BALDWIN THE BEARDED
While, during the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Lotharingian lords
were striving to retain their independence under German rule, the
counts of Flanders acquired very rapidly a considerable influence in
France, and were practically left free to administer their domains
without any interference from outside. No duke, no bishops stood in
their way. They were directly dependent on the French kings, and the
latter were so weak, at the time, that they could not use the power
they possessed. From this point of view the story of the two parts of
mediaeval Belgium presents a striking contrast. On one side of the
Scheldt, an enfeebled and divided nobility struggled against a powerful
suzerain; on the other, a powerless suzerain was vainly attempting to
assert his authority over one of his most overbearing vassals.
[_COUNTS OF FLANDERS_]
There is, however, one characteristic which the house of Regner and
that of the Flemish counts had in common. Both owed their initial power
to their alliance with the Carolingian dynasty. Just as Regner's father
had abducted one of Lotharius's daughters, Baldwin Iron Arm succeeded
in abducting Judith, daughter of Charles the Bald, and widow of the
English king Ethelwulf (862). This gave him a pretext to intervene in
French affairs, of which his son Baldwin II (879-918) made full use.
After extending his domains as far as the Somme and annexing Walloon
Flanders and Artois, this prince consolidated his power by marrying a
daughter of Alfred the Great.
Flanders was definitely established as one of the richest fiefs of the
French crown, in close contact with England. Like Lotharingia, it
possessed two essentially Belgian characteristics. It had neither
racial nor linguistic unity, the north being Germanic and the south
romanized, and it was placed between two rival Powers, France and
England. The counts, or "marchios" as they preferred to call
themselves, sought alliance at one time with their suzerain, at another
with their neighbour, according to circumstances. When the power of the
French kings increased, they leant more and more towards England, as
the Lotharingian nobles had towards France when threatened by the
German emperors.
Arnulf I, having secured Douai and Arras, turned his attention towards
Normandy, but his progress was soon checked in that direction. His
seal, which has been preserved, is the oldest feudal seal known, and
the story of his life, the _Sancta prosapia domini Arnulfi comitis
gloriosissimi_, was the origin of the collection of annals and
chronicles in Latin, French and Flemish which formed, in the sixteenth
century, the well-known _Excellente Cronijke van Vlaenderen_. His son
and grandson gave up all attacks against Normandy and endeavoured to
extend their possessions towards the east and south. Baldwin IV seized
Valenciennes, in Hainault, and held it, for some time, against a
coalition including the emperor, the King of France and the Duke of
Normandy. He was finally obliged to restore the town in 1007, but, a
few years later, succeeded in obtaining a portion of Zeeland and
Zeeland Flanders ("Four Metiers"). In spite of the efforts made by the
emperors to fortify the line of the Scheldt at Antwerp and
Valenciennes, his successor, Baldwin V, the Bearded, crossed the river,
and, after pushing as far as the Dendre, obtained from Henry II the
investiture of the country of Alost and Zeeland. This was called
"Imperial Flanders," as opposed to French Flanders, and the count,
though nominally subjected to the rule of king and emperor, acquired
from his intermediate position a new prestige. Like the dukes of
Burgundy, four centuries later, he only lacked the title of a
sovereign. "The kings," according to William of Poitiers, "feared and
respected him; dukes, marquises, bishops trembled before him." When
Henry I of France died, Baldwin was unanimously chosen to act as regent
until young Philip came of age. The latter called him "his patron, the
protector of his childhood"; he called himself "_regni procurator et
bajulus_."
The regency ended in 1065, at a time when William of Normandy, who had
married one of Baldwin's daughters, was preparing to invade England.
The mere threat of a diversion on the Somme would have prevented this
expedition, whose consequences were to prove later on so dangerous to
France. But Baldwin acted as a Belgian, not as a French prince. It
suited his policy to create a rival to his suzerain. Far from hampering
William, he allowed a number of his subjects to take an active part in
the enterprise.
[_BRUGES AS CAPITAL_]
The marriage of Baldwin's eldest son with Richilda of Hainault and of
his second son Robert with Gertrude of Holland suggested the
possibility of an early unification of Belgium under the counts of
Flanders. According to Gilbert of Bruges, the two sons of Baldwin were
"like powerful wings sustaining him in his flight."
The reunion of Hainault and Flanders was, however, destined to be
short-lived. Baldwin VI died in 1070, leaving his widow Richilda with
two young children; Robert, her brother-in-law, rebelled against her.
After his victory at Mont Cassel, where he defeated a French army sent
by the king to Richilda's help, he left Hainault to his nephew and took
possession of Flanders.
Up to then, the counts had resided most of the time in the southern
part of their possessions, where they had their richest domains. Robert
the Frisian established his capital at Bruges, whose trade was
beginning to develop rapidly, and which had opened relations with
England and the Baltic countries. The fact that Robert's first
possessions were in Holland might have influenced his choice, but the
change marks, nevertheless, an important stage in the evolution of
Flanders from a purely agricultural country into an industrial and
commercial one. It looked at one time as if war was going to break out
between England and Flanders, as the Conqueror, owing to his marriage,
had some claims on the country. Robert, who had given his daughter in
marriage to King Canute of Denmark, concluded an alliance with him, and
even projected a combined attack on the English coast, which, however,
never materialized. He proved an irreconcilable enemy to the German
emperors, and entered into close relations with the Pope. His
pilgrimage to Jerusalem, in 1083, added to his prestige, and the
Emperor Alexis, who had received him with great pomp in Constantinople,
asked his support against the Turks. The letter which the emperor
addressed to him at the time, as to the "staunchest supporter of
Christianity," and which was given wide circulation, had a considerable
influence in preparing the first crusade, in which his son Robert II
(1093-1111) took a prominent part under Godfrey of Bouillon.
The rich and powerful Count of Flanders did not remain in the Holy
Land, like the ruined Duke of Lotharingia. His home interests were far
too important. He gave up the Danish policy of his father and allied
himself to the King of France against the English kings, whose power
was rapidly increasing. The French alliance stood him in good stead
when, making a pretext of the struggle of the investitures and of his
relationship with the Pope, he renewed his ancestor's claim upon the
emperor's possessions. More successful than Baldwin IV, he succeeded in
detaching the bishopric of Arras from Cambrai, and in spite of the
obstinate resistance of Henry IV and Henry V, in obtaining the
suzerainty over Cambraisis.
[_POLICY OF FLANDERS_]
On the other hand, by encouraging and protecting the first Capetians,
Robert of Jerusalem and his son Baldwin VII made a very grave political
mistake. Too preoccupied by the imminent danger from England, they did
not realize that, owing to its geographical position, this country
could never threaten Flanders's independence in the same way as France,
which had, besides, the right to interfere in its internal affairs. It
is, however, characteristic of the Count's policy that, on several
occasions, in 1103 and 1109, they signed separate agreements with Henry
I, in which they promised him to use all their influence in his favour
in case the French king contemplated an expedition against England,
and, if their efforts failed, not to give their suzerain more help than
they were strictly bound to. Even at the time when the alliance with
France was most cordial, the door was never closed on possible
negotiations with England. To call such a policy sheer duplicity would
be to misunderstand the spirit of the period and the special position
in which the Belgian princes, whether of Lotharingia or of Flanders,
were placed. Their diplomacy was the necessary result of the central
situation occupied by their possessions. Unless they endeavoured to
maintain a certain balance of power between their neighbours, they were
in direct danger of losing their independence. Periods of hesitation
coincided with a divided menace. As soon as the danger became evident
on one side, the Belgian princes invariably turned towards the other.
The same reasons which bound the descendants of Regner Long Neck to
France soon brought about a closer entente between the counts and
communes of Flanders and the English kings.