NEUTRAL INDEPENDENCE
From 1839 till 1914, Belgium lived under the regime of independent
neutrality.
Her territory had been gradually reduced during modern times. She stood
stripped of all her marches. In the course of the seventeenth century
she had lost Walloon Flanders and Artois to France and Northern Brabant
to Holland, while the conquest by the latter Power of Zeeland Flanders
and some districts in Eastern Limburg had been confirmed and enlarged
by the 1839 settlements. In 1816 Prussia had seized the districts of
Eupen, Malmedy, St. Vith and Bitsburg, and the XXIV Articles had given
half of Luxemburg to the German Confederation.
The same treaty granted Belgium independence. Within these narrow
limits, she remained at least mistress of her destinies. She had her
own king, her own Government, her own Constitution. As far as internal
affairs were concerned, she enjoyed full sovereignty. She was
diminished, but not deeply altered. She maintained, in the nineteenth
century, all the main characteristics which had distinguished her
history and civilization during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.
Two races, two languages, were still associated on her soil. Walloons
and Flemings took an equal share in the framing of her future. The sea
remained free for commercial purposes, and the great European roads,
which had so largely contributed in the past to placing her in the
forefront of European nations, still found in the country their natural
and necessary meeting-place. This main fact must be made evident if one
attempts to explain the causes of the Belgian renaissance during the
nineteenth century. It is not enough to say that the Belgium of Leopold
I and Leopold II followed the tradition of the Belgium of Charles V and
Philip the Good. It must be added that modern Belgium, in spite of
gradual encroachments, had remained whole. Such encroachments having
taken place on all sides, the nucleus was untouched. Belgium preserved
her great towns and her main streams. No essential organ of the
national body had been impaired.
As far as internal affairs were concerned, Belgium then emerged free
and sound from the turmoil of three centuries of European warfare. For
external affairs, she was still subjected to the restriction of
guaranteed neutrality. It is scarcely necessary to dwell on the
distinction between self-imposed neutrality, such as that existing in
Switzerland, and the regime of guaranteed neutrality imposed by the
Powers on Belgium. The first is no restriction of the sovereign rights
of the State upon its foreign policy, the second takes away from it
practically all initiative in foreign matters. If the Powers bound
themselves, in the 1839 treaty, not to violate the integrity of Belgian
territory and to defend the country in case of attack, Belgium, on her
side, undertook to observe strictly the rules of neutrality and to take
necessary measures towards the defence of her frontiers. It might be
argued, and it has been argued frequently in Belgium, that such
neutrality could not prevent a nation from possessing colonies and
concluding a defensive alliance for the sole purpose of safeguarding
herself. But, as a matter of fact, rival Powers could not give such a
liberal interpretation to the text of the treaties. First from the
French side, later from the German side, Belgium was constantly held
under suspicion. Any manifestation of public opinion concerning foreign
affairs was deeply resented, her military policy was narrowly watched,
she could not take a step towards self-defence or economic expansion
without provoking some discontent among the Powers. Thanks to the
firmness of her statesmen and, more than once, to the friendly support
of Great Britain, she was able to resist urgent demands. But it goes
without saying that the Belgian Government, anxious to preserve their
dignity, avoided all possible cause of friction, so that Belgium
scarcely ever made use of her legitimate right to determine, within
some limits, her foreign policy. Neutrality, to all intents and
purposes, meant paralysis. For many, it meant worse than
that--carelessness and apathy.
[_FALSE SECURITY_]
After the eight years of uncertainty which followed the first signature
of the XXIV Articles--eight years during which all parties joined under
the permanent Dutch menace--two currents of thought divided Belgian
opinion. The first attempted to minimize the military responsibility of
the country, and, trusting blindly to the promise of the Powers, to
reduce to a strict minimum Belgium's military charges in men and money.
The second saw clearly that, without an adequate army and the
necessary defences, Belgium would be unable to fulfil her obligations
in case her integrity should be violated, and would suffer in
consequence; it realized that any weakness in the country's defences
increased the temptation of some Powers to break their pledge. It is
easy to understand that the first school was generally more popular
than the other, and rallied not only the sincere idealists who thought
such a contingency as the tearing up of solemn treaties absolutely
impossible, but many unscrupulous politicians only too anxious to use
the popular catchword "Not a penny, not a soldier," or "Niemand
gedwongen soldaat," for electoral purposes. The Belgians had always
been stubbornly opposed to conscription; it will be remembered that
they resisted all attempts at enforcing it in the past and that it was
the main cause of the War of Peasants (1798) against the "Sans
Culottes." To a people which, by tradition, was strongly adverse to
militarism and centralization, it was only too easy to misrepresent
measures of self-defence, urgently required by the European situation,
as the first step towards autocracy and oppression. The partisans of
military safeguards found themselves, therefore, in a minority, and
their only support was the personal influence of the Belgian kings,
who, from the first days of the new regime till the eve of the war,
never ceased to emphasize the evident danger of disregarding the
country's international responsibilities. It is true that, with the
lapse of time, the danger became more and more threatening, but, on the
other hand, the "anti-militarists" found a fresh argument in the fact
that, during so many years, the country had been able to weather the
storm.
[_MILITARY PROBLEMS_]
The first trouble arose in connection with the Socialist revolution
which broke out in France in 1848. In the previous year, Marx and
Engels had established their headquarters in Brussels, where they
drafted the "Manifesto of the Communist Party." The Belgians, however,
were not prepared to adopt it, and the revolutionaries decided to
invade the country from the South. Bands organized in France and
secretly encouraged by some French leaders attempted to cross the
frontier near Mouscron, at Risquons Tout, but their advance was easily
checked by the Belgian forces.
The only consequence of these disturbances was the vote by the Chamber
of a new grant towards the reinforcement of the army: "No doubt," said
the Minister Rogier on that occasion, "it will cost something to equip
a greater number of men. But has one ever estimated the cost of an
invasion, even if it only lasted a week?" In 1850, Leopold II wrote to
one of his ministers: "Without means of defence you will be the
plaything of everyone."
A greater danger loomed ahead. Louis Napoleon had, by the coup d'etat
of December 1, 1851, imposed his dictatorship on France. Many prominent
exiles and refugees came to Belgium, and the Brussels papers openly
expressed their opinion of the new dictator. So that Belgium, which
three years before had been branded as ultramontane, was now denounced
as a nest of communists and rebels. Pressure was even brought to bear
on the Government to introduce Press censorship. It was duly ignored,
and the relations between the two countries became strained. One year
later, Napoleon became Emperor of the French, and all clear-sighted
Belgians realized that he was only awaiting an opportunity to extend
his power and authority towards the North. This was shown plainly by
the French policy with regard to Luxemburg.
[_FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR_]
The emperor having approached the King of Holland in view of obtaining
from him the cession of the Grand Duchy, a conference was called in
London (May 1867) at which the independence, neutrality and
inviolability of the duchy were placed under the collective guarantee
of the Powers. Thwarted in this direction by European diplomacy,
Napoleon III attempted to obtain a footing in Luxemburg by controlling
the railways. In January 1868 the Compagnie de l'Est, under guarantee
of the French Government, took over from the Compagnie Guillaume
Luxembourg its railway lines both in Luxemburg and Belgian territory.
Further negotiations began with the Belgian companies Grand Luxemburg
and Chemins de fer Liegeois-Limbourgeois, which would have placed all
the main railways of Luxemburg and South-eastern Belgium in French
hands. Warned in time, the Premier, Frere-Orban, instructed the Belgian
representative in Paris to declare that Belgium would never consent to
such an arrangement. Napoleon's threats remained without result, the
Belgian policy being strongly upheld by Lord Clarendon, and, in July
1869, a protocol was signed annulling the contracts of the Compagnie de
l'Est as far as the Belgian railways were concerned. At the same time,
Napoleon III, anxious to find at any cost "compensations" for the
increased prestige which Prussia obtained from her Danish and Austrian
victories, had sounded that Power regarding a project of partition of
the Netherlands. His proposal, first kept secret and subsequently
revealed by Bismarck on the morrow of the declaration of war in 1870,
was to annex Belgium to France, while Prussia would be left a free hand
in Holland. The publication of this revelation by _The Times_ did more
than anything else to alienate British public opinion, if not from
France at least from the French emperor, during the Franco-Prussian
War.
Baron Chazal, who had joined the Belgian ministry in 1857, succeeded in
convincing the Cabinet of the necessity of reinforcing Belgian
defences. In view of the superiority of the French army--for the threat
came evidently from that quarter at the time--it was decided to give up
the idea of defending the country by a cordon of inefficient
fortresses, and to build round Antwerp a powerful "entrenched camp,"
where the Belgian army could retreat and maintain itself until
reinforcements came from abroad. It goes without saying that the only
country which would be in a position to send such reinforcements to
Antwerp, in case of an invasion, was Great Britain, and Antwerp was
purposely chosen as the only position where considerable forces could
conveniently be disembarked from the sea. In view of the present
interpretation placed on the 1839 treaties by Holland, which gives to
the latter country the right to close the Scheldt in time of war, this
scheme seems, to say the least, hastily conceived. But the Dutch
exclusive sovereignty over the Scheldt did not appear nearly so
definite at the time as it appears now. No mention being made of the
matter in the 1839 settlement, many Belgian authorities considered that
the stream was placed under a regime of co-sovereignty, and it seemed
then incredible that the Dutch should stop the passage of relief ships.
In the face of strong popular opposition, the Chamber voted a credit of
50,000,000 francs for the Antwerp fortifications, and General
Brialmont, one of the foremost military engineers in Europe, was
entrusted with the work. After its completion, Antwerp was considered
one of the strongest fortified towns in the world.
As soon as a conflict became imminent between France and Prussia, Great
Britain, in accordance with her traditional policy as far as Belgium
was concerned, demanded from the two Powers a declaration confirming
Belgian neutrality. The situation in 1870 corresponds exactly to that
in 1914, and the language used by Mr. Asquith during the first days of
August of the latter year seems to echo the words uttered forty years
before by his great chief. "It would be impossible for us not to
interfere," firmly declared Mr. Gladstone, "should we witness the
destruction of Belgium's liberty and independence." In both cases,
British policy was inspired by the guarantee mentioned in the treaties,
a guarantee which not only implied safety for Belgium, but also
absolute opposition to any Power attempting to seize the Belgian coast.
The motives were the same, the steps taken were the same, the outcome
only was different. Both the French emperor and Bismarck confirmed, in
1870, the inviolability of Belgian territory, the latter stating that
such a declaration was not required, the treaties being sufficiently
explicit on the subject.
[_EUROPEAN POLICY IN 1870_]
Why did Germany respect in 1870 a treaty which she ignored in 1914?
Even without taking into account the change in German mentality since
her victory, military conditions were totally different. The strong
chain of fortifications on the French Eastern frontier had not yet been
erected, and the strength of the Belgian army appeared by no means
negligible. Before the enormous increase of modern armies which took
place during the twenty years of "armed peace," 80,000 men might have
made all the difference one way or the other. It was approximately the
strength of the French army which surrendered at Sedan. After this
great defeat, German Headquarters declared their intention to pursue
the fugitives into Belgian territory if the French forces attempted to
escape being encircled by crossing the frontier. Such steps, however,
were not rendered necessary. While showing their intense sympathy for
the vanquished, the Belgians fulfilled most scrupulously all their
obligations, and the European diplomats who had conceived the idea of
neutralizing "the cockpit of Europe" could congratulate themselves.
Their arrangements had worked perfectly, and for once Belgium had not
been drawn into the conflict.
In the light of recent events, it is almost to be regretted that the
test had been so successful. More than anything else, the 1870
experience allayed suspicion in and out of Belgium. The Powers
refrained from pressing on the country the necessity for further
armaments, and the hands of the anti-militarists in Belgium, instead
of being weakened (as they ought to have been if events had been placed
in their proper light), were considerably strengthened.
Illustration: LEOPOLD II. (REIGNED 1865-1909).
_Ph. B._
[_ANTWERP, LIEGE, NAMUR_]
During the long period of armed peace which followed, while the Powers
formed, on one side the "Triplice" (1883), on the other the "Duplice"
(1891) and the Entente Cordiale (1904), while armies and fleets were
increased tenfold and German aggressive policy asserted itself more and
more acutely, Belgium's defences were only slowly reinforced, in spite
of the desperate efforts of disinterested patriots and of the stern
warnings of the kings. The name of Leopold II must be associated here
with that of Albert I. Both were prompted in their action by the same
motives that inspired Leopold I's policy. They placed security on a
level with, and even above, prosperity. Standing aloof from party
intrigues, they were in a position to appeal to all patriots without
distinction, and to make use of the services of a little band of
clear-sighted citizens who saw the centre of danger transferred from
France to Germany, and watched the young Empire's military and economic
development with growing anxiety. Foremost among them stood Emile
Banning, author of a prophetic report on the Meuse defences (1881-86).
Nothing illustrated more clearly the crippling influence of neutrality
on Belgian international thought than the way this man of genius was
ignored by his fellow-citizens. In any other country, he would have
exercised a considerable influence on public opinion. In Belgium, he
was only heard by a few statesmen and, happily, by Leopold II, who no
doubt had his report in mind when, in 1887, he warned one of his
ministers of the necessity of Belgium not only safeguarding her
independence, but "preventing the passage" of foreign troops through
her territory. Germany had now become the main source of danger, but in
order to avoid all criticism it was decided to build two bridgeheads,
one at Namur and the other at Liege. The first commanded the upper
valley of the Meuse, the second the middle course of the stream; one
was facing France, the other Germany. The plan of defence was
consequently developed, the forts enabling the army to make a short
stand before retiring into the entrenched camp of Antwerp. It is
largely to Banning's clearsightedness and to Leopold II's firm attitude
that Western Europe owes the respite given by the resistance of Liege
in August 1914. Had not General Brialmont's original plans of the forts
been unduly curtailed, this resistance would have proved still more
effective.
[_MILITARY REFORM_]
Credits for the defences of Liege and Namur, like those of Antwerp a
few years before, were voted grudgingly by a Chamber lulled into a
false state of security by the experience of 1870. But, if public
opinion was little inclined to devote money to improve the country's
defences, it became obdurate when experts advised a reform of the
Belgian military system. Not only were the effectives ridiculously
small, compared with the size of the German and French armies, but
recruiting was managed through a system of drawing lots, to which was
added the evil of "substitution"--that is to say, the sons of the
bourgeois class who drew a "bad number" were entitled to buy a
substitute, who took their place in the ranks. A campaign for personal
and general service was launched, but in spite of the king's support it
met with little success. A certain number of volunteers were added to
the normal effectives in 1902, and in 1908, after the sensational
journey of William II to Tangiers, new credits were voted for the
development of the Antwerp defences. To those who objected that
fortifications would be useless if Belgium did not possess a sufficient
army to man them, the king answered: "Let us have the stones first. The
men will come later." When the seventy-fifth anniversary of Belgian
Independence gave him at last the opportunity of breaking the silence
imposed upon him by the Congo campaign, he uttered a supreme warning to
the nation: "Let us not be overconfident in our present prosperity; let
us stand closer and closer together around our flag. Nations, like
human beings, have to pass through a critical age which brings about
old age or premature death. Its date, for young nations, falls _during
the last quarter of the first century of their existence_." Once more,
on February 18, 1909, he imparted to a friend--for his lack of
popularity had made public declarations useless at that time--his
anxieties regarding the future: "It is indispensable that we should
possess a good army, that we should be able to defend ourselves, and
thus, in conformity with our international obligations, prevent the
crossing of our territory by a foreign army, and _make such crossing as
costly as possible, in order to remove the temptation from those who
would be inclined to attempt it.... On my return from my recent journey
to Germany, I warned all concerned that Germany is building more ships
and increasing her military expenses. We must efficiently complete our
fortifications and our equipment. You know that neither one nor the
other can be improvised...._"
Leopold II attached such importance to the adoption of personal
service, proposed in 1909, that he deliberately postponed an operation
which might have saved his life, in order to be able to sign the decree
which placed the Bill on the Statute Book. He died three days later.[1]
Footnote 1: See E. Vandersmissen, _Leopold II and Beernaert_, and G.
Harry, _Leopold II_ (1920).
This supreme satisfaction was not unmixed. Important concessions had
had to be made. The voluntary system was maintained to a certain
extent, only one son per family being called up for a short time
(fifteen months). The passing of the Bill was a victory in principle,
but it only increased very slightly the strength of the Belgian army.
The Pan-German campaign was in full swing by then. Maps were published,
beyond the Rhine, showing large portions of Belgium painted in imperial
red, like the rest of the Reich. Pamphlets and books appeared claiming
Antwerp as a German port and connecting East Africa with the German
Cameroons through the Belgian Congo. Still the majority of the Belgians
would not believe that such views were shared by the German Emperor and
his Government. It was only after the Agadir coup (1911) and Algeciras
(1912) that M. de Broqueville, Minister of War, strongly supported by
King Albert, was able to carry through a Bill introducing general and
compulsory service, which would have placed the army on a proper
footing if its provisions had been rendered immediately effective.
Unhappily, the Bill only provided for a gradual increase, the army
reaching its full strength of 340,000 men in 1917. This last
reservation proved nearly fatal to the country, for, when mobilization
was ordered, in July 1914, the total forces available only amounted to
117,000 men, of which the combatant portion was reduced to 93,000
bayonets--an increase of only 10,000 over the effectives of 1870.
There are few subjects so depressing as the slow development of Belgian
defences under the threat of invasion. Each time the situation became
serious, as in 1848, 1852, 1908 and 1911, public opinion allowed some
progress to be made. But it came always too late. The people were ready
to face their responsibilities, but they could not be made to realize
them. Blindly relying on the 1839 treaties, absorbed in their economic
and intellectual development, they showed little interest in
international affairs. Those who did, found themselves in the dilemma
either of taking refuge in a fools' paradise or of powerlessly facing
an ever-growing menace. Neutrality may have saved Belgium in 1870, full
independence might have saved her in 1914.