THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Roosevelt appoints me member of the Hague Tribunal--Trouble with
Philippine Mohammedans averted--Humanitarian diplomacy under
Roosevelt; Hay's Roumanian note; Roosevelt's Russian cable--The
Alaska boundary--Panama and the "covenant running with the
land"--White House luncheons; Carnegie suggests to Roosevelt a
legacy for my grandchildren--Roosevelt and organized
labor--Roosevelt's definition of Americanism--Overnight at the
White House; conference regarding the President's
Message--Roosevelt and the Portsmouth peace negotiations; Count
Witte invites a committee to discuss the Russian Jewish question;
Roosevelt writes to Witte--Roosevelt's prophetic characterization
of Germany--Some essential qualities of Roosevelt.
I began the year 1901 as a private citizen once more. I devoted much of
my time, however, to public activities, giving close attention
particularly to the international questions that arose.
The doctrine of citizenship and the rights of naturalized American
citizens in foreign countries had for many years formed the major
subject in our foreign relations, and it had been one for constant
controversy between our own and foreign countries, especially Germany,
Austria, and Turkey. In the spring I read a paper at a meeting of the
American Social Science Association, of which I was the president,
entitled "The United States Doctrine of Citizenship and Expatriation."
Later in the year I received, in consequence, a letter from Senator S.
M. Cullom of Illinois, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, asking me to prepare material for amendments to legislation
on this subject, which I did.
When Theodore Roosevelt became President of the United States through
the lamentable death of William McKinley, one of my earliest relations
with him was my being appointed by him as a member of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague. Whether or not he acted herein in
conformity with McKinley's intention, I cannot say. When McKinley was
selecting the original members, he conferred with me and indicated that
if agreeable to me, he would be pleased to appoint me as a member.
Shortly afterward when the appointments were announced, my name was not
among them. It was some time before I saw him again, and while I should
never have mentioned it, he did. He said he was very sorry that through
the pressure of duties he had quite forgotten his intention to name me
when the time came to announce the appointments. I told him I thought
perhaps I had been mistaken in understanding that he had offered me one
of the appointments. He said I had not misunderstood, but that he would
make amends should a vacancy occur while he was still President; he had
wanted me as a member of the Court, not alone in recognition of the
great services I had rendered, but because he regarded me exceptionally
qualified. He added that when he became ex-President he would like to be
a member of that Court himself; it appealed to him more than any other
office he could think of.
The vacancy in the membership of the Court occurred sooner than any one
anticipated, by the death, in March, 1901, of ex-President Harrison; but
by the decree of the gods McKinley himself was no longer with us when
the time came to fill President Harrison's place. In fact I think the
day we talked about the Court marked my last conference with him. He was
always simple in manner and of charming personality. Together we enjoyed
a good smoke that afternoon; he was fond of smoking and knew I enjoyed a
good cigar, and he was wont to have me take one of his brand. I begged
him not to concern himself further with the omission of my appointment
at The Hague, that I was satisfied to know he thought me worthy of the
selection.
It is possible that Roosevelt knew the circumstance and McKinley's
intention, for he was Vice-President at the time it happened. At any
rate, when the successor to President Harrison was chosen, I received
the following appointment, somewhat different in form from most
documents of the kind:
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, _January 8, 1902_
MY DEAR SIR:
Article XX of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, signed July 29, 1899, by the
Plenipotentiaries to the Hague Peace Conference, provides for the
organization of a permanent Court of Arbitration, and Article XXIII
of the same Convention provides for the selection by each of the
signatory Powers of four persons at the most, as members of the
Court, who are to be appointed for a term of six years.
It will give me pleasure to designate you as one of the four United
States members if you will advise me that such action is agreeable
to you.
Very Truly Yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
HONORABLE OSCAR S. STRAUS
New York, N.Y.
Since then I have been reappointed three times: in 1908, again by
Roosevelt, in 1912 and 1920, by Wilson.
In April, 1902, there appeared in the press a dispatch to the effect
that an expedition of twelve hundred men was to be sent to the southern
Philippines to punish the Mohammedans there for killing one of our
soldiers and wounding several others. I immediately wrote the President
that I believed such a step would be unwise and would probably bring on
a general uprising in that province. I called his attention to the
negotiation I had had with the Sultan of Turkey regarding these people,
and suggested that instead of the expedition a commission be sent to
treat with them. The President asked me to come to Washington to confer
with him in the matter, and after the Cabinet meeting I met him in his
study. There were present also Mr. Taft, who had been appointed governor
of the Philippines, Adjutant-General Corbin, and Mr. Sanger, acting
Secretary of War. I presented my arguments more fully. The President had
already telegraphed General Chaffee regarding the sending of a
diplomatic mission, in accordance with my letter.
The result of our conference was that General Corbin was directed to
advise General Chaffee to use the office of the friendly datos to obtain
the desired redress. It developed later that the soldier killed was
laying a telegraph line, which procedure, not being understood by the
Moros, was regarded by them as a device for their destruction. The
slayers were surrendered and punished and the incident was
satisfactorily adjusted.
* * * * *
At about this time disturbances in Roumania were being reflected in our
country. Eleven years before, a committee of prominent Jews had brought
before President Harrison the pitiable condition of the large number of
Jews arriving in New York from Russia, and it was now necessary to take
similar steps with regard to the Jews from Roumania.
In Chapter IV I mentioned that Roumania disregarded the provisions of
the Treaty of Berlin and placed restrictions upon her Jewish subjects.
Into that treaty, by which Roumania was made an independent kingdom
following the Russo-Turkish War, Article XLIV was inserted specially for
the protection of the Jews, of whom there were about four hundred
thousand in the new state. It provided that difference of religion
should not be ground for exclusion in the participation of civil,
political, or economic rights. In spite of this, however, the Jews in
Roumania were being oppressed and discriminated against on the specious
claim that they were foreigners, though they and their ancestors had
been living in the land for generations. They were compelled to serve in
the army, but not permitted to become officers; they were made subject
to exceptional taxes; they were excluded from the professions and from
owning and cultivating land. In every direction they were being
throttled, and new laws were being promulgated to shut off every avenue
of self-support.
The result was what had doubtless been the intention in putting into
force these drastic measures: the Jews who could emigrated, and they
left Roumania _en masse_. The obstacles in the way of their gaining
admission into the countries of Western Europe were so great that few of
them could settle there. The leading Jewish organizations of Great
Britain and France, namely, the Jewish Colonization Association in
London and the Alliance Israelite Universelle in Paris, laid the matter
before their respective governments, but, on account of the disturbed
conditions in the Balkans and the cross-currents of European politics,
no pressure could be exerted through these governments.
The main stream of the Roumanian exodus was thus directed to America,
and they arrived here in increasing numbers. The leading Jewish agencies
of the country, particularly the B'nai B'rith Order under the presidency
of Leo N. Levi, used their best efforts to distribute the immigrants
over the country and to places where they were most likely to find
employment. Later our very able commissioner of immigration at Ellis
Island, Robert Watchorn, went over to Roumania for the special purpose
of studying the situation and made a graphic report of what he learned.
But to alleviate the situation action of a more official character was
needed.
Jacob H. Schiff and I prepared a careful brief on conditions and
presented it to President Roosevelt. The President said he was willing
to take the matter in hand provided something could be done by our
Government. Congressman Lucius N. Littauer also extended helpful
cooperation. He had recently returned from Roumania and had first-hand
knowledge of the question, which he took up in conferences with the
President and with Secretary Hay.
Finally, in September, 1902, the President directed Secretary Hay to
prepare his now famous Roumanian Note to the Powers signatory to the
Treaty of Berlin. The note was sent to our diplomatic representatives in
those countries with instructions to present it to the governments to
which they were accredited. The occasion for sending it was found in
connection with negotiations initiated by Roumania for the concluding of
a naturalization treaty with our country. The note gave the reasons why,
under the circumstances, we were unwilling to conclude such a treaty.
After referring to the Treaty of Berlin and the obligations assumed by
Roumania under it regarding the treatment of subject nationalities, the
Secretary said:
The United States offers asylum to the oppressed of all lands. But
its sympathy with them in no wise impairs its just liberty and
right to weigh the acts of the oppressor in the light of their
effects upon this country, and to judge accordingly.
Putting together the facts, now painfully brought home to this
Government, during the past few years, that many of the
inhabitants of Roumania are being forced by artificially adverse
discriminations to quit their native country; that the hospitable
asylum offered by this country is almost the only refuge left to
them; that they come hither unfitted by the conditions of their
exile to take part in the new life of this land under circumstances
either profitable to themselves or beneficial to the community, and
that they are objects of charity from the outset and for a long
time--the right of remonstrance against the acts of the Roumanian
Government is clearly established in favor of this Government.
Whether consciously and of purpose or not, these helpless people,
burdened and spurned by their native land, are forced by the
sovereign power of Roumania upon the charity of the United States.
This Government can not be a tacit party to such an international
wrong. It is constrained to protest against the treatment to which
the Jews of Roumania are subjected, not alone because it has
unimpeachable ground to remonstrate against the resultant injury to
itself, but in the name of humanity. The United States may not
authoritatively appeal to the stipulations of the treaty of Berlin,
to which it was not and can not become a signatory, but it does
earnestly appeal to the principles consigned therein, because they
are the principles of international law and eternal justice,
advocating the broad toleration which that solemn compact enjoins
and standing ready to lend its moral support to the fulfillment
thereof by its cosignatories, for the act of Roumania itself has
effectively joined the United States to them as an interested party
in this regard.
One of the most valuable by-products of the Congress of Berlin was to
bring into closer relations the autocratic with the liberal governments
of Europe and cause the former to become more amenable to the
enlightened conscience of the world. Hay's dispatch, while not pleasing
to the Government of Roumania, yet, because of the world-wide publicity
it received, had a measure of influence in modifying Roumania's
indefensible proscriptions.
* * * * *
Another need for humanitarian diplomacy arose the following year. The
attitude and proscriptions of the Roumanian authorities had doubtless
encouraged anti-Semitic activity in Russia, and the latter Government,
no longer contenting itself with the application of restrictions in the
book of laws which compelled Jews to live in the Pale settlements,
officially encouraged mobs to massacre and loot, culminating on April
19-20, 1903, with the outbreak in Kishineff, where forty-seven Jews were
killed, ninety-two severely wounded, and some five hundred more slightly
injured. In addition great material losses were inflicted: seven hundred
houses were destroyed, six hundred stores pillaged, and thousands of
families utterly ruined.
When these facts became known, they called forth an expression of
indignation throughout the civilized world. In New York a mass meeting
was called at Carnegie Hall by hundreds of the foremost New York
Christians, in protest against the outrages upon the Jews in Russia and
particularly against the Kishineff affair. The meeting was presided over
by Paul D. Cravath, eminent lawyer, and the speakers were ex-President
Cleveland, Mayor Seth Low, Jacob G. Schurman, president of Cornell, and
Edward M. Shepard, well known for his unselfish devotion to the
interests of the public. I have in my possession the manuscript of
Cleveland's address on this occasion, which concludes:
In the meantime, let the people of the United States, gathered
together in such assemblages as this in every part of the land,
fearlessly speak to the civilized world--protesting against every
pretence of civilization that permits mediaeval persecution, against
every bigoted creed that forbids religious toleration and freedom
of conscience, against all false enlightenment that excuses hatred
and cruelty towards any race of men, and against all spurious forms
of government protection, that withhold from any human being the
right to live in safety, and toil in peace.
I will also quote part of the resolutions adopted that evening:
Resolved, that the people of the United States should exercise such
influence with the Government of Russia as the ancient and unbroken
friendship between the two nations may justify to stay the spirit
of persecution, to redress the injuries inflicted upon the Jews of
Kishineff, and to prevent the recurrence of outbreaks such as have
amazed the civilized world.
A few weeks later a committee from the B'nai B'rith Order, consisting of
Simon Wolf, Adolf Moses, Julius Bien, Jacob Furth, Solomon Sulzberger,
and Joseph D. Coons, and headed by their president, Leo N. Levi, called
upon Secretary Hay and presented to him a statement regarding the
massacres in Russia together with a proposed petition which they wished
forwarded to the Government of the Czar. The Secretary expressed great
sympathy and the desire to do what might be possible in the matter. His
reply to the committee, taken down in shorthand at the time, was
published in full in the press, and from it I quote the concluding
sentence:
All we know of the state of things in Russia tends to justify the
hope that even out of the present terrible situation some good
results may come; that He who watches over Israel does not slumber,
and that the wrath of man now, as so often in the past, shall be
made to praise Him.
The Secretary then accompanied the committee to the White House, where
they met the President and presented to him an outline of the oppression
of their co-religionists in Russia.
Early in July I received a telegram from the President's secretary to
the effect that the President would like to have me lunch with him the
day following at Oyster Bay, and that Simon Wolf of Washington, and Leo
N. Levi also had been invited. When I arrived at Sagamore Hill there
were present besides those named Dr. Albert Shaw of the "Review of
Reviews," and an English friend of his, Mr. Morris Sheldon Amos.
We discussed the Russian situation throughout lunch. The President
suggested that a note be sent by the Secretary of State to John W.
Riddle, our charge at St. Petersburg, and that this note should embody
the entire petition which Mr. Levi and his committee had drafted. Dr.
Shaw observed that the embodying of the petition to the Czar and giving
publicity to the note would have all the effects of a presentation even
if the Czar should refuse to receive it, which was exactly what the
President had in mind.
After luncheon we adjourned to the study, and Roosevelt said: "Now let's
finish this thing up." Hay had been to see him the day before and had
left a memorandum. Roosevelt at once drafted the note with his own pen,
using part of Hay's memorandum. The note was to be sent as an open
cable. It read as follows:
RIDDLE
St. Petersburg
You are instructed to ask an audience of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and to make to him the following communication:
_Excellency_: The Secretary of State instructs me to inform you
that the President has received from a large number of prominent
citizens of the United States of all religious affiliations, and
occupying the highest positions in both public and private life, a
respectful petition addressed to his Majesty the Emperor relating
to the condition of the Jews in Russia and running as follows:
[Here is set out the petition.]
I am instructed to ask whether the petition will be received by
your Excellency to be submitted to the gracious consideration of
his Majesty. In that case the petition will be at once forwarded to
St. Petersburg.
Roosevelt wanted the cable to be sent at once and was in a hurry to get
it to Washington. One of his reasons was that the late Russian
ambassador, Cassini, had been dismissed and was on his way back to
Russia, and he wanted the note to reach the Russian Government before
Cassini arrived in St. Petersburg. Mr. Wolf, who lived in Washington,
was to take the drafted cable to Secretary Hay; but as he could not
return that night the President asked whether I could take it so that it
might be dispatched next morning. By ten o'clock the following morning I
placed the draft in the Secretary's hands and it was immediately put on
the wire.
In planning the cable as he did, the President was right in his
anticipation. Duly the American charge at St. Petersburg informed the
State Department that the Russian Government, through its Minister of
Foreign Affairs, had declined to receive or consider the petition.
Nevertheless, its purpose was accomplished. Official Russia was made to
realize the aroused indignation and the public protests of the civilized
world. This in turn had a decided influence in checking, for the time
being at least, similar outbreaks threatened throughout the empire,
besides bringing to trial and punishment some of the leaders of the
massacres.
* * * * *
That afternoon at Sagamore Hill, after the Russian matter had been
disposed of, the President was talking to Dr. Shaw and me about the
Alaskan boundary question. He pulled out a map showing the disputed
boundary, and explained that three commissioners from the United States
and three from Great Britain and Canada would take up the dispute for
investigation. He argued that they were not arbiters and he refused to
sign an arbitral agreement; if they did not agree, he would take the
matter into his own hands; that the whole trouble arose from the fact
that the Canadians had shoved down the boundary line after the discovery
of gold. "Suppose a man pitches a tent on my grounds and claims them,
and I want him to get off; and he says he won't get off, but will
arbitrate the matter!" Roosevelt exclaimed. Then, turning to me, he
added: "Straus, you are a member of the Hague Tribunal; don't you think
I'm right?"
I calmly replied that as a member of the Hague Tribunal I should first
have to hear what the other side had to say and therefore must reserve
my judgment. And we all had a good laugh.
* * * * *
During the Venezuela controversy in 1902, Venezuela on the one side and
Great Britain and Germany on the other, Roosevelt was very much incensed
that Germany, with the feeble backing of England, should undertake a
blockade against Venezuela to make the latter carry out certain
agreements, and he promptly took steps to prevent it. Thereupon there
was a disposition on the part of Germany to ask Roosevelt to arbitrate.
Secretary Hay, it seems, favored such a course, but I strongly advised
against it.
At a luncheon to which I was invited by the President early in November,
1903, the conditions in Panama came up as the principal topic of
conversation. There were present on this occasion, besides Mr. and Mrs.
Roosevelt, Cornelius N. Bliss, former Secretary of the Interior; John
Clark Davis, of the "Philadelphia Ledger"; H. H. Kohlsaat, of Chicago;
Lawrence F. Abbott, of "The Outlook"; and the President's
brother-in-law, Lieutenant-Commander Cowles, of the Navy. News had been
received that Panama had separated from Colombia and we were about to
recognize Panama. In his informal way, as was his custom at luncheons,
the President began to discuss the situation, referring to the fact that
our treaty of 1846 was with New Granada, which afterwards became the
United States of Colombia and then the Republic of Colombia, and that in
that treaty we had guaranteed to protect the transit route. One of the
questions raised was whether the treaty still held us to that
obligation, notwithstanding these several changes of sovereignty.
The President was directing his remarks toward me, which was his way of
signifying the particular person from whom he wanted to draw comment. I
answered that it seemed to me, as I recollected the terms of the treaty,
which I had recently read, that the change of sovereignty did not affect
either our obligations or our rights; that I regarded them in the nature
of a "covenant running with the land."
"That's fine! Just the idea!" Roosevelt replied, and as soon as luncheon
was over, he requested me to express that idea to Hay. He scratched a
few lines on a correspondence card asking Secretary Hay to go over with
me the suggestion I had made and to work into the treaty the "covenant
running with the land" idea.
That evening I called on the Secretary. He seized the idea at once and
said he would make use of it in a statement he was just preparing for
the press detailing the whole situation. The following day there was
reported in the papers of the country the fact that the President,
following a meeting of the Cabinet, had decided to recognize the _de
facto_ government of Panama; and then the detailed statement by
Secretary Hay regarding the terms of the treaty, the history of the
negotiations, and the subsequent development, covered several newspaper
columns. It contained this paragraph:
It must not be lost sight of that this treaty is not dependent for
its efficacy on the personnel of the signers or the name of the
territory it affects. It is a covenant, as lawyers say, that runs
with the land. The name of New Granada has passed away; its
territory has been divided. But as long as the isthmus endures, the
great geographical fact keeps alive the solemn compact which binds
the holders of the territory to grant us freedom of transit, and
binds us in return to safeguard for the isthmus and the world the
exercise of that inestimable privilege.
A few days thereafter I received a short note from the President
reading: "Your 'covenant running with the land' idea worked admirably. I
congratulate you on it." And from my friend John Bassett Moore I
received an amusing letter:
So you had a finger in the pie! I find a good deal of amusement in
reflecting on the end reached from the premise of my memorandum;
and almost as much on the conclusion reached from your suggestion.
Perhaps, however, it is only a question of words--that is to say,
it is, indifferently, a question of the "covenant running with the
land" or a question of the "covenant running (_away!_) with the
land"!!
Those luncheons at the White House were always pleasant and interesting
occasions. One met there all kinds of people, of every station in life,
but always people who stood for something and who interested the
President. At the table Roosevelt would speak without apparent reserve
and free from all official restraint, and I doubt whether these
confidences were ever abused. By this means, too, he received the frank,
unreserved statements and criticisms of his guests.
As an illustration of the range of personalities one would meet at the
Roosevelt luncheons, I remember one day when Seth Bullock, a former
sheriff of the Black Hills district and an intimate friend of Roosevelt
during his cowboy days, sat next to Seth Low at the table. And in his
"Autobiography" Roosevelt himself says:
No guests were ever more welcome at the White House than these old
friends of the cattle ranches and the cow camps--the men with whom
I had ridden the long circle and eaten at the tail-board of a
chuck-wagon--whenever they turned up at Washington during my
Presidency. I remember one of them who appeared at Washington one
day just before lunch, a huge, powerful man who, when I knew him,
had been distinctly a fighting character. It happened that on that
day another old friend, the British Ambassador, Mr. Bryce, was
among those coming to lunch. Just before we went in I turned to my
cow-puncher friend and said to him with great solemnity, "Remember,
Jim, that if you shot at the feet of the British Ambassador to make
him dance, it would be likely to cause international
complications"; to which Jim responded, with unaffected horror,
"Why, Colonel, I shouldn't think of it, I shouldn't think of it!"
Mrs. Roosevelt is a most charming and cultured woman, typically the wife
and mother. Literary and intellectual matters appeal to her, though her
dominant note is the domestic one. I am sure she would have been just as
happy as the mistress of a private household as the leading lady of the
land in the White House, despite her great tact, sweetness, and simple
dignity in filling the latter position.
The President was an omnivorous reader. He could read faster and
remember better than any one I have ever known. On one occasion he
recommended to me Ferrero's "Greatness and Decline of Rome," which he
had just finished in the original Italian, and which had been brought
out in English by the Putnam house. Subsequently, too, I met this author
at the White House, where he and his wife were the guests of the
President for several days.
In January, 1904, a large conference was held in Washington of
representatives of the various peace societies and other persons
prominently interested in the calling of an international peace
congress. George F. Seward, of New York, was chairman, and others
connected with it were the Reverend Edward Everett Hale and Robert Treat
Paine, of Boston; Henry St. George Tucker, of Virginia, Andrew Carnegie,
and myself. Resolutions were adopted recommending the negotiation of a
treaty with Great Britain whereby all differences between us which might
fail of adjustment through diplomatic channels were to be submitted for
arbitration to the Permanent Court at The Hague. It was further
recommended that we enter into like treaties with other powers as soon
as practicable. We called on the President and the resolutions were
presented by Mr. Tucker; Mr. Carnegie and I each made a few remarks,
which the President in turn answered with a brief address. When he had
finished and we were all standing around him, Mr. Carnegie said to him,
"I have just been congratulating Mr. Straus on the compliments you paid
him, and suggested that he get a copy of that portion of your remarks to
preserve for his children and grandchildren." Roosevelt immediately
turned to Mr. Loeb, his secretary, and instructed him to send to me that
portion of his remarks, adding: "And I meant every word I said." I trust
I may be pardoned for the egotism which prompts me to incorporate it in
these memoirs:
I have had from Mr. Straus aid that I can not over-estimate, for
which I can not too much express my gratitude, in so much of the
diplomatic work that has arisen in this administration--aid by
suggestion, aid by actual work in helping me to carry out the
suggestions; and Mr. Straus was one of the two or three men who
first set my mind, after I came in as President, in the direction
of doing everything that could be done for the Hague Tribunal, as
that seemed to be the best way to turn for arbitration.
At another pleasant luncheon there was present Alice, now the wife of
Congressman Longworth, of Ohio, Roosevelt's daughter by his first wife.
In the course of our discussion about the reciprocity treaty with Cuba
and the making of more favorable tariff arrangements, I said: "We went
to war with Spain for the liberation of Cuba, and now if we treat her
step-motherly and starve her to death, what would the world say?" There
was hearty laughter all round the table, and Miss Alice turned to me and
said, in her naive way and with a mischievous sparkle in her eyes: "Do I
look starved?" The President had fairly exploded with laughter, and when
I remarked that I had "put my foot into it," he added, amid another
outburst, "Yes, both of them!"
The President did not smoke, but always served cigars and cigarettes to
his guests. When I did not take one, he said, "Straus, you smoke."
"Yes," I answered, "but I certainly want to pay as much respect to you
as I always did to the Sultan of Turkey. He did not drink, and I never
took any when it was served."
"You go right ahead and smoke. If Root were here he would smoke and
always does," replied Roosevelt.
After lunch that day, when the other guests had gone, he and I went into
an adjoining room and had a general discussion--labor matters, the
National Civic Federation, the Republican Party, etc., etc. He said he
had received a number of requests to put into the Republican platform a
plank protesting against the discrimination made by Russia against
Americans of the Jewish faith. "You know," he said, "I am prepared to do
anything that I can for all of our citizens regardless of race or
creed, but unless we mean to do something further than simply protest it
would look like an effort to catch votes, for such statements in the
platform could not be regarded for any other purpose." He added he had
in mind a different and more effective way of handling the subject when
the time came. He said he remembered that I had never asked him to take
action in this or any other question that was not justified on broad
American principles, but that if anything arose which specially
reflected upon the Jews he looked to me to bring it to his attention,
and I was to regard that just as much my duty as the protection of
American Christian interests in Turkey.
We spoke about the Russo-Japanese War, and I told him that some one had
said that the Japs were yellow-skinned, but the Russians were yellow all
the way through. This called forth a hearty laugh. Humor of any kind,
provided it was clean, he always appreciated, and his own sense of it
continually served, as it did for Lincoln, to lighten the seriousness of
his duties.
* * * * *
Like Lincoln, too, Roosevelt combined with that balancing sense of humor
an innate and always active sense of justice. Time and again in my
relationship with him I have observed and admired it. I recall in this
regard the case of an employee named Miller in the Government Printing
Office, who was discharged because he did not belong to the union, and
Roosevelt reinstated him. Mr. Gompers and several members of the
Executive Committee of the American Federation of Labor thereupon called
upon the President to protest against this reinstatement. They said his
discharge was based on two points: that he was a non-union man, and also
that he was an incapable worker. Roosevelt's answer was: "The question
of his personal fitness is one to be settled in the routine of
administrative detail, and cannot be allowed to conflict with or to
complicate the larger question of governmental discrimination for or
against him or any other man because he is or is not a member of a
union. This is the only question now before me for decision; and as to
this my decision is final."
As I was in constant touch with the President by correspondence and
conferences, I wrote him telling of my gratification to find in his
decision anent the Miller case such consonance in principle with his
position regarding the anthracite coal strike, to which I received the
following reply that brings out the point I have just made about his
sense of justice:
WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON
_October 1, 1903_
MY DEAR MR. STRAUS:
I thank you heartily for your letter. When you can get on here I
should like to tell you for your own information some of my
experiences in connection with this Miller case. I feel exactly as
you do--that my action was a complement to my action, for instance,
in the anthracite coal strike, and that I could no more hesitate in
the teeth of opposition from the labor unions in one case, than I
could when the opposition came from the big monied men in the other
case.
Sincerely yours
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Perhaps no President has had a policy, with regard to labor, so wise and
far-seeing as that of Roosevelt. Invariably he sought the counsel of
labor leaders in matters affecting their interests, and always they were
made to feel that redress for their just grievances, and their rights
generally, were as much a concern of his and of his administration as
any rights of the rich. In this connection I recall a remark of P. H.
Morrissey, then head of the railroad train-men. We were seated in the
Red Room of the White House for conference after dinner. There were
present some thirty or more men prominently identified with labor, whom
the President had invited to discuss labor legislation. Morrissey
recalled one time several years before when he sat in front of the great
fireplace in the Red Room waiting for the President; and he said he
could not help reflecting what a long way it was from the cab of the
locomotive engine to this stately room in the official residence of the
President of the United States, an honor and a privilege that Roosevelt
was the first President to give to men of labor.
On the same evening I saw in clear relief Roosevelt's wonderful tact,
judgment, and understanding of men as I had never seen it displayed
before. One or two of the labor leaders showed some bitterness in their
criticism of certain legislation. Roosevelt showed frank approval of
just complaints and allayed irritation in a most tactful way where the
demand was unjust or unreasonable.
* * * * *
In the election of 1904 I took an active part and kept in close touch
with Roosevelt. An unusual amount of bitterness characterized this
campaign, though it was foreseen that Roosevelt would win by a large
majority. In this connection I received a characteristic letter from
him, dated at the White House October 15th:
I notice that various Democratic papers, including the Evening
Post, have endeavored to show that I have appealed to the Jew vote,
the Catholic vote, etc. Now the fact is that I have not appealed to
any man as Jew, as Protestant, or as Catholic, but that I have as
strongly as in me lies endeavored to make it evident that each is
to have a square deal, no more and no less, without regard to his
creed. I hope that this country will continue in substantially its
present form of government for many centuries. If this is so it is
reasonable to suppose that during that time there will be
Presidents of Jewish faith, Presidents of Catholic faith. Now, my
aim as President is to behave toward the Jew and the Catholic just
as I should wish a Jewish or Catholic President to behave towards
Protestants--in other words, to behave as a good American should
behave toward all his fellow Americans, without regard to the
several creeds they profess or the several lands from which their
ancestors have sprung. Moreover, I am pleased at what Lebowich says
at my not having a spirit of condescension or patronizing. I have
enough of the old Adam in me to object almost as strongly to being
patronized as to being wronged; and I do not intend knowingly to
behave toward others in a manner which I should resent if it were
adopted toward me.
These sentences bring to mind another and public statement of
Roosevelt's in which he characterized Americanism; the occasion was an
address at the unveiling of the Sheridan equestrian statue in
Washington:
We should keep steadily before our minds the fact that Americanism
is a question of principle, of purpose, of idealism, of character;
that it is not a matter of birthplace, or creed, or line of
descent.
Here in this country the representatives of many old-world races
are being fused together into a new type, a type the main features
of which are already determined, and were determined at the time of
the Revolutionary War; for the crucible in which all the new types
are melted into one was shaped from 1776 to 1789, and our
nationality was definitely fixed in all its essentials by the men
of Washington's day.
Soon after the election he invited me to come to the White House for
dinner one evening and to spend the night; there were a number of things
he wanted to talk over with me. When I arrived I found Dr. Lyman Abbott
and his son Ernest had been similarly invited, and there were additional
guests for dinner: Attorney-General Moody, Senator Knox, Secretary of
War Taft, and James R. Garfield, chief of the Bureau of Corporations in
the Department of Commerce and Labor.
At dinner the President announced that we had come together to do some
business, and he produced from his pocket a slip of paper on which were
noted the several subjects he wished to consider with us, mainly things
to be incorporated in his forthcoming Message to Congress. First there
was the negro question. The South had vilified him because he
entertained Booker Washington and appointed Crum Collector of the Port
at Charleston. When Congress assembled, one of the things he intended
doing was to send in again the name of Crum for confirmation. "The
Southerners either do not or do not wish to understand it," he said;
adding that his position plainly was that he would do everything in his
power for the white man South without, however, doing a wrong or an
injustice to the colored man. He was sympathetic with the South, for he
was half Southerner himself, his mother having come from Roswell,
Georgia. His remarks on this topic were directed mainly to Dr. Abbott.
The conversation then turned to the recent election and became very
general, every one joining and relating instances or experiences in
connection with it. Mr. Taft, who had waged a vigorous campaign for the
Administration, told a joke on himself: he had received a letter from
Wayne MacVeagh saying that so far as he (MacVeagh) could see, Taft's
speeches did not do any harm.
When the talk had gone along these general lines for a while, Roosevelt
interjected with "Now we must get back to business," and proceeded to
discuss the diplomatic service in relation to his Message. He thought
civil service too strictly applied would be detrimental, as we had a
great deal of old timber there that should be gotten rid of.
Next he took up a discussion of Panama. Mr. Taft with several others was
to leave next day on a mission there to look into the difficulties
between the native army and the President of Panama, and some one
humorously suggested that he had better go down and take away the
weapons from the army and let them muster as much as they wanted to
without weapons.
After dinner we adjourned to the President's study on the floor above.
He sat down at his desk and pulled open a drawer as he said: "I want to
read to you incomplete drafts of portions of my Message which I should
like to have you criticize, as on some of the subjects I have not yet
fully made up my mind." The Message was in separate parts, each dealing
with an important subject. He took up the part dealing with our foreign
relations, in regard to Russia and Roumania, and addressed me, saying he
would like me to pay special attention to that as he had consulted me
all along concerning the action to be taken. He said our Government had
been criticized as interfering with the internal affairs of other
nations, and the statement had been repeatedly made that we should not
like it if other nations took us to task for our negro lynchings in the
South; but he argued that the lynchings were comparatively few, and,
though bad enough, were nothing compared to the wholesale murder in cold
blood under official sanction and perhaps instigation, as in Kishineff.
"My answer to all these criticisms is this," he said; "only a short time
ago I received a remonstrance or petition from a society in Great
Britain regarding the lynchings in this country. I did not reject it; on
the contrary, I answered it most politely and expressed my great regret
for these unlawful, unjustifiable acts, with which neither I nor the
Government had any sympathy. On the contrary the Government does
everything in its power to prevent these outrages and unlawful acts.
And I authorize any one to make use of this information whenever the
occasion presents itself."
To the labor question also he wanted me to pay special attention because
of my experience with such matters and in the arbitration of labor
disputes. He began with the statement that he was in favor of organized
capital and organized labor. I asked him whether right at that point I
might make a suggestion, which was that he begin with the general
subject of capital and labor, because organized labor did not comprise
more than fifteen per cent of the wage-earners of the country. This
suggestion he accepted.
Roosevelt then expressed himself in favor of the eight-hour law. Messrs.
Moody, Knox, Taft, and myself did not agree with his statement in the
form he had it. We explained that there were several bills before
Congress on the subject, some of which had passed the lower house, but
were defeated in the Senate; that it was all right for the Government in
its own yards to adopt an eight-hour day, but when it gave out contracts
to other shops, while it had a right to say that the work upon that
contract should be done by eight-hour days, it had no right to require
work on other contracts to be done in eight-hour days. When we had
discussed the subject quite thoroughly, it was agreed to omit it from
the Message.
Next he took up the trust question. He said Mr. Garfield had several
suggestions to offer for making the interstate commerce law effective.
It was generally agreed that the law as originally passed fully provided
the remedy that was intended, but it had been emasculated by the
decisions of the Supreme Court. Messrs. Knox, Taft, and Moody referred
to several of these decisions and pointed out that the railroads, under
subterfuge of switches and free cars--cars that were furnished by such
shippers as the beef trust--got completely around the law. They allowed
a mileage charge for the supply of these cars in excess of what should
be allowed, and under such cover it amounted to a rebate to those
shippers and was a complete circumvention of the law. Garfield's
suggestion was that the interstate commerce corporations be compelled to
obtain a license or charter from the National Government to do business.
We thoroughly discussed this, but it was disapproved as being an
interference with the legal rights of States, and that therefore no such
law could be passed by Congress. The President then turned to the legal
members of our group and said, "Now here is a great wrong and you
lawyers have always got a way of preventing us from reaching a remedy."
Knox created a laugh by replying, "The President wants us as usual to
jump over the Supreme Court."
The work on the Message done, Roosevelt said it was his intention to go
South and make a few speeches. He would begin at San Antonio and would
visit Tuskegee and Sewanee Colleges, for he wanted his views in regard
to the South and the negro question fully understood. He read us a draft
along the lines of thought he wanted to present, quoting much from
Lincoln, which seemed highly to the point. When some one mentioned the
curtailing of suffrage so as to have it based upon educational
qualifications and property ownership, the President said it would not
be wise to agitate that subject, and that herein Booker Washington
agreed with him; but, he added, "There is something inherently wrong
about a Southern member representing in some instances only a quarter of
the number of votes that an Eastern member represents, and having an
equal vote with him in Congress."
It was half after midnight when our little company separated. The
President then suggested to Dr. Abbott and me that we meet at 8.15
breakfast, if we did not object to having this meal with him and the
children. In the absence of Mrs. Roosevelt, who had gone to New York,
the President next morning took the head of the table, and with the
coffee urn before him served us each with our coffee, cream, and sugar.
There were Teddy, Ethel, Kermit, Archie, and Quentin, the governess, the
tutor, besides Dr. Abbott, his son, and myself. After the meal we
strolled in the park back of the White House until 9.30, when the
President left for his work-room in the new office building west of the
White House.
* * * * *
I did not see Roosevelt again for several months. One day in May I took
lunch with him upon his return from Chicago where he had had a
conference with the representatives of the labor unions who were
carrying on the teamster's strike that paralyzed the commerce of the
city. He said he had received through his secretary my memorandum
regarding an adjustment of the trouble, and that it was of great
assistance to him in discussing the situation and coming to some
equitable arrangement. He was preparing a Message for an extra session
of Congress in October, and said he would send me parts of it,
especially those referring to immigration and the Far East, for my
advice and suggestion.
* * * * *
In 1905, when Roosevelt was busy with negotiations to bring peace
between Russia and Japan, I received a letter from him stating that he
had endeavored to get these two nations to go to The Hague, but Russia
was most reluctant and Japan positively refused; nor would they go to
either Paris or Chefoo, but they were both willing to come to
Washington. In his own "Autobiography," which I never tire of reading,
Roosevelt gives an interesting sketch of his mediation between these two
countries which finally brought about the conference and treaty at
Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
Count Sergius Witte, head of the Russian mission to Portsmouth, was
desirous of meeting some of the representative Jews of our country with
a view to seeking what might practicably be done to improve the
condition of the Jews in the Russian Empire. While it was said that his
wife was a Jewess, his interest in the Jewish question was perhaps
primarily to improve the relations between Russia and the United States.
The Russian massacres, with the resultant enforced emigration, the
public meetings of protest in this country and the press comments, had
seriously prejudiced public opinion here against Russia.
The Count therefore invited a committee to confer with him and Baron
Rosen at Portsmouth. There were Jacob H. Schiff, Isaac N. Seligman,
Adolph Kraus, Adolf Lewisohn, and myself. The Count admitted with much
frankness the condition of the Jewish population of Russia, and that it
was an injustice. He expressed his purpose to exert his best influence
to remedy the just grievances of the oppressed Jews. We assured him that
we asked for no special privileges for our co-religionists, but the
same, and no greater, rights for them than were accorded other Russian
subjects; that the granting of such rights would relieve Russia of the
Jewish question and of the international ill-will to which this question
naturally and rightly gave rise. Both the Count and Baron Rosen agreed
with us, but argued that it was not practicable to grant such complete
emancipation, but that it should come about gradually. We told them, of
course, that with that premise we could not and would not agree.
The Count was very much impressed with our presentation of the subject,
and our statements were corroborated by his own observations later when
he made a visit to the lower East Side of New York where he spoke with a
number of the Russian-Jewish immigrants. He said that upon his return to
Russia he would at once take up the problem with a view ultimately to
secure equal rights for the Jewish subjects, that he realized the
necessity for this not only from a humanitarian standpoint, but from the
standpoint of Russia's best interests and of her relations with the
leading nations of the world, particularly with the United States.
Before going to Portsmouth on Count Witte's invitation, I conferred with
Roosevelt. He wanted me in an unofficial capacity to observe carefully
the progress of the negotiations and keep him advised. Just at that time
it looked as if the conference might break up, and before that stage was
actually reached he wanted to be notified, for he would probably have a
communication to make to the commissioners. On arriving at Portsmouth I
had a confidential talk with Fedor Fedorovich Martens, the great Russian
international jurist, who was one of my fellow members at the Hague
Tribunal, and with whom I had been in personal touch on several previous
occasions. He was legal adviser to the Russian delegation. I apprised
him of what I knew to be the desire of the President, and he agreed that
if a break became imminent, a communication such as the President would
send would be likely to have the right influence, and he would see to it
that, should the necessity arise for such a message, Roosevelt should be
promptly informed. I advised the President of my understanding with
Martens, but fortunately no rupture occurred and the terms of peace were
agreed upon.
In his "Autobiography" Roosevelt says, with regard to these Portsmouth
negotiations: "I had certainly tried my best to be the friend not only
of the Japanese people but of the Russian people, and I believe that
what I did was for the best interests of both and of the world at
large." He refers with characteristic generosity to the help given him
at St. Petersburg by our ambassador, George von Lengerke Meyer, who
"rendered literally invaluable aid by insisting upon himself seeing the
Czar at critical periods of the transaction, when it was no longer
possible for me to act successfully through the representatives of the
Czar, who were often at cross-purposes with one another."
And when the Portsmouth Conference was over, the President further took
a deep interest in bringing about amelioration of the condition of the
Jews in Russia. When Count Witte came to New York, Roosevelt wrote him
the following letter, of which he sent me a copy:
OYSTER BAY, N.Y.
_September 10, 1905_
MY DEAR MR. WITTE:
... In furtherance of our conversation of last evening I beg you to
consider the question of granting passports to reputable American
citizens of Jewish faith. I feel that if this could be done it
would remove the last cause of irritation between the two nations
whose historic friendship for one another I wish to do my best to
maintain. You could always refuse to give a passport to any
American citizen, Jew or Gentile, unless you were thoroughly
satisfied that no detriment would come to Russia in granting it.
But if your Government could only see its way clear to allowing
reputable American citizens of Jewish faith, as to whose intentions
they are satisfied, to come to Russia, just as you do reputable
American Christians, I feel it would be from every standpoint most
fortunate.
Again assuring you of my high regard, and renewing my
congratulations to you and to your country upon the peace that has
been obtained, believe me,
Sincerely yours
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Early in 1906, when the Algeciras Conference regarding Morocco was in
session, and the press reported that it was likely to break up without
an agreement on account of Germany's attitude, Carl Schurz, knowing of
my close relationship with Roosevelt, wrote to me that the President
could probably prevail upon the Powers concerned to refer the question
to the Hague Tribunal. This letter I forwarded to Roosevelt; but
although he was ever ready to vitalize the machinery of the Hague
Tribunal, advice coming from Mr. Schurz at this time was not regarded
with favor, possibly because of their previous differences. In his reply
to me, however, the President showed what a clear and prophetic insight
he had into Germany's attitude and purposes:
Modern Germany is alert, aggressive, military and industrial. It
thinks it is a match for England and France combined in war, and
would probably be less reluctant to fight both those powers
together than they would be together to fight it. It despises the
Hague Conference and the whole Hague idea. It respects the United
States only in so far as it believes that our navy is efficient and
that if sufficiently wronged or insulted we would fight. Now I like
and respect Germany, but I am not blind to the fact that Germany
does not reciprocate the feeling. I want us to do everything we can
to stay on good terms with Germany, but I would be a fool if I were
blind to the fact that Germany will not stay in with us if we
betray weakness. As for this particular case, when I see you next I
shall tell you all that I have done and you will see that I have
been using my very best efforts for peace.
In all my relations with Roosevelt, even before I became a member of his
Cabinet, I was more and more convinced that no consideration of
political self-interest or partisan advantage ever entered his mind in
determining his attitude or action in upholding the right or dethroning
a wrong. He resented nothing more than when some politician or
inconsiderate person made an appeal to him for action on the plea that
it would be good politics. He was visioned, but not visionary; and
withal highly practical, in that he understood the workings and
tendencies of human forces. Just as he would read a book by absorbing a
page at a glance, so he would instinctively appraise his fellow men;
their qualities would impress him just as a brilliant paragraph in a
book would arrest his instant attention.
Roosevelt would not make an idle gesture or even imply a threat which he
did not purpose to carry into action. He was more abused by those whom
he designated as "the interests," and better understood and trusted by
the masses, than any President in our history with the exception of
Lincoln. So it is always with real leaders, who seek to guide rather
than pander to public opinion. The latter course appeals to weak though
well-intentioned public men; the former requires not only clear vision
but high courage, and these qualities Roosevelt possessed to an
extraordinary degree.