be hoodwinked even by such a plausible plea as negative action, General
Polk, commanding a Southern force of considerable dimensions, was
ordered to push up into the State. This he did, and seizing Columbus,
an important town some twenty miles or so south of the junction of the
Mississippi and Ohio rivers, established there his headquarters.
Another force of Southern troops took possession of Bowling Green,
an important centre on the far east of Kentucky. Between these two
Confederate centres the rivers Tennessee and Cumberland flowed, the
rivers themselves and their valleys forming natural highways to the
very heart of the South. To prevent any such use being made of these
by the Federals, the Confederates built two forts--Fort Henry on the
Tennessee River, and Fort Donaldson on the Cumberland River. These were
placed at points where the two rivers were only twelve miles apart;
and a line drawn from General Polk’s headquarters, Columbus, on the
Mississippi east to Bowling Green, intersecting the two forts, would be
the line between the North and the South.
This General Polk, commanding at Columbus, was a character in
his way. When war broke out it found him Bishop of the Episcopal
Church in Louisiana; and without resigning his ecclesiastical
position--intending, in fact, to again resume active work when the
war should be over--he accepted command of a Confederate force and
served with considerable distinction, effectively checking Grant at the
Battle of Belmont, and holding Columbus until the capitulation of Fort
Donaldson, when he fell back to join General Johnston at Corinth, which
movement brought him on the field of Shiloh. He was killed on Pine
Mountain by a cannon shot in 1864.
When Polk and his Confederates seized Columbus, a Federal force was
massed at Cairo, in the State of Illinois, not many miles north of the
Confederate headquarters. Among the officers stationed at Cairo there
was one who, although as yet in a comparatively subordinate position,
was destined to become the central figure of the war. Before the
struggle ceased the name Ulysses S. Grant became known throughout the
length and breadth of the land.
Like a large majority of the officers engaged in the war, Grant had
served through the Mexican campaign, and at the taking of Mexico
won personal compliments from General Worth for, among many other
remarkable deeds, mounting a Howitzer in a church belfry, and from that
elevation firing upon the enemy. When the Mexican war collapsed, Grant
retired from the army and lived in obscurity, at one time tilling a
small farm near St. Louis, at another clerking in a hardware store,
and again, earning his living as a carter; but when the civil strife
began, the Governor of Illinois appointed him mustering officer, and
step by step he advanced until the capture of Fort Donaldson brought
his personality vividly before the people of America. From that day his
fame as a leader spread. After years of fighting he brought the war to
a conclusion, and before he died had been twice elected President of
his country.
But stationed at Cairo, and confronting General Polk, he had his
reputation still to make. The headquarters of the Northern forces
were at St. Louis, General Halleck being then the commander of the
Federals in that part of the country. To him Grant proposed a scheme,
and applied for permission to break the Southern line by an attack and
capture of the twin forts, Henry and Donaldson. Supplementing Grant’s
appeal, this plan was urged upon Halleck by many prominent military
experts in the North.
For a long time General Halleck did not even reply to Grant’s request.
However, on February 1st, 1862, Grant obtained the permission for
which he sought, and, marching against Fort Henry, quickly reduced
it. Without losing a moment’s time he pushed across the twelve miles
intervening, and set about the taking of Fort Donaldson. This proved
a much more difficult undertaking than Fort Henry had been, but on
account of divided authority among the Confederates holding the fort,
and excellent fighting by the Northern forces, this in time fell.
For these successes General Halleck was assigned to the command of
the Department of the Mississippi, and Grant, raised to the rank of
major-general, assigned to the command of the military district of
Tennessee.
Polk evacuated Columbus, made a stand at “Island No. 10,” was driven
from there, and the Southern line was shattered.
Grant drove the Southern forces out of the State of Kentucky and across
the whole breadth of the State of Tennessee.
General Johnston, the Southern commander, ordered a concentration
at a place called Corinth, near the border-line of Tennessee and
Mississippi, and the Northern forces concentrating at Savannah,
twenty-three miles farther north, made the battle of Shiloh inevitable.
On March 11th President Lincoln in a war order commanded, “That the
two departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck
and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies
west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville,
Tennessee, be considered and designated the Department of the
Mississippi, and that, until otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck
have command of said Department.” Halleck was an exacting officer,
who carried caution and prudence to such an extent that they ceased
to be virtues. About the time Lincoln issued this war order, Grant
in some way had offended Halleck, and, as a consequence, had been
superseded for the time being in the command by General C. F. Smith, a
sturdy soldier, held in high esteem by his superiors. Smith was first
ordered to Savannah, and when there, General Halleck instructed him
to search out a fit position in the vicinity to assemble the Federal
army preparatory to advancing on Corinth. Pittsburg Landing, nine miles
south of Savannah on the Tennessee River, and on the direct line to
Corinth, was the chosen spot, and thither General Grant, reinstated in
his command, proceeded to take up his position to await the arrival
of General Buell and 22,000 Northern troops who were on their way to
reinforce him before he advanced to Corinth. Both North and South,
recognising the inevitability of a decisive battle, set about the
amassing of troops at their respective centres--Pittsburg Landing and
Corinth.
Albert Sidney Johnston, a general who had seen much service against the
Mexicans and Indians, and who was looked upon as the most brilliant of
all the Southern leaders, had his headquarters at Nashville, Tennessee,
when the crushing news of the capture of Forts Henry and Donaldson
reached him. He saw that he must without delay fall back and at some
point consolidate the scattered forces of the South. On February 18th
he moved out, evacuating Nashville, and leaving in that city only
a small company to preserve order, made Corinth his object point.
General Beauregard, second in command at this time as at Bull Run, was
guarding the Mississippi, and Johnston now set about joining their two
armies to check the advance of the Federals under Grant. To accomplish
this it was imperative that Johnston should give up his hold either
on the Mississippi or Central Tennessee, and he decided to hold the
Mississippi at all hazard. For this purpose, and to retain control of
railways indispensable to the South, he decided that Corinth was the
proper point for concentration. Picking up on his way all those who
had escaped capture at Fort Donaldson, he arrived at Corinth on March
24th with 20,000 men. To meet him came General Bragg, from Pensacola,
with 10,000 men; General Polk, from Columbus; General Ruggles, from
New Orleans; and General Beauregard, commanding the whole. In all,
his force numbered about 50,000 men. General Grant, already stationed
on what was destined to be the field of the Battle of Shiloh, had
about 38,000 men, and General Buell, marching to reinforce Grant, had
something like 22,000 men. Johnston’s troops as a whole were poorly
armed. Thousands of them were, in fact, practically without arms,
and many regiments were under the necessity of borrowing rifles from
other regiments with which to do their drills. Moreover, there was a
serious deficiency in ammunition, and the clothing of the majority
of the troops was in a deplorable condition. But Johnston and his
officers set to work with the greatest determination. Green regiments
were broken into their duties, the country was scoured for volunteers,
and train-loads of arms were hurried from the Atlantic coast. Johnston
strained every nerve to complete arrangements and to get his army in a
proper state to admit of his attacking Grant and beating him, before
Buell could arrive with reinforcements. He had been so fortunate as
to effect the concentration of his forces first, and there was, so
it seemed to him, a good chance of finding himself in a position to
fight the Northern army in sections. If he could but come at Grant
before Buell arrived he entertained no fears of the results. Grant once
beaten, a highway to the north would be thrown open to him. Buell, as
it happened, was being seriously delayed by broken bridges and roads
well-nigh impassable from heavy rains and overflowing streams; but
Grant, with false security, awaited his coming with no impatience.
It seems never to have crossed Grant’s mind that there existed a
possibility of Johnston attacking him. He erected no breastworks, nor
does he seem to have taken the simple precaution of keeping a sharp
look-out with scouts or pickets at a reasonable distance in front of
him. The absence of ordinary prudence must have cost him thousands of
lives in this, the Battle of Shiloh.
[Illustration: SHILOH BATTLE-FIELD: SCENE ABOVE THE RIVER
WHERE THE CONFEDERATES’ ADVANCE WAS CHECKED IN THE EVENING OF
THE FIRST DAY.]
All matters carefully arranged, Johnston determined to strike at Grant
without further delay, issuing marching orders on the afternoon of
April 3rd, and the Confederate army set out to surprise the Federal
army as it lay on the banks of the Tennessee. The marching force
consisted of 40,000 men divided into three corps, commanded by Generals
Bragg, Hardee, and Polk; Breckenridge commanding the reserve. Johnston,
of course, assumed supreme command, and Beauregard was second in
command, without specific orders. Hardee led the van, Bragg followed,
and Polk and Breckenridge on the left and right brought up the rear.
As it turned out, the march to Shiloh was one of galling hardship.
Blinding sleet, and snow, and rain beat upon the advancing hosts
that struggled along knee-deep in slush and mire, painfully dragging
after them ladened waggons and heavy guns. Ill clad, poorly fed, and
sore-footed from long marches to the place of concentration, the
soldiers of the South still made the best of matters, and seemed as
eager as their commander to strike the blow before it would be too
late. Johnston hoped to reach a position to permit of his attacking
Grant early on Saturday, April 5th; but when he saw the slow progress
his men made along roads that were nothing but stretches of quagmire,
he almost despaired of ever covering the miles that lay before him,
and, indeed, gave up all hope of surprising the Federals. That Grant
would fail to hear of his approach he could not believe. But in this he
was mistaken. Grant seemed to have abandoned all caution, and to have
made very little, if any, attempt to keep himself in touch with the
movements of the Confederates.
[Illustration: THE MARCH TO SHILOH.]
After two days wallowing through the mire, Johnston bivouacked his
army within four miles of the Federal camp, and neither Grant nor his
officers knew anything about the movement.
To show how completely in the dark the Federal commander must have
been, it is only necessary to look at official reports.
Sherman on Saturday reported to Grant--“All is quiet along my line”;
and later, “I do not apprehend anything like an attack upon our
position.”
The same day Grant, reporting to his superior, Halleck, wrote--“I have
scarcely the faintest idea of an attempt being made upon us”; and in an
earlier telegram he said--“The main force of the enemy is at Corinth.”
When he was writing these words the Confederate army, 40,000 strong,
was at his very door.
It clearly could never have entered the head of General Smith, when
he picked upon Pittsburg Landing as the proper camping-place for
the Northern army until such time as accumulated forces warranted a
march against Corinth, that there was a ghost of a chance of the
South assuming the offensive. Three sides of the camp were bordered
by waterways impassable to troops. To the rear of the camp the broad
Tennessee River flowed, to the right Snake Creek, to the left Lick
Creek--both deep, sluggish, and unfordable. The ground enclosed by
these waters was high, and in places deeply scarred with gullies.
The situation was a _cul-de-sac_, the only opening that towards
Corinth. And when on that Sunday morning General Johnston’s army
suddenly appeared, stretching across this opening, the army of the
North found itself in a trap from which, if beaten, there could be no
escape. Retreat was utterly impossible. There was nowhere to retreat.
Never was an army more hopelessly hemmed about than the army of Grant
at Shiloh.
Shiloh Church stood at what may be called the entrance to the
_cul-de-sac_. Against it, forming the right wing of Grant’s army,
lay Sherman, clearly the hero of the battle. In the centre, and on
a line with Sherman, was stationed Prentiss, while at the extreme
left near Lick Creek lay Stewart. To the left and rear of Sherman was
McClernand, while in the rear lay the divisions of Generals Hurlbut
and W. H. L. Wallace. Another General Wallace, Lewis by name, with
5,000 reserves, was encamped some miles distant on the northern side
of Snake Creek. On the Tennessee River, opposite Pittsburg Landing,
a few gunboats rode at anchor, and these, later in the day, played a
prominent part in the action.
It was a few minutes after five o’clock on Sunday morning, April the
6th, that Johnston ordered his army to advance. A short distance from
the Northern army the Federal pickets were encountered. These were
brushed aside, and the Southern soldiers came cheering and firing
through the wood. Before the Federals encamped on the banks of the
Tennessee were rightly awake, the Confederates came charging down upon
the camp. Sherman’s men were the first encountered. The firing of the
pickets and the subsequent cannonading had awakened this general to the
situation, and he called his men under arms, and drew them up to resist
the attack. Sherman’s brigades standing firm as a rock, the Confederate
attack glanced off his ranks and struck Prentiss with irresistible
force. This unfortunate general attempted to stay the charge, and for
some minutes his men, half-dressed and in confusion, fought valiantly;
but in a very short time Prentiss himself and whole companies of his
men were surrounded and taken prisoners, his guns captured, and his
camp overrun and destroyed.
Grant on Saturday had received a request from General Buell to meet him
at Savannah on this Sunday morning. Little thinking that an engagement
was imminent, Grant had gone thither to keep the appointment, and the
first news he had of the Confederate movements was conveyed to him
by the thundering of the cannon. Listening, he soon realised that a
serious engagement was beginning. Taking steamer to Pittsburg Landing,
he arrived on the scene of battle at eight o’clock, and found the whole
Confederate army about his ears. With 33,000 men, to all intents and
purposes men who had been taken by surprise, he had to fight 40,000,
who for days had been looking forward to the fray. Already his men
had been driven back all along the line. The situation was desperate,
Sherman alone having for the three hours made a good struggle of it.
Stubbornly fighting against overwhelming odds, himself sorely wounded,
and his men falling by scores about him, General Sherman held his
ground so that those behind him might have time to get into line and
take up favourable positions. Hard pressed, and in the thick of the
fire, he rode up and down the lines, personally supervising every
detail of the fight, and nerving his men to the great occasion. But
the soldiers of the South were not to be gainsaid. Like a wedge, they
drove themselves between Sherman and Prentiss, being slaughtered by
hundreds in the process; but, unflinchingly persevering, they assailed
Sherman’s left so savagely that the general was in the end forced to
use his right as a pivot, and in that way to swing his whole command
into a fresh position to save his left being turned. In the process
he lost two of his batteries and his camp. This movement of Sherman’s
permitted General Johnston to hurl his forces against McClernand, who,
unable to withstand the ferocity of the charge, was driven far back.
Stewart, who held the extreme left near Lick Creek, also fell back,
and Hurlbut in the centre was only saved from annihilation by General
W. H. L. Wallace’s division coming to his succour, and allowing his
command to retire from the open ground into a wood, where all the day
he was obliged to fight like a tiger, withstanding charge after charge
delivered by the fiery Southerners. In the defence of this position
General W. H. L. Wallace was killed.
General Lewis Wallace, in command of the Federal reserves--5,000
men--lay the other side of Snake Creek, and for his arrival Grant
waited with impatience, for matters were becoming desperate. The only
way Wallace could possibly reach the scene of battle was by means of
a bridge across Snake Creek, and so it seemed to Grant the existence
of his army now depended on this bridge being held against capture.
Sherman knew this, too, and he gradually fell back, until to fall back
any further meant the loss of the bridge. Then he took up as favourable
a position as he could find, and refused to retreat one step more,
although one-half of the Confederate army dashed against his lines.
During the long hours that he stood there, waiting for Lewis Wallace
and the reserves, it seemed as though his whole command must be wiped
out of existence.
Drawn up in the partial cover of a wood, with before them open rough
country, across which the enemy’s forces must rush, and with the
knowledge that should they allow themselves to be forced back their
whole army would be exterminated, each Federal under Sherman and
McClernand stood and fought with the desperation of a trapped and
stricken tiger. General Johnston, hoping to force the position, hurried
forward brigade after brigade, and hurled them against the soldiers
of the North. Again and again the van of the Confederates pierced the
ranks of the Federals, fighting hand to hand and face to face, with
thrust of bayonet and crash of clubbed rifle, but pierced the line
only to be blotted out of existence by the men who stood, as it were,
with their backs to a wall, and who fought the fight of grim despair.
This was the first great slaughter-pen of the bloody battle of Shiloh.
Whole companies of Southern troops, bareheaded, barefooted, in rags,
hungry, and ill-equipped, but undaunted and determined, rushed headlong
across the rugged ground, and with the fury of fanatics flew at the
hemmed-in ranks of the North, only to be beaten back by those who could
go back no farther. The men of the North grimly held to their position,
trusting that fate would soon bring Lewis Wallace and his reserves on
the scene to succour an already defeated army.
The South fought for victory, but the North fought for time, for
darkness, for life.
[Illustration:
THE
BATTLE
OF
SHILOH.]
At ten o’clock in the morning General Johnston had the satisfaction of
knowing that all his plans had worked out to a nicety. He had forced
Grant into a corner, carried position after position, captured many
guns, and taken prisoners by hundreds. Grant’s army was now confined in
a space of not more than 400 acres. At eleven o’clock there came a lull
in the fight. The time had arrived for General Johnston to begin the
second movement of his plan of battle. This was to turn Grant’s left,
sweep him from Pittsburg Landing, and crush the left against Sherman on
the right. To do this the Confederates must advance across open ground
in the very teeth of batteries and entrenched infantry. In the thick of
this, the most difficult work of the day, the South suffered a sudden
and irreparable loss. General Johnston while directing the movement was
struck by a rifle-bullet. He fell, and almost immediately died. The
news ran from lip to lip, and checked the charge. And, to add to the
confusion, General Beauregard, on whom the command devolved, could not
at once be found to be told that his chief was dead. The fight still
continued, but during the time it took to find Beauregard, and the
further time that elapsed before he could get the strings of battle
into his hands, the Southerners fought themselves into some confusion,
and Grant was able to re-form and tighten up his lines. Moreover, the
Southerners had driven the Federals so close to the river that they
themselves, in following up their successes, found themselves within
range of the guns aboard the boats on the Tennessee River, and shells
from the gunboats began to play havoc in the Confederate lines. But
this could not be helped. It was the price of success. The afternoon
was advancing, and Beauregard hastened to the task of the turning of
the left before darkness should make further fighting impossible.
Across the ground that divided Federal from Confederate ran a deep
scar, and on the shoulder of the opposite bank of this Grant had thrown
up some hasty breastworks. When the Southerners dashed into this gully,
shot and shell from the gunboats on the river shrieked up the length of
it, and an appalling rifle-fire came down the slope and into the mass
of men that struggled forward to take the breastwork. The Federals were
at their last resource. If the breastwork should be taken, and their
left turned, it meant the end of all things to them. The Confederates,
too, were in desperation, for night was falling upon the land, and
victory still unwon. Into the valley they poured, and up the bank they
struggled and scrambled, but scarcely one of them reached the top. Shot
and shell and bayonet-thrust soon filled the valley with Southern dead
and wounded; and while the fight still continued, darkness fell, and
put an end to the day’s struggle. Beauregard, reporting the state of
things after the first day’s fight, said:
“At six o’clock p.m. we were in possession of all his encampments
between Owl (a tributary of Snake Creek) and Lick Creeks but one,
nearly all his field artillery, about thirty flags, colours, and
standards, over three thousand prisoners, including a division
commander (General Prentiss) and several brigade commanders, thousands
of small-arms, an immense supply of subsistence, forage, and munitions
of war, and a large amount of means of transportation--all the
substantial fruits of a complete victory--such, indeed, as rarely have
followed the most successful battles.”
[Illustration: SHILOH BATTLE-FIELD: SCENE WHERE GENERAL
JOHNSTON FELL.]
But this was to be the end of the fruits of victory for the South.