MY MEETINGS WITH JOFFRE, HAIG, CURRIE, AND PERSHING
Just one week after the United States entered the war, President Wilson
invited twenty-four men from all parts of the country to meet in
Washington on April 21, 1917, to consider means of financing the
American Red Cross. As I was one of the group, I came to Washington a
day earlier, and a few of us met at dinner. Of the guests that I can now
recall there were Charles D. Norton, Cornelius N. Bliss, Jr., Cleveland
H. Dodge, Vance McCormick, and Eliot Wadsworth. We all agreed that the
funds should be raised by a nation-wide popular subscription. The
impression of all those present, with the exception of myself, was that
about five, or at the most ten, millions could be raised for this
purpose. I vigorously contested this point of view, and suggested that
the minimum sum that we should start out to raise was fifty million
dollars. I outlined the terrific needs, not only in this country, but
also in Europe, for help of this kind. None of them agreed with me that
as large a sum as fifty millions could be secured, and they finally
said: “If you feel this way about it, you propose it at the full
committee meeting to-morrow.”
The next day, when the committee was in session, I made the proposition
and was astonished that none of those present at first grasped the idea
that the American people could be induced to subscribe fifty million
dollars. I then spoke a second time and told the committee that the
American Jews alone (of whom there were only three million) were then
engaged in raising a fund of ten million dollars for their
co-religionists abroad, and pointing to my friend, Julius Rosenwald,
added: “There is one man in this room who individually obligated himself
to contribute up to one million dollars to that fund. And I have no
doubt there are several other men in this room who could and would
subscribe one million dollars to the Red Cross, to say nothing of the
other patriotic Americans who would do likewise.”
When our committee finally selected Harry P. Davison, of the firm of J.
P. Morgan & Company, to be chairman, some of them hesitatingly told him
of my suggestion that fifty million dollars be raised, adding that they
thought my proposal was absurd. “You are right,” he said, “Mr.
Morgenthau’s proposal of fifty million dollars is absurd--absurdly
inadequate. At least one hundred million dollars will be required, and
that is the amount we must determine to raise.”
This was an inspiring example of those qualities of imagination, vision,
and daring, which had made Mr. Davison, while still a young man, one of
the foremost leaders of American finance. His decisive leadership and
fiery energy aroused the enthusiasm of his associates, and put the work
instantly in full swing.
I suggested that the best way to get our campaign immediately and
dramatically before the public was to obtain a proclamation from the
President commending our plan to the nation. “We have a psychological
opportunity,” I declared, “to reach the pockets of the people through an
appeal to their eager desire to serve. At the most, only a small
percentage of the population, and those the young men, can be active
combatants. But every citizen wants to feel that he is himself enlisted
in the common cause. Active membership in the Red Cross is such an
enlistment, because the Red Cross will be the second line of our army,
inspiriting and heartening the boys.”
They all agreed, but they feared it would take some time to get such a
proclamation from the President, because he was so very busy, and it
would be hard for him to find time to write it. I thought the
proclamation could be secured by the following morning, and told Mr.
Davison that Secretary Franklin K. Lane was the man in Washington who
could most nearly phrase an idea in the language of the President, and
that if we could get him to write the proclamation for us, I had no
doubt that the President would sign it without substantial change. We
went to Lane’s office, and it was a pleasure to me to introduce these
two able men of such diverse achievements, and to see how promptly each
fell under the spell of the other’s charm of manner. Mr. Lane readily
agreed to draft the proclamation, and promised to have it ready in a day
of two. “We want it in twenty minutes!” I exclaimed. “I will give you
the ideas we want expressed, and you can write it as well in that time
as in as many days.” “All right, go ahead,” he replied, and after a
short discussion, he reached for pen and paper, and within a few minutes
had written the following message to the American people, that thrilled
the country and made easy the path of the Red Cross Campaign.
Throughout the land the spirit of the American people has been
aroused and an intense desire to render some service that will give
proof of their patriotism is moving every heart. As not more than
one million of our citizens can be utilized to serve in the Army
and Navy of the United States and be given the privilege of risking
their lives on behalf of our beloved country, it is the duty of all
the rest to do something to help those who are at the front.
Sickness and discomforts can only be prevented by the hearty
coöperation of those who remain at home.
To give every one a chance to share in the defense of our country:
I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, and President of
the American National Red Cross, do appoint and proclaim that May
30th, 1917, be dedicated, in addition to our devotion on that day
to those who have heretofore sacrificed their lives on the altars
of our country, as a Red Cross day on which all our citizens should
give, according to the measure of their ability, their money and
their time to the American National Red Cross for the general
purposes of the Society, and especially for the comfort of our
armed forces, the care of those dependent upon them, and the relief
of war sufferers in foreign lands. We must perform this duty
generously and not stintingly. No less than fifty million dollars
should satisfy American pride.
In a few minutes, his stenographer supplied us with typewritten copies,
and within another hour, Mr. Tumulty, the President’s secretary, with
whom we left the draft, had promised to bring it to Mr. Wilson’s
attention that night. The following morning it was delivered to us,
bearing the President’s signature. The confidence in America’s
generosity was more than justified, as the Red Cross drive brought in
110 million dollars.
In the following month (May, 1917) I had a curious experience with the
ineptitude that able men sometimes display in public affairs. In that
month a number of gentlemen gathered for the purpose of formulating a
plan for a government-backed campaign to inform the American people more
fully regarding the European situation, our aims in the war, and our
proposed methods of waging the war. This meeting was one of the first
steps taken in the direction which ultimately led to the formation of
the Bureau of Public Information, which performed the dual function of
distributing government war publicity in this country and American war
propaganda abroad. This was a non-partisan gathering, and the following
gentlemen were present: Charles E. Hughes, Thomas L. Chadbourne, Jr.,
John Purroy Mitchel, Hon. William R. Willcox, Chairman of the
Republican National Committee, William Hamlin Childs, George W.
Perkins, Frank Munsey, Willard D. Straight, William A. Prendergast,
Robert Adamson, and myself. We had a very interesting discussion, and at
the close, Vance McCormick and I were appointed a committee to submit
the results to the President. That evening, Frank Munsey called me up on
the telephone and after a great panegyric of John Wanamaker, and
enlarging upon his vast experience as an advertiser and publicity man,
and as though he were delivering a nominating speech, suggested Mr.
Wanamaker as War Publicity Director. I curtly answered that he would not
do. He then veered over into a similar and extended eulogy of George W.
Perkins who, he declared, and with some justice, was one of the great
experts in the securing of publicity. I was really taken aback that a
man of Mr. Munsey’s acuteness should suggest to me that I propose one of
these two men, both of whom had so openly and unflinchingly attacked
President Wilson during the recent campaign. I reminded him that Mr.
Wanamaker had paid for lavish advertisements to bring about the defeat
of President Wilson. Then my sense of humour overcame my annoyance: the
very absurdity of his suggestions was irresistibly funny, and I asked
Mr. Munsey why he did not suggest George Harvey as his third choice and
so complete the trinity of Wilson’s strongest opponents in the publicity
line.
Another episode, as felicitous as this one was inept, occurred in this
same month. The occasion was the reception which New York City gave to
Marshal Joffre, René Viviani, and Arthur J. Balfour, who were visiting
this country as the heads of the French and British mission sent to
express the appreciation of their governments upon our entrance into the
war, and to advise with us upon the best means of making our military
alliance effective. New York City enthusiastically welcomed both its
distinguished guests, and Mayor Mitchel and his Reception Committee
were happy at the opportunity to give these visitors the freedom of the
city. To prevent any possibility of wounded susceptibilities, by seeming
preference of one guest over another, separate ceremonies were arranged
for each.
At all these ceremonies, including the reception of the men at the dock,
and even at the special dinner given to a select seventy at Sherry’s,
the lead was always given to that great citizen and grand old man of
American private and public life, the late Joseph H. Choate. There never
was any doubt as to who should be selected to match the generations of
culture and statecraft so ably represented by Balfour, the nephew of
Salisbury, the vivid French eloquence so charmingly illustrated by
Viviani, and the French eminence in the art of war which Marshal Joffre,
the hero of the Marne, so adequately typified. Joseph H. Choate was
preëminently the man whom we could proudly call upon; who in his own
person combined all the requisites of social grace, intellectual power,
and international distinction.
The climax of the entertainments offered our guests was a great dinner
at the Waldorf-Astoria, at which Mr. Choate presided. As I was also a
member of all the committees, and was in addition an ex-Ambassador, I
was constantly at his side. I know of no one, either in my own
experience or in history, who at that advanced age, was his equal in
youthful energy, in ebullition of spirits, in consummate geniality, and
spontaneity of wit; nor any one who so wonderfully combined the learned
lawyer, the able diplomat, and the democratic citizen. He was
universally recognized as the “highest type of living American,” and we
were proud to match him against the world.
When he made his speech with Joffre, Viviani, and Balfour at his side,
and delivered that famous message to the officials at Washington: “For
God’s sake, hurry up,” and was greeted with the thunderous applause that
followed, he reached the pinnacle of his career. As he stood there
looking at that audience, radiating forth one of his beaming smiles,
full of human sympathy, of hope and faith in America, it thrilled the
audience and gave to the British and French representatives an
unmistakable assurance that America was with them, and would stay with
them to the finish. It was a glorious and most fitting close to Choate’s
great career to be permitted to use his last thoughts and energies, in
his eighty-fourth year, for the welfare of his country. A few days
later, while the effect of his last speech was still penetrating into
the farthest corners of the earth, he passed away, mourned by all.
In June, 1917, the President asked me to go abroad upon a secret
diplomatic errand, which I am not even yet at liberty to disclose,
further than to say that I learned that what the President hoped for
could not be accomplished, and after a few days I proceeded to Paris.
This was one of the great hours of history. General Pershing had arrived
with his little staff of officers and a few regiments of American
Regular soldiers. This was America’s first pledge toward the promise of
military aid, which was speedily to be redeemed in terms of two millions
of American troops in France, and final victory in the war. I dined with
Ambassador Sharp; and in his home I met General Pershing, Thomas Nelson
Page, our Ambassador to Italy, and other prominent Americans. I renewed
old acquaintances in the American colony at Paris, and soon learned the
immense significance of the appearance of our soldiers in France. It was
now the middle of July, and only a little earlier the French people had
almost seemed to falter in their struggle. France seemed to have been
bled white by three years of devastating war. Frenchmen were saying
that it was as well to die on their doorsteps as to be led to useless
slaughter at the front. The French Government was making a final
desperate effort to restore the nation’s confidence. Joffre in May had
pleaded at Washington for American troops--“No matter how few you send,
only give us the sight of Americans in uniform on the streets of Paris.”
I now had the privilege of watching, from the most favourable point of
vantage, a critical test of the national psychology which the French
Government made in July, 1917. With a profound sense of dramatic values,
they had arranged that the American troops should be exhibited to the
French public on their Independence Day, July 14th, as units of a great
patriotic parade. To make sure that they might accurately gauge the
psychological effect, the President’s reviewing stand was placed in
Vincennes, where the people had suffered greatly from the privations of
the war, and where disaffection was rife. I received an invitation to
witness the parade from the President’s reviewing stand, and Ambassador
Sharp, General Pershing, and I were the only Americans so favoured. We
were arranged around President Poincaré, with Monsieur Painlevé,
Minister of War, and others. M. Painlevé afterward told me that he and
the President of the Republic had headed the procession while it was
passing through the poorer quarters of the city, to test the attitude of
the people before they had tasted the enthusiasm which the sight of
troops would naturally arouse, and that they had been encouraged by
receiving everywhere a cordial and even a hearty reception.
Nevertheless, I could plainly see the evidences of nervousness amongst
the French officials--a nervousness which grew more intense as the
military parade approached. It was somewhat relieved as the French
soldiers marched by, and were greeted by the hearty cheers of the
people. It disappeared entirely when our splendid Americans swung past
the reviewing stand. The enthusiasm of the spectators then passed all
bounds. To the French officials this approval of the populace meant
relief from a heart-breaking anxiety: to us Americans who stood with
them it was an occasion for patriotic pride. To see the flag of our
young nation in this old capital of Europe, and behind it those two
thousand splendid examples of our young manhood, so erect in carriage,
and so lithe in motion--their faces so eager and intelligent--their
whole bearing so proudly representative of the millions that were to
follow them, and to see how much their presence meant to rulers and
people alike--all this made a picture that filled us with happiness. The
effect upon the French nation was instantaneous and electrical. From
despair, they changed overnight to fresh hope and confidence. Though
they then only hoped for one third of a million reinforcements within a
year, and little dreamed of the marvel which was actually performed of
bringing two million men speedily to France, they were nevertheless
enthusiastic over the prospect. Responsible Frenchmen urged me to advise
President Wilson to assert himself at once as the leader of the whole
alliance against Germany; and responsible Britons soon afterward added
that they, as well as the French, would welcome a unified control of the
Allies’ political policy with President Wilson in command. I think it
profoundly significant, in view of the later course of events, that the
European nations thus early conceded the necessity that Americans should
lead.
I was still further informed of the real thoughts of the French
officials when a few days later I dined with Painlevé, who spoke with
deep appreciation of the help which America was beginning now to extend.
He spoke quite freely of the recent disaffection that had come among the
French people after three years of terrible fighting and heavy losses,
and with gratification of the change that had come over public opinion
with the arrival of the American troops. He covered at length the
dangerous situation on the Russian front, the blunder committed at the
beginning of the war in the failure of the Entente fleet properly to
pursue the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, the capture of which would have
kept Turkey out of the war and spared them the difficult problem of the
Balkans. He discussed also the difficulties of the French in governing
their colonies and dependencies; and, with special significance, he
declared that negotiations for peace with Germany could not be commenced
before the complete evacuation of all the territory then occupied by the
enemy.
Painlevé was especially solicitous regarding our ability to solve the
problem of transportation of men and munitions to France. He was
concerned over our ability to drill into a real army more than two
hundred and fifty thousand men within a year. He asked eagerly about
President Wilson’s character, especially whether I thought he had the
determination which, now that we had entered the war, would cause him to
see it through with energy. He feared, from the hesitancy that we had
displayed before entering, that we might be planning a lukewarm effort.
He was delighted when I assured him of the iron resolution of President
Wilson, and of the habit of the American people, once aroused, to see a
fight through to the finish.
In the course of that evening (Saturday), he asked me whether I had
posted myself on the military conditions in France. I told him I had
projected a trip to the British front, and was only waiting for the
arrangements to be completed. He asked me whether I would not like to
see something else in the meantime, and I replied that I should like
very much to see the French front, and especially to visit the parts of
Alsace which the French had at last reunited to France. He was somewhat
taken aback when, having asked me when I should like to go, I replied on
the following Monday. Nevertheless, he proved himself possessed of a
capacity for prompt action and execution. At ten o’clock on Monday
morning, there appeared at my hotel a very dapper French officer. He
saluted, introduced himself as Captain Jaubert of General Headquarters,
and added: “At your command. I am to accompany you on your mission--your
visit to the front.” A few moments later, a heavy-set, very
intelligent-looking man, in the garb of a chauffeur, presented himself,
likewise came to attention, saluted, and informed us that the car was
ready. Shortly thereafter, we were on our way.
Our party consisted of Captain Jaubert, my old friend Schmavonian of the
American Embassy at Constantinople, Professor Herbert Adams Gibbons, and
myself. Our first objective was Gondrecourt, the camp and headquarters
of the then tiny American Expeditionary Force. Our route took us through
that part of the battlefield of the Marne which was nearest to Paris,
and as we sped along, Jaubert explained to us, by means of sketches
traced on the window glass with his forefinger, the tactics of that
battle.
Arrived at Gondrecourt, we saw a splendid sight. Here were American boys
in American uniform, with American automobiles and other equipment. It
gave us a keen sense of home. Captain Jaubert, whom I had by this time
discovered to be not only a captain but a marquis, and a nephew of the
Duke of Montebello, soon located the headquarters of General Sibert. We
were here invited to dine with General Ponydreguin, the commander of the
famous “Blue Devils,” a very charming gentleman. He commanded the French
troops in this neighbourhood, as General Sibert commanded the Americans.
After dinner, we adjourned to the camp headquarters, which I found
these two gentlemen shared. As neither spoke the other’s language, it
was amusing to see them, while using an interpreter to converse with
each other, carry through the French politenesses of direct
conversation, smiling at each other, and bowing and courtesying, General
Sibert especially finding it difficult to accommodate his rather formal
American manner to the livelier conventions of Continental usage.
After a tour of inspection, on the following morning, of the interesting
activities of the camp, we proceeded on our way to Domremy, the
birthplace of Joan of Arc, where I wished to visit the church, which is
a shrine to her memory. By this time I had discovered not only that my
escort was a marquis, but, more surprising, that our chauffeur had been
in private life a member of the Paris Bourse. The car in which we were
riding belonged to him, and he had volunteered to do his bit for his
country by putting the car at the Government’s service, and offering
himself as its chauffeur. Captain Jaubert, in accordance with military
traditions of discipline, had treated him, a mere sergeant, as
impersonally as if he were another piece of the car’s mechanism. When we
drew up at Joan of Arc’s Chapel, and dismounted to enter, I saw by his
expression that he was as eager as I to see the interior of this famous
shrine. The yearning look on his face, as he stood before the portals,
which an absurd military convention forbade him to enter in company with
us, who were no better than he, was too much for me to withstand. I
asked Captain Jaubert to relax the rigours of discipline for the moment,
and allow him to accompany us. The Captain acquiesced with
characteristic French politeness, though I suspected he did not
especially relish it; but the chauffeur’s appreciation was sufficient
recompense for whatever slight damage was done to military tradition.
The Captain himself had a fair grievance against military fate: he was
a graduate of St. Cyr and had resigned from the army during the Dreyfus
episode, with the result that he had had to reënter the army as a
captain, while most of his classmates at the Military School were at
least colonels and many of them generals.
That night we reached Thann. We arrived about nightfall, and were met at
the town boundary by the Mayor. He invited us to spend the night with
him at his suburban home, as it was not safe for us to sleep in the
town. I was ushered into the best room in his house, and found that the
mirror in the bathroom, as well as the tub, was almost demolished. The
Mayor explained that this damage had been done during the week, and that
he had not had time to repair it. The next day was a great Catholic
holiday, Assumption Day, and we were invited to attend the services at
the church of St. Theobald. This spectacle was intensely interesting,
because the parents of these people, though French by origin and
sympathy, had been compelled by the Germans to rear their children in
the German tongue, and consequently, though the first sermon of the
celebration was delivered in French by a chaplain of the French army, a
second sermon was then delivered in German by an old abbé. The French
general explained to me that he saw no reason why he should deprive the
inhabitants of the town of their religious comfort simply because they
could not understand French.
At one o’clock we were entertained at the hotel by the two oldest
inhabitants and most respected citizens of the town, Messieurs Weber and
Groshents. At this luncheon they paid me one of the most touching
compliments I have ever received in my life. They were men of about
seventy. Both had been of age during the Franco-Prussian War, and both
had continued throughout the forty-three years of the German occupation,
since that war, to be unconquerably French in their patriotism. During
the luncheon, while the conversation was lagging, owing to my
insufficient knowledge of French, the two old men whispered to each
other for a few minutes, and then one of them, Mr. Weber, turned to me,
and said in German: “We have just released each other from the vows we
made in 1871, that we would never again speak German in public. But we
want to enjoy your company and we want so much to hear you talk to us,
that we think we are justified in suspending our agreement.”
We then had a most delightful conversation. Mr. Weber told me how, in
1871, he had taken the French flag which had flown over the City Hall
until the German occupation, and secreted it in the back of a sofa in
his parlour, and how he had taken the flag staff and hidden it in his
garret. Then, when the French entered the town in 1914, he ripped open
the sofa, took out the flag, fastened it back on its staff, and at
seventy years of age had proudly presented it to President Poincaré in
celebration of the return of Alsace to France.
Leaving these delightful old gentlemen and their quaint city of Thann,
we motored southward. At dinner next evening we were entertained by the
Mayor of Mazevant, Count de Witt Guizot. After a very pleasant evening
with him, and as we were about to take our leave, I inquired if he were
related to Francis P. G. Guizot, the famous historian. He smiled, and
replied: “Slightly; he was my grandfather.”
Another day of interesting travel took us through the Alsatian provinces
to Belfort, and there we abandoned the automobile, and returned by train
to Paris.
A few days later I had the pleasure of renewing my acquaintance with
Marshal Joffre, which I had first made at the civic receptions in New
York. I called upon him at his headquarters at the Military School in
Paris. Marshal Foch had succeeded him as Commander-in-Chief of the
French armies, and Joffre was now engaged chiefly in training staff
officers, and in advising the High Command when his judgment was needed
in council. The Marshal gave me, with great frankness, his ideas upon
what America should do to make effective our military participation in
the war.
Immediately after our interview I had a memorandum prepared by the
gentleman who acted as my interpreter, from which I have made the
following extracts:
In the present warfare there is a most vital need for artillery
officers and for general staff officers. The American Department of
War must realize this. It is not enough to have the men, the other
officers, and even the equipment. The framework of the army is far
from being complete or efficacious before you have a sufficient
number of trained artillery and general staff officers. In order to
train these officers for active field service, they should be sent
to France. They can at once be sent to the front where for a week
or two they can see the work done there. The general staff officers
can then attend courses in the general staff school, and the
artillery officers can be attached to French artillery regiments
until they are thoroughly familiarized with the work.
Besides the artillery and general staff officers, the Marshal
advises to send in turns a certain number out of the two hundred
newly promoted American generals to join the French divisions, army
corps, or armies where they can obtain very valuable practical
information most useful to them when they take over commands in the
field.
The Marshal said that he had something very delicate to add. He had
come to know that in America there was a certain class of officers
whom he would call “the old officers”--those who would like to see
all promotions and appointments made solely on the basis of
seniority. Between these old officers, and the younger officers,
the Marshal understood, there was or there might be friction. The
Marshal said that in an emergency like the present the things to be
taken into consideration are efficiency and ability. When he took
over the command, the same question came up in France. The Marshal
did not hesitate to drop from the ranks a large number of officers
and to appoint in their stead younger and more capable men, without
taking into consideration the seniority of the former. Without
clearly stating it, the Marshal very delicately left the impression
that in his opinion politics should play no part in military
appointments.
The Marshal said that twice he had Mr. Roosevelt next to him at
dinner in America. Mr. Roosevelt seemed anxious to come to France
with some volunteers and fight against the Germans, and he (Mr.
Roosevelt) would be satisfied by being only second in command under
a general. Marshal Joffre was not of the opinion that the
realization of Mr. Roosevelt’s plan could be of great service and
therefore desired to dissuade him from attempting to carry out his
plan. So the Marshal told Mr. Roosevelt, “My Colonel, whatever you
may be, you cannot be second!”
In recapitulating, the Marshal said, “Do not wait until you are
entirely ready _in America_. You should not attempt to act before
you are ready, but there are things which you can do at once by
degrees, little by little, while you are preparing yourselves. Send
officers to be instructed for the artillery and General Staff
services, send some generals, and put them at once in contact with
our generals at the front. Let a regiment or a battalion go to the
trenches. From time to time send some men over.” The Marshal’s idea
seemed to be that while the main preparation and equipment should
be carried out in America, some men and officers should be sent
over for instruction in France, and the arrival from time to time
of men and officers would create a favourable impression on the
minds of the French who would see that America was doing something.
The Marshal spoke very highly of General Pershing.
Two days before my conversation with Marshal Joffre, I had arranged a
dinner in honour of General Pershing. On the morning of that day,
however, I received a letter from his secretary postponing the
engagement. It read as follows:
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Commanding General
Saturday, August 18, 1917.
MY DEAR MR. MORGENTHAU:
General Pershing has requested me to inform you that much to his
regret he will be unable to dine with you and Mrs. Morgenthau this
evening. The General has had an engagement of long standing to
take a particular trip with General Petain when the latter was able
to arrange it. This morning General Petain has just sent General
Pershing word that he has made all arrangements for them to leave
this afternoon. So under the circumstances the General hopes you
will understand why he is unable to be with you this evening.
Very sincerely,
W. C. EUSTIS,
_Secretary_.
When we met at dinner, four days later, the true meaning of this letter
was revealed. General Pershing explained that “his engagement of long
standing to take a particular trip,” when translated, meant that General
Petain had promised him to let him witness the battle at Verdun the
first time active operations were resumed there. On the morning of our
first appointment, General Petain had sent General Pershing word to come
to Verdun at once, and Pershing had, of course, cancelled all
conflicting engagements, and left for the front. He described to us what
he had seen at Verdun, and spoke with the eloquence and enthusiasm of a
boy who has just seen his first Big League game of baseball. Pershing
gave us a vivid picture of a modern battle. He had accompanied General
Petain to an observation dugout, where they could see the battle through
the telescopes, as well as keep in touch with its multitudinous
operations by telephone. The General in command of the division at this
point was receiving messages from all parts of the battlefield, and
transmitting them to Petain. Word would come that X had taken another
hill, and Petain would tell him to hold it or to move on, making his
decisions for the various parts of the battlefield in accordance with
his general plan of military action.
General Pershing was especially interested in a double coincidence of
this visit. The Division Commander in the dugout was General Gouraud.
Oddly enough, General Gouraud had been the French military attaché in
Tokio when Pershing was American attaché at the same point. In the
dugout they fell to comparing notes on their experiences together in
Japan in 1905. General Pershing recalled that one of their acquaintances
there had been the German attaché, whom they had both detested. “By the
way,” he inquired of Gouraud, “what has become of that little German,
Von Etzel, that we used to know in Tokio?” “Come here,” Gouraud replied,
“and look through this telescope. That is Von Etzel’s army retreating.”
Three days later, my eagerly anticipated trip to the British front was
undertaken. Schmavonian again accompanied me. Lord Esher, who had
arranged this trip for me on behalf of the British, introduced to me
Captain Townroe of the British General Headquarters Staff, a fine,
determined gentleman, who had been the private secretary of Lord Derby
during the recruiting period in England and was the author of a popular
play called “Nations at War.” General Pershing had kindly designated
Captain Quekemeyer, then as now his personal _aide_, to accompany us as
an American representative. They first escorted us to an old château
occupying the land where the battle of Agincourt was fought. First we
visited two American regiments of engineers. It was a great revelation
to see how two or three West Point officers had been able to whip into
perfect shape 1,200 civilians and out of them to create splendid
regiments. General Biddle escorted me to their headquarters, and we
reviewed the regiments. We then went to Roisel where we visited the 12th
U. S. Engineers. They were just making camp. Their colonel apologized
for the chaotic condition of affairs. I kept looking at him, thinking
that I had met him before. At length I made a few inquiries of him as to
his antecedents, and where I could have met him, when suddenly, having
penetrated through the years
[Illustration: Mr. Morgenthau as one of the group of financiers,
doctors, and sociologists who organized the international association of
Red Cross societies at Cannes in 1919]
which had left its marks upon him, it dawned upon me that this man,
Colonel C. M. Townsend, was the same Townsend that had attended the
College of the City of New York with me in 1870, and we had not seen
each other once in the ensuing forty-seven years! This was one of the
most remarkable feats that my memory ever surprised me with.
When we returned to the château that evening, our genial host, Colonel
Roberts, introduced us to a number of British writers who had arrived
that day. Lovat Fraser, then leading editor of the London _Times_; C. J.
Beattie, the night editor of the _Daily Mail_; L. Cope Crawford, of the
London _Morning Post_; H. B. Tourtel, of the _Daily Express_; Sydney
Low, and a few others. After supper, we sat in the parlour in the old
château, with its engravings by Wilkie on the walls, and the old
furniture, etc., and were reminded that it was right on the battlefield
of Agincourt. I listened to Sydney Low’s story of his writing “The
Conquest of Attila,” who was assisted in his war by the Ostrogoths
(Austrians) and opposed by the Franks, Visigoths, etc., and how Attila
had said that God would help him to destroy the Christians, and he would
be a scourge to them and sack their cities, or, as Low put it, “just
like Emperor William, who told his army to act like the Huns, and they
are doing it.”
Another evening, we had discussions with some of the British labour
leaders, who had come over to visit the front under the direction of Mr.
J. E. Baker of the Ministry of Munitions. They were amazed when I told
them that it was ridiculous to think that democracy could be established
in a few years. They were really surprised to think that twenty-five
years was inadequate to reform the world.
Another evening, Colonel Roberts asked me whether he could invite Major
Tibbetts who was then in command of Tank Town, which they called the
headquarters of the Tank Corps in that neighbourhood, as the Major was
very anxious to meet me. I told him I had never heard of the Major, but
that I should be very glad to meet him. It turned out that Major
Tibbetts was in command of one of the landing parties at the Dardanelles
and that he was most desirous to ascertain what took place on the
Turkish side of the lines at that time. So here we sat in France and
completely dovetailed our two stories into each other. He told me of his
experiences--how he, with his party, had reached the cliffs, and had to
dig themselves in, and the Turks were pushing them hard, while the
British ships were attacking the Turks on the beach, and they were
suspended between the two fires, totally ignorant of the actual state of
affairs, while we in Constantinople were wondering why those two
detachments had not coöperated. He explained it, but as his explanation
was rather confidential, I do not care to repeat it.
One day, General Charters, who was in charge of the Intelligence
Department, came to see me, and asked me whether I was perfectly
satisfied with my programme. I looked at him quizzically and said:
“Satisfied? Yes. Perfectly? No.” He said: “What else do you want?” I
told him that I had heard so much recently of the activities of Sir
Arthur Currie, that I was anxious to meet him. He told me that it was
impossible, as General Currie was then conducting the attack on Lens. I
said to him: “Look here, General, when I took charge of British affairs
in Constantinople, and found that the secretaries and clerks were much
inclined promptly to say ‘No’ to all requests from British citizens, I
promulgated Order No. 1, which was, that no one but myself could say
‘No’ to any request from any citizen of any country whose affairs we had
taken charge of, and, furthermore, that I would not say ‘No’ unless I
had first received a ‘No’ from the Grand Vizier, or from the State
Department in Washington.”
General Charters said: “I am on, sir,” and left the room. He came back
in twenty minutes, and said: “Sir Arthur Currie most cordially invites
you to lunch with him to-morrow at one o’clock.” I said: “Accepted with
great pleasure; but tell me, how did you do it?” He said: “I called up
Sir Douglas Haig, and told him your story. He called up Sir Arthur
Currie, and the invitation was, as you see, promptly extended.”
Rather than repeat from memory the very interesting interview I had with
Sir Arthur, I shall quote verbatim from the diary which I kept at the
time, giving my impressions as they were written fresh at the moment:
August 25, 1917. Received by Currie, a fine, tall, well-set, calm,
determined man. He was anxious to make sure of our names. Even
there he showed his thoroughness. We repeated our names and handed
him our cards. We were presented to his staff, Generals Radcliffe
and Sinclair, Prince Arthur of Connaught, etc., and went straight
to lunch, “hot curry,” liver and bacon, rice pudding, salad and
fruit, being served. We discussed Turkish conditions, the price of
land there, etc., Currie saying that their expected land grants
would hardly be appreciated. We also discussed general affairs of
war, Radcliffe and Connaught joining in the conversations, as they
were anxious for facts about the Dardanelles and Bagdad.
After luncheon, the General took us into his office from two to
three o’clock. We talked of warfare, the battle of Lens while it
was in progress. He said that he still had in his corps men who
were very proud of their victorious record and tried to live up to
it. He spoke fairly freely, and explained his method of leap-frog
attack, laying great stress upon a full knowledge of the enemy’s
position and strength, etc., when about to make an attack. His
command had never failed to get their objective and retain it.
Example of spirit of men: Two units who after capturing a height
and then a quarry were driven out of latter and he was wondering
what to do and studying the situation, when he heard that the men
without waiting for orders, of their own initiative, attacked the
quarry again, regained it, and are now in possession of it. Currie
bemoaned an accident to his ankle which he had sprained playing
Badminton. He disliked going amongst men who were real casualties,
while his injury was caused by a game. He favours reserving and
using different and fresh troops for repelling counter-attacks and
attributes much of his success to this policy. He has strong common
sense. His men coöperate. Artillery answered S. O. S. call in
thirty seconds, and thus helped to relieve infantry promptly. He
favours light railways which he has greatly extended in this
section. Carries two thousand tons a day on them instead of
expected one hundred and fifty tons. Spirit of victory induces
Smith, R. R. engineer, if requested by Jones Chief Gunner for more
shells to make special trip _sans_ hesitation. Canadians originated
raiding trenches without capturing them.
When complimented on calmness amidst storm, etc., as several
generals and flyers were waiting outside to report and for
conference for further action in battle in progress, he evidently
was totally absorbed and enjoying our talk. He said: “The Great God
has given me this calm nature, which prevents my becoming excited,
and I use it to study everything which I think will help to lick
the Boche.”
He showed great confidence in the final issue of the war, and was
delighted with the U. S. entry into it, and said: “I do not believe
that God or Fate has brought English-speaking people together
intending them to lose.” He objected to Canadians being treated
patronizingly by the British, and he said: “England doesn’t want
it, why should we? We are not fighting for England, but for the
British Empire of which we are a part, and which we want
perpetuated, and we are fighting for our skins.” He insisted upon
the imperative need of a G. O. C. [General Officer Commanding]
having undisputed and untrammelled power to send home incompetent
officers and disregarding political influences. Men should only be
sent against enemies with good leaders. It is strange all the
generals speak of the Germans as “he” and “him.”
Canada is provided with clothing and food by England. It pays them
for everything. He recognized that the United States could not have
entered earlier, as their people were not favourable. Hoped the U.
S. would profit by their experience and avoid their mistakes. “The
lessons of the war should teach the U. S. how to use their great
power to advantage and secure permanent victory and peace.” He said
he knew a great deal about the U. S., as he lived in Vancouver, and
was a National Guardsman, colonel of a regiment, then had a
brigade, a division, and now a corps.
After our talk, we entered his Rolls Royce, and went to Vimy Ridge
accompanied by G. S. O. No. 3 of the Corps, a fine intelligent
fellow. We walked eight hundred yards over a long row of slats laid
down for King George who made the same trip, and after passing
through a trench, reached an observation tower. It had an opening
about 8 ft. wide and was 20 inches in height, and was used by a
sergeant and two assistants. Had powerful glasses and maps showing
the country. We could see the Battle of Lens in its progress. The
ground around it was pock-marked with shells. The panorama of the
fight was thrilling to behold. It gave an impression of the
enormity of the task to make any progress at all. We wore steel
helmets and carried our gas masks with which we had practised in
the auto, as we were well in the danger zone. Some shells dropped
within 400 yards of us. The N. C. O. [non-commissioned officer] in
charge pointed out some Boches running on the streets of Lens and
also corpses lying in little gray heaps. Sixty-pounders and other
shells were being hurled through the air above us right into Lens
and Mericourt and in return the Germans were firing on Vimy. Two
airplanes were flying right over the battlefield, with German
shells exploding several hundred feet below them.
When I had started on this trip with Sir Douglas Haig as my chief
objective, my wife had begged me to ascertain from Sir Douglas why he
had not captured Lens. The reader will recall that, at that time, there
were constant reports about the Battle of Lens, and it was very puzzling
to us that, although the British seemed in complete control of the
batteries around Lens, they hesitated about taking the town. Therefore,
one of the first questions I put to Sir Douglas when I met him three
days after my meeting with Currie, was the one entrusted to me by my
wife, and in reply he explained to me that it was more efficacious to
use Lens as a means of diminishing the Germans’ unused reserve than to
take possession of it.
The full record of my meeting with Sir Douglas Haig, quoted from my
diary, is as follows:
Tuesday, August 28, 1917: It rained hard. We left the Château at
11 A.M. ... We had an accident with auto forty minutes from
headquarters, were hastily transferred to another car, an open
Sunbeam, with torn top which I had to hold down, raining, rushing
madly, stopped by R. R. crossing, and once by a long line of
troops, but we reached there at 1 P.M.
Sir Philip Sassoon, M. P., private secretary of Sir Douglas Haig,
received us and ushered me into private room of D. H. We talked for
ten minutes before, and forty minutes after, lunch, alone; most
interesting and instructive. He showed me and explained maps of
Ypres, Lens, etc., and lists of German divisions and the steady
diminution, since April 15, of their unused reserves which declined
from 44 to 5. He said that Germans having concluded that the French
were used up and the British unprepared, commenced transporting
troops to the Russian front, and among other things he wanted to
save Russians, so he ordered attack on Lens and made attack on
Ypres. He also wanted to convince Lloyd George and others of his
capacity to push back the Germans and settle the war on western
front. He thinks it wrong tactics to attempt to secure small
victories at Gaza or Bagdad. The war can only be won by attacking
the German army. The only place to reach them is at the western
front. Germans will never admit or consider themselves defeated
even if all their allies are whipped and forsake them. Hence
everybody should concentrate attention here. Italians should also
help....
Thinks Germans are beginning to realize their position and possible
defeat and great loss of economic position, and will in October or
so offer peace terms, which it will be difficult to have French
decline. He begs and urges that no early, incomplete peace be made,
now being the day or time of reckoning. He thinks the Germans are
much worse off than is known. He is positive that England will hold
out until we can come to assist. He says it is unnecessary expense
for us to prepare great airplane units, and that shelling German
cities will not end war, or shorten it. It is right here, with
artillery and infantry and of course a proper amount of airplanes,
that work must be done.
He believes that the U. S. is destined to play a very important
part, but thinks we must admit it is also self-defense that prompts
our actions, and not only the altruistic spirit. He said the French
were not ready at Havre to receive U. S. troops, and it would be
much more effective if U. S. troops joined them and received their
hints in good English which they understood. He is pleased that U.
S. troops believe in same system of warfare as English, offensive
and hitting out and not defensive. He explained their method of
attacking, their intention only to move far enough each time to
secure a height and drive the Germans from points of advantage and
be prepared for counter attacks and each time absorb some German
divisions. Lays great stress on gradual diminution of German unused
reserve division.
Engineers built 600 miles of standard and narrow-gauge railroads.
They have 600 locomotives and 6,000 cars. Shortage of freight cars
was great handicap. They took old rails from England, South
America, and U. S. to build these lines. He hopes we will send more
railroad men and engineers. Quick transporting of men and material
greatest help. He thinks war has at last given Great Britain an
empire and hopes it will also give them the U. S. as a permanent
ally. War must be won by Great Britain and U. S. jointly. Said
their own experience will make them patient with us. Spoke most
flatteringly of Pershing and our American troops. Thinks their
temperament is so spirited and warlike.... He makes the impression
of a determined experienced soldier, who has a well-defined plan
which he is sure will lead to victory and wants everyone to adopt
it and fight it out here in Flanders. He neither drank nor smoked
at lunch.
From our luncheon with Sir Douglas Haig we returned at once to Paris. My
diary for the next day contains the following:
Wednesday, August 29, 1917: Called at headquarters. Saw Col.
Harbord, and then General Pershing.... Harbord told me French put
Americans south of them and not next to English, because they,
themselves, wanted to be defending Paris and did not want
foreigners to determine destiny of France. It sounds plausible. He
again suggested a visit from Baker, who could then talk more
convincingly to Americans and would understand needs. Pershing told
me that every sinew of his muscles, every artery leading to his
heart, and all his energy and hours are devoted to working for
success. He again expressed hope of United States fighting to the
end. He spoke of needs of dockage for the ships, thinks it will
require 30 to 40. Feels we need our own locomotives and cars to
send men, etc., to front; claims our camps will be so located that
we can send men to any part of lines. Shipping is needed to bring
men over, and then their food and ammunition. He says nothing can
be secured here--all must come over. Hopes seized German ships will
answer; if not we should insist upon Allied ships, including Japan
and Italy. It will take fully a year before we can be of much
actual assistance.
A few days later, I sailed for America to make my report to President
Wilson. It was my intention, upon my arrival in New York, to make this
report in the form of a letter, and with this idea in mind, while still
aboard ship, I wrote several drafts of it by hand, and in New York
dictated a letter in final form to the President under date of September
15, 1917. I finally decided, however, that a verbal report was better,
and consequently, I proceeded to Washington, and on September 19th,
called on the President. I gave him at considerable length the
information I had gathered. As our conversation, however, was simply a
verbal enlargement of my letter of the 15th, I will quote that letter
here. It is, I think, of some historical importance:
September 15, 1917.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
After close observations, visiting fronts, conversations with
members of the French Cabinet, Generals and others, both French and
British, I have arrived at the following conclusions, which I
submit for your consideration, and expect to elaborate upon, when
you grant me an interview. Among the men I have talked with are
Generals Sir Douglas Haig, Sir Arthur Currie, Joffre, Pershing,
Sibert, Biddle, and others, and also Messieurs Painlevé, Ribot,
Cambon, and Steeg of the Cabinet.
No separate peace can be made at present with the Turks as they
still think that the Germans will be victorious, and because many
of the members of the Union and Progress Committee are enriching
themselves through the continuation of this war.
The Turkish atrocities perpetrated against Armenians, Syrians, and
Arabs establish beyond doubt that the Turks should no longer be
permitted to govern non-Moslems and non-Turks of any description.
The British and French successes at Verdun, Ypres, and Lens have
reduced the German unused Reserve Divisions from forty-four in
April to five in August, and have demonstrated that the German
positions are not, as has long been believed in the United States,
impregnable. The British and French are now confident of final
victory, depending, however, on the coöperation of the United
States Army.
For moral and political effect, they deem it highly desirable that
more American troops, though unprepared, be sent immediately.
The German autocracy with its strong leadership and blind following
of its allies will never yield until German military prestige has
been destroyed.
A test of strength will have to take place on the Western Front.
Victory will be won as much through the steady hand and intrepid
determination of the leader that will direct the united allied
forces as by the physical resources that will be employed.
Both British and French authorities have separately admitted that
in none of the Entente countries is there a statesman who would
satisfy them all as a leader. They think that your consistent
attitude in this great struggle between democracy and autocracy and
all your messages and particularly your masterful answer to the
Pope’s proposition, indicate you as the leader--to take immediate
control of the situation. They do not want you to wait until our
Army, Navy, and Aircraft are equipped and at the front. They are
willing to discount all this, as they need your guiding and
universally trusted hand now at the International Helm.
Traditional mutual jealousies and ambitions, and their consequent
suspicions disqualify any European statesman for that leadership;
while the knowledge that America has no political ambitions in any
part of the Old World, and the esteem which they feel for you
personally would secure you the enthusiastic support of all the
statesmen of the Allied Governments and their peoples. All our
European co-belligerents are deferential towards us, receptive to
American ideas and ready, as far as possible, to meet our wishes.
I, therefore, venture to urge upon you to give this matter your
very serious thought. The need for a disinterested leader is
absolutely imperative.
In addition to the power you exert through the Government at
Washington, the diplomatic missions in the Entente Capitals, and
the American military missions in Europe, you might appoint a
special commission to be stationed in Europe to represent you in
all civil and political matters. It is difficult here to enumerate
the various activities which you could entrust to such a
Commission. This Commission should assist, in case of need, the
American military authorities in their relations with the French or
other European Governments and try to avoid and adjust all possible
friction between them; it should be in touch with the political
parties, the civil authorities, journalists, and all men who have a
share in the forming of public opinion; it should collect all
possible information, especially of a political nature, and report
the same to you; it should, at the same time, through the press,
the platform, and other similar means, impart American information
and exercise an influence on French public opinion in the direction
you may desire. I lay stress on this matter of exercising an
influence on French public opinion because French affairs are now
subject to petty political differences, schemes, and
counter-schemes of those who are in power and men like Caillaux,
Briand, Clemenceau, and others of the opposition. Such a commission
under your guidance should endeavour to exercise such a salutary
effect upon French public opinion as to make Frenchmen forget at
this critical juncture all their petty strifes and induce them to
concentrate their entire forces and energy upon the great main aim
to destroy the autocracy of Germany, which should be declared an
“international nuisance” for it is maintained by the Hohenzollerns
contrary to the wishes of many of its citizens. Even prior to the
war, more than forty per cent. of the votes were cast by Social
Democrats and others of the opposition. It is certainly a menace to
the welfare and rights of self government of surrounding nations.
No one feels this more keenly than the Germans and their
descendants in the United States. They left Germany to escape this
monster and have enjoyed the privilege of living anew and becoming
an indissoluble part of this great liberty-loving nation. Alexander
II emancipated the Russian serf; Lincoln freed the poor Negro; and
it is your privilege to extricate the Germans from their miserable
thraldom.
Moreover, our co-belligerents have divergent and conflicting
interests, both in regard to the disposition of territories which
they hope to liberate from their enemies, and in regard to the
general problem of what concessions can be allowed our enemies,
when the bargaining begins.
This Commission should study these questions and all others
connected with them, so that you will have your own independent
up-to-date information upon which to act in dealing with the Allies
and the enemies during the war and at the Peace Conference.
Such a Commission can greatly assist you in your task to infuse the
Great American Spirit into the Allied peoples, and so strengthen
them that they will fight for right until it is established and has
permanently destroyed the danger of a tyrannic militarism fastening
its clutches into the whole world.
Yours most sincerely,
HENRY MORGENTHAU.
Perhaps the most important feature of my conversation with the President
was the word I brought him of the universal desire of our European
associates, that he should exert the intellectual and moral leadership
of the common cause. The President was deeply impressed with the
earnestness and solemnity of this message that I had brought him. He
seemed for the moment almost overpowered at the thought of the
stupendous responsibility that it thrust upon him. We now know how nobly
he rose to that responsibility--how adequately he expressed and
organized the moral basis of our cause--with what masterful and
intellectual grasp and statesman’s firm procedure he rose to be the
undisputed leader of a world in righteous arms against the menace of
autocracy. But, at the moment, he seemed perplexed, he seemed almost to
despair. “They want me to lead them!” he exclaimed. “But where shall I
lead them to?”