the bands of exiles and conspirators who were

under his protection. The head of the government at the beginning of 1831

was Laffitte, a weak politician, dominated by revolutionary sympathies and

phrases, but incapable of any sustained or resolute action, and equally

incapable of resisting Louis Philippe after the King had concluded his

performance of popular leader, and assumed his real character as the wary

and self-seeking chief of a reigning house. Whether the actual course of

French policy would be governed by the passions of the streets or by the

timorousness of Louis Philippe was from day to day a matter of conjecture.

The official answer given to the inquiries of the Austrian ambassador as to

the intentions of France in case of an Austrian intervention in Italy was,

that such intervention might be tolerated in Parma and Modena, which

belonged to sovereigns immediately connected with the Hapsburgs, but that

if it was extended to the Papal States war with France would be probable,

and if extended to Piedmont, certain. On this reply Metternich, who saw

Austria's own dominion in Italy once more menaced by the success of an

insurrectionary movement, had to form his decision. He could count on the

support of Russia in case of war; he knew well the fears of Louis Philippe,

and knew that he could work on these fears both by pointing to the presence

of the young Louis Bonaparte and his brother with the Italian insurgents as

evidence of the Bonapartist character of the movement, and by hinting that

in the last resort he might himself let loose upon France Napoleon's son,

the Duke of Reichstadt, now growing to manhood at Vienna, before whom Louis

Philippe's throne would have collapsed as speedily as that of Louis XVIII.

in 1814. Where weakness existed, Metternich was quick to divine it and to

take advantage of it. He rightly gauged Louis Philippe. Taking at their

true value the threats of the French Government, he declared that it was

better for Austria to fall, if necessary, by war than by revolution; and,

resolving at all hazards to suppress the Roman insurrection, he gave orders

to the Austrian troops to enter the Papal States.

[Austrians suppress Roman revolt, March, 1831.]

[Casimir Perier, March, 1831.]

The military resistance which the insurgents could offer to the advance of

the Pope's Austrian deliverers was insignificant, and order was soon

restored. But all Europe expected the outbreak of war between Austria and

France. The French ambassador at Constantinople had gone so far as to offer

the Sultan an offensive and defensive alliance, and to urge him to make

preparations for an attack upon both Austria and Russia on their southern

frontiers. A despatch from the ambassador reached Paris describing the

warlike overtures he had made to the Porte. Louis Philippe saw that if this

despatch reached the hands of Laffitte and the war party in the Council of

Ministers the preservation of peace would be almost impossible. In concert

with Sebastiani, the Foreign Minister, he concealed the despatch from

Laffitte. The Premier discovered the trick that had been played upon him,

and tendered his resignation. It was gladly accepted by Louis Philippe.

Laffitte quitted office, begging pardon of God and man for the part that he

had taken in raising Louis Philippe to the throne. His successor was

Casimir Perier, a man of very different mould; resolute, clear-headed, and

immovably true to his word; a constitutional statesman of the strictest

type, intolerant of any species of disorder, and a despiser of popular

movements, but equally proof against royal intrigues, and as keen to

maintain the constitutional system of France against the Court on one side

and the populace on the other as he was to earn for France the respect of

foreign powers by the abandonment of a policy of adventure, and the steady

adherence to the principles of international obligation which he had laid

down. Under his firm hand the intrigues of the French Government with

foreign revolutionists ceased; it was felt throughout Europe that peace was

still possible, and that if war was undertaken by France it would be

undertaken only under conditions which would make any moral union of all

the great Powers against France impossible. The Austrian expedition into

the Papal States had already begun, and the revolutionary Government had

been suppressed; the most therefore that Casimir Perier could demand was

that the evacuation of the occupied territory should take place as soon as

possible, and that Austria should add its voice to that of the other Powers

in urging the Papal Government to reform its abuses. Both demands were

granted. For the first time Austria appeared as the advocate of something

like a constitutional system. A Conference held at Rome agreed upon a

scheme of reforms to be recommended to the Pope; the prospects of peace

grew daily fairer; and in July, 1831, the last Austrian soldiers quitted

the Ecclesiastical States. [393]

[Second Austrian intervention, Jan., 1832.]

[French occupy Ancona, February, 1832.]

It now remained to be seen whether Pope Gregory and his cardinals had the

intelligence and good-will necessary for carrying out the reforms on the

promise of which France had abstained from active intervention. If any such

hopes existed they were doomed to speedy disappointment. The apparatus of

priestly maladministration was restored in all its ancient deformity. An

amnesty which had been promised by the Legate Benvenuti was disregarded,

and the Pope set himself to strengthen his authority by enlisting new bands

of ruffians and adventurers under the standard of St. Peter. Again

insurrection broke out, and again at the Pope's request the Austrians

crossed the frontier (January, 1832). Though their appearance was fatal to

the cause of liberty, they were actually welcomed as protectors in towns

which had been exposed to the tender mercies of the Papal condottieri.

There was no disorder, no severity, where the Austrian commandants held

sway; but their mere presence in central Italy was a threat to European

peace; and Casimir Perier was not the man to permit Austria to dominate in

Italy at its will. Without waiting for negotiations, he despatched a French

force to Ancona, and seized this town before the Austrians could approach

it. The rival Powers were now face to face in Italy; but Perier had no

intention of forcing on war if his opponent was still willing to keep the

peace. Austria accepted the situation, and made no attempt to expel the

French from the position they had seized. Casimir Perier, now on his

death-bed, defended the step that he had taken against the remonstrances of

ambassadors and against the protests of the Pope, and declared the presence

of the French at Ancona to be no incentive to rebellion, but the mere

assertion of the rights of a Power which had as good a claim to be in

central Italy as Austria itself. Had his life been prolonged, he would

probably have insisted upon the execution of the reforms which the Powers

had urged upon the Papal government, and have made the occupation of Ancona

an effectual means for reaching this end. But with his death the wrongs of

the Italians themselves and the question of a reformed government in the

Papal States gradually passed out of sight. France and Austria jealously

watched one another on the debatable land; the occupation became a mere

incident of the balance of power, and was prolonged for year after year,

until, in 1838, the Austrians having finally withdrawn all their troops,

the French peacefully handed over the citadel of Ancona to the Holy See.

[Prussia in 1830.]

[The Zollverein, 1828-1836.]

The arena in which we have next to follow the effects of the July

Revolution, in action and counter-action, is Germany. It has been seen that

in the southern German States an element of representative government, if

weak, yet not wholly ineffective, had come into being soon after 1815, and

had survived the reactionary measures initiated by the conference of

Ministers at Carlsbad. In Prussia the promises of King Frederick William to

his people had never been fulfilled. Years had passed since exaggerated

rumours of conspiracy had served as an excuse for withholding the

Constitution. Hardenberg had long been dead; the foreign policy of the

country had taken a freer tone; the rigours of the police-system had

departed; but the nation remained as completely excluded from any share in

the government as it had been before Napoleon's fall. It had in fact become

clear that during the lifetime of King Frederick William things must be

allowed to remain in their existing condition; and the affection of the

people for their sovereign, who had been so long and so closely united with

Prussia in its sufferings and in its glories, caused a general willingness

to postpone the demand for constitutional reform until the succeeding

reign. The substantial merits of the administration might moreover have

reconciled a less submissive people than the Prussians to the absolute

government under which they lived. Under a wise and enlightened financial

policy the country was becoming visibly richer. Obstacles to commercial

development were removed, communications opened; and finally, by a series

of treaties with the neighbouring German States, the foundations were laid

for that Customs-Union which, under the name of the Zollverein, ultimately

embraced almost the whole of non-Austrian Germany. As one Principality

after another attached itself to the Prussian system, the products of the

various regions of Germany, hitherto blocked by the frontier dues of each

petty State, moved freely through the land, while the costs attending the

taxation of foreign imports, now concentrated upon the external line of

frontier, were enormously diminished. Patient, sagacious, and even liberal

in its negotiations with its weaker neighbours, Prussia silently connected

with itself through the ties of financial union States which had hitherto

looked to Austria as their natural head. The semblance of political union

was carefully avoided, but the germs of political union were nevertheless

present in the growing community of material interests. The reputation of

the Prussian Government, no less than the welfare of the Prussian people,

was advanced by each successive step in the extension of the Zollverein;

and although the earlier stages alone had been passed in the years before

1830, enough had already been done to affect public opinion; and the

general sense of material progress combined with other influences to close

Prussia to the revolutionary tendencies of that year.

[Insurrections in Brunswick and Cassel.]

[Constitutions in Hanover and Saxony, 1830-1833.]

There were, however, other States in northern Germany which had all the

defects of Prussian autocracy without any of its redeeming qualities. In

Brunswick and in Hesse Cassel despotism existed in its most contemptible

form; the violence of a half-crazy youth in the one case, and the caprices

of an obstinate dotard in the other, rendering authority a mere nuisance to

those who were subject to it. Here accordingly revolution broke out. The

threatened princes had made themselves too generally obnoxious or

ridiculous for any hand to be raised in their defence. Their disappearance

excited no more than the inevitable lament from Metternich; and in both

States systems of representative government were introduced by their

successors. In Hanover and in Saxony agitation also began in favour of

Parliamentary rule. The disturbance that arose was not of a serious

character, and it was met by the Courts in a conciliatory spirit.

Constitutions were granted, the liberty of the Press extended, and trial by

jury established. On the whole, the movement of 1830, as it affected

northern Germany, was rationally directed and salutary in its results.

Changes of real value were accomplished with a sparing employment of

revolutionary means, and, in the more important cases, through the friendly

co-operation of the sovereigns with their subjects. It was not the fault of

those who had asked for the same degree of liberty in northern Germany

which the south already possessed, that Germany at large again experienced

the miseries of reaction and repression which had afflicted it ten years

before.

[Movement in the Palatinate.]

Like Belgium and the Rhenish Provinces, the Bavarian Palatinate had for

twenty years been incorporated with France. Its inhabitants had grown

accustomed to the French law and French institutions, and had caught

something of the political animation which returned to France after

Napoleon's fall. Accordingly when the government of Munich, alarmed by the

July Revolution, showed an inclination towards repressive measures, the

Palatinate, severed from the rest of the Bavarian monarchy and in immediate

contact with France, became the focus of a revolutionary agitation. The

Press had already attained some activity and some influence in this

province; and although the leaders of the party of progress were still to a

great extent Professors, they had so far advanced upon the patriots of 1818

as to understand that the liberation of the German people was not to be

effected by the lecturers and the scholars of the Universities. The design

had been formed of enlisting all classes of the public on the side of

reform, both by the dissemination of political literature and by the

establishment of societies not limited, as in 1818, to academic circles,

but embracing traders as well as soldiers and professional men. Even the

peasant was to be reached and instructed in his interests as a citizen. It

was thought that much might be effected by associating together all the

Oppositions in the numerous German Parliaments; but a more striking feature

of the revolutionary movement which began in the Palatinate, and one

strongly distinguishing it from the earlier agitation of Jena and Erfurt,

was its cosmopolitan character. France in its triumph and Poland in its

death-struggle excited equal interest and sympathy. In each the cause of

European liberty appeared to be at stake. The Polish banner was saluted in

the Palatinate by the side of that of united Germany; and from that time

forward in almost every revolutionary movement of Europe, down to the

insurrection of the Commune of Paris in 1871, Polish exiles have been

active both in the organisation of revolt and in the field.

[Reaction in Germany.]

Until the fall of Warsaw, in September, 1831, the German governments,

uncertain of the course which events might take in Europe, had shown a

certain willingness to meet the complaints of their subjects, and had in

especial relaxed the supervision exercised over the press. The fall of

Warsaw, which quieted so many alarms, and made the Emperor Nicholas once

more a power outside his own dominions, inaugurated a period of reaction in

Germany. The Diet began the campaign against democracy by suppressing

various liberal newspapers, and amongst them the principal journal of the

Palatinate. It was against this movement of regression that the agitation

in the Palatinate and elsewhere was now directed. A festival, or

demonstration, was held at the Castle of Hambach, near Zweibrücken, at

which a body of enthusiasts called upon the German people to unite against

their oppressors, and some even urged an immediate appeal to arms (May 27,

1832). Similar meetings, though on a smaller scale, were held in other

parts of Germany. Wild words abounded, and the connection of the German

revolutionists with that body of opponents of all established governments

which had its council-chamber at Paris and its head in Lafayette was openly

avowed. Weak and insignificant as the German demagogues were, their

extravagance gave to Metternich and to the Diet sufficient pretext for

revising the reactionary measures of 1819. Once more the subordination of

all representative bodies to the sovereign's authority was laid down by the

Diet as a binding principle for every German state. The refusal of taxes by

any legislature was declared to be an act of rebellion which would be met

by the armed intervention of the central Powers. All political meetings and

associations were forbidden; the Press was silenced; the introduction of

German books printed abroad was prohibited, and the Universities were again

placed under the watch of the police (July, 1832). [394]

[Attempt at Frankfort, April, 1833.]

If among the minor sovereigns of Germany there were some who, as in Baden,

sincerely desired the development of free institutions, the authority

exercised by Metternich and his adherents in reaction bore down all the

resistance that these courts could offer, and the hand of despotism fell

everywhere heavily upon the party of political progress. The majority of

German Liberals, not yet prepared for recourse to revolutionary measures,

submitted to the pressure of the times, and disclaimed all sympathy with

illegal acts; a minority, recognising that nothing was now to be gained by

constitutional means, entered into conspiracies, and determined to liberate

Germany by force. One insignificant group, relying upon the armed

co-operation of Polish bands in France, and deceived by promises of support

from some Würtemberg soldiers, actually rose in insurrection at Frankfort.

A guard-house was seized, and a few soldiers captured; but the citizens of

Frankfort stood aloof, and order was soon restored (April, 1833). It was

not to be expected that the reactionary courts should fail to draw full

advantage from this ill-timed outbreak of their enemies. Prussian troops

marched into Frankfort, and Metternich had no difficulty in carrying

through the Diet a decree establishing a commission to superintend and to

report upon the proceedings instituted against political offenders

throughout Germany. For several years these investigations continued, and

the campaign against the opponents of government was carried on with

various degrees of rigour in the different states. About two thousand

persons altogether were brought to trial: in Prussia thirty-nine sentences

of death were pronounced, but not executed. In the struggle against

revolution the forces of monarchy had definitely won the victory. Germany

again experienced, as it had in 1819, that the federal institutions which

were to have given it unity existed only for the purposes of repression.

The breach between the nation and its rulers, in spite of the apparent

failure of the democratic party, remained far deeper and wider than it had

been before; and although Metternich, victor once more over the growing

restlessness of the age, slumbered on for another decade in fancied

security, the last of his triumphs had now been won, and the next uprising

proved how blind was that boasted statesmanship which deemed the sources of

danger exhausted when once its symptoms had been driven beneath the

surface.

[Conspirators and exiles.]

[Dispersion of the Swiss exiles, 1834.]

In half the states of Europe there were now bodies of exasperated,

uncompromising men, who devoted their lives to plotting against

governments, and who formed, in their community of interest and purpose, a

sort of obverse of the Holy Alliance, a federation of kings' enemies, a

league of principle and creed, in which liberty and human right stood

towards established rule as light to darkness. As the grasp of authority

closed everywhere more tightly upon its baffled foes, more and more of

these men passed into exile. Among them was the Genoese Mazzini, who, after

suffering imprisonment in 1831, withdrew to Marseilles, and there, in

combination with various secret societies, planned an incursion into the

Italian province of Savoy. It was at first intended that this enterprise

should be executed simultaneously with the German rising at Frankfort.

Delays, however, arose, and it was not until the beginning of the following

year that the little army, which numbered more Poles than Italians, was

ready for its task. The incursion was made from Geneva in February, 1834,

and ended disastrously. [395] Mazzini returned to Switzerland, where

hundreds of exiles, secure under the shelter of the Republic, devised

schemes of attack upon the despots of Europe, and even rioted in honour of

freedom in the streets of the Swiss cities which protected them. The effect

of the revolutionary movement of the time in consolidating the alliance of

the three Eastern Powers, so rudely broken by the Greek War of Liberation,

now came clearly into view. The sovereigns of Russia and Austria had met at

Münchengrätz in Bohemia in the previous autumn, and, in concert with

Prussia, had resolved upon common principles of action if their

intervention should be required against disturbers of order. Notes were now

addressed from every quarter to the Swiss Government, requiring the

expulsion of all persons concerned in enterprises against the peace of

neighbouring States. Some resistance to this demand was made by individual

cantons; but the extravagance of many of the refugees themselves alienated

popular sympathy, and the greater part of them were forced to quit

Switzerland and to seek shelter in England or in America. With the

dispersion of the central band of exiles the open alliance which had

existed between the revolutionists of Europe gradually passed away. The

brotherhood of the kings had proved a stern reality, the brotherhood of the

peoples a delusive vision. Mazzini indeed, who up to this time had scarcely

emerged from the rabble of revolutionary leaders, was yet to prove how

deeply the genius, the elevation, the fervour of one man struggling against

the powers of the world may influence the history of his age; but the fire

that purified the fine gold charred and consumed the baser elements; and of

those who had hoped the most after 1830, many now sank into despair, or

gave up their lives to mere restless agitation and intrigue.

[Difficulties of Louis Philippe.]

[Insurrections, 1832-1834.]

[Repressive Laws, Sept., 1835.]

It was in France that the revolutionary movement was longest maintained.

During the first year of Louis Philippe's rule the opposition to his

government was inspired not so much by Republicanism as by a wild and

inconsiderate sympathy with the peoples who were fighting for liberty

elsewhere, and by a headstrong impulse to take up arms on their behalf. The

famous decree of the Convention in 1792, which promised the assistance of

France to every nation in revolt against its rulers, was in fact the true

expression of what was felt by a great part of the French nation in 1831;

and in the eyes of these enthusiasts it was the unpardonable offence of

Louis Philippe against the honour of France that he allowed Poland and

Italy to succumb without drawing his sword against their conquerors. That

France would have had to fight the three Eastern Powers combined, if it had

allied itself with those in revolt against any one of the three, passed for

nothing among the clamorous minority in the Chamber and among the orators

of Paris. The pacific policy of Casimir Perier was misunderstood; it passed

for mere poltroonery, when in fact it was the only policy that could save

France from a recurrence of the calamities of 1815. There were other causes

for the growing unpopularity of the King and of his Ministers, but the

first was their policy of peace. As the attacks of his opponents became

more and more bitter, the government of Casimir Perier took more and more

of a repressive character. Disappointment at the small results produced in

France itself by the Revolution of July worked powerfully in men's minds.

The forces that had been set in motion against Charles X. were not to be

laid at rest at the bidding of those who had profited by them, and a

Republican party gradually took definite shape and organisation. Tumult

succeeded tumult. In the summer of 1832 the funeral of General Lamarque, a

popular soldier, gave the signal for insurrection at Paris. There was

severe fighting in the streets; the National Guard, however, proved true to

the king, and shared with the army in the honours of its victory.

Repressive measures and an unbroken series of prosecutions against

seditious writers followed this first armed attack upon the established

government. The bitterness of the Opposition, the discontent of the working

classes, far surpassed anything that had been known under Charles X. The

whole country was agitated by revolutionary societies and revolutionary

propaganda. Disputes between masters and workmen, which, in consequence of

the growth of French manufacturing industry, now became both frequent and

important, began to take a political colour. Polish and Italian exiles

connected their own designs with attacks to be made upon the French

Government from within; and at length, in April, 1834, after the passing of

a law against trades-unions, the working classes of Lyons, who were on

strike against their employers, were induced to rise in revolt. After

several days' fighting the insurrection was suppressed. Simultaneous

outbreaks took place at St. Etienne, Grenoble, and many other places in the

south and centre of France; and on a report of the success of the

insurgents reaching Paris, the Republic was proclaimed and barricades were

erected. Again civil war raged in the streets, and again the forces of

Government gained the victory. A year more passed, during which the

investigations into the late revolt and the trial of a host of prisoners

served rather to agitate than to reassure the public mind; and in the

summer of 1835 an attempt was made upon the life of the King so terrible

and destructive in its effects as to amount to a public calamity. An

infernal machine composed of a hundred gun-barrels was fired by a Corsican

named Fieschi, as the King with a large suite was riding through the

streets of Paris on the anniversary of the Revolution of July. Fourteen

persons were killed on the spot, among whom was Mortier, one of the oldest

of the marshals of France; many others were fatally or severely injured.

The King, however, with his three sons, escaped unhurt, and the repressive

laws that followed this outrage marked the close of open revolutionary

agitation in France. Whether in consequence of the stringency of the new

laws, or of the exhaustion of a party discredited in public estimation by

the crimes of a few of its members and the recklessness of many more, the

constitutional monarchy of Louis Philippe now seemed to have finally

vanquished its opponents. Repeated attempts were made on the life of the

King, but they possessed for the most part little political significance.

Order was welcome to the nation at large; and though in the growth of a

socialistic theory and creed of life which dates from this epoch there lay

a danger to Governments greater than any purely political, Socialism was as

yet the affair of thinkers rather than of active workers either in the

industrial or in the Parliamentary world. The Government had beaten its

enemies outside the Chamber. Within the Chamber, the parties of extremes

ceased to exercise any real influence. Groups were formed, and rival

leaders played against one another for office; but they were separated by

no far-reaching differences of aim, and by no real antagonism of

constitutional principle. During the succeeding years of Louis Philippe's

reign there was little visible on the surface but the normal rivalry of

parties under a constitutional monarchy. The middle-class retained its

monopoly of power: authority, centralised as before, maintained its old

prestige in France, and softened opposition by judicious gifts of office

and emolument. Revolutionary passion seemed to have died away: and the

triumphs or reverses of party-leaders in the Chamber of Deputies succeeded

to the harassing and doubtful conflict between Government and insurrection.

[The English Reform movement.]

The near coincidence in time between the French Revolution of 1830 and the

passing of the English Reform Bill is apt to suggest to those who look for

the operation of wide general causes in history that the English Reform

movement should be viewed as a part of the great current of political

change which then traversed the continent of Europe. But on a closer

examination this view is scarcely borne out by facts, and the coincidence

of the two epochs of change appears to be little more than accidental. The

general unity that runs through the history of the more advanced

continental states is indeed stronger than appears to a superficial reader

of history; but this correspondence of tendency does not always embrace

England; on the contrary, the conditions peculiar to England usually

preponderate over those common to England and other countries, exhibiting

at times more of contrast than of similarity, as in the case of the

Napoleonic epoch, when the causes which drew together the western half of

the continent operated powerfully to exclude our own country from the

current influences of the time, and made the England of 1815, in opinion,

in religion, and in taste much more insular than the England of 1780. The

revolution which overthrew Charles X. did no doubt encourage and stimulate

the party of Reform in Great Britain; but, unlike the Belgian, the German,

and the Italian movements, the English Reform movement would unquestionably

have run the same course and achieved the same results even if the revolt

against the ordinances of Charles X. had been successfully repressed, and

the Bourbon monarchy had maintained itself in increased strength and

reputation. A Reform of Parliament had been acknowledged to be necessary

forty years before. Pitt had actually proposed it in 1785, and but for the

outbreak of the French Revolution would probably have carried it into

effect before the close of the last century. The development of English

manufacturing industry which took place between 1790 and 1830, accompanied

by the rapid growth of towns and the enrichment of the urban middle class,

rendered the design of Pitt, which would have transferred the

representation of the decayed boroughs to the counties alone, obsolete, and

made the claims of the new centres of population too strong to be resisted.

In theory the representative system of the country was completely

transformed; but never was a measure which seemed to open the way to such

boundless possibilities of change so thoroughly safe and so thoroughly

conservative. In spite of the increased influence won by the wealthy part

of the commercial classes, the House of Commons continued to be drawn

mainly from the territorial aristocracy. Cabinet after Cabinet was formed

with scarcely a single member included in it who was not himself a man of

title, or closely connected with the nobility: the social influence of rank

was not diminished; and although such measures as the Reform of Municipal

Corporations attested the increased energy of the Legislature, no party in

the House of Commons was weaker than that which supported the democratic

demands for the Ballot and for Triennial Parliaments, nor was the repeal of

the Corn Laws seriously considered until famine had made it inevitable.

That the widespread misery which existed in England after 1832, as the

result of the excessive increase of our population and the failure alike of

law and of philanthropy to keep pace with the exigencies of a vast

industrial growth, should have been so quietly borne, proves how great was

the success of the Reform Bill as a measure of conciliation between

Government and people. But the crowning justification of the changes made

in 1832, and the complete and final answer to those who had opposed them as

revolutionary, was not afforded until 1848, when, in the midst of European

convulsion, the monarchy and the constitution of England remained unshaken.

Bold as the legislation of Lord Grey appeared to men who had been brought

up amidst the reactionary influences dominant in England since 1793, the

Reform Bill belongs not to the class of great creative measures which have

inaugurated new periods in the life of nations, but to the class of those

which, while least affecting the general order of society, have most

contributed to political stability and to the avoidance of revolutionary

change.