BLACK, YELLOW AND RED
The Vienna settlement, creating the joint kingdom of the Netherlands,
suited the Powers which made it. It suited England, since it placed the
Belgian provinces, and especially Antwerp, out of the reach of France.
It suited Prussia, which acquired a strong foothold on the plateaux
commanding the Meuse and the right to interfere in the affairs of
Luxemburg. It suited Holland, whose position was considerably
strengthened by the addition of rich and populous provinces. It suited
Austria and Russia, since it created a strong buffer State acting as a
bulwark against French annexionism in the North. It suited everybody
but the Belgians themselves, who had never been consulted, in spite of
their desire to be independent, made evident by the Brabanconne
Revolution and their attitude under the French regime. They had been
disposed of as being without legitimate owner, and if the idea of
granting them the right to rule themselves ever occurred to European
diplomacy at the time, it was promptly dismissed, under the assumption
that Belgian independence meant, sooner or later, reabsorption by
France.
The project of reuniting Belgium and Holland affords an excellent
example of a scheme plausible enough on paper, but which could not
resist the test of reality. It not only seemed sound from the Powers'
selfish point of view, it ought to have worked for the common benefit
of Belgians and Dutch alike. An end was made to the bitter struggle
waged by Holland against the Southern provinces. The commerce of
Antwerp ceased to threaten the Dutch ports, the Scheldt was open, the
commercial blockade lifted at last, and Belgian trade able to regain
its former importance after two centuries of stagnation. Belgium must
benefit from the association with a strong maritime Power, possessing
rich colonies and a limitless capacity for expansion. Holland's
prosperity, on the other hand, must be largely increased through the
agricultural and industrial resources of the Southern provinces. Even
from a purely historical point of view the idea of reconstituting the
Burgundian Netherlands must have appealed to those who had preserved
the memory of their former grandeur. This was not a mere inert buffer
State: it might become the strong central nation which European balance
of power so urgently required, since the Renaissance, to relieve the
tension of Franco-British or Franco-Prussian relations. Thus could be
bridged the gap created, during two centuries, by the religious wars.
The old tradition of Philip the Good and Charles V was to be renewed,
and the Netherlands to take once more their rank at the outposts of
European civilization.
[_THE JOINT KINGDOM_]
And, indeed, under exceptionally favourable conditions, sound union, if
not "complete and intimate fusion," could have been the outcome of this
bold experiment. Had the Powers formally recognized Belgian nationality
and provided for the respect of the country's institutions under the
new regime, the Belgians might have reconciled themselves to the idea
of wiping away past grievances. The Dutch might have justified their
attitude under the plea that they had not been fighting Belgium, but
Spain or France, and that their policy had been dictated by the
necessity in which they had been placed of defending themselves against
foreign invasion. William I might have conciliated public opinion in
Belgium by respecting scrupulously the country's customs, which had
survived Spanish and Austrian domination, by avoiding all undue
interference in religious affairs, by protecting the rights of the
French-speaking minority and by placing the Belgians exactly on the
same footing as the Dutch. In fact, his policy aimed at achieving the
complete and intimate assimilation advised at Vienna from the Dutch
point of view and without any consideration for the natural feeling of
a people whose traditions and religion were different from his own.
The new Constitution was the Dutch Constitution adopted in 1814,
revised by a commission including an equal number of Belgian and Dutch
delegates. It provided for equal toleration for all creeds and a two
Chamber Parliament where an equal number of deputies from both
countries would sit. (This in spite of the fact that Belgium had 50 per
cent. more inhabitants than Holland.) This Constitution or "fundamental
law," as it was called, was adopted by the Dutch, but rejected by the
Belgian States General. Instead of amending the law, the king
considered abstentions as favourable votes and ignored all opposition,
so that the new Constitution was passed, in spite of a strong adverse
majority. This singular procedure was called, at the time, "Dutch
arithmetic."
In several aspects, the policy of William I resembled that pursued
thirty years before by Joseph II. It had the same qualities and the
same defects. Though taking into consideration the material interests
of the people, he ignored their character and traditions and the
psychological problems with which he was confronted. Faced with
opposition, he attempted to override all resistance by asserting his
sovereign will, with little consideration for the democratic spirit
which pervaded Western Europe at the time.
[_POLICY OF WILLIAM I_]
Like Joseph II, William I, very wisely, attached great importance to
the economic revival of the country. The embargo once removed, Antwerp
made surprising progress, its tonnage being increased twofold between
1818 and 1829. New canals were built between Maestricht and
Bois-le-Duc, Pommeroeul and Antoing, while through the creation of
powerful banks, such as the "Societe generale pour favoriser
l'Industrie nationale," Belgian manufacturers received adequate
credits. The king supported, also, the creation of several factories,
such as the "Phoenix" at Ghent and "Cockerill" at Seraing. It was
during his reign that Belgian collieries began considerably to increase
their production and that the first blast furnaces were erected near
Liege and Charleroi.
The Dutch king attempted also to develop national education. He placed
the three Universities (Ghent, Louvain and Liege) under State control.
Many secondary and primary schools were founded all over the country
and public instruction made considerable progress.
Such measures would have been beneficial to Belgium, but they needed a
deep knowledge of and sympathy for local conditions to be carried out
successfully. Neither the king nor his Dutch ministers (the Belgians
remained always in a minority in the Cabinet) were able to realize the
difficulties which stood in the way and the legitimate grievances which
might easily be created by hasty action.
When Holland entered the union, she had a debt of nearly 2,000,000,000
florins, while Belgium's debt was much smaller (30,000,000). The latter
was, nevertheless, obliged to bear half of the total liabilities and
the heavy taxes rendered necessary by the king's enterprising policy.
Besides, in the distribution of such taxes the interests of Belgium,
still almost entirely agricultural, were sacrificed to those of
commercial Holland. The latter stood for free trade, the former for
protection. It is characteristic of the situation that the first sharp
conflict between Belgian and Dutch deputies took place in 1821 over a
bill imposing taxes on the grinding of corn and the slaughter of
cattle. These immediate grievances overshadowed, in the minds of the
Belgians, the encouragement given by the Government to Belgian trade
and industry.
A similar disregard for existing conditions and long-established
traditions brought about the failure of the measures taken by William I
to promote education. Not content with creating new schools, he
endeavoured to give the monopoly of public education to the State and
to subject the existing private establishments (almost all led by
priests) to official control. He further increased Catholic opposition
by establishing a Philosophical College at Louvain, where all those
intending to enter a seminary were obliged to study.
These examples show how premature was the idea of a "complete union"
between the two countries--an idea put forward, no doubt, owing to the
necessity of creating a strong centralized State on the northern
boundary of France. Had the Dutch Government possessed as much
political wisdom as the Austrian Minister at the court of The Hague,
they would have realized that the "kingdom of the Netherlands would
never be consolidated as long as the constitutional and administrative
union was not replaced by a federal system."
The same solution might have avoided a great deal of discontent with
regard to the language question. The difference of language between
Northern and Southern Belgium had created no difficulty in the last
centuries, owing to the fact that the country was nearly equally
divided, and also that the Northern provinces were bilingual, French
being used by the bourgeoisie and Flemish by the people. The union with
Holland placed the French-speaking population in a minority. On the
other hand, twenty years of French occupation had left their mark on
the country, and the prestige of French letters had never been so
brilliant. It seemed, therefore, urgent to display a great deal of tact
in any reform dealing with the language question, in order not to
encourage pro-French tendencies at the expense of Dutch sympathy. The
idea of introducing Dutch as the official language in Flemish-speaking
Belgium seemed wise enough, since it was the language understood by the
great majority of the people, but there was no urgent demand for it,
and it could have been realized progressively with the development of
Flemish education. King William, nevertheless, decreed that no
officials or civil servants should remain in office in Northern Belgium
unless they spoke and wrote Dutch correctly. Since a great many of
these officials belonged to the Flemish bourgeoisie and had only a very
incomplete knowledge of the popular language, they were obliged to
resign their posts and were supplanted by Dutchmen. So that a measure
which might have been popular in Flanders, at another time and under
different circumstances, was considered as a mere pretext for turning
Belgian subjects out of office.
It must be made clear that this language question played a secondary
part among the causes of discontent. It alienated the Flemish
bourgeoisie without conciliating the working classes, whose influence
in politics, at the time, was very small. It scarcely affected the
French-speaking population, since only few Walloon officials were
concerned in the matter.
[_BELGIAN GRIEVANCES_]
Scorning all opposition, William I had not even attempted to conciliate
one of the two great parties which divided the Belgian population: the
conservative Catholics and the Liberals, advocates of the "Rights of
Man" and opposed to the influence of the Church. He had alienated the
first by his attempt to monopolize education and the second by the
autocratic manner in which he suppressed all opposition. The
prosecution against a Liberal journalist, De Potter, who attacked the
Government's policy in _Le Courier des Pays-Bas_, brought about the
reconciliation of the two parties against the common enemy, in 1828,
just as the harsh attitude of Joseph II had caused the alliance of Van
der Noot and Vonck on the eve of the Brabanconne Revolution. From
anti-Government, the movement became gradually anti-Dutch, and party
grievances were henceforth merged into a revival of patriotic feeling,
aiming first at administrative separation and later at complete
independence.
The final outburst was no doubt hastened by the 1830 Revolution in
France, when the legitimist dynasty was overthrown in favour of Louis
Philippe d'Orleans, just as the taking of the Bastille determined a
corresponding movement in Belgium against Austrian rule. But nothing
could be more misleading than to attribute to French influence the
popular demonstration which took place in Brussels, on August 25th,
following a performance of Auber's _Muette de Portici_ at the Monnaie
Theatre. The song which stirred such wild enthusiasm in the breasts of
the Brussels people was purely patriotic, and it was to defend the
rights of their country that they sacked the house of Van Maenen, King
William's unpopular minister, and the offices of _Le National_, whose
director, a French pamphleteer named Libri, was looked upon as a Dutch
agent. It is true that the French flag was for a short time hoisted at
the Hotel de Ville, but it was soon replaced by the three colours of
Brabant.
French influences had been at work, but the French party remained a
small minority. Every act of the leaders of the revolution shows that
they were bent on obtaining first administrative separation, and later,
after such a proposal had been made impossible through the king's
stubborn attitude, complete independence. Never did the idea of a union
with France commend itself to the people. From Brussels, standing on
the language frontier, the revolution spread to Walloon Liege and
Flemish Louvain. Most of the important towns, with the exception of
Ghent and Antwerp, joined in the movement in both parts of the country.
The Prince of Orange, whose popularity was used in order to calm the
multitude, came to visit Brussels, but, unable to make any definite
promise, he was obliged to fly from the city.
[_THE SEPTEMBER DAYS_]
Even at that last hour, the joint kingdom of the Netherlands might have
been saved, since the most enthusiastic leaders, like Gendebien, only
urged autonomy; but King William remained deaf to all advice of
moderation and sent a Dutch army of 12,000 men against Brussels under
Prince Frederick. The revolutionary leaders had preserved but small
hope, owing to the unpreparedness of the defence. The Belgian success
in the street-fighting which took place near the Rue Royale and the
adjoining streets was nothing short of a miracle. After three days,
Prince Frederick was obliged to leave the town, leaving 2,500 dead
behind him; but the losses on the Belgian side had also been heavy, and
all reconciliation had become impossible. A provisional Government was
formed, a National Congress summoned, the complete independence of the
country proclaimed and a new Constitution prepared, a special
commission adopting the principle of constitutional monarchy (October
4th).
Meanwhile, the few towns, including Ghent and Antwerp, which had not
already done so expelled their garrisons, the citadel of Antwerp alone
remaining in Dutch hands.
The fascinating scheme endorsed by the Vienna Congress had completely
miscarried. Though only a ruler of great political talent could have
realized it, the story of the fifteen years of union between the two
countries shows that the king and his Dutch ministers were unable to
master the very elements of the difficult proposition they had to
solve. Up to the last months several opportunities offered themselves
to them of retracing their steps and retrieving the situation. They
failed to seize them. A careful survey of events will show that the
action brought against De Potter and the choice of The Hague as the
seat of the Supreme Court did more to estrange the Belgian bourgeoisie
from Dutch rule than the activity of French propagandists. The initial
blunder of William I was to ignore the fact that Belgium was not merely
a group of ownerless provinces, but a nation as strong in her soul, if
not as happy in her fate, as the Dutch nation, deserving the same care
and the same consideration. Had he acted as a national prince he would
have succeeded, in spite of the sad memories of past oppression, as
many princes had succeeded before. But he remained essentially Dutch in
his manners and his political outlook, and as such he was bound to
fail, as Joseph II, Maximilian and Philip II had failed before him.
Illustration: MODERN BELGIUM (TREATIES OF 1830-1839 AND 1919).