Ti-pingdom in 1861.--Its Armies.--The Foreign Policy of
England.--Its Consequences.--Admiral Hope's
Expedition.--Comments thereon.--Its Results.--Lord Elgin's Three
Points.--Official Communications.--Secret Orders.--Evidence of
such.--Their Object.--Official Communications.--Mr. Parkes'
Despatch analyzed.--Newspaper Extracts.--Official Papers.--Mr.
Parkes' Measures.--His Arrogant Behaviour.--Result of the
Yang-tze Expedition.--Ngan-king Invested.--Modus Operandi.--The
Ying-wang's Plans.--His Interview with Mr. Parkes.--Sacrifices
his Interests.--Sketch of the Ying-Wang.--Hung-jin's
Adventures.--The Chung-wang's Operations.--The Results.--Siege
of Hang-chow.--Its Capture.--Manchoo Cruelties.--Position of the
Ti-pings in 1861.
Far brighter dawned the spring of 1861 upon the Ti-ping cause than did
the opening of the previous year. In nearly every direction the
revolutionists were victorious: the principal forces of the Manchoo
emperor were completely routed, and a considerable portion of the most
valuable territory in China had fallen into their hands, and was fast
becoming thoroughly consolidated as a part of their possessions. It
seemed as though at last their heroic struggles were about to receive
their well-merited reward. So great was the prestige of their late
triumphs that, wherever they marched, whole armies of Imperialists
vanished away without striking a blow, or, if unable to seek security in
precipitate flight, defended themselves with the wild unorganized
desperation of despair.
The extent of country entirely under the Ti-ping rule was very
considerable. Along the line of the great Yang-tze river, from N.E. to
S.W., their territory extended from its banks below Chin-kiang into the
central part of the province of Kiang-si, south of the Poyang lake, a
distance of more than 360 miles; while from the boundaries of their
possessions N.W. of the river to the opposite limits in the S.E., an
irregular breadth of 200 to 250 miles included the whole of their
settled dominions, forming an area upwards of 90,000 square miles, and
containing a population of some 45,000,000. Besides this, large portions
of the provinces of Hoo-peh, Hoo-nan, Fu-keen, Che-kiang, and the
distant Sze-chuan, were occupied by powerful Ti-ping armies. The lowest
approximate strength of their forces at this time might be estimated at
350,000; but a large proportion consisted of mere boys. This force was
divided into five principal armies, the remainder doing garrison duty at
Nankin, Soo-chow, and many other of the most important cities within
their jurisdiction. One of the five armies in the field was commanded by
the Ying-wang in the province of Hoo-peh: the Chung-wang commanded a
large force in the southern districts of Ngan-whui; the Shi-wang, with a
very powerful army, was operating in the central part of Kiang-si; and
the Kan-wang, having proceeded to the province of Hoo-nan, was joined by
upwards of 40,000 insurgents from the old seats of rebellion against the
Manchoo dynasty,--the provinces in the southern limit of the empire,
Kwang-tung, Kwang-se, and Kwei-chow; and, besides this force, far away
upon the western boundary of China, Shih-ta-kae (I-wang), the Ti-ping
emperor's brother, in command of a large army, was successfully
operating in Sze-chuan. In fact, north, south, east, and west, the star
of the patriots shone brightly in the ascendant, while that of the
Manchoos seemed setting in the gloom and darkness, through which,
upwards of two hundred years ago, it had struggled into existence. The
greatest empire in the world appeared at length about to be relieved
from that incubus which for two centuries had paralyzed its hopes and
energies; the enlightenment of China seemed approaching, step by step
with the advent of Christianity, which, following rapidly on the
expulsion of the Tartar, with its vast train of benefit and improvement,
promised, not alone to place that empire upon the pedestal of greatness
yet reserved for her, but to realize corresponding advantages for the
whole civilized world. One dark cloud alone appeared to cast a shadow
upon so bright an horizon--the policy of the British Government.
Language can scarcely express how seriously the interests of the
universe, and of England in particular, have been prejudiced by a
persistence in the suicidal measures dictated by a policy so mistaken.
Forcibly as the moral effect of the general foreign policy of England
has been denounced by statesmen, how few have been found to raise their
voices in the British senate in protestation against the practical evils
which that policy has engendered in the far East, a country abounding in
tea and silk, and now paralyzed by opium instead of being enriched by
the manufactures of Great Britain. The moral effect of bad
statesmanship, however much it may weaken England's just influence and
the future peace of Europe, cannot sensibly affect the _present_ wealth
and pursuits of the people. Trade, politics, civilization, and religion,
are pretty well balanced and regulated throughout Europe; therefore,
whatever evil might result from the foreign policy of the British
Government, no particular improvement could be expected to take place in
a state of affairs which we consider almost perfect. But very different
are the results of our peculiar kind of foreign policy in the case of
China. With that extensive empire present relations are unsatisfactory,
and the mutual benefits to be derived from a free intercourse are yet
hidden in the vale of futurity. Mutual benefit is hardly the correct
expression, for from a country which may be regarded as the richest in
the world in proportion to its extent and population, England would
derive far greater commercial advantages than she could possibly bestow.
Whenever a prospect of the most satisfactory relations offered, and
whenever a free intercourse was not only offered, but actually
established by any section or part of that innumerable people, it would
be only natural for England to rejoice, if not for the sake of the
Chinese, and the higher objects of humanity, at least for selfish
motives. But this is exactly what the British _Government_ has proved
incapable of appreciating, by preferring temporary interests to those
which were much greater and far more lasting.
The Ti-pings offered not only satisfactory relations and free
intercourse, but every advantage that England could possibly wish for or
be benefitted by. Christianity and civilization, as practised among
ourselves, would have become morally and physically certain under their
rule. The detestable opium trade would have been completely annihilated,
and British produce would have taken its place, to the benefit of the
Chinese, and the relief of the choked markets and distressed operatives
of England. The fulfilment of the Ti-ping law, that European "brethren"
should "go out or in, backwards or forwards, in full accordance with
their own will or wish," whether for pleasure or "to carry on their
commercial operations," _did_ throw open the whole of their territory to
free intercourse and trade, and would have done the same for the entire
Chinese empire. The exclusiveness and hatred of the Manchoo Government
to the "outer barbarians" and "foreign devils" _was_ by the Ti-pings
changed into friendship and kindness. Modern improvements would have
been extensively introduced. The trade, at present restricted to a few
treaty ports, would have become universal throughout the empire, and the
vast stores of mineral riches, almost unknown to foreigners, would have
yielded forth their mines of wealth, while a general and enormous
commerce, perfectly free and unfettered (excepting opium), would have
thrown open an empire richer in itself than all Europe. To England
especially, as the greatest commercial power, an inexhaustible source
of profit would certainly have been established, and would have
produced, without aggression or usurpation of territory, a revenue far
excelling any derived from India. All these and many other important
advantages _were_ partially established by the Ti-pings, and would
undoubtedly have been completed upon the final overthrow of the
Manchoos.
Strong as these inducements should have been to cause England to adopt a
different policy towards China, and much as such a course would have
tended to her own advantage, there was another and a higher
consideration which she should have permitted to influence her. As a
powerful and influential nation, a duty was cast upon her, if not to
extend the hand of friendship to a people who were nobly struggling to
follow her in the path of civilization and to learn the true religion,
at least not to thwart such efforts, and, by untimely interference,
render them hopelessly inoperative. Personal experience, the reports of
men of intelligence and honour, all prove but too plainly how the
friendly Ti-ping nation was crushed by British interference. It has been
urged that the friendly professions of that people were not genuine, and
that their undertaking would never have been performed. Had such a
course, so opposed to their nature, been pursued, surely it would have
been more grateful to the martial spirit of England to resort to arms
for the purpose of enforcing an observance of good faith and honour,
than for that of avenging the capture of a wretched opium smuggler.
Upon the 11th of February the expedition under command of Admiral Hope,
started for the Yang-tze-kiang with the object of opening that river to
foreign trade, in accordance with the treaty lately concluded at Pekin.
In all respects this expedition was of the greatest importance, as well
to the Chinese as the foreigners whom it most particularly interested.
Its results were entirely prejudicial to the Ti-pings. The diplomatic
and military authorities of the expedition mostly opposed the Ti-ping
movement for its interference with the "carrying into due effect the
terms of the treaty" just forced from the Manchoo at the cannon's mouth,
and the almost certain prospects of its success, which would not only
sadly affect the "China indemnity," but their own individual prospects
of office and aggrandizement expected through their intercourse with the
suddenly changed polite and obliging Manchoo mandarins. The deputation
of the mercantile community attached to the expedition was utterly
absorbed with its trading pursuits, and looked upon anything and
everything likely to interfere with its _immediate_ profits with no
little amount of hostility: the _future_ was completely ignored; its
expectations were an uninterrupted trade for _three_ years, and a return
to England with a large fortune; therefore it is hardly to be wondered
at that it looked with hatred upon the change progressing in the shape
of the Ti-ping revolution. Besides the personal and spontaneous
prejudice entertained by these two classes against the Ti-pings, it
seems pretty certain that directly after all the efforts of the Manchoo
Government to repel foreigners by _force_ had failed, intrigues to
deceive and induce them to act against the rebels they were unable to
subdue, were successfully adopted. Even Mr. Bruce (who had stated in his
despatches--"If there is one art of diplomacy understood by the Chinese
it is that of separating interests which ought to be identical") seems
to have been thoroughly imposed upon, while the false professions of the
Manchoos, in order to obtain the assistance of the British against the
Ti-pings, have had no small share in consummating that gross outrage.
Again discussing the policy of assisting the Imperialists (which the
latter had requested, making great protestations of "friendship,"
"mutual commercial interests," &c.), he says:--"It is evidently for the
interest of the Chinese authorities to induce us to embark in a course
of action which will embroil us with the insurgents."
Yet, eventually, Mr. Bruce chose to place implicit faith in their
professions, and took one occasion out of many, in that disgraceful
affair of the Anglo-Chinese fleet (depending upon the truth of the
truthless Prince Kung, whose hands yet reeked with the blood of our
murdered countrymen), to give his favourable opinion to the British
Government; and the British people, depending upon their
representatives, who depended upon the Government, who depended upon Mr.
Lay, who depended upon Wan-siang, president of the Manchoo Foreign
Office, who depended upon Prince Kung, who depended upon some one else,
actually permitted the very laws of the land to be set aside, by
allowing the ordinance of neutrality to be broken, and the Foreign
Enlistment Act to be declared null and void. Fortunately the disgraceful
affair terminated in the most ignominious manner, and the British
sailors were saved the degradation (that had been thrust upon the
soldiers) of becoming the mercenary braves of a corrupt and sanguinary
despotism.
Upon the opening of the Yang-tze to trade, and the selection of the
cities of Han-kow, Kiu-kiang, and Chin-kiang as the treaty ports, it
became necessary to enter into some agreement with the Ti-pings, who
commanded the river throughout its principal positions; in fact, by
their possession of Nankin, Wu-hoo, Tae-ping-foo, the cities of
Seaou-shan, Tung-shan, and several others, this trade was almost as
completely in their power as the valuable silk trade had been since May,
1860. In consequence of this, Admiral Hope (ignoring, with all the
arrogance of superior strength, the fact that the murderous repulse of
the Ti-pings from Shanghae had given them a perfect right to make it a
_casus belli_, and to retaliate upon British commerce, lives, or any
other possession) communicated with the Ti-ping authorities at Nankin,
and _pledged_ the neutrality of the British nation once more.
The Earl of Elgin's instructions to Admiral Hope contain the
following:[35]--
"It is obvious, however, that before British vessels can
navigate the river in safety, some understanding must be arrived
at with the rebels, who are believed to be in possession of
certain points upon it. It is with the view of obtaining your
assistance towards the accomplishment of this object that I now
address myself to your Excellency.
"Nothing, I am confident, would so surely tend to the
establishment of such an understanding on a satisfactory basis
as your Excellency's own presence and authority, if your other
engagements should permit of your proceeding up the river in
person. At any rate, I would venture to suggest that a naval
force, sufficiently large to inspire respect, should present
itself before Nankin, and that the rebel authorities should be
informed _that we do not appear as enemies, or with the
intention of taking part in the civil war now raging in China_,
but that we require from them some sufficient assurance that
British vessels proceeding up or down the river for trading
purposes shall not be interfered with, or subjected to
molestation by persons acting under their orders."
In his letter of instruction to Mr. Parkes, who accompanied the admiral
as diplomatic secretary or agent, Lord Elgin gave three points to be
observed:--
"THE EARL OF ELGIN TO MR. PARKES.
"Hong-kong,
"_January 19, 1861_.
"1. That attempts on the part of foreigners to introduce into
the disturbed districts munitions of war and recruits should be
vigorously repressed."
"2. That the dues of the Chinese Government on foreign trade,
both inwards and outwards, should be collected at Chin-kiang or
Shanghae."
"3. That we should maintain an attitude of _strict neutrality_
between the Imperial Government and the rebels."
HOW LORD ELGIN'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE INTERPRETED AND ACTED ON.
Notwithstanding existing pledges of neutrality, the Imperialists
were supplied with ships, stores, arms, and every munition of
war _they_ required, at Shanghae and all the _treaty ports_.
The revenues were secured to the Tartars, and the ports of
collection defended against the Ti-pings.
By assisting the Imperialists in every possible way; protecting
the treaty ports and constituting Imperialist bases of operation
against the Ti-pings at each of them; allowing trade with the
Imperialists and prohibiting any with the Ti-pings;--by
supplying the Imperialists with revenue, and protecting it
against the Ti-pings;--by defending Shanghae for the
Imperialists and shooting down the Ti-pings when they demanded
it in 1860 and 1862;--by supplying the Imperialists with arms to
the prejudice of the Ti-pings.
The following passage appears in the letter of instructions addressed
by the Earl of Elgin to Mr. Parkes, viz.:--
"It is not possible to anticipate with certainty the reply which
the rebel leaders may give to the communication which the
admiral is about to make to them, although there is, I think,
reason to hope that they will not receive it in an unfriendly
spirit; nor, if it were possible, would it be necessary that I
should attempt to do so on the present occasion, _as you are
already fully acquainted with the views that I entertain
respecting the policy which it is expedient to adopt towards
them_, and the objects which we ought to endeavour to accomplish
under the provisional arrangement for opening up the Yang-tze,
which has been entered into by Mr. Bruce and Prince Kung."
Reading these instructions together with the third of the three articles
above cited, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that a policy of
neutrality was intended to be acted upon: how far such intentions were
sincere may be gathered from the following "orders" addressed to
Commander Aplin.
"ORDERS ADDRESSED TO COMMANDER APLIN.
"Memo. _Coromandel_, Nanking, _March 28, 1861_.
"You are, in company with Mr. Muirhead, to wait on the chief
authorities of the Taepings, for the purpose of making the
following communication, leaving a copy with them, should they
wish you to do so, and noting their answers in the margin for my
information.
"(Signed) J. HOPE,
"Vice-Admiral, and Commander-in-Chief."
"Commander APLIN,
Her Majesty's ship _Centaur_, Nanking."
"COMMUNICATION MADE BY COMMANDER APLIN TO THE TAEPING
AUTHORITIES AT NANKING.
"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces of
her Majesty the Queen of England in China, to acquaint you that
it is his intention to have beacons put up on the river-side
between Woo-sung and Fu-shan....
"_That the Governments of England and France having ordered_
that any attempt of the Taeping army to enter Shanghae or
Woo-sung shall be repelled by force; and it being clear,
therefore, that the presence of the Taeping troops in that
vicinity can be productive of no good to them, and may lead to
collision, it is very desirable that they should not approach
within two days' march of these places, and the
Commander-in-Chief requests that orders may be sent to the
officers in command of their troops to this effect; copies to be
supplied to me. _Should this be done, he will exert his
influence to prevent any hostile expedition issuing from these
places for the purpose of attacking the Taeping troops._"
With regard to this document, in the first place, the statement that the
English Government had "ordered" Shanghae and Woo-sung to be defended
_vi et armis_, is simply untrue. The Foreign Secretary's first
"_orders_" with regard to the defence of Shanghae, or any other treaty
port, bear date, "Foreign Office, July 24th, 1861," and are given to Mr.
Bruce:--
"I have received from the Admiralty, together with other papers,
a copy of Vice-Admiral Hope's letter to you of the 8th of
May.... I have caused the Admiralty to be informed, in reply,
that I am of opinion that Vice-Admiral Hope's measures should be
approved; and I have _now_ to instruct you to endeavour to make
arrangements to secure the neutrality of all the treaty ports
against the rebels. The Government of Pekin will probably make
no difficulty in abstaining from using the treaty ports as bases
of operations against the rebels, provided the rebels on their
side refrain from attacking those ports.... _You will
understand, however, that her Majesty's Government do not wish
force to be used against the rebels in any case, except for the
actual protection of the lives and property of British
subjects._
"I am, _&c._,
"(Signed) J. RUSSELL."
If then orders had been issued to Admiral Hope or any one else, they
must have been _secret_ orders, for none are upon record to such effect
as stated in the communication to the Ti-ping authorities. Moreover, the
_condition_ upon which the neutrality of the treaty ports was proposed
in the Foreign Secretary's despatch was _not_ observed. The Pekin
Government was never asked to abstain from using Shanghae as a base of
operations against the Ti-pings; on the contrary, they were not only
assisted to make it one by the moral and indirect support of the British
authorities, but by the actual assistance of British soldiers and
sailors in the field, chiefly headed by Admiral Hope, who almost before
the ink of his guarantee was dry openly violated it. What renders this
flagrant disregard of all truth and honour still more to be deplored is
the fact that the Ti-pings, in their wonderfully earnest endeavours to
cultivate the friendship of Europeans, complied with every requisition
of _even_ Admiral Hope and his colleagues. They agreed not to attack
Shanghae for the space of _one year_, upon the special understanding
that the British upon their part would prevent the Imperialists from
using that city for any aggressive or belligerent purposes; and although
not even the shadow of an attempt was made by Admiral Hope, or any other
_British_ authority, to fulfil the pledges given upon the part of
England, with an almost incredible forbearance and good faith, the
Ti-pings to the very day, nay, nearly to the very hour, faithfully, but
entirely to their own prejudice, refrained from any attack upon
Shanghae. As for the orders with regard to _Woo-sung_, they can only be
attributed to the exuberant imagination of the diplomatic Admiral, such
place having never upon any occasion been referred to by the "orders"
from the Foreign Secretary.
It is difficult indeed to consider Admiral Hope's communication, either
in accordance with the _public_ instructions of Lord Elgin and Earl
Russell, or other than in direct opposition to them. Of course it would
be idle to suppose that either Mr. Bruce, the minister to Pekin, Admiral
Hope, Mr. Parkes, the diplomatic agent, or any of the consuls, would
have dared to systematically violate the orders of their Government; it
can therefore only be concluded that secret orders were given.
To those who cannot reconcile Admiral Hope's and Mr. Parkes's
communications with the Ti-pings, with the explicit instructions they
had each received, and can neither approve of their idea of "strict
neutrality," it must appear that the Admiral's communication at Nankin
was simply a very unsailor-like trap to catch the Ti-pings. The plot was
doubtless very creditable to the ingenuity and diplomatic finesse of
those who planned it; but those admirable politicians, though remarkably
indifferent moralists, cannot easily reconcile it with honour and
justice. Had the drama been enacted nearer to home, it would from its
very clumsiness have attracted attention; but as it occurred so far
away, scarcely a soul but those personally interested either knew or
cared anything about it.
The intention evidently was to induce the Ti-pings to promise not to
attack Shanghae, and then, by converting that city into a base and
nucleus for the Manchoos, to _compel_ them to do so for their
self-preservation. The theory was a bold one, and would have been
realized were it not for the extraordinary forbearance of the Ti-pings,
which forced Admiral Hope, and the others, to commence hostilities
themselves. The _conditions_ upon which the insurgents had agreed not to
attack Shanghae, the violation of the British pledges, and the _true_
position of affairs, of course, formed no part of the programme to be
made public; and it was correctly considered that China was too far
away, and the British people not sufficiently interested to scrutinize
matters very closely. Thus it is that a few unprincipled officials have
been able to attempt the justification of their conduct, upon the pleas,
that the Ti-pings _broke faith_ and attacked Shanghae, and that the
leaders of this great Christian and patriotic movement were a horde of
banditti who desolated everything, and meditated the destruction of
Shanghae, &c. &c. &c.
The reply of the Ti-ping authorities to Admiral Hope's "strict
neutrality" despatch, as translated by government interpreters, is
thus:--
"Mung, the Tsan-sze-keun (successor elect to the Prince Tsan),
of the heavenly Tai-ping kingdom, issues the following urgent
orders to the Ching Tsin-kwan, Ai-teene, and Moh-hun-te" names
of certain high officers, "for their information:--
"'Whereas officers, deputed by the Admiral of Great Britain,
have come to the palace of the Tsan-sze-keun, and stated that,
as Shanghae and Woo-sung are depôts of their commerce, _they_
have undertaken the protection of those two places, in order
that the safety of all classes of the people living there may be
secured; they therefore request that the forces of the Celestial
dynasty may not go to those two places, the same being
_unnecessary_, and not likely to be attended with any material
advantage. The Tsan-sze-keun accordingly issues these urgent
orders to his younger brethren, in order that they may direct
the troops composing the different divisions that, whenever they
arrive in the vicinity of the places named, they must not
approach nearer to them than 100 li, an arrangement which will
conduce to the advantage of both parties. They are also to
understand that the capture of those places is to form no part
of the plan of campaign for the PRESENT YEAR.'"
This decree sufficiently evinces the anxiety of the Ti-ping Government
to act in accordance with the wishes of that of England.
Commander Aplin thus reported the result of his mission to Admiral
Hope:--
"With reference to the communication made by me to the chief
Taeping authorities at Nankin.... I received a promise to-day
that the order should be given, as requested, respecting the
beacons; that, with regard to the 2nd paragraph of the
communication, an order would be sent to their officers in
command not to attack Shanghae or Woo-sung THIS YEAR"....
Mr. Parkes, in his report of the means by which the agreement of the
Ti-pings to Admiral Hope's communication was obtained, states:[36]--
"We replied that, of course, any insurgents having the folly to
attack Shanghae, after the Governments of France and England (?)
had determined to protect that port, would meet certain
destruction, but that the object of the Commander-in-Chief was
to prevent collision and unnecessary bloodshed. We had long been
doing all in our power to avoid this; (!!!) _we took no part in
the struggle_ between the Taepings and the Imperialists, with
whom we were also at peace, and should fall out only with those
who injured us ... and any Taeping movement upon Shanghae would
be considered as an attempt to injure us. (!!) Were they, on
their part, equally anxious to maintain a friendly understanding
with us, they would surely write the orders they had been
requested to furnish if this were the case, and a refusal to do
so would naturally lead us to mistrust their intentions." (!!!)
Mr. Parkes continues:--
"I endeavoured to make clear to them the objects of British
policy in China; (?) that our interests here were strictly
commercial, and that they must disabuse their minds of an
impression which I fancied they entertained, that we, like
themselves, sought the possession of territory, and therefore
that our interests were opposed to theirs. It was for the
protection of our commerce, and for that purpose only, that we
stationed a force at Shanghae."
Mr. Parkes had ample room to dilate on this subject, for it is difficult
to imagine in what light, save that of an usurpation of territory, the
Ti-pings could behold the seizure of Shanghae, Woo-sung, Ningpo, &c.
"Experience," continues Mr. Parkes, "had proved to us that we
could not trust to the Imperial Government to protect the place,
either against the Taeping forces, or the inferior bodies of
insurgents...; that experience had also shown that, owing to
their imperfect organization and discipline, plunder and
violence marked the progress of the Taepings; and consequently,
_to secure the safety of our people and their property, it was
necessary we should protect ourselves_. (!!) That this mode of
protection was perfectly efficient, but as it put us to expense
and inconvenience, we should be glad when it was rendered no
longer necessary by the restoration of the country to order,
whether this was effected by its becoming wholly Taeping, or by
reverting to Imperial rule, and when Shanghae or any other place
that the English Government might see fit to protect, would
revert to the hands of the governing power.... They (the
Taepings) wished to know, however, in which way the Admiral
would 'use his influence' to prevent their being attacked by the
Imperialists from Shanghae; and whether one of their officers
would be allowed to visit Shanghae to learn what arrangements
were made in this respect."
This very singular extract is much open to objection. 1. If "experience
had proved" that the Imperialists were unable to withstand the Ti-pings,
how is it that Mr. Parkes states, with regard to the defence of
Shanghae, &c., "we should be glad when it was no longer rendered
necessary by the restoration of the country to order," particularly when
the policy that was pursued naturally prolonged the struggle and delayed
that result? 2. The inaccuracy of the statement that, "to secure the
safety of our people and their property, it was necessary we should
protect them ourselves," is thoroughly proved by the capture of Ningpo
by the Ti-pings on the 9th December, 1861, when not the slightest
particle of British property was touched, and all foreigners were
treated as "_brothers_" by the Ti-pings; and, moreover, by the fact that
_not a single case is upon record_ in which the Ti-pings have ever
retaliated upon European life or property when they might have done so
with every justification. 3. Then, with regard to the "any other place
that the English Government might see fit to protect," when the whole of
the province, with the exception of Shanghae, _was_ in the possession of
the Ti-pings, and when the entire silk and a great proportion of the tea
trades were also in their undisturbed possession, why was not Shanghae
surrendered to the rising and triumphant power, as Ningpo had been;
particularly when we are told that "it was rendered no longer necessary,
by the restoration of the country to order," to pursue the policy of
defending the treaty ports, or any other place, "that the English
Government might see fit to protect"?
Mr. Parkes continues his report thus:--
"I then said that our discussion had chiefly related to
Shanghae, and to the warning given them by the Admiral not to
approach that port; but I was anxious to learn how far the
friendly dispositions they professed" (more than the
Imperialists ever did) "would induce them to abstain from
obstructing our commerce, and whether they were disposed to
agree to propositions of the following nature:--
"1. No Taeping force to advance within 100 li of any Chinese
port or place open by treaty to British trade, _provided_ that
the Tartar government do not send out expeditions from those
parts or places to attack the Taepings." (It was upon this
condition the Ti-pings promised not to attack Shanghae during
the "present year," 1861.)
"2. The Taeping authorities or forces not to obstruct the
transit of native produce to the aforesaid ports or places, nor
to prevent British merchandise passing from thence into the
interior." (This clause always was, and has been, faithfully and
regularly observed; and such being the case, upon what grounds
but the extraction of the "indemnity" from the Imperial customs
at Shanghae, can the plea of injury to trade upon the capture of
that city by the Ti-pings rest, seeing that elsewhere they never
injured, but did their utmost, even amidst the sanguinary and
fierce prosecution of civil war, to foster and preserve it?)
"At the close of the interview I had to go into some further
explanations as to the rights and duties of neutrality, in
consequence of their having asked whether the English vessels of
war at Nankin would carry supplies from them to the besieged
garrison at Ngan-king, which I, of course, told them could not
be done."
This savours rather highly of hypocrisy when it emanates from one of
those fully acquainted with what was to be. "Of course," their
destruction being predetermined, the Ti-pings "could not be" assisted;
can Mr. Parkes and his superiors explain the conduct described in the
following extract by the same "rights and duties of neutrality"?
"TO THE EDITOR OF THE _Shanghae Times_.
"Sir,--Do the authorities think that the terms of the treaty
were that foreign vessels should be allowed to transport troops
and ammunition for the suppression of this revolutionary
movement in China?
"That foreign vessels should be the chief instruments in the
hands of this imbecile government to do their _dirty work_,
although garnished with _gold_. Can it be possible that H. B.
M.'s Government will allow its ships to take passengers from
here--_ostensibly as coolies, but really as soldiers_--a fact to
which the whole foreign and native community here are alive? Can
it be possible that, after so much experience and the sacrifice
of so many of our countrymen, we are going to throw ourselves
needlessly into the boiling caldron?
"Let us look before we leap. Vessels are loading here with
soldiers for Shanghae" (Imperialist soldiers). "The fact is
known at Hong-kong, and it will create much difficulty. Let the
history of the three past wars with China teach us not to create
another.
"Yours, &c.,
"A FRIEND TO CHINA.
"Hankow, _January 11, 1862_."
For some months this disgraceful work proceeded, till at last the
following official sanction appeared:--
"CONSUL MEDHURST TO MR. BRUCE.[37]
"Shanghae, _March 21, 1862_.
"Sir,--The Taoutae" (Manchoo governor of the walled Chinese city
of Shanghae) "having been anxious for some time past to get a
reinforcement from the army under General Tseng-kwo-fan"
(Manchoo general commanding Imperialist troops up the river
Yang-tze) "for the relief of this garrison and that of
Sung-kiang-foo, and having repeatedly questioned me as to the
possibility of allowing a few British vessels to be chartered
for the purpose of bringing the troops down....
"The Taoutae accordingly entered into negotiations with a house
here for the employment of a certain number of steamers for the
conveyance hither of 9,000 men.... I at once addressed Sir J.
Hope a letter, ... and from his answer ... you will observe that
he entirely approves of the measure.
"I have, &c.,
(Signed) "W. H. MEDHURST."
This arrangement, in accordance, we are bound to believe, with the
"duties of neutrality," was executed by the house of Mackenzie,
Richardson, & Co., of Shanghae, _in consideration of the sum of 180,000
taels (£60,000)_ paid by the Manchoo Government.
While the British steamers have passed the walls of Nankin, crowded with
Imperialist troops, hastening to the destruction of the Ti-pings in the
neighbourhood of Shanghae, I have sat on the silent batteries and
sympathized with the too credulous people who, faithful to _their_
promises of neutrality, foolishly allowed the Tartar troops to pass
scathless right under the muzzles of their guns, simply because they
were safely sheltered by the British ensign flying over them. The _ruse_
of shipping the soldiers as coolies, and so smuggling them past the
Ti-ping positions, was abandoned upon the _legalization_ of the trade by
the same admiral and authorities who, but a few months previously, had
explained the "duties of neutrality" to the Ti-pings, and had given them
to understand it was impossible _their_ stores could be conveyed to
Ngan-king, as any such act would constitute a breach of neutrality!
After the _legalization_, the Imperialist _braves_ were carried down to
Shanghae by thousands, and many a time I have longed to put a shot
through the hulls of their conveyances; but the Ti-pings would not allow
me, because, as they said, it might hurt the "foreign brethren"!
Meanwhile, directly the cowardly rabble had passed out of range of the
batteries, their yells of bravado could be plainly heard, and British
oak and British seamen became hidden and disgraced by a cloud of Manchoo
flags waved in defiance, whenever it could be done in safety.
As Mr. Parkes and his co-adjutors did not obtain an instant compliance
with their grossly unjust demands upon the Ti-pings, viz., not to attack
Shanghae, a city belonging to them by every known right as natives of
the soil, if they were able to capture it from the Manchoos; not to levy
duty upon the British vessels passing through their territory, and to
avoid all the principal ports, the great sources of revenue to their
enemies, simply because their capture of such places _might_ interfere
with the British trade--they took more active measures, _viz._:--
"To effect this, we proceeded early on the following morning to
the palace of the Tien-wang ... and on arriving there at 10 A.M.
handed the following note to an officer, with the request that
it might be sent to the Tien-wang:--
"The undermentioned British officers, namely, Captain Aplin,
senior naval officer in the Yang-tze river, and Mr. Parkes,
having been engaged during the last five days in fruitless
endeavours to arrange certain important business with the
Taeping authorities, and being greatly inconvenienced by the
delay thus occasioned, respectfully request admission to the
Tien-wang, or that the Tien-wang will appoint an officer to meet
them with full authority to settle their business without
further trouble.'"
Let Englishmen apply this arrogant document to themselves. The Tien-wang
was crowned sovereign over a vast territory; his large armies were in
victorious possession; and he, being invested with all the mystery and
divine attributes common to eastern monarchs, became a much more
unapproachable object than western rulers, even to his own people. What
would Englishmen do if some foreign official, dissatisfied with waiting
"five days" in negotiation with their proper authorities "to arrange
certain important business," were to force themselves into Her Majesty's
palace, and "request" her to personally treat with them, or "appoint an
officer to meet them," and so infringe official etiquette?
Not satisfied with issuing this presumptuous summons, Mr. Parkes
proceeds:--
"After having repeatedly inquired whether the Tien-wang had
taken any notice of our application, and been as often told that
it had been sent in to him, we at last ascertained that instead
of this having been done, our note had been forwarded to the
Tsan-sze-keun" (one of the Ti-ping secretaries of state, and the
proper authority to receive any communication). "We now told the
officer who had deceived us to bring back our note, and while
waiting for it the Tsan-sze-keun and Le Teen-tseang, a chief who
had taken a prominent part at all the interviews, sent to tell
us that the orders we wanted should be ready to-morrow. _We took
no notice of this message_, and they sent a second time to say
that they wished to see us at the Tsan-sze-keun's residence. To
this we replied that having found it necessary to make an
application to the Tien-wang himself, we could not now return to
them, _and that if they_" (the persons appointed by the Ti-ping
Government to transact such business) "_wished to speak with us
they should come to the palace_."
If Mr. Parkes had met with the fate of Mr. Richardson and others in
Japan, or experienced indignities similar to those suffered by Mr. Edan,
political agent at the Bhootanese court, during his superlatively
arrogant dictation to the Ti-ping chiefs, can it be denied that it
would have been his own fault?
In his explanation of thrusting himself into the Tien-wang's palace, and
outraging all the Ti-ping rules and ceremonies, Mr. Parkes has evidently
forgotten himself, and represented his own conduct as that of the
Ti-pings. He says:--
"It was clearly necessary to take a stand of this kind when we
saw that the ignorance and pride of these people induced them to
assume the same absurd and insufferable pretensions in their
treatment of foreigners that characterized the Mandarins in days
that are past."
This little conceit of the diplomatic agent is really amusing, by reason
of its being perfectly unique. I cannot remember another instance in
which the Ti-ping has been compared with the Manchoo in behaviour to
foreigners or anything else. When people set themselves to work
deliberately to injure others, it generally happens that they strive to
vilify them in order to justify themselves. To this motive, I suppose,
we must ascribe the "clearly necessary stand" of Mr. Parkes.
The result of the Yang-tze expedition, in so far as the Ti-pings were
concerned, amounted to a treaty of neutrality between them and England;
a promise on their part not to attack Shanghae, and to remain 100 li
(about 30 miles) away from it during the "_present year_" (1861), upon
_condition_ that the British authorities prevented the Imperialists from
attacking them from that place, or using it for belligerent purposes;
and a pledge from Admiral Hope, that if the Ti-ping forces were to
attack the other treaty ports, all British subjects being "unmolested
both in their persons and property, the commanders of the vessels of war
stationed there will receive directions in _no way whatever to interfere
in the hostilities which may be going on_, except for the purpose of
protecting their countrymen, should it be necessary to do so." It also
resulted in their being compelled to break their engagements, and thus
expose themselves to British hostility and encourage the violation of
solemn pledges of neutrality. Grave as are the accusations which may be
brought forward against a number of British officials, it must be
admitted that their conduct fully justified the most severe
animadversions.
In the meanwhile, during the negotiations at Nankin, the Ti-ping forces
mentioned in the first pages of this chapter were severally engaged
prosecuting, upon the whole, a very successful series of operations.
The city of Ngan-king (capital of Ngan-whui province) having become
closely invested by an Imperialist army of some 20,000 men, and a
flotilla of several hundred gun-boats, the Ying-wang was charged with
the relief of that city during his march up the course of the Yang-tze
to his destined operations in the province of Hupeh.
Although Ngan-king had been threatened by Imperialist forces during some
eighteen months, until the spring of 1861 it had never been seriously
menaced, the Manchoo _braves_ having contented themselves with the
ordinary phase of Chinese warfare--watching, flag-waving, and yelling at
a safe distance from any probable vicious attempt of the dangerous
Chang-maous.[38] Ngan-king, however, was a place of great strength for
Chinese warfare; it formed the _point d'appui_ of all Ti-ping movements
either to the northern or north-western provinces, and previous to any
attack upon their capital, Nankin, or its fortified outposts, its
reduction was an absolute necessity. The city being built right on the
brink of the great river, was absolute mistress of that important
highway, without which, and its invaluable water communication, any
extensive movement of the Manchoo armies in an easterly direction became
impracticable. At last, therefore, the Manchoo warriors girded up their
loins, that is to say, tucked up the bottoms of their petticoat
inexpressibles, fiercely wound their tails around their cleanly-shaven
caputs, made a terrible display of huge flags, roaring gongs, horridly
painted bamboo shields, and a most extravagant waste of gunpowder, and
moving forward with terrific cloud-rending yells, established themselves
safely out of cannon-range of the walls, and proceeded to complete the
investment of the doomed city by building themselves in with a
formidable series of earth-works and stockades, from which they could
neither climb out nor enemies climb in. As a rule, the Chinese never
fight unless they are obliged to. Not that they are so cowardly as some
Europeans have mistakenly seemed to believe, but rather from those
singularly refined traits of reasoning which, with these peculiar
people, border closely upon the absurd. For instance, having myself
often spoken with Chinamen regarding their ineffective and almost
childish, but for the merciless treatment of the vanquished, military
tactics, I have always been answered to the following effect:--
"Hi-ya, how can? Two piecee man no can stop one place aller same time,
spose nother piecee man _must_ wantchee come, mi must wantchee go; spose
mi _must_ wantchee stop, nother piecee man no can come."
Singularly enough this principle is generally applied. If a determined
resistance is _certain_, those who should attack content themselves by
safely fortifying themselves at a distance, as in the case at Ngan-king;
but should the determination of the defensive party be doubtful, then an
attack, with no little impetuosity and daring, will almost surely take
place.
Now, the Ti-pings have never been known as remarkable for the logic,
cowardice, or whatever it may be termed, generally peculiar to the race
of Chinese: upon the contrary, their reputation has ever been that of
fighting men. In consequence of this certain prospect of hard knocks in
the event of their being irrational enough to try and climb over the
walls of Ngan-king when the Ti-pings were determined to try and prevent
them, the Imperialists very wisely made themselves masters of the
situation by establishing a complete cordon of stockades around the
city, extending from the river above to a point just below its walls,
calculating, with a perfect philosophy, that when the rice within the
city became finished, those without might make a good breakfast, then
scale the walls free from any "hard knocks," and, better than all,
gather the heads of the helpless and famished garrison, _ad libitum_;
thus capturing the city, obtaining the emoluments of a long and easy
campaign, and winding up with the head-money, all without the danger of
fighting.
Meantime, although the city was fast becoming straitened for provisions,
the Ying-wang confined his efforts for its relief to distant operations,
probably considering its garrison amply sufficient not only to maintain
the place, but to prevent any complete blockade by sallying forth upon
the Manchoos, as their strength, although less than half that of the
besiegers, was considered such as would not be likely to diminish their
possible chance of victory. In this case, however, too much was expected
from a mostly newly-levied force, exposed to the attack of Honan
_braves_ and Tartar troops, the best forces in the service of the
Manchoo emperor.
The Ying-wang, his plans, and the success attending his hitherto
operations, became known to the Yang-tze expedition, under Admiral Hope,
in March. Upon the 22nd of that month Mr. Parkes visited the Ying-wang
at the city of Hwang-chow, situated upon the northern bank of the river,
50 miles from the treaty port Han-kow. In his report of the interview he
states:--
"At the gate by which we entered I observed a proclamation in
the name of the Ying-wang, assuring the people of protection,
and inviting them to come and trade freely with the troops.
Another proclamation, addressed to the latter, prohibited them
from that date from wandering into the villages and plundering
the people. A third notice, _appended to the heads of two
rebels_, made known that these men had been executed _for
robbing_ the people of their clothes while engaged in collecting
grain for the troops."
This statement, to those who know anything about the Ti-pings, appears
perfectly true; how does Mr. Parkes reconcile it with his report that
"plunder and violence marked the progress of the Ti-pings"?
"He informed me that he was the leader known as the Ying-wang
(or Heroic Prince); that he was charged from Nankin to relieve
Ngan-king, and had undertaken a westward movement with the view
of gaining the rear of the Imperial force, and besieging that
city on the western side. So far he had been completely
successful.
"Leaving Tung-ching, a city forty miles to the north of Nankin,
on the 6th instant, he marched in a north-westerly direction
upon the city of Hoh-shan, thus avoiding all the Imperialist
posts in the districts of Yung-chung, &c. On the 10th he took
Hoh-shan, where there was no considerable force to oppose him;
and then turning to the south-west, reached Yung-shan on the
14th, which fell in the same way. Hastily securing the munitions
of these two places, of which he stood in need, he pressed on to
Kwang-chow, and succeeded in surprising a camp of the Amoor
Tartars, killing, as the Ying-wang said, all the men, and
capturing all the horses. This, and a small affair at Paho,
placed him in possession of Kwang-chow, which he entered without
opposition on the 17th instant. He had thus taken three cities,
and had accomplished a march of 600 li (say 200 miles) in eleven
days, and was now in a position either to attack in rear the
Imperial force which he had just turned, and draw them off from
Ngan-king, or, postponing that operation, to occupy Han-kow,
from which he was distant only fifty miles. He added, however,
that he felt some hesitation in marching upon the latter place,
as he had heard that the English had already established
themselves at that port.
"I commended his caution in this respect, and advised him not to
think of moving upon Han-kow, as it was impossible for the
insurgents to occupy any emporium at which we were established,
without seriously interfering with our commerce, _and it was
necessary that their movements should be so ordered as not to
clash with ours_."
Now this exaggerated "caution" and absurd regard for "_our_ commerce"
made the Ying-wang sacrifice his _own_ interests.
His expedition was planned for the express purpose of capturing Han-kow
(preparatory to that of Wu-chang, the capital of the Hupeh province,
situated directly opposite, on the other side of the Yang-tze); the
relief of Ngan-king was to be effected _en route_, either by the direct
attack of his army or by the effect of its success elsewhere. At the
time of his interview with Mr. Parkes, either operation was simply a
matter of choice, for Han-kow was almost undefended and offered an easy
capture; while having completely outmanoeuvred the besiegers of
Ngan-king, he might have fallen upon their rear, and, with a sortie of
the garrison, probably exterminated them. Of course, to effect either
plan a continuation of his hitherto prompt and decisive action was
imperative; this, however, became arrested by the unfortunate and
prejudicial presence of the English, who, in the midst of his successes,
established themselves at the city the capture of which formed the
terminal point of his campaign. Of course, Mr. Parkes does not report
the threats of hostility thrust upon the Ying-wang to deter him from
advancing upon, and occupying the Eldorado on which foreigners of every
degree were greedily intent, trusting to the terms of the Elgin treaty
with the Manchoo Government for the fulfilment of their golden visions.
But it were idle, indeed, to suppose so energetic a commander as the
Ying-wang would allow all the fruits of his past operations and the
favourable prospects of a rapid prosecution of his movement, to be lost
either by "hesitation in marching upon Han-kow," or by the _advice_ of
Mr. Parkes. The Ying-wang undoubtedly received a threat of "strict
neutrality" in event of his appearing at Han-kow--that sort of
"neutrality" with which Mr. Parkes was "fully acquainted," and which has
invariably been assumed towards the Ti-pings, but which some might
interpret by the words, "gratuitous hostility."
The Ti-ping cause suffered from British contact in this, as in every
other instance, as the Ying-wang delayed his march upon Han-kow, and
sent to Nankin for orders. His army, although mustering nearly 50,000
men, did not possess a fighting strength of more than half that number,
the rest being simply the coolies in usual attendance upon all Chinese
armies; therefore delay in the enemy's country simply meant defeat. The
critical and favourable moment to strike a successful blow was lost,
and while the great cause of Christianity and freedom was once more
paralyzed by the incubus of British interests, the opponents to both
received such ample time to concentrate their out-generalled forces,
that when, after a delay of several months, the Ying-wang received
orders to advance upon Han-kow, and open communication with the British
authorities, he encountered their vastly superior army close to the city
of Ma-ching, and after a most desperately contested battle, was defeated
with heavy loss, and then gradually driven beyond the city of Ngan-king
without having been able to succour that position, or obtain the
slightest advantage from his previous brilliant exploits.
The Ying-wang, although only twenty-four years of age, had already, by
his extraordinary courage, obtained one of the highest positions among
the Ti-pings, ranking at this time as a generalissimo of the army, and a
noble of the first degree, with the honourable title of Ying-wang
(Heroic Prince). By the Imperialists he had received the cognomen of
"Sze-ngan-kow" (Four-eyed dog), in consequence of his remarkably rapid
and successful strategy; and next to the Chung-wang his presence
inspired more fear in Manchoo bosoms than the vicinity and operations of
any other Ti-ping leader. Singularly romantic were the antecedents of
this young and gallant chieftain. A youthful Cantonese student, while
immersed in studying the wise proverbs of the Chinese classics, he
chanced to meet a fellow-scholar related to some of the Hung family, who
had originated and still formed so important a part of the Ti-ping
rebellion. Shortly afterwards, having been unfairly treated in his
examination by the corrupt government officials, he turned towards the
new doctrines of the Ti-pings, and, with the assistance of his friend,
paid a visit to Hung-jin, the future Kan-wang, who at this time, 1857,
was fulfilling the duties of Christian teacher and catechist to the
London Missionary Society at Hong-kong. Of an impulsive and enthusiastic
disposition, he soon became a convert to Christianity, which Hung-jin
preached with an eloquence that obtained the future Prime Minister of
Ti-ping-wang the confidence and entire approval of all missionaries and
Christians for many years, though, singularly enough, when the time of
Hung-jin's elevation to the second place among the Ti-pings
arrived--that is to say, the moment when by his power and influence it
might naturally have been _known_ that his exertions to Christianize
China would have become immense, and would have been accompanied by
proportionately gigantic results--his English pretended friends for the
most part abandoned him.
The Ying-wang added one more to the large number of proselytes obtained
by the earnestness and devotion of the warm-hearted and noble-minded
Hung-jin. He had been for some months under the tuition of the latter,
and had become greatly attached to him, when, deeply impressed by the
information of the imprisonment of Hung-jin's mother, wife, and several
other relatives, by the Canton mandarins, because of their connection,
though very distant, with the principal members of the Ti-ping
rebellion, and that they were only saved from execution by the efforts
of some missionaries, he formed the determination to rescue them from
imprisonment and ill-treatment.
Proceeding with his fellow-student to the city of Canton, they managed,
through bribing some of the prison warders, to obtain a moment's
admission to the aged mother of Hung-jin. To their surprise they found
with her, besides other relatives, a granddaughter of surpassing beauty,
who was the orphan of Hung-jin's brother--a brother who, with nearly the
whole of his family, perished during the ruthless massacres of the
innocent kindred of the Ti-ping rebels. Although their first meeting
lasted but a few minutes, it seems the future Ying-wang and the
beautiful captive maid became mutually attached. In their case, however,
the romance admits of explanation. I have myself seen both the Ying-wang
and the lady, and I consider that of each sex they were by far the most
handsome I ever beheld in China. I can, therefore, easily believe that
when in the wretchedness of her captivity, the young and noble-looking
student appeared before her surrounded by all the extra attractions of
his position as her deliverer, the lonely and miserable girl turned
towards him with her whole heart. Not less natural seems the passion of
the student, whose newly-aroused religious enthusiasm predisposed him to
entertain the warmest feelings towards those he came to rescue and whose
cause he had already espoused. During the short moments of his first
interview, he told the prisoners to be prepared for an attempt to escape
upon a certain night. The appointed time arrived, but no rescue, for the
would-be deliverer, betrayed by one of the gaolers whom he had bribed
and trusted, was seized while making his way into the prison by means of
false keys, and thrust, helpless as themselves, among those anxiously
awaiting his assistance. Brought before the cruel Manchoo mandarins, he
was sentenced to the barbarous death by "cutting into a thousand
pieces," while Hung-jin's mother, wife, niece, and several other
relatives, were condemned to torture and decapitation.
Time flew onwards, and at length the evening before the fatal day
arrived. What dread and overpowering feelings those poor doomed
creatures felt upon that last day of life, while anticipating the horrid
tortures coming with the morrow's sun, I do not know; but what I can
tell is, that suddenly, about midnight, the doors of their prison were
burst asunder, and the whole of the captives liberated by an
insurrection of famine-maddened Chinamen.
These tumults, created for want of rice, are of very frequent occurrence
in China, and are often attended with great loss of life; in nearly all
such cases the rioters break open the prisons and augment their strength
with the released captives. To such an event were the Ti-pings indebted
for their brave Ying-wang, for many a future victory, and for the
Manchoos' oft-repeated defeat.
Making his way down to the European settlement, Hung-jin's pupil, with
his teacher's mother, wife, and niece, and several male relatives of the
Hung family, found safety under the kind protection of some European
missionaries. In the morning they all embarked and took passage to
Hong-kong on board an American river steamer plying between the two
places, and within four or five hours anchored in safety under the folds
of the flag of freedom.
Hung-jin's happiness in the release and society of his wife and mother
may easily be imagined; but soon rumours of other Manchoo persecution
reached him, and, dreading the sudden death of his dearest relatives, if
captured, he determined to make his way to Nankin, and then return for
them, if such a plan proved practicable. His travel through the country
and ultimate arrival at Nankin has been noticed in another chapter;
suffice it, therefore, to say, he was accompanied by him who afterwards
became the Ying-wang, himself disguised as an itinerant surgeon, and the
latter as his attendant. Upon their arrival at Nankin, Hung-jin was
detained and created Kan-wang by his relative the Ti-ping-wang, while
his companion, receiving a commission in the Ti-ping army, was given
letters to a number of Ti-ping partisans in the provinces of Kwang-tung,
Fo-keen, and Kiang-si, and also received instructions to bring the
Kan-wang's relatives from Hong-kong, and having delivered his
despatches, to return to Nankin in company with those who would join his
party (several Ti-ping officers accompanying him) by the way. Reaching
Hong-kong safely, disguised as wandering mendicants, the whole of the
refugees succeeded in arriving at the first rendezvous in small parties
of two or three, under his guidance. At this place several hundred men
mustered in arms, and recruited at other parts of their route. After
many encounters with the Manchoo troops and many perilous adventures,
the Ying-wang having principally contributed to the successful efforts
of his comrades by his distinguished gallantry, re-entered Nankin with
the Kan-wang's family. Soon after the successful issue of his mission,
the Ying-wang was promoted, and received the beautiful niece of his
patron and friend in marriage.
The Ying-wang having studied for a military life and possessing
undaunted bravery, soon rose in the Ti-ping army, and during the famous
victories obtained over the besiegers of Nankin in May, 1860, while in
command of a small division, defeated the Tartar body-guard of
Chang-kwoh-liang, second in command of the Imperialist army, and killed
that general, falling himself desperately wounded in the moment of
victory. Upon his recovery he received the title and position of
Ying-wang.
While in the west, successes that would undoubtedly have led to the
capture of Han-kow and other important positions were rendered nugatory
through the presence of the English; in fact wherever the Ti-pings
carried on their operations apart from that baneful influence, good
fortune crowned their efforts.
The Shi-wang in Kiang-si, the I-wang in Sze-chuan, the Kan-wang in
Hoo-nan, and the Chung-wang in Che-kiang, were successful in each
province.
Although the movements of the three former Wangs were very extensive,
and although the Shi-wang had captured the capital and many other large
cities in Kiang-si, and in June had occupied the city of Wu-chang-hien
(situated a few miles below the Ying-wang's position at Hwang-chow, but
on the opposite side of the river, and from which two points the armies
of the Shi and Ying Wangs would have co-operated in the reduction of
Han-kow, but for the stoppage of their movements caused by the presence
of British authorities and merchants at that city, and the menaces they
had been treated to by the politicians of the Yang-tze expedition), all
these operations paled before those of the Chung-wang in Che-kiang.
Pressing rapidly forward with a small army of observation, the
Commander-in-Chief made a false attack upon the important city of
Hang-chow, the provincial capital, strongly garrisoned by Tartar troops
of the Eight Banners, and after satisfying himself as to the strength of
the enemy, by a rapid and brilliantly executed series of manoeuvres,
succeeded in capturing the important cities of Chapoo, Hayen, Kashen,
Hoo-chow, Hi-ning, &c., and, in fact, obtaining complete possession of
all that most valuable territory extending from the south of the Ta-hoo
lake to the walls of Hang-chow, and from the banks of the river Yang-tze
to the sea at Shanghae, with the exception of that small portion
adjacent to the latter city that was guaranteed by the agreement with
Admiral Hope to remain a neutral ground during the "present year."
In consequence of the tactics pursued by the Commander-in-Chief as the
result of his short campaign of observation, the main body of the two
armies respectively commanded by the Shi and Kan Wangs were recalled
from their distant successes and concentrated at the important cities of
Hwuy-chow (capital and centre of the green tea districts in Ngan-whui,
upon the south of the Yang-tze, at the time completely under the
jurisdiction of the Ti-pings) and Soo-chow, with a large force already
under the personal command of the Chung-wang himself. These two columns
were marched, the one from Soo-chow in a south-westerly, and that from
Hwuy-chow in an easterly direction, co-operating with each other upon
the city of Hang-chow.
The Manchoo force concentrated at Hang-chow for its defence, and for the
general defence of the Che-kiang province, numbered 125,000 men, of whom
35,000 were Tartars of the Eight Banners, the whole commanded by the
Imperial commissioner and Tartar general, Luy-chang, assisted by the
noted Chinese commander Chang Yuh-leang.
At the commencement of the Chung-wang's campaign, a movement took place
which was attended by a success that put in action the hostile
operations of the British Government, and thus brought disaster to the
Ti-pings, whose available forces amounted to about 295,000 men, as
opposed to 420,000 Manchoo Imperialists. Although to a casual and
uninformed observer these figures may appear greatly advantageous to the
Imperial cause, such was very far from being the case. With the
exception of their Tartar troops and certain portions of the Chinese
regulars, the Manchoo Government could not depend upon its defenders.
Those who might fairly be trusted did not exceed two-thirds of the total
number; the rest, comprising the militia (_braves_), were comparatively
useless in the field, and many of the veteran Ti-pings confidently
advanced against a greater odds than ten to one.
The two divisions of the Chung-wang's army uniting under the walls of
Hang-chow, commenced the siege of that city with much vigour. The Tartar
garrison being of great strength, and aided by an army in the field, for
nearly a month the progress of the besiegers was not very material.
Numerous actions occurred, and a severe struggle was maintained, without
any decided success upon either side. At last, unable to carry the city
by direct attack, after severely repulsing a sortie of the garrison,
combined with an attack of the army of co-operation, the Chung-wang
determined to reduce the city by cutting off its communications, and
with this intent organized operations that, judging by their results,
proved of the very gravest importance to Manchoo, foreigner, and Ti-ping
alike.
Establishing the main body of his army in lines of circumvallation
around Hang-chow, a strong division of nearly 50,000 men was detached
under the command of the generals Hwang and Fang, with orders to capture
all the important cities to the south-east of Hang-chow, and terminate
the expedition with the full possession of the seaport Ningpo, one of
the treaty ports open to foreign trade.
Dividing into two columns, respectively commanded by the above-mentioned
generals, the division pushed rapidly forward, acting under the direct
orders of the Shi-wang, who superintended the movement against the
enemy's communications, while the Chung-wang himself conducted the siege
operations. The columns of Hwang and his colleague Fang, during the
month of November, successively captured all the cities to the south and
south-east of Hang-chow, while other expeditionary columns detached by
the Shi-wang obtained possession of all situate between the possessions
of the Ti-pings in the north and north-east, round to the westward, and
to the positions occupied by the two subordinate generals; thus
completely cutting off every communication of the besieged city. After
reducing the departmental and district cities, Shaou-shing, Fung-wha,
Yü-yaou, Yen-chow, Tsze-ke, and many others, and after receiving a
deputation from the European residents of Ningpo, who left them highly
satisfied, the leaders of the two columns effected a junction of their
forces, and, moving upon Ningpo, carried that city by a sudden assault
on the 9th of December, 1861. Meanwhile, other divisions, detached from
the Chung-wang's army, captured and garrisoned all the southern,
western, and eastern departments of the province, so that when, upon the
29th of December, the garrison of Hang-chow succumbed to famine and the
determined assault given by the besiegers on that day, the whole of
Che-kiang became subject to the Ti-ping Government.
In consequence of these successful operations, the end of the year found
the Ti-pings in almost entire possession of the two richest and most
densely populated provinces of China, Che-kiang and Kiang-su, while the
small portion of Kiang-su yet held by Manchoo authorities was comprised
within a radius of thirty miles around Shanghae. Faithfully observing
_their_ part of the agreement made with Admiral Hope and his coadjutors,
the Ti-pings refrained from any advance upon Shanghae, even although
the non-fulfilment by the British authorities of the _conditions_ upon
which the said agreement was made fairly released them from its
obligations; but directly the "present year" had expired, every other
position in the province being already in their hands, troops were moved
forward to drive the Manchoos from this their last stronghold in the
province.
As has been already observed, the position of the Ti-pings was one which
but for the interference of the British Government must undoubtedly have
caused the overthrow of the Manchoo Tartar dynasty. They possessed the
valuable silk districts, the tea districts of Ngan-whui and Che-kiang,
the cotton districts of Kiang-su, and the potteries and porcelain
manufacturing districts of Kiang-si, which together constitute the
principal sources of revenue in the empire. The repulse of the
Ying-wang, and consequent fall of Ngan-king upon the 5th of September,
afforded the Imperialists but little compensation for their defeats
everywhere else. Ngan-king, completely invested by land and water, and
unrelieved by the Ying-wang, after its garrison had endured the most
terrible privations, fell into the hands of the besiegers. Three
regiments of the garrison, unable to endure the horrors of the famine
raging within the doomed city, which had reduced them to cannibalism of
the most frightful description, human flesh being eagerly sought at the
price of eighty cash per catty[39] and devoured with avidity,
surrendered to the Imperialists upon condition of a free pardon, but
were massacred to a man, and their headless bodies cast into the
Yang-tze. After this the remaining portion of the fighting men came to
the usual Chinese arrangement with the besiegers, and leaving the city
unmolested, reached the Ti-ping position at Loo-chow. Then came the
triumph of the Manchoos, who, entering the city, ruthlessly slaughtered
the non-combatant inhabitants: men, women, and children, whose mutilated
bodies were borne down towards the sea by the swiftly rushing waters of
the great river. I beheld them mangled with every atrocity that fiends
could perpetrate, floating down the stream in hundreds, huddled
together, while the river steamers, _Governor-General_ and _Carthage_,
surrounded by the ghastly remnants of mortality, became impeded in their
movements.
[Illustration: MAP OF CHINA _Showing the position of Ti-ping Tien-Kwoh,
or the settled dominions of the Ti-pings at the close of the year 1861,
the zenith of the Ti-ping Power. Also indicating the most important
movements places &c., connected with the Revolution from its
commencement_.
London Day & Son (Limited)]
The capture of Hang-chow and the entire of the Che-kiang province
concluded the operations of the Ti-pings in 1861. They had now attained
a magnificent position; the richest provinces and most important cities
of China had become subservient to them, the most valuable sea-coast in
the world was partly theirs, their base of operations against the
Manchoos could not be surpassed, and it only now remained to capture the
commercial city of Shanghae. The whole of the trade of the interior,
valuable beyond calculation, was justly theirs,--it had been so since
1860; but yet that city was maintained by British forces as the citadel
of the Manchoos, whereby the Ti-pings were defrauded of the export and
import duties which belonged to them, but which, in the hands of the
Manchoos, not only answered for the "indemnity," but served to obtain
for them all munitions of war needed to carry on the struggle. Under
these circumstances, the possession of Shanghae became imperatively
necessary, and yet such was the chivalrous observance of good faith on
their part that they refrained from hostilities until the expiration of
the "present year," although long since released from all moral
obligations, and prompted by all considerations of self-interest and
aggrandisement to subjugate Shanghae without a moment's notice or
delay.
FOOTNOTES:
[35] See Parliamentary "Correspondence respecting the opening of the
Yang-tze-kiang river to foreign trade."
[36] See Blue Book, "Upon the Rebellion in China," presented to
Parliament April, 1862.
[37] See "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," presented
to both Houses of Parliament by command of her Majesty.
[38] Long-haired, a name given the Ti-pings because of their tresses.
[39] About fourpence per 1.333 lb. avoirdupois.