CHAPTER XII

WAR ON THE OCEAN

[Sidenote: Importance of the control of the water]

Until the war of independence the Americans had no navy of their own,

such maritime expeditions as that against Louisburg having been

undertaken with the aid of British ships. When the war broke out, one of

the chief advantages possessed by the British, in their offensive

operations, was their entire control of the American waters. Not only

were all the coast towns exposed to their sudden attack, but on the

broad deep rivers they were sometimes able to penetrate to a

considerable distance inland, and by means of their ships they could

safely transport men and stores from point to point. Their armies always

rested upon the fleets as bases of operations, and soon lost their

efficiency when severed from these bases. General Howe was not safe in

Philadelphia until his brother had gained control of the Delaware river,

and Burgoyne's army invited capture as soon as its connection with the

lakes was cut off. From first to last, the events of the war illustrated

this dependence of the army upon the fleet. On the retreat from

Lexington, it was only the ships that finally saved Lord Percy's weary

troops from capture; at Yorktown, it was only the momentary loss of

naval superiority that made escape impossible for Cornwallis. For want

of a navy, General Washington could not hold the island of New York in

1776; and for a like reason, in 1778, after the enemy had been reduced

to the defensive, he could not prudently undertake its recapture. It was

through lack of effective naval aid that the Newport expedition failed;

and the events of 1779, in Virginia and Connecticut, bore sad testimony

to the defenceless condition of our coasts.

[Portrait: John Barry]

[Sidenote: Feeble action of Congress]

Early in the war this crying want was earnestly considered by Congress,

and efforts were made to repair it by the construction of a navy and the

equipment of private cruisers. But the construction of a regular navy,

which alone could serve the purpose, was beset with even greater

difficulties than those which attended the organization of a permanent

army. There was, indeed, no lack of good material, whether for ships or

for seamen. New England, in particular, with its great length of

seacoast and its extensive fisheries, had always possessed a

considerable merchant marine, and nourished a hardy race of seafaring

people. How formidable they could become in naval warfare, Great

Britain was destined, nearly forty years afterward, to find out, to her

astonishment and chagrin. But the absence of a central government was

even more seriously felt in naval than in military affairs. The action

of Congress was feeble, unintelligent, and vacillating. The "marine

committees," "navy boards," and "boards of admiralty," to which the work

of creating a navy was entrusted, were so often changed in their

composition and in their functions that it was difficult for any piece

of work to be carried out in accordance with its original design. As

there was a total absence of system in the department of admiralty, so

there was utter looseness of discipline in the service. There were the

same wranglings about rank as in the army, and the consequences were

even more pernicious. It was difficult to enlist good crews, because of

the uncertainty arising from the general want of system. The risks

encountered were excessive, because of the overwhelming preponderance of

the enemy from the outset. Of thirteen new cruisers laid down in the

autumn of 1775, only six ever succeeded in getting out to sea. During

the war one ship-of-the-line was built,--the America 74, first commanded

by Captain John Barry;[28] but she was launched too late for active

service. Between 1775 and 1783, there were twenty small frigates and

twenty-one sloops-of-war in the service. Most of these were either

captured by the enemy, or destroyed to prevent their falling into the

enemy's hands.[29] The armaments of these ships were very light; the

largest of them, the Bon Homme Richard, was constructed for a

thirty-eight, but her heaviest guns were only twelve-pounders.

[Illustration: AUGUSTATUS KUNINGAM]

[Sidenote: American and British cruisers]

Yet in spite of this light force, weak discipline, and unsteady

management, the little American navy did some very good work in the

course of the war, and it was efficiently helped by a multitude of

private cruisers, just as the Continental army often got valuable aid

from the militia. Before the French alliance more than six hundred

British vessels had fallen prey to the American cruisers, and so

venturesome were these swift little craft that they even hovered around

the coast of England, and merchant vessels going from one British port

to another needed the protection of a convoy. During the same period,

about nine hundred American vessels were taken by British cruisers; so

that the damaging power of the American marine seems to have amounted to

about two thirds that of such part of the British marine as could be

devoted to the injury of American shipping. The damage inflicted upon

the Americans was the more serious, for it well-nigh ruined the New

England fisheries and the coasting trade. On the other hand, the

American cruisers caused marine insurance in England to rise to a far

higher point than had ever before been known; and we learn from a letter

of Silas Deane to Robert Morris that, shortly before the alliance

between France and the United States, the docks on the Thames were

crowded with French vessels loading with British goods that sought the

shelter of a neutral flag.

[Illustration: CONYNGHAM CAPTURING A BRITISH PACKET]

[Sidenote: Wickes and Conyngham]

[Sidenote: John Paul Jones]

[Sidenote: Franklin's supervision of maritime affairs]

In one respect the value of this work of the American cruisers was

incalculable. It familiarized Europe with the sight of the American flag

in European waters. It was of great importance that Europe should think

of the new republic not as merely the theme of distant rumours, but as a

maritime power, able to defend itself within sight of the British

coasts; and in this respect it would be difficult to overrate the

services rendered by the heroic captains who first carried the flag of

the United States across the ocean, and bearded the lion in his native

lair. Of these gallant fellows, Lambert Wickes was the first, and his

ship, the Reprisal 16, which carried Benjamin Franklin to France in the

autumn of 1776, was the first American war vessel to visit the eastern

shores of the Atlantic. After a brilliant cruise in the summer of 1777,

she foundered off the banks of Newfoundland, with the loss of all on

board. Next came Gustavus Conyngham, with the Surprise and the Revenge,

which in the same summer took so many prizes in the North Sea and the

British Channel that insurance rose as high as twenty-five per cent.,

and in some instances ten per cent. was demanded for the short passage

between Dover and Calais. But the fame of both these captains was soon

eclipsed by that of John Paul Jones, a Scotch sailor, who from boyhood

had been engaged in the Virginia trade, and in 1773 had gone to Virginia

to live. When war broke out Jones offered his services to Congress, and

in October, 1776, his name appears as eighteenth in the list of captains

in the new navy. From the outset he was distinguished for skill and

bravery, and in 1778, being then thirty years old, he was sent, with the

Ranger 18, to prowl about the British coasts. In this little ship he

made a successful cruise in the Irish Channel, burned some of the

shipping in the port of Whitehaven, in Cumberland, and in a fierce fight

off Carrickfergus captured the British sloop-of-war Drake 20; losing

only eight men in killed and wounded, while the Drake lost forty-two.

With the Drake and several merchant prizes, Jones made his way to Brest,

and sent the Ranger home to America, while he remained to take command

of a more considerable expedition that was fitting out for the following

year. Along with the other duties of Franklin, as minister of the United

States at the French court, was joined a general superintendence of

maritime affairs. He was a sort of agent plenipotentiary of Congress in

all matters relating to the navy. He had authority from Congress to

issue letters of marque, and exercised it freely, while imposing

restrictions that were characteristic of his magnanimous spirit. In

1779, he issued instructions to all American cruisers that, in

whatsoever part of the sea they might happen to meet the great

discoverer Captain Cook, they were to forget the temporary quarrel in

which they were fighting, and not merely suffer him to pass unmolested,

but offer him every aid and service in their power; since it would ill

beseem Americans to lift their hands against one who had earned the

reverence and gratitude of all mankind. So in the instructions given to

Paul Jones, he ordered him not to burn defenceless towns on the British

coast except in case of military necessity, and in such case he was to

give notice, so that the women and children, with the sick and aged

inhabitants, might be removed betimes.

[Portrait: J. Landais]

[Sidenote: Jones's squadron]

The expedition of which Paul Jones took command in the summer of 1779

was designed for a signal "demonstration" upon the coasts of Great

Britain. The object of the British raids in Virginia and Connecticut was

partly to terrify the Americans by a bold and savage assertion of the

ubiquity of British power. The expedition of Paul Jones was to serve as

a sort of counter-irritant. The confused and indefinite character of the

American naval service at that time could not have a better illustration

than is to be found in the details of the little squadron with which he

was called upon to undertake his perilous task. The flagship was an old

Indiaman named the Duras, purchased by the French government and fitted

up for the occasion. In compliment to the author of Poor Richard's

maxims, her name was changed to "Bon Homme Richard." She was an

exceedingly clumsy affair, with swelling bows and a tower-like poop such

as characterized the ships of the seventeenth century. She was now

pierced for a thirty-eight-gun frigate, but as there was delay in

procuring the eighteen-pounders suited for such a craft, her main deck

was armed with twelve-pounders instead. In the gun-room below, Captain

Jones had twelve portholes cut, in which he mounted six old eighteens,

that could be shifted from side to side as occasion required. Leaving

these eighteens out of the account, the force of the Bon Homme Richard

was about equal to that of a thirty-two-gun frigate. This singular

vessel was manned by a crew as nondescript as herself,--a motley gang of

sailors and marines from nearly every country in Europe, with half a

dozen Malays into the bargain. To these a hundred New England men were

afterwards added, bringing up the whole number to 380. For this flagship

three consorts were supplied, under the direction of the French

government. The Pallas, a merchant vessel pierced for the occasion, was

thus transformed into a thirty-two-gun frigate; the Vengeance and Cerf

were of smaller calibre. All these ships were French built. To these

Franklin added the Alliance 32, which happened to be in a French port at

the time. The Alliance, lately built at Salisbury, in Massachusetts, and

named in honour of the treaty between France and the United States, was

a swift and beautiful ship, one of the finest in the American navy.

Unfortunately, it was thought desirable to pay a further compliment to

our new allies by appointing a French captain to command her, and this

step gave rise to so much discontent and insubordination as well-nigh to

destroy her efficiency. Nor had Captain Landais done anything to merit

such distinction; he was simply an adventurer, seeking notoriety in the

American service.

[Illustration: Paul Jones's Commission]

[Sidenote: Jones's cruise on the British coast]

[Sidenote: He meets a British fleet off Flamborough Head]

The ships in this motley squadron were not privateers. The Alliance was

a regular member of our navy. The French-built ships were regarded as

loaned to the United States, and were to resume their French nationality

after the termination of the cruise; but they were all duly commissioned

by Franklin, under the powers delegated to him by Congress. For the time

being, they were part of the American navy and subject to its

regulations. Their commodore, Paul Jones, has often been spoken of as a

privateer, sometimes as a pirate, but he was as much a regular captain

in our navy as Greene was a regular general in our army. Though,

however, there could be no doubt as to the legitimate naval character of

the expedition, a more ill-assorted or disorderly squadron was perhaps

never sent to sea. The summer was spent in cruising about the British

coasts, and many prizes were taken; but the insubordination of the

French commanders was so gross that during a large part of the time the

ships were scattered in all directions, and Jones was left to cruise

alone. On the 17th of September, having got his fleet together, he

entered the Frith of Forth, and came within gunshot of Leith, which he

intended to attack and capture. Sir Walter Scott, then a schoolboy at

Edinburgh, has given, in the introduction to "Waverley," a graphic

description of the excitement which was felt upon that occasion. But, as

Scott says, "a steady and powerful west wind settled the matter by

sweeping Paul Jones and his vessels out of the Frith of Forth." Four

days later, the Bon Homme Richard and the Vengeance entered the river

Humber, and destroyed several vessels. On the 23d, the Alliance and

Pallas having come up, a British fleet of forty sail was descried off

Flamborough Head. They were merchant vessels bound for the Baltic,

under convoy of the Serapis 44, Captain Richard Pearson, and the

Countess of Scarborough 20, Captain Piercy. Jones instantly gave chase,

ordering his consorts to follow and form in line of battle; but the

Alliance disobeyed and ran off to some distance, for a time

disconcerting the Pallas, which could not understand the discrepancy

between the signals and the movements. The British merchant ships

crowded all sail to get out of the way, but the two frigates accepted

Jones's challenge, and came up to fight. The Countess of Scarborough was

very inferior in size and armament to the Pallas, while on the other

hand the Serapis was much more powerful than the Bon Homme Richard. She

was a two-decker, mounting twenty eighteen-pounders below, and twenty

nine-pounders above, with ten six-pounders on her quarter-deck and

forecastle; so that she could throw 300 pounds of metal on a broadside.

The Bon Homme Richard, with her six eighteens, could indeed throw 312

pounds on a broadside, but her weight of metal was very badly

distributed among light guns. Without her eighteens, she could throw

only 204 pounds on a broadside, being thus inferior to her opponent by

one third. The Serapis had a crew of 320 well-trained British sailors,

and she was a new and fast ship, perfect in all her appointments.

[Portrait: CAPTAIN PEARSON]

[Sidenote: Terrific fight between the Serapis and the Bon Homme Richard,

Sept. 23, 1779]

The fight began at half past seven o'clock, a little before moonrise, on

a cloudy evening, in smooth water. The two principal opponents delivered

their entire broadsides at the same moment. At this first fire, two of

the old eighteens in the American frigate burst, killing a dozen men.

After this disaster, no one had confidence enough in such guns to fire

them again, so that the Bon Homme Richard was at once reduced to two

thirds the force of her antagonist, and in ordinary fight must soon have

been overcome. A brisk cannonade was kept up for an hour, while the two

ships manoeuvred for a raking position. The Serapis, being much the

better sailer, was passing across her adversary's bows, with very little

elbow-room, when Jones succeeded in running his vessel into her just aft

of her weather beam. For a moment all firing ceased on both ships, and

Captain Pearson called out, "Have you struck your colours?" "I have not

yet begun to fight," replied Captain Jones. For a moment the ships

separated, the Serapis running ahead almost in a line with the Bon Homme

Richard. The Serapis now put her helm hard down and was boxhauled, in

order to luff up athwart her adversary's bow, and thus regain her raking

position; but the Bon Homme Richard changed her tack, and presently, in

a dense cloud of smoke, the two ships came together again, the British

bowsprit passing over the high old-fashioned poop of the American

vessel. This was just what Jones desired, and as he stood there on his

quarter-deck he seized a stout rope, and lashed the enemy's jib-boom to

his mizzen-mast. Thus tied fast, the pressure of the light wind brought

the ships alongside, the head of the one lying opposite the stern of the

other. Grappling-hooks were now thrown into the quarter of the Serapis,

and with repeated lashings fore and aft the two monsters were held

together in deadly embrace. So close did they lie that their yards were

interlocked, and some of the guns of the Serapis became useless for want

of room to use the rammers. The advantage of her superior armament was

thus in some measure lost, while her advantage in quickness of movement

was entirely neutralized. Still her heavy guns at this short range did

frightful execution, and the main deck of the Bon Homme Richard was soon

covered with mangled and dying men, while her timbers were badly

shivered and many cannon were knocked from their carriages. Unable to

bear this terrible fire, the Americans crowded upon the upper deck in

such numbers as easily to defeat the British attempts to board. Parties

of marksmen, climbing into the rigging, cleared the enemy's tops, and

shot down every man upon the Serapis who ventured from under cover.

Hand-grenades were thrown into her portholes to slay the gunners; and

presently one bold fellow, crawling out to the very end of the Bon Homme

Richard's main-yard, just over the main hatchway of the Serapis, dropped

one of these mischievous missiles through the hatchway, where it ignited

a row of cartridges that were lying upon the main deck. The explosion

ran swiftly along the line, as through a pack of gigantic fire-crackers.

More than twenty men were blown into fragments, their heads, arms, and

legs flying in every direction, while forty others were disabled. With

the havoc already wrought by the guns, the Serapis had now lost two

fifths of her crew, and her fire perceptibly slackened; so that the

Americans were able to go below and work their guns again, pouring into

the British portholes a storm of grape and canister which made an awful

carnage.

It was now ten o'clock. All this time the Alliance had kept out of the

fight, but the Pallas had attacked the Countess of Scarborough, and

after a brisk cannonade compelled her to surrender. The Alliance now

came down, and stupidly poured a raking volley along the decks of the

two chief combatants, doing impartial damage to friend and foe. Warning

shouts went up from the Bon Homme Richard, and her commander called out

to Captain Landais to fall upon the farther side of the Serapis and

board her. The Frenchman replied that he would do so, but instead he ran

his ship off a couple of miles to leeward, and comfortably awaited the

end of the battle. By this time the Serapis was on fire in several

places, so that part of her crew had to leave their guns, and bend all

their energies to extinguishing the flames. The American ship was in

still worse plight; she had not only been burning for half an hour, but

so many holes had been shot in her hull that she began to sink. She had

more than a hundred British prisoners below decks, and these men were

now set free and marshalled at the pumps. Few guns were worked on

either ship, and the rest of the fight between the two exhausted

combatants was a mere question of dogged tenacity. At last Captain

Jones, with his own hands, directed a couple of guns against the enemy's

mainmast, and just as it was threatening to fall she surrendered. The

gallant British commander stood almost alone on the main deck of his

ship, in the midst of an awful scene of death; while of his few men who

remained unhurt, most had sunk down, panting and overcome with fatigue.

No sooner were the ships cut asunder than the tottering mainmast of the

Serapis went overboard, carrying with it the mizzen topmast and all the

mizzen rigging.[30] The Bon Homme Richard was with difficulty kept

afloat till morning, and all night long fresh men from her consorts were

hard at work fighting the flames, while the wounded were being carried

off. At ten o'clock next morning she sank.

[Sidenote: Effect of Jones's victory]

Thus ended one of the most obstinate and murderous struggles recorded in

naval history. Of the men engaged, more than half were killed or badly

wounded, and few got off without some scar or bruise to carry as a

memento of that dreadful night. From a merely military point of view,

this first considerable fight between British and American frigates had

perhaps no great significance. But the moral effect, in Europe, of such

a victory within sight of the British coast was prodigious. The King of

France made Paul Jones a knight of the order of merit, and from the

Empress of Russia he received the ribbon of St. Anne. The King of

Denmark settled a pension on him, while throughout Europe his exploit

was told and told again in the gazettes, and at the drinking-tables on

street corners. On his arrival in Holland, whither he went with his

prizes a fortnight after the battle, the British government peremptorily

demanded that he should be given up, to be hanged as a pirate. The

sympathies of the Dutch were decidedly with the Americans; but as they

were not quite ready to go to war with England, a tardy notice was given

to Jones, after ten weeks, that he had better quit the country. Though

chased by a British fleet, he got safely to France in December, and

after various adventures, lasting through the ensuing year, he reached

Philadelphia early in 1781. On inquiry into the extraordinary behaviour

of Captain Landais some doubt as to his sanity arose, so that he was not

shot for disobedience of orders, but simply discharged from the navy.

Paul Jones was put in command of the America 74, but the war was so

nearly ended that he did not get to sea again, and Congress presented

his ship to the King of France. In 1788, he passed into the Russian

service with the rank of rear-admiral. He died in Paris, in 1792, in the

forty-fifth year of his age.

[Portrait: De Vergennes]

Here the question naturally arises, Why should the King of Denmark and

the Empress of Russia have felt so much interest in the victory of Paul

Jones as to confer distinguished honours upon him for winning it? The

answer, at which we shall presently arrive, will forcibly disclose to us

the extent to which, by the end of the year 1779, the whole civilized

world had become involved in the quarrel between England and her

revolted colonies. As at the bridge of Concord the embattled farmers of

Massachusetts had once fired a shot heard round the world, so those last

guns aimed by Paul Jones against the mainmast of the Serapis aroused an

echo of which the reverberations were not to cease until it should be

shown that henceforth nobler principles of international law must

prevail upon the high seas than had ever yet been acknowledged. We have

now to trace the origin and progress of the remarkable complication of

affairs which at length, during the year 1780, brought all the other

maritime powers of Europe into an attitude of hostility toward Great

Britain. For not until we have duly comprehended this can we understand

the world-wide significance of our Revolutionary War, or estimate aright

the bearings of the events which led to that grand twofold

consummation,--the recognition of the independence of the United States,

and the overthrow of the personal government of George III. in England.

[Sidenote: Relations of Spain to France and England]

Paul Jones was not the only enemy who hovered about the British coast in

the summer of 1779. In June of that year, Spain declared war against

England, but without recognizing the independence of the United States,

or entering into an alliance with us. From the beginning, Count

Vergennes had sought Spanish aid in his plans for supporting the

Americans, but anything like cordial coöperation between Spain and

France in such an undertaking was impossible, for their interests were

in many respects directly opposite. So far as mere hatred toward England

was concerned, Spain doubtless went even farther than France. Spain had

not forgotten that she had once been mistress of the seas, or that it

was England which had ousted her from this supremacy in the days of

Queen Elizabeth. Of England, as the greatest of Protestant and

constitutional powers, as the chief defender of political and religious

liberty, priest-ridden and king-ridden Spain was the natural enemy. She

had also, like France, the recollection of injuries lately suffered in

the Seven Years' War to urge her to a policy of revenge. And to crown

all, in the event of a successful war, she might hope to regain Jamaica,

or the Floridas, or Minorca, or, above all, Gibraltar, that impregnable

stronghold, the possession of which by England had for more than sixty

years made Spaniards blush for shame. On the other hand, Spain regarded

the Americans with a hatred probably not less rancorous than that which

she felt toward the British. The mere existence of these English

colonies in North America was a perpetual reminder of the days when the

papal edict granting this continent to Spain had been set at naught by

heretical cruisers and explorers. The obnoxious principles of civil and

religious liberty were represented here with even greater emphasis than

in England. In Mexico and South America the Spanish crown had still a

vast colonial empire; and it was rightly foreseen that a successful

revolt of the English colonies would furnish a dangerous precedent for

the Spanish colonies to follow. Spain was, moreover, the chief upholder

of the old system of commercial monopoly; and here her interests were

directly opposed to those of France, which, since it had been deprived

of its colonial empire, saw in the general overthrow of commercial

monopoly the surest way of regaining its share in the trade of the

world.

[Portrait: COUNT FLORIDA BLANCA]

[Signature: el conde de florida blanca]

[Sidenote: Intrigues of Spain]

[Sidenote: Treaty between Spain and France, April, 1779]

Under the influence of these conflicting motives, the conduct of Spain

was marked for a time by hesitation and double-dealing. Between his

various wishes and fears, the Spanish prime minister, Florida Blanca,

knew not what course to pursue. When he heard of the alliance between

France and the United States, which was undertaken against his advice to

Vergennes, his wrath knew no bounds. It was a treaty, he said, "worthy

of Don Quixote." At first he intrigued with the British government,

offering his services as mediator between England and France. Lord

Weymouth, the British minister for foreign affairs, refused to enter

into any negotiation so long as France should extend aid to the rebel

colonies. To the covert threat of the wily Spaniard, that if the war

were to continue his royal master would doubtless feel compelled to take

part with one side or the other, Lord Weymouth replied that the

independence of the United States would prove fatal to the continuance

of Spanish control over Mexico and South America; and he suggested,

accordingly, that the true interest of Spain lay in forming an alliance

with Great Britain. While this secret discussion was going on, Florida

Blanca also sounded Vergennes, proposing that peace should be made on

such terms as to allow the British to retain possession of Rhode Island

and New York. This, he thought, would prevent the formation of an

American Union, and would sow the seeds of everlasting dissension

between Great Britain and the American States, whereby the energies of

the English race would be frittered away in internecine conflict,

leaving room for Spain to expand itself. But Vergennes would not hear of

this. France had recognized the independence of the thirteen States, and

had explicitly and publicly agreed to carry on the war until that

independence should be acknowledged by England; and from that position

she could not easily retreat. At the same time Vergennes intimated that

France was in no way bound to protect the American claim to the Ohio

valley, and was far from desiring that the people of the United States

should control the whole of North America. Upon this suggestion the

Spanish court finally acted. After six months more of diplomatic

fencing, a treaty was concluded in April, 1779, between France and

Spain, whereby it was agreed that these two powers should undertake a

concerted invasion of England. For this undertaking, France was to

furnish the land force, while both powers were to raise as great a naval

armament as possible. France was to assist Spain in recovering Minorca

and the Floridas, and if Newfoundland could be conquered, its fisheries

were to be monopolized by the two parties to this treaty. Neither power

was to make peace on any terms until England should have surrendered

Gibraltar to Spain.

This convention brought Spain into the lists against England without

bringing her directly into alliance with the United States. She was left

free to negotiate with Congress at her own good pleasure, and might ask

for the whole Mississippi valley, if she chose, in return for her

assistance. Gerard, the French minister at Philadelphia, sought to

persuade Congress to give up the fisheries and relinquish all claim to

the territory west of the Alleghanies. There were hot debates on this

subject in 1779, and indeed the situation of affairs was sufficiently

complicated to call for the exercise of skilful diplomacy. As the treaty

between France and Spain became known in America, it was felt to be in

some respects inconsistent with the prior convention between France and

the United States. In that convention it had been stipulated that

neither party should make peace with Great Britain without the consent

of the other. In the convention between France and Spain it was agreed

that neither party should make peace until Great Britain should

surrender Gibraltar. But the Americans rightly felt that, should Great

Britain be found willing to concede their independence, they were in no

wise bound to keep up the war for the sole purpose of helping France to

conquer Gibraltar for a power which had never owed them any good will,

and was at this very moment hoping to cut down their territory. The

proposal to exclude America as well as Great Britain from the fisheries

excited loud indignation in New England.

[Sidenote: French and Spanish fleets attempt an invasion of England,

Aug., 1779]

Meanwhile, the new allies had gone energetically to work. Early in 1779,

a French fleet had captured the British settlements in Senegambia, and

made a vigorous though unsuccessful assault upon the island of Jersey.

In June, war was declared by Spain so suddenly that England was quite

taken by surprise. Florida Blanca had lied with so grave a face that

Lord North had not been looking out for such a step. In August, the

allied French and Spanish fleets, numbering more than sixty

ships-of-the-line, with a full complement of frigates, entered the

English Channel, with intent to repeat the experiment of the Invincible

Armada; while a French army lay at Havre, ready to cross at the first

opportunity. To oppose this formidable force, Admiral Hardy was able to

get together only thirty-eight ships-of-the-line, with the ordinary

proportion of frigates. There was a panic in England, and the militia

were called out. But owing to dissensions between the French and Spanish

admirals and serious illness in the crews, nothing whatever was

accomplished, and the great fleet retired crestfallen from the channel.

Everybody blamed everybody else, while an immense sum of money had been

spent upon a wretched fiasco. In America, however, the allies were more

successful. Galvez, the Spanish governor of Louisiana, captured Baton

Rouge and Mobile, with their British garrisons, and preparations were

made for the siege of Pensacola, to complete the conquest of West

Florida. In the West Indies, the islands of Grenada and St. Vincent were

captured by Estaing. The moment that war was declared by Spain, there

was begun that siege of Gibraltar which, for the heroic defence, as well

as for its long duration of nearly four years, has had no parallel in

the annals of modern warfare.

[Portrait: G B Rodney]

[Sidenote: Sir George Rodney]

It was only through maritime expeditions that the two new allies could

directly assail England with any hope of success; but here on the sea

her natural superiority was not long in asserting itself. Great efforts

were made to increase the strength of the navy, and in December, 1779,

the command of the fleet in the West Indies was given to a man who among

English sailors ranks with Blake and Hawke, on a plane inferior only to

that occupied by Nelson. The brilliant career of Sir George Rodney began

in the Seven Years' War, in the course of which he bombarded Havre, thus

warding off a projected invasion of England, and moreover captured

several islands in the West Indies. It was Pitt who first discerned his

genius, and put him into a position in which he could win victories.

After the peace of 1763 he became a member of Parliament, but lost all

he had in gambling, and fled to France to get rid of his creditors. When

war broke out between France and England in 1778, the venerable Marshal

de Biron lent him enough money to save him from the Marshalsea or the

Fleet, and he returned to England to be appointed to the chief command

in the West Indies. A vain and unscrupulous man, as many called him, he

was none the less a most skilful and indomitable captain. He was

ordered, on his way to the West Indies, to relieve Gibraltar, which was

beginning to suffer the horrors of famine, and never was such a task

more brilliantly performed. First, he had the good fortune to fall in

with fifteen Spanish ships, loaded with provisions and under the convoy

of seven war vessels, and all this fleet he captured. Then, at Cape St.

Vincent, on a dark and stormy night, he gave chase to a Spanish fleet of

eleven ships-of-the-line and two frigates, and in a sharp fight captured

or destroyed all but four of them without losing one of his own ships.

He thus reached Gibraltar, and after passing up to the fortress the

welcome cargoes of the fifteen merchant prizes went on to the West

Indies, where his presence turned the scale against the allies. A

powerful French fleet under Count de Guichen was cruising in those

waters; and it was hoped that this fleet would soon be able to come to

New York and coöperate with Washington in an attempt to regain that

city. But the arrival of Rodney changed all this, and the Count de

Guichen, after being worsted in battle, sailed away for France, while

Rodney proceeded to New York, to relieve Sir Henry Clinton and foil the

projects of Washington.

[Sidenote: Rights of neutrals upon the sea]

[Sidenote: The Consolato del Mare]

That very supremacy upon the sea, however, which enabled England to defy

the combined fleets of France and Spain served, in its immediate

consequences, only to involve her in fresh difficulties. By the arrogant

and indiscriminate manner in which she exercised the right of search,

she soon succeeded in uniting against her all the neutral nations of

Europe; and a principle of international law was laid down which in our

own time has become fully established, and must in future essentially

limit the areas over which wars are likely to extend. This new principle

of international law related to the rights of merchant vessels belonging

to neutral powers in time of war. In early times it was held that if one

country went to war with another, its right to prey upon its enemy's

commerce was virtually unlimited. If it found its enemy's goods carried

in a ship belonging to some neutral power, it had a right to seize and

confiscate them; and in days when hostility was the rule and peace the

exception, when warfare was deemed honourable and commerce ignoble, and

when the usages of war were rough and unscrupulous, the neutral ship

itself, which carried the goods, was very likely to be confiscated also.

As the neutral power whose ship was seized would be sure to resent such

behaviour, it followed that any war between two maritime powers was

likely to spread until it involved every other power which possessed any

merchant shipping or did any business upon the high seas. With a view to

confining such evils within as narrow a limit as possible, the maritime

code known as the Consolato del Mare, which represented the commercial

interests of the Middle Ages, and was generally accepted as of the

highest authority in maritime affairs, recognized the right of

confiscating an enemy's goods found in a neutral ship, but did not

recognize the right of confiscating the neutral ship. In the Middle Ages

maritime warfare played a subordinate part; but after colonies had been

planted in America and the East Indies by the great maritime nations of

Western Europe, the demand for fixed rules, whereby the usages of such

warfare should be regulated, soon came to be of transcendent importance.

England and the Netherlands, as powers with whom industrial

considerations were of the first consequence and military considerations

only secondary, adhered firmly to the rule of the Consolato del Mare as

the most liberal rule then in existence. France and Spain, as

preëminently militant powers, caring more for the means of annoying an

enemy than for the interests of commerce in general, asserted the

principle that neutral ships detected in carrying an enemy's goods were

themselves lawful subjects for seizure. France, however, did not hold

this doctrine so firmly as Spain. Here, as in so many other respects,

France showed herself more advanced in civilization than Spain, while

less advanced than England and the Netherlands. In 1655, by a treaty

between Cromwell and Mazarin, France accepted the English rule; in 1681,

under the retrograde government of Louis XIV., she went back to her

ancient practice; in 1744, she again adopted the English rule, while

Spain kept on with her old custom, until sharply called to account by

Russia in 1780.

[Illustration: MEDAL GIVEN PAUL JONES BY CONGRESS (OBVERSE)]

[Illustration: MEDAL GIVEN PAUL JONES BY CONGRESS (REVERSE)]

[Sidenote: England’s conduct in the eighteenth century]

Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the most liberal doctrines

respecting maritime warfare had concerned themselves only with the

protection of neutral ships. It had never occurred to anybody to

maintain that the goods of an enemy should be guaranteed against

scrutiny and seizure by the mere fact of their being carried on a

neutral ship. That any belligerent could seize its antagonist's

property, if found on a neutral ship, was the doctrine laid down alike

by Vattel and Bynkershoek, the chief French and Dutch authorities on

maritime law. In acting upon this principle, therefore, at the time of

our Revolutionary War, England acted strictly in accordance with the

recognized maritime law of Europe. She was not, as some American writers

seem to have supposed, introducing a new principle of aggression, in

virtue of her position as chief among maritime powers. In stopping the

defenceless merchant vessels of neutral or friendly powers, compelling

them to show their bills of lading, searching their holds if need be,

subjecting them to a hateful inquisition and vexatious delays, she did

no more than every maritime nation had been in the habit of doing, and

even less than Spain claimed the right to do. It was quite natural, too,

that England should insist upon retaining this privilege, as something

which no great naval power could afford to dispense with; for obviously,

if in time of war your enemy can go on trading with everybody but

yourself, and can even receive timber and provisions from people not

concerned in the struggle, your means of crippling him are very

materially diminished.

[Sidenote: Prussian doctrine: free ships make free goods]

[Sidenote: Influence of the French philosophers]

Such reasoning seemed conclusive everywhere in Europe until after the

middle of the eighteenth century. At that time, however, the unexampled

naval preponderance of England began to lead other nations to take a new

view of the case. By the maintenance of the old rule, England could

damage other nations much more than they could damage her. Other

nations, accordingly, began to feel that it would be a good thing if the

flag of a neutral ship might be held to protect any merchandise

whatsoever that she might happen to have on board. This modern doctrine,

that free ships make free goods, was first suggested by Prussia in 1752.

Such a view naturally commended itself to a nation which had a

considerable number of merchantmen afloat, without any navy fit to

protect them; and it was accordingly likely to find favour in the eyes

of such nations as Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and the United States. But,

more than this, it was a view entirely in accordance with the

philosophic tendencies of the age. The great humanitarian movement,

which in our time has borne rich and ample fruit, and which has tended

in every practicable way to diminish the occasions for warfare and to

restrict its scope, had its first brilliant literary representatives

among the clear-sighted and enthusiastic French philosophers of the

eighteenth century. The liberal tendencies in politics, which hitherto

England alone had represented practically, were caught up in France, as

soon as the dismal and protracted tyranny of Louis XIV. had come to an

end, with an eagerness that partook of fanaticism. English political

ideas, without being thoroughly comprehended in their practical

bearings, were seized and generalized by Montesquieu and Turgot, and a

host of lesser writers, until they acquired a width of scope and a

genial interest which exercised a prodigious influence upon the thought

of Continental Europe. Never in any age, perhaps, since the days when

Sokrates talked to enchanted crowds upon street corners in Athens, did

men of broad philosophic ideas come so closely into contact with men

absorbed in the pursuit of life's immediate ends as at the time when all

Paris rushed to kiss the hand of Voltaire, and when ladies of the court

went to sleep with the last _brochure_ of Diderot or Helvetius under

their pillows. The generous "enthusiasm of humanity," which revealed

itself in every line of the writings of these great men, played an

important part in the political history of the eighteenth century. It

was an age of crowned philosophers and benevolent despots. Joseph of

Austria, Frederick of Prussia, and Catherine of Russia, in their several

ways, furnished illustrations of this tendency. Catherine, who wrote

letters to Voltaire, and admired Fox above all other English statesmen,

set almost as much store by free thought as by free love, and her

interest in the amelioration of mankind in general was second only to

her particular interest in the humiliation of the Turk. The idea of

taking the lead in a general movement for the liberation of maritime

commerce was sure to prove congenial to her enlightened mind, and her

action would have great weight with England, which at that time,

isolated from all European sympathy, was especially desirous of an

alliance with Russia, and especially anxious to avoid offending her.

[Portrait: Catherine]

[Sidenote: Great Britain wishes to secure an alliance with Russia]

[Sidenote: Importance of Minorca]

At the beginning of 1778, Sir James Harris, afterward Earl of

Malmesbury, was sent as ambassador to St. Petersburg, with instructions

to leave no stone unturned to secure an offensive and defensive alliance

between Russia and Great Britain, in order to offset and neutralize the

alliance between France and the United States. Negotiations to this end

were kept up as long as the war lasted, but they proved fruitless. While

Catherine coquetted and temporized, the Prussian ambassador had her ear,

and his advice was unfavourable to such an alliance. For the England of

Pitt the great Frederick felt sympathy and gratitude; for the England of

George III. he had nothing but hatred, and his counsels went far to

steady Catherine, if ever she showed signs of wavering. The weight of

France was of course thrown into the same scale, and for four years the

Russian court was the scene of brisk and multifarious intrigues. Harris

said that his very valets were offered bribes by busybodies who wished

to get a look at his papers; and when he went out, leaving his secretary

writing, he used to lock him up, not through doubts of his fidelity, but

lest he should thoughtlessly leave the door ajar. From Prince Potemkin,

one of Catherine's lovers whose favour Harris courted, he learned that

nothing short of the cession of Minorca would induce the empress to

enter into the desired alliance. Russia was already taking advantage of

the situation to overrun and annex the Crimea, and the maritime outlook

thus acquired made her eager to secure some naval station on the

Mediterranean. Minorca was England's to give. She had won it in the war

of the Spanish Succession, and for seventy years it had been one of the

brightest jewels in her imperial crown. Together with Gibraltar it had

given her that firm grasp upon the Mediterranean which--strengthened in

later times by the acquisition of Malta, Cyprus, and the isthmus of

Suez--has gone far toward making that vast inland sea an English lake.

So great a value did England set upon Minorca, that when, in the Seven

Years' War, it was lost for a moment, through an error of judgment on

the part of Admiral Byng, the British people were seized with a

bloodthirsty frenzy, and one of the foulest judicial murders known to

history was committed when that gallant commander was shot on his own

quarter-deck. Yet even this island, by which England set such store, she

was now ready to surrender in exchange for the help of Russia against

her revolted colonies and the House of Bourbon. It was not, however,

until 1781 that the offer of Minorca was made, and then Catherine had so

far acceded to the general combination against England that she could

not help refusing it. That such an offer should ever have been made

shows how important an alliance with Russia seemed to England at the

moment when France and Spain were leagued against her, and all the

neutral powers looked on her with hostile eyes. We can thus the better

appreciate the significance of the step which Russia was now to take

with reference to the great question of maritime law that was beginning

to agitate the civilized world.

[Sidenote: France adopts the Prussian doctrine]

In the summer of 1778, the French government, with intent to curb the

depredations of British cruisers, issued a proclamation adopting the

Prussian doctrine of 1752, that free ships make free goods, and

Vergennes took occasion to suggest that Catherine should put herself at

the head of a league of neutral powers for the purpose of protecting

neutral commerce all over the world. For the moment no decided action

was taken, but the idea was one of those broad ideas in which the

empress delighted. Count Panin, her principal minister, who was strongly

in sympathy with the King of Prussia, insisted upon the necessity of

protecting the commerce of minor powers against England, which since

1763 had become the great naval bully of the world. England was

doubtless acting in strict accordance with time-honoured custom, but

circumstances had changed, and the law must be changed to meet them. The

first great war since 1763 was now showing that England could destroy

the commerce of all the rest of the world, without any fear of

retaliation except through a universal war. During the summers of 1778

and 1779, Prussian, Swedish, Danish, and Dutch ships were continually

overhauled by British cruisers, and robbed of cargoes which they were

carrying to France. Such gross outrages upon private property, however

sanctioned by laws of war that had grown up in a barbarous age, awakened

general indignation throughout Europe; and from whatever quarter

complaints poured in, Vergennes and Frederick took good care that they

should be laid before the Empress of Russia, until presently she came to

look upon herself as the champion of little states and oppressed

tradesmen.

[Sidenote: Affair of Fielding and Bylandt]

The British depredations were, moreover, apt to be characterized by an

arrogance which, while it rendered them all the more exasperating,

sometimes transcended the limits of aggression prescribed by the rude

maritime law of that day. Upon Netherland commerce England was

especially severe, for the Dutch had more merchant shipping than any

other people on the Continent, with a weak navy to protect it. England

forbade the Dutch to send timber to France, as it would probably be used

in building ships of war. On the 30th of December, 1779, seventeen Dutch

vessels, laden with tar and hemp, and other materials useful in

shipyards, were sailing through the English Channel, escorted by five

ships-of-the-line under Count Bylandt, when toward nightfall they were

overtaken and hailed by a British squadron of sixteen ships-of-the-line

under Admiral Fielding. A lively parley ensued. Bylandt swore that his

ships should not be searched, and Fielding threatened violence. While

this was going on, twelve of the Dutch ships got away under cover of

darkness, and reached in safety the French ports to which they were

bound. Early in the morning, Bylandt fired upon the boat which was

bringing a party of British officers to search the merchantmen that

remained. Upon this, three British ships instantly poured their

broadsides into the Dutch flagship, which returned the compliment, and

then hauled down its flag, as resistance was useless. Nobody was killed,

but Fielding seized the five merchantmen, and took them in to

Portsmouth. The States-General of the Netherlands complained of the

outrage to Lord Stormont, the new foreign secretary, and demanded the

restitution of the prizes. The matter was referred to the British court

of admiralty, and the singular doctrine was there laid down that the

Dutch vessels were virtually blockade-runners, and as such were lawfully

captured! "Great Britain," said the judge, "by her insular position,

blocks naturally all the ports of Spain and France, and she has a right

to avail herself of this position as a gift of Providence." But the

States-General did not accept this interpretation of the law and

theology of the matter, and they appealed to the Empress of Russia.

[Sidenote: Spanish cruisers capture Russian vessels]

[Sidenote: Catherine's proclamation, March 8, 1780]

Just at this moment events occurred which compelled Catherine to take

some decided stand on the question of neutral rights. Through fear of

adding her to the list of their enemies, the British ministry had

issued the most stringent orders that no Russian vessels should be

searched or molested, under any circumstances. The Dutch and Danish

flags might be insulted at pleasure, but that of Russia must be

respected; and so well were these orders obeyed that Catherine had no

grounds for complaint against England on this score. Spain, on the other

hand, was less cautious. In the winter of 1779-80, her cruisers captured

two Russian vessels laden with wheat, in the mistaken belief that their

cargoes were destined for Gibraltar. The ships were taken into Cadiz,

their cargoes were sold at auction, while their penniless crews were

outrageously treated by the people, and came little short of starving.

Hereupon Catherine without delay ordered out fifteen ships-of-the-line

and five frigates for the protection of Russian commerce. For a moment

war between Spain and Russia seemed imminent. But Panin moved with

cautious shrewdness, and consulted the King of Prussia, who persuaded

Florida Blanca to restore the captured ships, with compensation to the

owners of the cargoes, and an ample apology for the blunder. The empress

was satisfied, and Panin assured her that now the time had come for her

to act with magnanimity and power, laying down an impartial code for the

protection of maritime commerce, and thus establishing a claim to the

gratitude of mankind through all future ages. On the 8th of March, 1780,

Catherine issued a proclamation, setting forth the principles of

maritime law which she was henceforth resolved to defend by force, if

necessary. Henceforth neutral ships were to sail unmolested from port to

port, even on the coasts of countries at war. They were to be free to

carry into such ports any goods or merchandise whatsoever, except arms

and ammunition, and the right of search was to be tolerated as regarded

such contraband articles, and for no other purpose. Hereafter no port

was to be considered blockaded unless the enemy's ships of war should be

near enough to make it dangerous to enter.

[Portrait: Gerard]

[Sidenote: The Armed Neutrality]

These principles were immediately adopted by Spain, France, and the

United States, the three powers actually at war with England. At the

same time, Denmark and Sweden entered into an arrangement with Russia

for the mutual protection of their commerce. It was announced that for

every Danish, Swedish, or Russian ship searched or seized by the

cruisers of any belligerent power, a strict retaliation would be made by

the allied navies of these three countries. This covenant, known as the

Armed Neutrality, was practically a threat aimed at England, and through

her unwillingness to alienate Russia it proved a very effective threat.

We can now understand the interest shown by Denmark and Russia in the

victory of Paul Jones, and we can also appreciate the prodigious moral

effect of that victory. So overwhelming was England's naval superiority

that the capture of a single one of her warships was a memorable event.

To the lesser maritime powers it seemed to bring the United States at

once into the front rank of belligerents. The British ministry was too

well instructed to be brought under this spell; but in view of the great

hostile combination now formed against it, for the moment it was at its

wits' end. "An ambiguous and trimming answer was given," says Sir James

Harris; "we seemed equally afraid to accept or dismiss the new-fangled

doctrines. I was instructed secretly to oppose, but avowedly to

acquiesce in them." In England, the wrath and disgust extended to all

parties. Shelburne and Camden joined with North and Thurlow in

denouncing Catherine's proclamation as an impudent attempt, on the part

of an upstart power, hardly known on the sea till quite lately, to

dictate maritime law to the greatest maritime power the world had ever

seen. It was contended that the right to search neutral vessels and take

an enemy's goods from them was a cardinal principle of international

law; and jurists, of course, found the whole body of precedents on the

side of this opinion. But in spite of all protests these "new-fangled

doctrines," subversive of all precedent, were almost immediately adopted

throughout Europe. In December, 1780, the Netherlands joined the Armed

Neutrality, under circumstances presently to be related. In May, 1781,

it was joined by Prussia; in October, 1781, by the Empire; in July,

1782, by Portugal; in September, 1782, by the Turk; in February, 1783,

by the Kingdom of Naples. Though England's maritime strength exceeded

that of all the members of the league taken together, she could not

afford to run the risk of war with all the world at once; and thus the

doctrine that free ships make free goods acquired a firm foothold. In

the chaos of the Napoleonic wars, indeed, paper blockades and illegal

seizures abounded, and it fared ill with neutral commerce on the high

seas. But the principles laid down by Catherine survived that terrible

crisis, and at last they were formally adopted by England at the close

of the Crimean War, in 1856.

[Sidenote: Vast Importance of the principles laid down by Catherine]

This successful assertion of the rights of neutrals was one of the

greatest and most beneficent revolutions in the whole history of human

warfare. It was the most emphatic declaration that had ever been made of

the principle that the interests of peace are paramount and permanent,

while those of war are subordinate and temporary. In the interest of

commerce it put a mighty curb upon warfare, and announced that for the

future the business of the producer is entitled to higher consideration

than that of the destroyer. Few things have ever done so much to confine

the area of warfare and limit its destructive power. If the old doctrine

were in force at the present day, when commerce has expanded to such

enormous dimensions, and every sea is populous with merchant ships, it

would be well-nigh impossible for any two maritime powers to go to war

without dragging all the rest of the world into the struggle. For the

speedy accomplishment of this great reform we have chiefly to thank the

Empress Catherine, whose action at the critical moment was so prompt and

decisive. It is curious to consider that an act which so distinctly

subordinated military to industrial interests should have emanated from

that country of Europe which had least outgrown the militant stage of

civilization, and should have been chiefly opposed by that country which

had advanced the farthest into the industrial stage. It is a brilliant

instance of what may be achieved by an enlightened despot when

circumstances are entirely favourable. Among the many acts of Catherine

which, in spite of her horrible vices, have won the admiration of

mankind, this is doubtless the most memorable; and as time goes on we

shall realize its importance more and more.

[Sidenote: Relations between Great Britain and Holland]

The immediate effect of the Armed Neutrality was to deprive England of

one of her principal weapons of offence. To add to her embarrassment,

there now came war with Holland. While there was strong sympathy between

the British and Dutch governments, there was great jealousy between the

peoples which had so long been rivals in the colonial world. Hence

there were two parties in the Netherlands,--the party of the

Stadtholder, which was subservient to the policy of the British

government, and the popular party, which looked with favour upon the

American cause. The popular party was far the more numerous, including

all the merchants of the most mercantile of countries, and it was

especially strong in the city of Amsterdam. A brisk trade--illicit from

the British point of view--was carried on between Holland and the United

States, chiefly through the little Dutch island of St. Eustatius, in the

West Indies. An equally lively trade went on between Holland and France,

and against this England felt that she had an especial right to make

complaint. Her relations with Holland were regulated not simply by the

ordinary law of nations, but by careful and elaborate treaties, made in

the days when the two peoples were leagued in sympathy against the

aggressive policy of Louis XIV. In 1678, it had been agreed that if

either England or Holland should be attacked by France, both powers

should make common cause against their common enemy; and in 1716 this

agreement had been renewed in such wise as to include the contingency of

an attack by Spain, since a younger branch of the House of Bourbon had

succeeded to the Spanish throne. When, in 1779, Spain declared war

against England, the latter power accordingly called upon the

Netherlands for aid; but no aid was given, for the Dutch felt that they

had an especial right to complain of the conduct of England. By that

same treaty which in 1674 had finally given New York to the English, it

had been provided that in case either England or Holland should ever go

to war with any other country, the ordinary rules of maritime law should

not be enforced as between these two friendly commercial powers. It was

agreed that either power might freely trade with the enemies of the

other; and such a treaty was at that time greatly to the credit of both

nations. It was made in a moment when an honourable spirit of commercial

equity prevailed. But it was one of the chief symptoms of the utter

demoralization of the British government in 1778, after the untimely

death of Lord Chatham, that these treaty obligations were completely

ignored; and in the general plunder of merchant shipping which went on

at that time, no nation suffered like the Dutch. George III. now felt

that he had got everything into his own hands, and when the Dutch

complained he gave them to understand that, treaty or no treaty, he

should do as he pleased. Under such circumstances, it was rather cool

for England to ask aid against Spain, and the Dutch quite naturally

turned a deaf ear to the demand.

[Portrait: Henry Laurens]

[Sidenote: Holland joins the Armed Neutrality]

It was thus a very pretty quarrel as it stood at the end of 1779, when

Fielding fired upon the flagship of Count Bylandt, and Paul Jones was

allowed to stay with his prizes ten weeks in a Dutch harbour. Each party

was thus furnished with an "outrage." The righteous anger of the Dutch

over the high-handed conduct of Fielding was matched by the British

chagrin over the victory of Jones. The Stadtholder's weak efforts to

keep the peace were quite overwhelmed in the storm of wrath that arose.

After much altercation, England notified Holland that all treaties

between the two countries must be considered as abrogated, owing to the

faithless behaviour of the Dutch in refusing aid against Spain, in

trading with France and America, in resisting the right of search, and

in sheltering Paul Jones. Having thus got rid of the treaties, England

proceeded to act as if there were no such thing as international law

where Dutchmen were concerned. During the summer of 1780, the wholesale

robbery on the high seas grew worse than ever, and, with a baseness that

seems almost incredible, the British ambassador at the Hague was

instructed to act as a spy, and gather information concerning the

voyages of Dutch merchants, so that British cruisers might know just

where to pounce upon the richest prizes. Thus goaded beyond human

endurance, Holland at last joined the Armed Neutrality, hoping thereby

to enlist in her behalf the formidable power of Russia.

[Portrait: William Lee]

[Sidenote: Capture of Henry Laurens and his papers]

[Sidenote: Great Britain declares war against Holland, Dec. 20, 1780]

But the policy of England, though bold in the extreme, was so far well

considered as to have provided against such an emergency. She was

determined to make war on Holland, to punish her for joining the Armed

Neutrality; but if she were to avow this reason, it would at once entail

war with Russia also, so that it was necessary to find some other

reason. The requisite bone of contention was furnished by a curiously

opportune accident. In October, 1780, an American packet was captured

off the banks of Newfoundland, and among the prisoners was Henry

Laurens, lately president of Congress, now on his way to the Hague to

negotiate a loan. He threw his papers overboard, but a quick-witted tar

jumped after them, and caught them in the water. Among them was found a

project for a future treaty of commerce between the Netherlands and the

United States which had been secretly concerted two years before between

Jean de Neufville, an Amsterdam merchant, and William Lee, an American

commissioner to Berlin. It was signed also by Van Berckel, the chief

magistrate of Amsterdam; but as it had been neither authorized nor

sanctioned by the States-General or by Congress, it had no validity

whatever. Quite naturally, however, the discovery of such a document

caused much irritation in England, and it furnished just the sort of

excuse for going to war which the ministry wanted. To impose upon the

imagination of the common people, Laurens was escorted through the

streets of London by a regiment of soldiers, and shut up in the Tower,

where he was denied pen and paper, and no one was allowed to enter his

room. A demand was made upon Holland to disavow the act of Van Berckel,

and to inflict condign punishment upon him and his accomplices, "as

disturbers of the public peace and violators of the rights of nations."

In making this demand, it was foreseen that the States-General would

disavow the act of Van Berckel, but would nevertheless decline to regard

him as a fit subject for punishment. The message was sent to the British

ambassador at the Hague on the 3d of November. It was then known in

England that Holland contemplated joining the Northern league, but the

decisive step had not yet been actually taken by the States-General. The

ambassador was secretly instructed by Lord Stormont not to present the

demand for the disavowal and punishment of Van Berckel unless it should

become absolutely certain that Holland had joined the league. At their

meeting in November, the States-General voted to join the league, and

the demand was accordingly presented. Everything happened according to

the programme. The States-General freely condemned and disavowed the

Amsterdam affair, and offered to make reparation; but with regard to the

punishment of Van Berckel, they decided that an inquiry must first be

made as to the precise nature of his offence and the court most fit for

trying him. England replied by a peremptory demand for the immediate

punishment of Van Berckel, and, without waiting for an answer, proceeded

to declare war against Holland on the 20th of December. Four days before

this, the swiftest ship that could be found was sent to Admiral Rodney,

who was then at Barbadoes, ordering him to seize upon St. Eustatius

without a moment's delay.

[Sidenote: Catherine decides not to interfere]

Whatever other qualities may have been lacking in the British ministry

at this time, they certainly were not wanting in pluck. England had now

to fight single-handed against four nations, three of which were, after

herself, the chief naval powers of the world. According to the

Malmesbury Diaries, "this bold conduct made a great and useful

impression upon the Empress" of Russia. It was partly with a view to

this moral effect that the ministry were so ready to declare war. It was

just at this time that they were proposing, by the offer of Minorca, to

tempt Catherine into an alliance with England; and they did not wish to

have her interpret their eagerness to secure her aid as a confession of

weakness or discouragement. By making war on Holland, they sought to

show themselves as full of the spirit of fight as ever. To strengthen

the impression, Harris blustered and bragged. The Dutch, said he, "are

ungrateful, dirty, senseless boors, and, since they will be ruined, must

submit to their fate." But in all this the British government was

sailing very near the wind. Prince Galitzin, the Russian ambassador at

the Hague, correctly reported that the accession of Holland to the

Armed Neutrality was the real cause of the war, and that the Amsterdam

affair was only a pretext. Upon this ground, the Dutch requested armed

assistance from Catherine, as chief of the league. The empress

hesitated; she knew the true state of the case as well as any one, but

it was open to her to accept the British story or not, as might seem

best. Dispatches from Berlin announced that Frederick was very angry.

When he first heard the news, he exclaimed, "Well! since the English

want a war with the whole world, they shall have it." Catherine then sat

down and wrote with her own hand a secret letter to Frederick, asking

him if he would join her in making war upon England. On second thoughts,

the King of Prussia concluded there was no good reason for taking part

in the affair, and he advised Catherine also to keep her hands free.

This decided the empress. She did not care to make war upon England,

except with such overwhelming force as to be sure of extorting some

important concessions. She accordingly chose to believe the British

story, and she refused to aid the Dutch, on the ground that their

quarrel with England grew out of a matter with which the Armed

Neutrality had nothing to do. At the same time, after dallying for a

while with the offer of Minorca, she refused that also, and decided to

preserve to the end the impartial attitude which she had maintained from

the beginning.

[Illustration: TYPES OF BRITISH CARICATURE]

[Illustration: North (as Boreas) studying the Americans

Rockingham

The King and Queen (as Farmer George and his Wife)

Burgoyne

]

[Sidenote: Capture of St. Eustatius, Feb. 3, 1781]

[Sidenote: Shameful proceedings]

Meanwhile, on the 3d of February, 1781, a powerful fleet under Rodney,

with the force of 5,000 men which had been detached in November, 1779,

from Clinton's army in New York, appeared before the island of St.

Eustatius, and summoned it to surrender. The Dutch governor, ignorant of

the fact that war had begun, had only fifty-five soldiers on the island.

He had no choice but to surrender, and the place was given up without a

blow. The British had an especial spleen against this wealthy little

island, which had come to be the centre of an enormous trade between

France and Holland and the United States. Rodney called it a nest of

thieves, and declared that "this rock, only six miles in length and

three in breadth, had done England more harm than all the arms of her

most potent enemies, and alone supported the infamous American

rebellion." His colleague, General Vaughan, who commanded the land

force, regarded it as a feeder for the American "colonies," of which the

summary extinction would go far toward ending the war. With such

feelings, they made up their minds to do their work thoroughly; and

accordingly they confiscated to the Crown not only all the public

stores, but all the private property of the inhabitants. Their orders

were carried out with great brutality. The goods in the warehouses were

seized and laden upon ships, to be carried away and sold at auction in

the neighbouring islands. Every kind of private and personal property

was laid hold of, and the beggared inhabitants were turned out of doors

and ordered to quit the island. The total value of the booty amounted to

more than twenty million dollars. Among the victims of this robbery were

many British merchants, who were no better treated than the rest. Rodney

tore up their remonstrance without reading it, and exclaimed, "This

island is Dutch, and everything in it is Dutch, and as Dutch you shall

all be treated." The proceedings were fitly crowned by an act of

treachery. The Dutch flag was kept flying as a decoy, and in the course

of the next seven weeks more than fifty American ships, ignorant of the

fate of the island, were captured by the aid of this dirty stratagem.

The conduct of the government in declaring war against Holland was

denounced by the Whigs as criminal, and the true character of the

shameful affair of St. Eustatius was shown up by Burke in two powerful

speeches. But the government capped the climax when it deliberately

approved the conduct of Rodney, and praised him for it. Many of the

British victims, however, brought their cases before the courts, and

obtained judgments which condemned as illegal the seizure of private

property so far as they were concerned. On the continent of Europe, the

outrage awakened general indignation, as an infraction of the laws and

usages of civilized warfare, the like of which had not been seen for

many years; and it served to alienate from Great Britain the little

sympathy that remained for her.

* * * * *

[Sidenote: Ignominious results of the politics of George III.]

To the historian who appreciates the glorious part which England has

played in history, the proceedings here recorded are painful to

contemplate; and to no one should they be more painful than to the

American, whose forefathers climbed with Wolfe the rugged bank of the

St. Lawrence; or a century earlier, from their homes in New England

forests, heard with delight of Naseby and Marston Moor; or back yet

another hundred years, in Lincolnshire villages defied the tyranny of

Gardiner and Bonner; or at yet a more remote period did yeoman's

service in the army of glorious Earl Simon, or stood, perhaps, beside

great Edward on the hallowed fields of Palestine. The pride with which

one recalls such memories as these explains and justifies the sorrow and

disgust with which one contemplates the spectacle of a truculent George

Germain, an unscrupulous Stormont, or a frivolous North; or hears the

dismal stories of Indian massacres, of defenceless villages laid in

ashes, of legalized robbery on the ocean highway, or of colossal

buccaneering, such as that which was witnessed at St. Eustatius. The

earlier part of the reign of George III. is that period of English

history of which an enlightened Englishman must feel most ashamed, as an

enlightened Frenchman must feel ashamed of the reigns of Louis XIV. and

the two Bonapartes. All these were periods of wholesale political

corruption, of oppression at home and unrighteous warfare abroad, and

all invited swift retribution in the shape of diminished empire and

temporary lowering of the national prestige. It was not until after the

downfall of the personal government of George III. that England began to

resume her natural place in the foremost rank of liberal and progressive

powers. Toward that happy result, the renewal and purification of

English political life, the sturdy fight sustained by the Americans in

defence of their liberties did much to contribute. The winning of

independence by the Americans was the winning of a higher political

standpoint for England and for the world.

FOOTNOTES:

[28] The first commander-in-chief of the United States navy was

Ezekiel Hopkins, of Rhode Island, appointed by Congress in

December, 1775. His rank was intended to correspond in the

navy with that held by Washington in the army. In the papers

of the time he is often styled "admiral," but among seamen he

was commonly known as "commodore." The officers next below him

were captains. In February, 1776, Hopkins got out to sea with

a small fleet; in April, with two sloops-of-war and three

small brigs, he attacked the British sloop Glasgow 20, and

failed to take her. His failure was visited with severe and

perhaps excessive condemnation; in the following October,

Congress passed a vote of censure on him, and in January,

1777, dismissed him from the service. For the rest of the war

no commander-in-chief of the navy was appointed.

One of Hopkins's vessels, the brig Lexington 14, was commanded

by John Barry, a native of Wexford county, Ireland, who had

long dwelt in Philadelphia. In April, 1776, a few days after

Hopkins's failure, the Lexington met the British tender Edward

off the capes of Virginia, and captured her after an hour's

fight. This was the first capture of a British warship by an

American. Barry served with distinction through the war and

died at the head of the navy in 1803.

[29] In March, 1780, the navy of the United States consisted of the

following vessels:--

America 74, Capt. John Barry, on the stocks at Portsmouth, N. H.

Confederacy 36, Capt. Seth Harding, refitting at Martinico.

Bourbon 36, Capt. Thomas Read, on the stocks in Connecticut.

Alliance 32, Capt. Paul Jones, in France. Trumbull 28, Capt.

James Nicholson, ready for sea in Connecticut. Deane 28, Capt.

Samuel Nicholson, on a cruise. Providence 28, Capt. Abraham

Whipple, } Boston 28, Capt. Samuel Tucker, } defending the

harbour Queen of France 20, Capt. I. Rathbourne, } of

Charleston, S.C. Ranger 18, Capt. S. Sampson, } Saratoga 18,

Capt. J. Young, on the stocks at Philadelphia.

See _Sparks MSS._ xlix. vol. iii. in Harvard University Library.

[30] Richard Paton's picture of this sea-fight, of which a

photogravure is here given, departs somewhat from the strict

truth of history, as is apt to be the case with historical

pictures. The Alliance is represented in the act of delivering

her impartial volley into the stern of the Serapis and the bow

of the Bon Homme Richard, which occurred soon after ten

o'clock. At the same time the mainmast of the Serapis is

represented as overboard, whereas it did not fall until the

ships were separated after the surrender, as late as half past

eleven. Apart from this inaccuracy, the general conception of

the picture is admirable. The engraving, published in 1780, was

dedicated to Sir Richard Pearson, the captain of the Serapis,

who was deservedly knighted for his heroic resistance, which

saved the Baltic fleet, although he was worsted in the fight.

There is a tradition that Paul Jones, on hearing of the honour

conferred upon Pearson, good-naturedly observed, "If I ever

meet him again I'll make a lord of him."

CHAPTER XIII

A YEAR OF DISASTERS

After the surrender of Burgoyne, the military attitude of the British in

the northern states became, as we have seen, purely defensive. Their

efforts were almost exclusively directed toward maintaining their

foothold, at first in the islands of New York and Rhode Island,

afterward in New York alone, whence their ships could ascend the Hudson

as far as the frowning crags which sentinel the entrance of the

Highlands. Their offensive operations were restricted to a few

plundering expeditions along the coast, well calculated to remind the

worthy Connecticut farmers of the ubiquitousness of British power, and

the vanity of hopes that might have been built upon the expectation of

naval aid from France. But while the war thus languished at the centre,

while at the same time it sent forth waves of disturbance that

reverberated all the way from the Mississippi river to the Baltic sea,

on the other hand the southernmost American states were the scene of

continuous and vigorous fighting. Upon the reduction of the Carolinas

and Georgia the king and Lord George Germain had set their hearts. If

the rebellion could not be broken at the centre, it was hoped that it

might at least be frayed away at the edges; and should fortune so far

smile upon the royal armies as to give them Virginia also, perhaps the

campaigns against the wearied North might be renewed at some later time

and under better auspices.

[Sidenote: State of things in the Far South]

In this view there was much that was plausible. Events had shown that

the ministry had clearly erred in striking the rebellion at its

strongest point; it now seemed worth while to aim a blow where it was

weakest. The people of New England were almost unanimous in their

opposition to the king, and up to this time the states of Massachusetts

and Connecticut in particular had done more to sustain the war than all

the others put together. Georgia and the Carolinas, a thousand miles

distant, might be regarded as almost beyond the reach of reinforcements

from New England; and it might be doubted whether they possessed the

ability to defend themselves against a well-planned attack. Georgia, the

weakest of the thirteen states, bordered upon the British territory of

Florida. In South Carolina the character of the population made it

difficult to organize resistance. The citizens of Charleston, and the

rich planters of English or Huguenot descent inhabiting the lowlands,

belonged mostly to the revolutionary party, but they were outnumbered by

their negro slaves; and the peculiar features of slavery in South

Carolina made this a very embarrassing circumstance. The relations

between master and slave were not friendly there, as they were in

Virginia; and while the state had kept up a militia during the whole

colonial period, this militia found plenty of employment in patrolling

the slave quarters, in searching for hidden weapons, and in hunting

fugitives. It was now correctly surmised that on the approach of an

invading army the dread of negro insurrection, with all its nameless

horrors, would paralyze the arm of the state militia. While the

patriotic South Carolinians were thus handicapped in entering upon the

contest, there were in the white population many discordant elements. It

was commonly said that the Quakers and men of German ancestry took

little interest in politics, and were only too ready to submit to any

authority that would protect them in their ordinary pursuits. A strong

contrast to the political apathy of these worthy men was to be found in

the rugged population of the upland counties. Here the small farmers of

Scotch-Irish descent were, every man of them, Whigs, burning with a

fanatical hatred of England; while, on the other hand, the Scotchmen who

had come over since Culloden were mostly Tories, and had by no means as

yet cast off that half-savage type of Highland character which we find

so vividly portrayed in the Waverley novels. It was not strange that the

firebrands of war, thrown among such combustible material, should have

flamed forth with a glare of unwonted cruelty; nor was it strange that a

commonwealth containing such incongruous elements, so imperfectly

blended, should have been speedily, though but for a moment, overcome.

The fit ground for wonder is that, in spite of such adverse

circumstances, the state of South Carolina should have shown as much

elastic strength as she did under the severest military stress which any

American state was called upon to withstand during the Revolutionary

War.

[Illustration: SEAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA (OBVERSE)]

[Illustration: SEAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA (REVERSE)]

[Sidenote: Georgia overrun by the British]

Since the defeat of the British fleet before Charleston, in June 1776,

the southern states had been left unmolested until the autumn of 1778,

when there was more or less frontier skirmishing between Georgia and

Florida,--a slight premonitory symptom of the storm that was coming. The

American forces in the southern department were then commanded by

General Robert Howe, who was one of the most distinguished patriots of

North Carolina, but whose military capacity seems to have been slender.

In the autumn of 1778 he had his headquarters at Savannah, for there was

war on the frontier. Guerrilla parties, made up chiefly of vindictive

loyalist refugees, but aided by a few British regulars from General

Augustine Prevost's force in Florida, invaded the rice plantations of

Georgia, burning and murdering, and carrying off negroes,--not to set

them free, but to sell them for their own benefit. As a

counter-irritant, General Howe planned an expedition against St.

Augustine, and advanced as far as St. Mary's river; but so many men were

swept away by fever that he was obliged to retreat to Savannah. He had

scarcely arrived there when 3,500 British regulars from New York, under

Colonel Campbell, landed in the neighbourhood, and offered him battle.

Though his own force numbered only 1,200, of whom half were militia,

Howe accepted the challenge, relying upon the protection of a great

swamp which covered his flanks. But a path through the swamp was pointed

out to the enemy by a negro, and the Americans, attacked in front and

behind, were instantly routed. Some 500 prisoners were taken, and

Savannah surrendered, with all its guns and stores; and this achievement

cost the British but 24 men. A few days afterward, General Prevost

advanced from Florida and captured Sunbury, with all its garrison, while

Colonel Campbell captured Augusta. A proclamation was issued, offering

protection to such of the inhabitants as would take up arms in behalf of

the king's government, while all others were by implication outlawed.

The ugly temper of Lord George Germain was plainly visible in this

proclamation and in the proceedings that followed. A shameless and

promiscuous plunder was begun. The captive soldiers were packed into

prison-ships and treated with barbarity. The more timid people sought to

save their property by taking sides with the enemy, while the bolder

spirits took refuge in the mountains; and thus General Prevost was

enabled to write home that the state of Georgia was conquered.

[Sidenote: Arrival of General Lincoln]

[Sidenote: Barbarous reprisals]

At the request of the southern delegates in Congress, General Howe had

already been superseded by General Benjamin Lincoln, who had won

distinction through his management of the New England militia in the

Saratoga campaign. When Lincoln arrived at Charleston, in December,

1778, an attempt was made to call out the lowland militia of South

Carolina, but the dread of the slaves kept them from obeying the

summons. North Carolina, however, sent 2,000 men under John Ashe, one of

the most eminent of the southern patriots; and with this force and 600

Continentals the new general watched the Savannah river and waited his

chances. But North Carolina sent foes as well as friends to take part in

the contest. A party of 700 loyalists from that state were marching

across South Carolina to join the British garrison at Augusta, when they

were suddenly attacked by Colonel Andrew Pickens with a small force of

upland militia. In a sharp fight the Tories were routed, and half their

number were taken prisoners. Indictments for treason were brought

against many of these prisoners, and, after trial before a civil court,

some seventy were found guilty, and five of them were hanged. The

rashness of this step soon became apparent. The British had put in

command of Augusta one Colonel Thomas Browne, a Tory, who had been

tarred and feathered by his neighbours at the beginning of the war. As

soon as Browne heard of these executions for treason, he forthwith

hanged some of his Whig prisoners; and thus was begun a long series of

stupid and cruel reprisals, which, as time went on, bore bitter fruit.

[Portrait: And^w Pickens]

[Portrait: B Lincoln]

[Sidenote: Americans routed at Briar Creek, March 3, 1779]

[Sidenote: Prevost's vandalism]

While these things were going on in the back country, the British on the

coast attempted to capture Port Royal, but were defeated, with heavy

loss, by General Moultrie. Lincoln now felt able to assume the

offensive, and he sent General Ashe with 1,500 men to threaten Augusta.

At his approach the British abandoned the town, and retreated toward

Savannah. Ashe pursued closely, but at Briar Creek, on the 3d of March,

1779, the British turned upon him and routed him. The Americans lost 400

in killed and wounded, besides seven pieces of artillery and more than

1,000 stand of arms. Less than 500 succeeded in making their way back to

Lincoln's camp; and this victory cost the British but five men killed

and eleven wounded. Augusta was at once retaken; the royal governor, Sir

James Wright, was reinstated in office; and, in general, the machinery

of government which had been in operation previous to 1776 was restored.

Lincoln, however, was far from accepting the defeat as final. With the

energetic coöperation of Governor Rutledge, to whom extraordinary powers

were granted for the occasion, enough militia were got together to

repair the losses suffered at Briar Creek; and in April, leaving

Moultrie with 1,000 men to guard the lower Savannah, Lincoln marched

upon Augusta with the rest of his army, hoping to capture it, and give

the legislature of Georgia a chance to assemble there, and destroy the

moral effect of this apparent restoration of the royal government. But

as soon as Lincoln had got out of the way, General Prevost crossed the

Savannah with 3,000 men and advanced upon Charleston, laying waste the

country and driving Moultrie before him. It was a moment of terror and

confusion. In General Prevost there was at last found a man after Lord

George Germain's own heart. His march was a scene of wanton vandalism.

The houses of the wealthy planters were mercilessly sacked; their

treasures of silver plate were loaded on carts and carried off; their

mirrors and china were smashed, their family portraits cut to pieces,

their gardens trampled out, their shade-trees girdled and ruined; and

as Prevost had a band of Cherokees with him, the horrors of the tomahawk

and scalping-knife in some instances crowned the shameful work. The

cabins of the slaves were burned. Cattle, horses, dogs, and poultry,

when not carried away, were slaughtered wholesale, and the destruction

of food was so great that something like famine set in. More than a

thousand negroes are said to have died of starvation.

[Sidenote: Plan for arming negroes]

In such wise did Prevost leisurely make his way toward Charleston; and

reaching it on the 11th of May, he sent in a summons to surrender. A

strangely interesting scene ensued. Events had occurred which had sorely

perturbed the minds of the members of the state council. Pondering upon

the best means of making the state militia available, Henry Laurens had

hit upon the bold expedient of arming the most stalwart and courageous

negroes, and marching them off to camp under the lead of white officers.

Such a policy might be expected to improve the relations between whites

and blacks by uniting them against a common danger, while the

plantations would be to some extent relieved of an abiding source of

dread. The plan was warmly approved by Laurens's son, who was an officer

on Washington's staff, as well as by Alexander Hamilton, who further

suggested that the blacks thus enrolled as militia should at the same

time be given their freedom. Washington, on the other hand, feared that

if the South Carolinians were to adopt such a policy the British would

forestall them by offering better arms and equipments to the negroes,

and thus muster them against their masters. It was a game, he felt, at

which two could play. The matter was earnestly discussed, and at last

was brought before Congress, which approved of Laurens's plan, and

recommended it to the consideration of the people of South Carolina; and

it was just before the arrival of Prevost and his army that the younger

Laurens reached Charleston with this message from Congress.

[Sidenote: Indignation in South Carolina]

[Sidenote: Action of the council]

The advice was received in anything but a grateful spirit. For a

century the state had maintained an armed patrol to go about among the

negro quarters and confiscate every pistol, gun, or knife that could be

found, and now it was proposed that three or four thousand slaves should

actually be furnished with muskets by the state! People were startled at

the thought, and there might well be a great diversity of opinion as to

the feasibleness of so bold a measure at so critical a moment. To most

persons it seemed like jumping out of the frying-pan into the fire.

Coming, too, at a moment when the state was in such desperate need of

armed assistance from Congress, this advice was very irritating. The

people naturally could not make due allowance for the difficulties under

which Congress laboured, and their wrath waxed hot. South Carolina

seemed to be left in the lurch. Was it to join such a league as this

that she had cast off allegiance to Great Britain? She had joined in the

Declaration of Independence reluctantly, and from an honourable feeling

of the desirableness of united action among the states. On that

momentous day, of which it was not yet clear whether the result was to

be the salvation or the ruin of America, her delegates had, with wise

courtesy, changed their vote in deference to the opinions of the other

states, in order that the American people might behave as a unit in so

solemn a matter. And now that the state was invaded, her people robbed

and insulted, and her chief city threatened, she was virtually bidden to

shift for herself! Under the influence of such feelings as these, after

a hot debate, the council, by a bare majority, decided to send a flag of

truce to General Prevost, and to suggest that South Carolina should

remain neutral until the end of the war, when it should be decided by

treaty whether she should cast in her lot with Great Britain or with the

United States. What might have come of this singular suggestion had it

been seriously discussed we shall never know, for Prevost took no notice

of it whatever. To neutralize South Carolina would not accord with the

British plan which involved the conquest and occupation of that state

as a base from which to proceed to the subjugation of its neighbours to

the north. Prevost refused to exchange question and answer with a branch

of the rebel government of South Carolina, but to Moultrie, as military

commandant, he announced that his only terms were unconditional

surrender. We can imagine how the gallant heart of Moultrie must have

sunk within him at what he could not but call the dastardly action of

the council, and how it must have leaped with honest joy at the British

general's ultimatum. "Very good," said he simply; "we'll fight it out,

then."

[Portrait: COUNT PULASKI]

In citing this incident for its real historic interest, we must avoid

the error of making too much of it. At this moment of sudden peril,

indignation at the fancied neglect of Congress was joined to the natural

unwillingness, on the part of the council, to incur the risk of giving

up the property of their fellow-citizens to the tender mercies of such a

buccaneer as Prevost had shown himself to be. But there is no sufficient

reason for supposing that, had the matter gone farther, the suggestion

of the council would have been adopted by the legislature or acquiesced

in by the people of South Carolina.

[Sidenote: End of the campaign]

On this occasion the danger vanished as suddenly as it came. Count

Pulaski, with his legion, arrived from the northern army, and Lincoln,

as soon as he learned what was going on, retraced his steps, and

presently attacked General Prevost. After an indecisive skirmish, the

latter, judging his force inadequate for the work he had undertaken,

retreated into Georgia, and nothing more was done till autumn. The

military honours of the campaign, however, remained with the British;

for by his march upon Charleston Prevost had prevented Lincoln from

disturbing the British supremacy in Georgia, and besides this he had

gained a foothold in South Carolina; when he retreated he left a

garrison in Beaufort which Lincoln was unable to dislodge.

[Signature: Veritable ami et Serviteur Pulaski]

[Sidenote: Attempt to recapture Savannah]

The French alliance, which thus far had been of so little direct

military value, now appears again upon the scene. During the year which

had elapsed since the futile Rhode Island campaign, the French fleet had

been busy in the West Indies. Honours were easy, on the whole, between

the two great maritime antagonists, but the French had so far the

advantage that in August, 1779, Estaing was able once more to give some

attention to his American friends. On the first day of September he

appeared off the coast of Georgia with a powerful fleet of twenty-two

ships-of-the-line and eleven frigates. Great hopes were now conceived

by the Americans, and a plan was laid for the recapture of Savannah. By

the 23d of the month the place was invested by the combined forces of

Lincoln and Estaing, and for three weeks the siege was vigorously

carried on by a regular system of approaches, while the works were

diligently bombarded by the fleet. At length Estaing grew impatient.

There was not sufficient harbourage for his great ships, and the

captains feared that they might be overtaken by the dangerous autumnal

gales for which that coast is noted. To reduce the town by a regular

siege would perhaps take several weeks more, and it was accordingly

thought best to try to carry it by storm. On the 9th of October a

terrific assault was made in full force. Some of the outworks were

carried, and for a moment the stars and stripes and the fleurs-de-lis

were planted on the redoubts; but British endurance and the strength of

the position at last prevailed. The assailants were totally defeated,

losing more than 1,000 men, while the British, in their sheltered

position, lost but 55. The gallant Pulaski was among the slain, and

Estaing received two severe wounds. The French, who had borne the brunt

of the fight, now embarked and stood out to sea, but not in time to

escape the October gale which they had been dreading. After weathering

with difficulty a terrible storm, their fleet was divided; and while

part returned to the West Indies, Estaing himself, with the remainder,

crossed to France. Thus the second attempt at concerted action between

French and Americans had met with even more lamentable failure than the

first.

[Sidenote: Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis go to Georgia]

While these things were going on, Washington had hoped, and Clinton had

feared, that Estaing might presently reach New York in such force as to

turn the scale there against the British. As soon as he learned that the

French fleet was out of the way, Sir Henry Clinton proceeded to carry

out a plan which he had long had in contemplation. A year had now

elapsed since the beginning of active operations in the south, and,

although the British arms had been crowned with success, it was

desirable to strike a still heavier blow. The capture of the chief

southern city was not only the next step in the plan of the campaign,

but it was an object of especial desire to Sir Henry Clinton personally,

for he had not forgotten the humiliating defeat at Fort Moultrie in

1776. He accordingly made things as snug as possible at the north, by

finally withdrawing the garrisons from Rhode Island and the advanced

posts on the Hudson. In this way, while leaving Knyphausen with a strong

force in command of New York, he was enabled to embark 8,000 men on

transports, under convoy of five ships-of-the-line; and on the day after

Christmas, 1779, he set sail for Savannah, taking Lord Cornwallis with

him.

The voyage was a rough one. Some of the transports foundered, and some

were captured by American privateers. Yet when Clinton arrived in

Georgia, and united his forces to those of Prevost, the total amounted

to more than 10,000 men. He ventured, however, to weaken the garrison of

New York still more, and sent back at once for 3,000 men under command

of the young Lord Rawdon, of the famous family of Hastings,--better

known in after-years as Earl of Moira and Marquis of Hastings, and

destined, like Cornwallis, to serve with great distinction as

governor-general of India. The event fully justified Clinton's sagacity

in taking this step. New York was quite safe for the present; for so

urgent was the need for troops in South Carolina, and so great the

difficulty of raising them, that Washington was obliged to detach from

his army all the Virginia and North Carolina troops, and sent them down

to aid General Lincoln. With his army thus weakened, it was out of the

question for Washington to attack New York.

[Portrait: Knyphausen]

[Sidenote: The British advance upon Charleston]

Lincoln, on the other hand, after his reinforcements arrived, had an

army of 7,000 men with which to defend the threatened state of South

Carolina. It was an inadequate force, and its commander, a thoroughly

brave and estimable man, was far from possessing the rare sagacity which

Washington displayed in baffling the schemes of the enemy. The

government of South Carolina deemed the preservation of Charleston to be

of the first importance, just as, in 1776, Congress had insisted upon

the importance of keeping the city of New York. But we have seen how

Washington, in that trying time, though he could not keep the city,

never allowed himself to get his army into a position from which he

could not withdraw it, and at last, through his sleepless vigilance, won

all the honours of the campaign. In the defence of Charleston no such

high sagacity was shown. Clinton advanced slowly overland, until on the

26th of February, 1780, he came in sight of the town. It had by that

time become so apparent that his overwhelming superiority of force would

enable him to encompass it on every side, that Lincoln should have

evacuated the place without a moment's delay; and such was Washington's

opinion as soon as he learned the facts. The loss of Charleston, however

serious a blow, could in no case be so disastrous as the loss of the

army. But Lincoln went on strengthening the fortifications, and

gathering into the trap all the men and all the military resources he

could find. For some weeks the connections with the country north of the

Cooper river were kept open by two regiments of cavalry; but on the 14th

of April these regiments were cut to pieces by Colonel Banastre

Tarleton, the cavalry commander, who now first appeared on the scene

upon which he was soon to become so famous. Five days later, the

reinforcement under Lord Rawdon, arriving from New York, completed the

investment of the doomed city. The ships entering the harbour did not

attempt to batter down Fort Moultrie, but ran past it; and on the 6th of

May this fortress, menaced by troops in the rear, surrendered.

[Sidenote: Surrender of Charleston, May 12, 1780]