The line of a muddy stream, called the Goldbach, marked the front of

the French army. This stream takes its source across the Olmutz road,

and flowing through a dell, of which the sides are steep, discharges

itself into the Menitz Lake. At the top of its high left bank stretches

the wide Pratzen plateau, and it appeared to Napoleon’s staff that he

had made an error in relinquishing such a vantage ground to his enemy;

but he told them that he had done so of set purpose, saying, “If I

remained master of this fine plateau, I could here check the Russians,

but then I should only have an ordinary victory; whereas by giving it

up to them and refusing my right, if they dare to descend from these

heights in order to outflank me, I secure that they shall be lost

beyond redemption.”

Let us examine the positions occupied by the French and the

Austro-Russian armies at the close of November, and we shall the better

understand the general strategy of the two combatant forces and the

tactics which each made use of when they came into collision. The

Emperor Napoleon rested his left, under Lannes and Murat, on a rugged

eminence, which those of his soldiers who had served in Egypt called

the “Santon,” because its crest was crowned by a little chapel, of

which the roof had a fancied resemblance to a minaret. This eminence

he had strengthened with field works, armed and provisioned like a

fortress. He had, by repeated visits, satisfied himself that his orders

were properly carried out, and he had committed its defence to special

defenders under the command of General Claparède, impressing upon them

that they must be prepared to fire their last cartridge at their post

and, if necessary, there to die to the last man.

His centre was on the right bank of the Goldbach. There were the corps

of Soult and Bernadotte, the Grenadiers of Duroc and Oudinot, and the

Imperial Guard with forty guns. Their doubled lines were concealed by

the windings of the stream, by scattered clumps of wood, and by the

features of the ground.

His right was entrusted to Davoust’s corps, summoned in haste to the

battle-field, and of which only a division of infantry and one of

Dragoons had been able to come into line. They were posted at Menitz,

and held the defiles passing the Menitz Lake and the two other lakes

of Telnitz and Satschau. Napoleon’s line of battle was thus an oblique

one, with its right thrown back. It had the appearance of being only

defensive, if not actually timid, its centre not more than sufficiently

occupied, its right extremely weak, and only its left formidable and

guaranteed against any but the most powerful attack. But the great

strategist had weighed well his methods. He trusted that the foe would

be tempted to commit themselves to an attack on his right, essaying to

cut his communications and line of retreat on Vienna. If they could be

led into this trap, the difficulty of movement in the ground cut up by

lake, stream, and marsh would give to Davoust the power to hold them in

check until circumstances allowed of aid being given to him. Meantime,

with his left impregnable and his centre ready to deal a crushing blow,

he expected to be able to operate against the Russo-Austrian flank and

rear with all the advantage due to unlooked-for strength.

The right of the Russo-Austrians, commanded by the Princes Bagration

and Lichtenstein, rested on a wooded hill near Posoritz across the

Olmutz road. Their centre, under Kollowrath, occupied the village of

Pratzen and the large surrounding plateau; while their left, under

Doctorof and Kienmayer, stretched towards the Satschau Lake and the

adjoining marshes.

The village of Austerlitz was some distance in rear of the

Russo-Austrian position, and had no immediate connection with the

movements of the troops employed on either side, but the Emperors of

Russia and Austria slept in it on the night before the battle, and

Napoleon afterwards accentuated the greatness of his victory by naming

it after the place from which he had chased them.

The two great armies now in presence of each other were markedly

unequal in strength--92,000 men were opposed to 70,000, and the

advantage of 22,000 was to the allies. But this inequality was to a

great extent compensated by the tactical dispositions of the leader of

the weaker force. Of the two antagonist lines, one was wholly exposed

to view, the other to a great extent concealed--first advantage to

the latter. They formed, as it were, two parallel arcs of a circle,

but that of the French was the more compact and uninterrupted--second

advantage; and this last was soon to be increased by the imprudent

Russian manœuvres. The two armies, barely at a distance of two

cannon-shot from each other, had by mutual tacit consent formed their

bivouacs, piled arms, fed and reposed peaceably round their fires, the

one covered by a thick cloud of Cossacks, the other by a sparse line of

vedettes.

Napoleon quitted Brunn early in the morning of the 1st December,

and employed the whole of that day in examining the positions which

the different portions of his army occupied. His headquarters were

established in rear of the centre of his line at a high point, from

which could be seen the bivouacs of both French and allies, as well

as the ground on which the morrow’s issue would be fought out. The

cold was intense, but there was no snow. The only shelter that could

be found for the ruler of France was a dilapidated hut, in which were

placed the Emperor’s table and maps.

The Grenadiers had made up a huge fire hard by, and his travelling

carriage was drawn up, in which he could take such sleep as his

anxieties would permit. The divisions of Duroc and Oudinot bivouacked

between him and the enemy, while the Guard lay round him and towards

the rear.

In the late afternoon of the same day Napoleon was watching the allied

position through his telescope. On the Pratzen plateau could be seen a

general flank movement of Russian columns, in rear of their first line,

from their centre to their left and towards the front of the French

position at Telnitz. It was evidently supposed by the enemy that the

French intended to act only on the defensive, that nothing was to be

feared from them in front, and that the allies had only to throw their

masses on their right, cut off their retreat upon Vienna, and thus

inflict upon them a certain and disastrous defeat. It was forgotten

by the Russo-Austrians that in thus moving their principal forces to

the left, the centre of their position was weakened, and on the right

their own line of operations and retreat was left entirely unprotected.

When Napoleon detected what was being done, trembling with satisfaction

and clapping his hands, he said: “What a manœuvre to be ashamed of!

They are running into the trap! They are giving themselves up! Before

to-morrow evening that army will be in my hands!” In order still more

to add to the confidence of his enemy and to encourage them in the

prosecution of their mistaken plan, he ordered Murat to sally forth

from his own position with some cavalry, to manœuvre as if showing

uneasiness and hesitation, and then to retire with an air of alarm.

This order given, he returned immediately to his bivouac, dictated and

issued the famous proclamation in which he assured his army that the

Austro-Russians were exposing their flank and were offering certain

glory to the soldiers of France as a reward for their valour in the

coming struggle: he said that he himself would direct their battalions,

but that he would not expose himself to danger unless success was

doubtful, and he promised that, after their victory, they should have

comfortable cantonments and peace.

The evening of the 1st of December closed in. The allied movement

towards their left was still continuing, and Napoleon, after renewing

his orders, again visiting his parks and ambulances and satisfying

himself by his own observation that all was in order, threw himself

on a bundle of straw and slept. About eleven o’clock he was awakened

and told that a sharp attack had been made on one of the villages

occupied by his right, but that it had been repulsed. This further

confirmed his forecast of the allied movements, but, wishing to make

a last reconnaissance of his enemy’s position, he again mounted, and,

followed by Junot, Duroc, Berthier, and some others of his staff, he

ventured between the two armies. As he closely skirted the enemy’s

line of outposts, in spite of several warnings that he was incurring

great risk, he, in the darkness, rode into a picquet of Cossacks. These

sprang to arms and attacked him so suddenly that he would certainly

have been killed or taken prisoner if it had not been for the devoted

courage of his escort, which engaged the Cossacks while he turned

his horse and galloped back to the French lines. His escape was so

narrow and precipitate that he had to pass without choosing his way

the marshy Goldbach stream. His own horse and those of several of

his attendants--amongst others Ywan, his surgeon, who never left his

person--were for a time floundering helpless in the deep mud, and the

Emperor was obliged to make his way on foot to his headquarters past

the fires round which his soldiery were lying. In the obscurity he

stumbled over a fallen tree-trunk; and it occurred to a grenadier who

saw him, to twist and use some straw as a torch, holding it over his

head to light the path of his sovereign.

In the middle of the anxious night, full of disquietude and

anticipation, the eve of the anniversary of the Emperor’s coronation,

the face of Napoleon, lighted up and suddenly displayed by this flame,

appeared almost as a vision to the soldiers of the nearest bivouacs.

A cry was raised, “It is the anniversary of the coronation! Vive

l’Empereur!”--an outburst of loyal ardour which Napoleon in vain

attempted to check with the words, “Silence till to-morrow. Now you

have only to sharpen your bayonets.” But the same thought, the same

cry, was taken up and flew with lightning quickness from bivouac to

bivouac. All made torches of whatever material was at hand. Some

pulled down the field-shelters for the purpose--some used the straw

that had been collected to form their beds; and in an instant, as if

by enchantment, thousands of lights flared upwards along the whole

French line, and by thousands of voices the cry was repeated, “Vive

l’Empereur!” Thus was improvised, within sight of the astonished

enemy, the most striking of illuminations, the most memorable of

demonstrations, by which the admiration and devotion of a whole army

have ever been shown to its general. It is said that the Russians

believed the French to be burning their shelters as a preliminary

to retreat, and that their confidence was thereby increased. As

to Napoleon, though at first annoyed at the outburst, he was soon

gratified and deeply touched by the heartfelt enthusiasm displayed,

and said that “This night is the happiest of my life.” For some time

he continued to move from bivouac to bivouac, telling his soldiers

how much he appreciated their affection, and saying those kindly and

encouraging words which no one better than he knew how to use.

[Illustration: MARSHAL PRINCE MURAT (AFTERWARDS KING OF

NAPLES).

(_From the Painting by Gérard._)]

The morning began to break on the 2nd of December. As he buckled on his

sword, Napoleon said to the staff gathered round--“Now, gentlemen, let

us commence a great day.” He mounted, and from different points were

seen arriving to receive his last orders the renowned chiefs of his

various _corps-d’armée_, each followed by a single aide-de-camp.

There were Marshal Prince Murat, Marshal Lannes, Marshal Soult, Marshal

Bernadotte, and Marshal Davoust. What a formidable circle of men, each

of whom had already gathered glory on many different fields! Murat,

distinctively the cavalry general of France, the intrepid paladin who

had led his charging squadrons on all the battle-fields of Italy and

Egypt; Lannes, whose prowess at Montebello had made victory certain;

Soult, the veteran of the long years of war on the Rhine and in

Germany, the hero of Altenkirchen, and Massena’s most distinguished

lieutenant at the battle of Zürich; Bernadotte, not more renowned as

a general in the field than as the minister of war who prepared the

conquest of Holland; Davoust, the stern disciplinarian and leader,

unequalled for cool gallantry and determination--all were gathered

at this supreme moment round one of the greatest masters of war in

ancient or modern times, to receive his inspiration and to part like

thunder-clouds bearing the storm which was to shatter the united armies

of two Empires.

The Emperor’s general plan of action was already partly known, but

he now repeated it to his marshals in detail. He was more than ever

certain, from the last reports which he had received, that the enemy

was continuing the flank movement, and would hurl the heaviest attacks

on the French right near Telnitz.

To Davoust was entrusted the duty of holding the extreme right and

checking, in the defiles formed by the lakes, the heads of the

enemy’s columns which, since the previous day, had been more and more

entangling themselves in these difficult passes.

Of Soult’s three divisions, one was to assist Davoust on the right,

while the other two, already formed in columns of attack, were to hold

themselves ready to throw their force on the Pratzen plateau.

Bernadotte’s two divisions were to advance against the same position on

Soult’s left. This combined onslaught of four divisions on the centre

of the Russo-Austrians which they had weakened by the movement to their

left, would be supported by the Emperor himself with the Imperial Guard

and the Grenadiers of Oudinot and Duroc. Lannes was ordered to hold

the left, particularly the “Santon” height; while Prince Murat, at

the head of his horsemen, was to charge through the intervals of the

infantry upon the allied cavalry which appeared to be in great strength

in that part of the field.

It was thus Napoleon’s intention to await and check the enemy’s attacks

which might be expected on both his flanks, and more especially on

his right, while he himself made a determined and formidable forward

movement against their centre, where he hoped to cut them in two,

and then, from the dominant position of the Pratzen plateau, turn an

overwhelming force against the masses on their too-far-advanced left,

which, entangled and cramped in its action among the lakes, would then

be crushed or forced to yield as prisoners.

It was eight o’clock. The thick wintry mist hung in the valley of the

Goldbach and rolled upwards to the Pratzen plateau. Its obscurity,

heightened by the lingering smoke of bivouac fires, concealed the

French columns of attack. The thunder of artillery and the rattle of

musketry told that the allied attack on the French right had begun and

was being strenuously resisted, while silence and darkness reigned

over the rest of the line. Suddenly, over the heights, the sun rose,

brilliantly piercing the mist and lighting the battle-field--the “Sun

of Austerlitz,” of which Napoleon ever after loved to recall the

remembrance.

[Illustration: “THOUSANDS OF LIGHTS FLARED UPWARDS”

(_p._ 188.)]

The moment of action for the French centre had come, and the corps of

Soult and Bernadotte, led by the divisions of Vandamme and St. Hilaire,

rushed forwards. No influence that could animate the minds of these

gallant troops was wanting. They fought directly under the eye of their

Emperor. They were led by chiefs in whom they had implicit confidence.

Their ardour was fired by the proclamation which had been issued on the

previous evening, and the bands accompanied their regiments, playing

the old attack march--

“On va leur percer le flanc

Rataplan, tire lire en plan!”

The Pratzen height was escaladed at the double, attacked in front

and on the right and left, and the appearance of the assailants was

so sudden and unexpected, as they issued from the curtain of mist,

that the Russians were completely surprised. They had no defensive

formation ready, and were still occupied in the movement towards their

left. They hastily formed in three lines, however, and some of their

artillery were able to come into action. Their resistance was feeble.

One after another, their lines, broken by the stern bayonet charge,

were driven back in hopeless confusion, and at nine o’clock Napoleon

was master of the Pratzen plateau.

Meanwhile, on the left, Lannes and Murat were fighting an independent

battle with the Princes Lichtenstein and Bagration. Murat, as the

senior marshal and brother-in-law of the Emperor, was nominally the

superior; but, in real fact, Lannes directed the operations of the

infantry, which Murat powerfully supplemented and aided with his

cavalry. General Caffarelli’s division was formed on the plain on

Lannes’s right, while General Suchet’s division was on his left,

supported by the “Santon” height, from which poured the fire of

eighteen heavy guns. The light cavalry brigades of Milhaud and

Treilhard were pushed forward in observation across the high road

to Olmutz. The cavalry divisions of Kellermann, Walther, Nansouty,

and d’Hautpoul were disposed in two massive columns of squadrons on

the right of Caffarelli. Against this array were brought eighty-two

squadrons of cavalry under Lichtenstein, supported by the serried

divisions of Bagration’s infantry and a heavy force of artillery.

The combat was commenced by the light cavalry of Kellermann, which

charged and overthrew the Russo-Austrian advanced guard. Attacked

in turn by the Uhlans of the Grand Duke Constantine, Kellermann

retired through the intervals of Caffarelli’s division, which, by

a well-sustained fire in two ranks, checked the Uhlans and emptied

many of their saddles. Kellermann re-formed his division and again

charged, supported by Sebastiani’s brigade of Dragoons. Then followed

a succession of charges by the chivalry of France, led by Murat with

all the _élan_ of his boiling courage. Kellermann, Walther, and

Sebastiani were all wounded, the first two generals seriously. In

the last of these charges the 5th Chasseurs, commanded by Colonel

Corbineau, broke the formation of a Russian battalion and captured

its standard. Caffarelli’s infantry were close at hand, and, pushing

forward, made an Austrian battalion lay down its arms. A regiment of

Russian Dragoons made a desperate advance to rescue their comrades,

and, mistaking them for Bavarians in the smoke and turmoil, Murat

ordered the French infantry to cease firing. The Russian Dragoons, thus

encountering no resistance, penetrated the French ranks and almost

succeeded in taking Murat himself prisoner. But, consummate horseman

and man-at-arms as he was, he cut his way to safety through the enemy,

at the head of his personal escort.

The allies profited by this diversion to again assume the offensive.

Then came the opportunity for the gigantic Cuirassiers of Nansouty,

which hurled the Russian cavalry back upon their infantry, and, in

three successive onslaughts, scattered the infantry itself, inflicting

terrible losses with their long, heavy swords and seizing eight pieces

of artillery. The whole of Caffarelli’s division advanced, supported

by one of Bernadotte’s divisions from the centre, and, changing its

front to the right, cut the centre of Bagration’s infantry, driving its

greater part towards Pratzen, separated from those who still fought at

the extremity of their line.

The Austro-Russian cavalry rallied in support of Bagration, who was

now hotly pressed by Suchet. Then came a magnificently combined

movement of Dragoons, Cuirassiers, and infantry. The Dragoons drove

back the Austro-Russian squadrons behind their infantry. Simultaneously

followed the levelled bayonets of Suchet’s division and the crushing

shock of d’Hautpoul’s mailclad warriors. The victory was decided--the

Russian battalions were crushed, losing a standard, eleven guns, and

1,800 prisoners. The rout was completed by the rapid advance of the

light cavalry brigades of Treilhard and Milhaud on the left, and

of Kellermann on the right, which swept away all that encountered

them, and drove the shattered allied troops towards the village of

Austerlitz. The Russo-Austrian losses on this part of the field of

battle amounted to 1,200 or 1,500 killed, 7,000 or 8,000 prisoners, two

standards, and twenty-seven pieces of artillery.

[Illustration: “Simultaneously followed the levelled bayonets

of Suchet’s Division” (_p._ 150).]

While Napoleon had thus struck a heavy blow at the allied centre and

had been completely victorious on his left, his right, under Davoust,

was with difficulty holding its own against Buxhowden (who had assumed

the command of the columns of Doctorof and Kienmayer), and but that

the masses brought against it were unable to deploy their strength it

must inevitably have been crushed. Thirty thousand foemen of all arms

were pressing in assault upon 10,000 French, already wearied by a long

and rapid march to their position at Raygern. But Davoust was able to

concentrate what power he had, and to meet at advantage the heads

only of the columns which were winding their way along the narrow

passes that opened between the lakes and through the marshy ground

in his front. Even so the strain was terrible, and would have been

more than less hardy troops under a less able and determined leader

could have stood. But Napoleon was quite alive to the necessities of

the gallant soldiers who were standing their ground so staunchly. He

ordered his reserve of Grenadiers and the Imperial Guard to move up

to the support of his right centre and to threaten the flank of the

columns that were attacking Davoust, while he also directed the two

divisions of Soult’s corps, which had made the attack on the Pratzen

plateau against Buxhowden’s rear.

It was one o’clock, and at this moment, while the orders just given

were being executed, the Russian infantry, supported by the Russian

Imperial Guard, made a desperate effort to retrieve the fortunes of

the day near Pratzen, and threw themselves in a fierce bayonet charge

on the divisions of Vandamme and St. Hilaire, which offered a stout

resistance. But, with the Russian Guard ready to join in the combat,

the odds against the French divisions were too great. It was the crisis

of the day.

Napoleon, from the commanding position where he stood, saw before him

the Emperor Alexander’s guard advancing in dense masses to regain their

morning position and to sweep before them his men, wearied and harassed

by the day’s struggle. At the same time he heard on his right the

redoubled fire of the advanced Russian left, which was pressing Davoust

and was threatening his rear. From the continued and increasing roar of

musketry and artillery it almost seemed as if success must, after all,

attend the great flank movement of the allies. Small wonder if even his

war-hardened nerves felt a thrill of confusion and anxiety when he saw

dimly appearing through the battle smoke another black mass of moving

troops.

“Ha! Can those, too, be Russians?” he exclaimed to the solitary

staff-officer whom the exigencies of the day had still left at his

side. Another look reassured him, however. The tall bearskins of the

moving column showed him that it was his own Guard, which, under Duroc,

was moving towards the lakes to the support of Soult and Davoust. His

right and rear were, at any rate, so far safe.

Battles of the nineteenth century, vol. 1 of 7 · 第 26 / 52 段