He then said, that he believed France and England had agreed too; that

the Count de Vergennes' son was gone to England with M. de Rayneval;

but he believed the Spaniards had not yet agreed, and the Dutch were

yet a great way off, and had agreed upon nothing. They had had several

conferences. At the first, he had informed Mr Fitzherbert, that their

High Mightinesses insisted upon the freedom of navigation as a

preliminary and a _sine qua non_. Mr Fitzherbert had communicated this

to his Court, but the answer received was, that his Court did not

approve of conceding this as a _sine qua non_, but chose to have all

the demands of their High Mightinesses stated together. M. Brantzen

answered, that his instructions were, not to enter into any

conferences upon other points, until this was agreed. That it was the

intention of the British Court to agree to this. That he could not

consider any changes in the Ministry as making any alteration. They

were all Ministers of the same King, and servants of the same nation.

That Mr Fox, when he was Secretary of State, by his letter to the

Russian Minister, had declared the intention of the King to consent to

the freedom of navigation, &c.

M. Brantzen said, however, that he had in his private capacity and

without compromising his ministerial character, entered into

explanations with Mr Fitzherbert, and had told him that he should

insist upon three points, the freedom of navigation, the restitution

of territories in the East and West Indies, and compensation for

damages. The two first points could not be disputed, and the third

ought not be; for the war against them had been unjust, the pretences

for it were groundless, their accession to the armed neutrality must

now be admitted, even by Britain's accession to it, to have been an

illegitimate cause of war, and the object of a treaty with America

could not be seriously pretended to be a just cause of war; and many

members of Parliament had in the time of it declared the war unjust,

and some of those members were now Ministers; even the prime Minister,

my Lord Shelburne himself, had freely declared the war unjust in the

House of Peers; and if the war was unjust, the damages and injustice

ought to be repaired.

Mr Fitzherbert said, that there was no precedent of compensation for

damages in a treaty of peace. M. Brantzen begged his pardon, and

thought there had been instances. One example in particular, which the

English themselves had set against the Dutch, which just then came

into his head. Cromwell had demanded compensation of them, and they

had agreed, as now appears by the treaty, to pay a hundred thousand

pounds sterling as a compensation.

M. Brantzen was not furnished with a full account of all the losses of

individuals, and therefore could not precisely say what the amount

would be. That perhaps they might not insist upon prompt payment, nor

upon a stated sum, but might leave both the sum and time of payment to

be ascertained by commissioners at their leisure after the peace.

I observed to him, that we intended to write to Mr Dana, and send him

a copy of our preliminaries, that he might commence his negotiations

with the neutral powers, and if he succeeded we could then make common

cause with Holland, and insist on an article to secure the freedom of

navigation. This idea he received with great pleasure, and said he

would write about it to the States. Upon this I asked him, with whom

he and the other Dutch Ministers abroad, held their correspondence? He

answered, that the Secretary Fagel was properly speaking the Minister

of Foreign Affairs. That their principal correspondence was with him;

but that they had a correspondence with the Grand Pensionary Bleiswick

too. That the letters received by the Secretary were laid before the

_Besogne Secrete_, or Committee of Secresy. This committee consisted

of so many members, one at least for each Province, that it was very

difficult to keep anything secret. Foreign Ministers were very

inquisitive, and the Duc de la Vauguyon would be likely to get at it.

So that if they had any to write, which they wished secret, they wrote

it to the Grand Pensionary, who is not obliged to lay before the

States letters entire. He selects such parts as he judges proper, and

prints them, to be taken _ad referendum_, and laid before the

Regencies of the cities. That they had sometimes a little diffidence

of this Court (_quelque mefiance_), for this Court was very fine

(_diablement fine_), and when this happened, they wrote to the Grand

Pensionary, that it might not be communicated to the French Minister,

and consequently to his Court. "These people are vastly profound, They

will not favor the Spaniards in obtaining the Floridas. They will play

England against Spain, and Spain against England. England against you,

and you against England, and all of you against us, and us against all

of you, according to their own schemes and interests. They are closely

buttoned up about Gibraltar, and as to Jamaica, they will not favor

Spain in that view. I expect they will get their own affairs arranged,

and then advise England to agree to the freedom of navigation and a

restitution of territory, and then advise us to be very easy about

compensation." Thus M. Brantzen.

I next visited Mr Jay, to talk about writing to Mr Dana, and

communicating to the neutral powers the preliminary articles. Mr Jay

says, that Mr Oswald is very anxious that his Court should do that,

and he has been writing to the ministry to persuade them to it. Had a

long conversation with Mr Jay about the manner of settling the western

lands. This I cannot now detail.

Went next to Mr Laurens, upon the subject of writing to Mr Dana, and

found him full in my sentiments, and at my return found answers from

Dr Franklin and Mr Laurens to the letters I wrote them, both agreeing

that this is the critical moment for Mr Dana to commence his

negotiations. Doctor Franklin promises to have an authentic copy made

to send to Mr Dana.

In the evening many gentlemen came in, among the rest Mr Bourse, the

agent of the Dutch East India company, Who expressed a good deal of

anxiety about their negotiations, and feared they should not have

justice in the East Indies.

_Wednesday, December 4th._--It is proper that I should note here, that

in the beginning of the year 1780, soon after my arrival at Paris, Mr

Galloway's pamphlets fell into my hands. I wrote a long series of

letters to a friend, in answer to them. That friend sent them to

England, but the printers dared not publish them. They remained there

until last summer, when they were begun to be printed, and are

continued to this day, (not being yet quite finished,) in Parker's

General Advertiser, but with false dates, being dated in the months of

January and February last, under the title of "Letters from a

distinguished American." They appear to have been well received, and

to have contributed somewhat to unite the nation in accelerating the

acknowledgment of American independence, and to convince the nation of

the necessity of respecting our alliances, and making peace.

I hope it will be permitted to me, or to some other who can do it

better, some ten or fifteen years hence, to collect together in one

view, my little negotiations in Europe. Fifty years hence it may be

published, perhaps twenty. I will venture to say, however feebly I may

have acted my part, or whatever mistakes I may have committed, yet the

situations I have been in, between angry nations and more angry

factions, have been some of the most singular and interesting, that

ever happened to any man. The fury of enemies, as well as of elements,

the subtlety and arrogance of allies, and, what has been worse than

all, the jealousy, envy, and little pranks of friends and copatriots,

would form one of the most instructive lessons in morals and

politics, that ever was committed to paper.

_Monday, December 9th._--Visited Mr Jay. Mr Oswald came in. We slided

from one thing to another, into a very lively conversation upon

politics. He asked me what the conduct of his Court and nation ought

to be in relation to America. I answered, the alpha and omega of

British policy towards America was summed up in this one maxim, see

that American independence is independent,--independent of all the

world,--independent of yourselves, as well as of France,--and

independent of both, as well as the rest of Europe. Depend upon it,

you have no chance for salvation, but by setting up America very high;

take care to remove from the American mind all cause of fear of you;

no other motive but fear of you will ever produce in the Americans any

unreasonable attachment to the House of Bourbon. "Is it possible,"

says he, "that the people of America should be afraid of us, or hate

us?" "One would think, Mr Oswald," said I, "that you had been out of

the world for these twenty years past; yes, there are three millions

of people in America, who hate and dread you more than anything in the

world." "What," said he, "now we have come to our senses?" "Your

change of system is not yet known in America," said I. "Well," said

he, "what shall we do to remove those fears and jealousies?" "In one

word," said I, "favor and promote the interest, reputation, and

dignity of the United States, in everything that is consistent with

your own. If you pursue the plan of cramping, clipping, and weakening

America, on the supposition, that she will be a rival to you, you will

make her really so; you will make her the natural and perpetual ally

of your natural and perpetual enemies." "But in what instance," said

he, "have we discovered such a disposition?" "In the three leagues

from your shores, and the fifteen leagues from Cape Breton," said I,

"to which your Ministry insisted so earnestly to exclude our

fishermen. Here was a point, that would have done us great harm, and

you no good; on the contrary, harm; so that you would have hurt

yourselves to hurt us; this disposition must be guarded against." "I

am fully of your mind, about that," said he, "but what else can we

do?" "Send a Minister to Congress," said I, "at the peace, a clever

fellow, who understands himself, and will neither set us bad examples,

nor intermeddle in our parties. This will show, that you are

consistent with yourselves; that you are sincere in your

acknowledgment of American independence; and that you do not entertain

hopes and designs of overturning it. Such a Minister will dissipate

many fears, and will be of more service to the least obnoxious

refugees, than any other measure could be. Let the King send a

Minister to Congress, and receive one from that body. This will be

acting consistently, and with dignity, in the face of the universe."

"Well, what else shall we do?" said he. "I have more than once

already," said I, "advised you to put your Ministers upon negotiating

the acknowledgment of our independence by the neutral powers." "True,"

said he, "and I have written, about it, and in my answers," said he,

laughing, "I am charged with speculation; but I do not care, I will

write them my sentiments. I will not take any of their money. I have

spent already twelve or thirteen hundred pounds, and all the reward I

will have for it shall be the pleasure of writing as I think. My

opinion is, that our Court should sign the armed neutrality, and

announce to them what they have done with you, and negotiate to have

you admitted to sign too. But I want to write more fully on the

subject, I want you to give me your thoughts upon it, for I do not

understand it so fully as I wish. What motives can be thrown out to

the Empress of Russia? Or what motives can she be supposed to have to

acknowledge your independence? And what motives can our Court have to

interfere, or intercede with the neutral powers, to receive you into

their confederation?"

"I will answer all these questions," said I, "to the best of my

knowledge, and with the utmost candor. In the first place, there has

been, with very little interruption, a jealousy between the Court of

Petersburg and Versailles for many years. France is the old friend and

ally of the Sublime Porte, the natural enemy of Russia. France, not

long since, negotiated a peace between Russia and the Turks; but upon

the Empress' late offers of mediation, and especially her endeavors to

negotiate Holland out of the war, France appears to have been piqued,

and, as the last revolution in the Crimea happened soon after, there

is reason to suspect that French emissaries excited the revolt against

the new independent government, which the Empress had taken so much

pains to establish. Poland has been long a scene of competition

between Russian and French politics, both parties having spent great

sums in pensions to partisans, until they have laid all virtue and

public spirit prostrate in that country. Sweden is another region of

rivalry between France and Russia, where both parties spent such sums

in pensions, as to destroy the principles of liberty, and prepare the

way for that revolution, which France favored from a principle of

economy, rather than any other. These hints are sufficient to show

the opposition of views and interests between France and Russia, and

we see the consequence of it, that England has more influence at

Petersburg than France. The Empress, therefore, would have two

motives, one, to oblige England, if they should intercede for an

acknowledgment of American independence, and another, to render

America less dependent upon France. The Empress, moreover loves

reputation, and it would be no small addition to her glory to

undertake a negotiation with all the neutral Courts, to induce them to

admit America into their confederacy. The Empress might be further

tempted; she was bent upon extending her commerce, and the commerce of

America, if it were only in duck and hemp, would be no small object to

her. As to the motives of your Court, Princes often think themselves

warranted, if not bound, to fight for their glory; surely they may

lawfully negotiate for reputation. If the neutral powers should

acknowledge our independence now, France will have the reputation,

very unjustly, of having negotiated it; but if your Court now takes a

decided part in favor of it, your Court will have the glory of it, in

Europe and in America, and this will have a good effect upon American

gratitude." "But," said he, "this would be negotiating for the honor

and interest of France, for no doubt France wishes all the world to

acknowledge your independence." "Give me leave to tell you, Sir," said

I, "you are mistaken. If I have not been mistaken in the policy of

France, from my first observation of it to this hour, they have been

as averse to other powers acknowledging our independence as you have

been." Mr Jay joined me in the same declaration. "I understand it

now," said he; "there is a gentleman going to London this day, I will

go home and write upon the subject by him."

_Tuesday, December 10th._--Visited Mr Oswald, to inquire the news from

England. He had the _Courier de l'Europe_, in which is Mr Secretary

Townshend's letter to the Lord Mayor of London, dated the 3d instant,

in which he announces the signature of the preliminaries, on the 30th

of November, between the Commissioners of his Majesty, and the

Commissioners of the United States of America. He had also the King's

speech, announcing the same thing.

Mr Oswald said, that France would not separate her affairs from Spain;

that he had hoped that America would have assisted them somewhat, in

compromising affairs with France; and Dr Franklin, who was present,

said he did not know anything of the other negotiations. He said that

neither Mr Fitzherbert, nor the Count de Vergennes, nor the Count

d'Aranda, communicated anything to him, that he understood the Dutch

were farthest from an agreement. Upon this, I said, "Mr Oswald, Mr

Fitzherbert cannot, I think, have any difficulty to agree with M.

Brantzen. There are three points, viz. the liberty of navigation;

restitution of possessions; and compensation for damages. The liberty

of navigation, I suppose, is the point that sticks. But why should it

stick? When all nations are agreed in the principle, why should

England stand out? England must agree to it, she has already in effect

agreed to it; as it affects all nations but Holland and America, and,

if she were disposed, she could not prevent them from having the

benefit." Upon this, Dr Franklin said, "the Dutch would be able in any

future war, to carry on their commerce, even of naval stores, in the

bottoms of other neutral powers." "Yes," said Mr Oswald, "and I am of

opinion, that England ought to subscribe the armed neutrality." "Very

well," said I, "then let Mr Fitzherbert agree to this point with M.

Brantzen, and let Mr Harris, at Petersburg, take Mr Dana in his hand,

and go to the Prince Potemkin, or the Count d'Ostermann, and say, the

king, my master, has authorised me to subscribe the principles of the

armed neutrality, and instructed me to introduce to you, Mr Dana,

Minister from the United States of America, to do the same. Let him

subscribe his name under mine."

At this, they all laughed very heartily. Mr Oswald, however,

recollecting himself, and the conversation between him and me,

yesterday, on the same subject, very gravely turned it off, by saying,

"he did not see a necessity to be in a hurry about that, America was

well enough." I said, "as to restitution of the Dutch territories, I

suppose your Court will not make much difficulty about that, if this

Court does not, as it is not probable they will, and as to

compensation for damages, the Dutch will probably be as easy as they

can about that."

Dr Franklin said, he was for beginning early to think about the

articles of the definitive treaty. We had been so happy as to be the

first in the preliminaries, and he wished to be so in the definitive

articles. Thus we parted.

_Thursday, December 12th._--Met at Mr Laurens', and signed the letter

I had drawn up to Mr Dana, which I sent off, enclosed with a copy of

the preliminaries, and consulted about articles to be inserted in the

definitive treaty. Agreed that Mr Jay and I should prepare a joint

letter to Congress. At seven o'clock, I met Mr Jay at his house, and

we drew up a letter.

_Friday, December 13th._--I went first to Mr Jay, and made some

addition to the joint letter, which I carried first to Mr Laurens,

who made some corrections and additions, and then to Passy, to Dr

Franklin, who proposed a few other corrections, and showed me an

article he had drawn up for the definitive treaty, to exempt

fishermen, husbandmen, and merchants, as much as possible, from the

evils of future wars. This is a good lesson to mankind, at least. All

agreed to meet at my house, at eleven o'clock tomorrow, to finish the

joint letter.

FOOTNOTE:

[15] For some account of the part taken by Dr Franklin, in regard to

the Treaty, before the arrival of Mr Jay and Mr Adams in Paris, see

the North American Review, for January, 1830, No. 66, p. 15.

END OF THE SIXTH VOLUME.

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The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 06 · 第 36 / 36 段