XXI. This philosopher flourished in the times, in which the fire of
emulation began to burn among the masters and disciples of the various
schools of philosophy, who mutually waged war against each other, by
making false interpretations of the doctrines that each maintained, and
by raising false accusations against one another’s customs and manners.
In the first place, many look upon Aristotle as a notorious calumniator;
but in the second place, they remark that he was amply repaid in his
own coin, for that he was egregiously calumniated himself. I find more
appearances of malice in the calumnies raised against Epicurus, than
in those raised against any of the other philosophers. Epicurus placed
extreme felicity in enjoyment; which was an equivocal doctrine, for,
considered in a latitudinary sense, it might be construed to mean both
honest and criminal enjoyments. The vulgar, when they hear the word
enjoyment, are apt to impute an evil signification to it, because,
agreeable to their gross ideas, they hardly consider any other things as
enjoyments, but unbounded indulgences, in incontinence and debauchery;
or they at least, are inclined to consider these as the greatest of all
enjoyments. This gross construction of his doctrines by the vulgar, gave
encouragement to his rivals to stigmatize his tenets, and to accuse him,
of placing all happiness in sensuality and gluttony. It was an easy
matter, to transfer the accusation against his doctrines, to militate
against his customs and manners; because it being evident, that all men
have an innate desire to make themselves happy; consequently, Epicurus
must be understood studiously to recommend those objects to them, in
which he thought happiness to consist. By attributing to him then this
perverse dogma, the inference drawn from it was, that he led a life which
corresponded with the tenet; that is, that it was all spent in lewdness,
gluttony, and drunkenness.
XXII. Besides the before-mentioned cause, there were two others, that
concurred to blacken the fame of Epicurus. The first was, his erroneous
and impious opinion with respect to the Deity; for he held, that it
consisted of a multiplicity of gods, which he maintained were indolent,
unable to do, and having no power of doing, either good or harm to
any one; and were without providence, without activity, and without
influence; and although he acknowledged they had a right to be worshiped,
he attributed the obligation we are under of paying them adoration, to be
due to the excellence of their nature, intirely distinct, and separate
from all dependence we have on them, or gratitude that we owe to them;
and that the obsequies we pay them, should be like the respect we pay
to a nobleman, on whom we have no dependence, and from whose favour we
entertain no expectations; and which we consider, as a thing due to his
quality. I grant, that this afforded a powerful motive for entertaining
a bad opinion, both of the moral doctrine, and the manners of Epicurus;
for if you take away the fear of punishment, and the hope of reward from
mankind, you can found but little expectation, that they will esteem, or
practise virtue.
XXIII. The second cause which tended to discredit Epicurus, was the
loose manner in which some of his followers lived; who, by perverting
the doctrine of their master, and construing it to favour their vicious
inclinations, persuaded many people, that Epicurus had taught what they
asserted he had taught, and that he had lived as they did.
XXIV. Notwithstanding all these prejudices against him, the cause of
Epicurus was not looked upon as so hopeless and forlorn, as to deter some
authors of eminence from undertaking his defence, which they did with
good success. Among these, we see stand forth in the foremost ranks, our
famous Don Francisco de Quevedo, who, from the clear testimonies of many
enlightened men of antiquity, proves in the first place, that Epicurus
did not place happiness in corporeal, but in spiritual enjoyments; and
secondly, that this philosopher, so far from being given to gluttony, was
very sparing in his diet, both with respect to his meat and his drink,
living for the most part upon bread, water, cheese, and the produce of
his own garden; and thirdly, that he lived chastly, and abstained from
venereal indulgencies. As the works of Quevedo are almost in the hands of
every body, I shall omit a repetition of the testimonies he produces in
favour of Epicurus. But to those he mentions, I shall add two others of
great weight, which he has not taken notice of. The first is, that of St.
Gregory Nazianzenus, who in his Iambics, applauds highly, both the moral
doctrine, and the life of Epicurus. These are his words:
_Ipsam voluptatem putavit præmium_
_Epicurus extare omnibus laboribus,_
_Mortaliumque tendere hùc bona omnia,_
_Ac ne ob voluptatem improbam hanc laudarier_
_Quis crederet, moderatus, et castus fuit,_
_Dum vixit, ille, dogma moribus probant._
In English:
_Epicurus thought that pleasure was the reward of all toils,
and that this was the object or completion of all mortal
good. But that no one should conclude he meant to recommend
vicious enjoyments, it will be proper to observe, that through
the whole course of his life, he was temperate and chaste,
and proved what his dogmas were intended to inculcate by his
manners._
XXV. The authority of this father, is of great weight in this matter,
because he studied in Athens, where Epicurus had fixed his habitation and
his school; and therefore it is probable, had an opportunity of obtaining
some authentic testimonies, both of his doctrine and manner of living.
This should mollify, or abate the force of the objection that is made
to Epicurus, by reason of the terms of contempt and reproach, in which
Saint Austin, Saint Ambrosius, and Saint Isidorus speak of him; who
having always lived at a great distance from Athens, may have given this
account of him, upon the credit of uncertain memoirs; and might possibly
have been induced to think, that some things were the productions of
Epicurus, which were falsely attributed to him by Diotimus, who was a
Stoic philosopher, and his declared enemy.
XXVI. The second testimony which Quevedo has omitted to mention, is that
of the philosopher Chrysipus, who was contemporary with, and an avowed
enemy and rival of Epicurus, and as such, should be believed with respect
to every thing he testifies in his favour. Chrysipus then, as quoted
by Stobæus, admits that Epicurus was endowed with chastity, although
he malignantly insinuates, that it proceeded from a cause, that was an
opprobrium to his character, for he attributes it, to his insensibility
or stupidity. These two philosophers, lived in Athens at one and the
same time; and as his neighbour and his rival, Chrysipus could not have
been ignorant of the vices of Epicurus; and if he had been lascivious,
it is very clear, that he would not have allowed he was continent. As he
could not then deny he was chaste, he gives his malice another turn, and
says, that his continence was not the effect of his virtue, but of his
stupidity.
XXVII. Finally, I shall urge against the calumniators of Epicurus, an
argument, that appears to me of great weight and efficacy: Diogenes
Laertius relates, that the writings of Epicurus were innumerable; and
that there was no author of antiquity, who had compiled such a multitude
of books. _Scripsit autem Epicurus infinita volumina, adeo ut illorum
multitudine cunctos superaverit._ (Diog. Laert. lib. 10.) Let any
man now who is the most prejudiced against Epicurus, tell me whether
it is likely, that a man who placed his whole happiness in corporeal
gratifications and enjoyments, and must consequently have given himself
up to gluttony, drunkenness, and lust, could possibly have written so
many books. It is plain and evident that he could not; because his
debaucheries would have prevented him for the greatest part of his time,
from being able to pursue his studies, and from taking pen in hand, and
must at last, have come to incapacitate him totally, as such debaucheries
commonly do those, who lead that brutal kind of life.
XXVIII. There remains something still for us to reply to, that has
been advanced on the three beforementioned heads, which are the
articles, on which the calumniators of Epicurus, principally ground
their accusations against him. The first thing he is charged with, is
easily answered, because it is generally allowed, that Epicurus lived
sparingly, and was sober and continent; from whence it may be evidently
inferred, that he could not place his whole happiness, in the delights
of gluttony and sensuality. He wished to be happy; which is a desire,
that from invincible necessity, attends every man; and consequently, if
he had thought happiness consisted in corporeal enjoyments, he would
industriously have fought after and embraced them. But let us delineate
this matter, with greater nicety and exactness.
XXIX. There are two things to be considered in the doctrine of Epicurus;
the one certain, the other questionable: the certain one is, what species
of enjoyment it was, in which he thought happiness consisted. With regard
to the first of these points, so far was he from falling in with, or
adopting gross ideas, that it was always remarked, he expressed himself
with more delicacy and propriety, and also more philosophically, than any
of the philosophers of Paganism; some of whom make happiness to consist
in riches, others in dominion, others in honours, others in health,
others in fame, &c. Generally, if you attend to them, besides their
erring in fundamentals, they reason with great impropriety, because they
sometimes mistake for happiness, the object that produced it; and at
others, the instrument that procured it. Epicurus, explains the matter
in a direct way, and agreeable to the nature and essence of the thing
itself, and not by its causes. He constitutes happiness, to consist in
an act of the soul, and in this, all our most eminent theologians agree
with him, and some of them likewise concur with him, with respect to
the species of the act; for they, like Epicurus, place formal felicity,
in delight, enjoyment, or fruition. This is a sentiment, which although
it is not the most approved in the schools, seems to be upheld by those
great authorities, Saint Austin, and Saint Thomas. Saint Austin in his
first book de Doctrin. Christ. cap. 32, says, that the supreme reward
which God bestows, is in the enjoyment of him: _Hæc autem merces summa
est, ut eo perfruamur_; and in his eighth book de Civit. cap. 9. he
expresses himself to this effect, that no one can be happy who does
not enjoy his beloved object: _Nemo beatus est, qui eo quod amat non
fruitur._ Saint Thomas 1. 2. quæst. 33. art. 3. in corp. distinguishing
between the ultimate objective, and formal end of man, says, _that the
first is God, and the second fruition, or act of enjoying God; in which
is included, the delight of possessing the ultimate end, and in this
sense it may be said, that enjoyment is the summum bonum of man. Optimum
in unaquaque re est ultimus finis. Finis autem, ut supradictum est,
dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei, sicut finis avari
est, vel pecunia, vel passio pecuniæ, et secundum hoc ultimus finis
hominis dici potest, vel ipse Deus, qui est summum bonum simpliciter, vel
fruitio ipsius, quæ importat delectationem quandam in ultimo fine; et
per hunc modum aliqua delectatio hominis potest dici optimum inter bona
humana._
XXX. Supposing then that Epicurus did not err, in placing all human
felicity in enjoyment, all that can be urged against him is, that he
mistook in assigning the object of this enjoyment; and I acknowledge that
he did err in this particular; but at the same time that I make this
acknowledgment, I must beg leave to alledge two things in his favour:
the first is, that if he did err, his error was not accompanied with
any dishonest design that tended to corrupt the manners of mankind: the
second is, that he erred less than any of the other Gentile philosophers.
In the first place, besides the testimonies we before produced, of the
sobriety and continence of Epicurus, the thing is proved by his own
writings. Among the few, which by the diligence of Diogenes Laertius
have been rescued from oblivion; is his letter to Meceus, where he
expounds his whole moral doctrine, and clearly points out and inculcates,
that the enjoyment he means to assign as the constitutive principle of
happiness, is that, which results from the blessings of health, bodily
ease, and tranquillity of mind; but positively excludes indulgences
in forbidden pleasures. The following words of his, which refute the
malignant interpretation that has been put upon his doctrine, by his
rivals, and many ignorant people, deserve particular attention: _Constat
igitur, quando voluptatem; beatæ vitæ dicimus finem, non intelligere
nos eas voluptates, quæ sunt virorum luxu diffluentium, aut aliorum
etiam, quatenus spectantur in ipsa actione fruendi, qua nimirum sensus
jucundè, dulciterque afficitur, veluti quiddam ignorantes, aut a nobis
dissentientes, aut alioquin adversum nos male affecti interpretantur; sed
illud dumtaxat intelligimus, non dolere corpore, ac animo non perturbari.
Siquidem non compotationes comessationesque perpetuæ, non ipsa puerorum
mulierumque consuetudo, non piscium deliciæ, aut quæcumque aliæ mensæ
lautioris cupediæ jucundam vitam pariunt, sed quæ cum sobrietate,
sereneque adeo animo, est ratio, causas, cur quid eligendum, fugiendumve
sit, investigans, ac opiniones abigens, ob quas plurima mentes occupat
perturbatio._
XXXI. This doctrine, does not tend to promote any irregularity whatever
in human life, for health of body, and serenity of mind, may very
lawfully be wished for by any man; and there are men very spiritually
disposed, who positively desire them, and are also solicitous about
procuring them. It is however a mistaken notion, to place ultimate, or
supreme felicity, in the enjoyment of them; but this is an error, which
was common to all the Gentile philosophers, who every one of them,
placed it on created objects. I say also, that the error of Epicurus
in this respect, was less than that of any of the others, because
he was at least right, with regard to the object on which he placed
happiness, by speaking of it, as confined to sublunary things; but the
other philosophers, did not even hit this nail on the head: for if we
contemplate a man possessed of all those advantages, in which they
maintained happiness consisted, such as riches, honours, fame, learning,
&c. he may notwithstanding his possessing all these, lead a very unhappy
and miserable life; because neither of them separately, nor all of them
put together, can secure him from a thousand afflictions, that may be
brought upon him, by numberless adverse accidents. For, suppose him to
be learned, rich, and powerful, to whatever degree you please, none of
these, can prevent the death of his esteemed friend; nor the infidelity
of his beloved wife; nor can they insure him, that his children shall not
turn out stupid or ill-disposed; nor can they shield him, from the stings
and mortifications he is exposed to, from the malice of envious people,
&c. But by attaining what Epicurus held happiness to consist in, that is
health of body, and serenity of mind, a man, let what will happen to him,
would at least live free from misery, and so long as he preserves these
blessings of bodily health, and a serene state of mind, may be said to be
a happy person, because he experiences no affliction, or anxiety.
XXXII. In opposition to this, some may reply, that the tenets of Zeno and
the Stoics, who place all happiness in the practice of virtue, should be
preferred to those of Epicurus. To which I answer, that this doctrine
has a fine sound, but that it is false and ridiculous in the fundamental
parts of it. I firmly believe, that the Stoics were the least sincere
of all the ancient philosophers. A great critic of recent date, very
humorously and properly called them the Pharisees of Paganism. The name
of virtue was ever in their mouths, and the virtue they preached up, was
of the most austere kind; but notwithstanding this, they in fact were as
solicitous to promote their own temporal interests and convenience, as
the most worldly of mankind. Seneca, that bright pattern of, and esteemed
honour to the Stoic school, at the same time that he rolled in riches,
and was living in the highest stile of pomp, and with the greatest
profusion of luxury, to say nothing of his usury, vociferated loudly in
favour of poverty; which strongly evinces, that the Stoics, without the
exception of even Seneca himself, were hypocrites, who did not believe it
was possible for any one to practise, the very virtue they had preached
up. They would have had a learned and a wise man, arrive at being an
insensible one; who while he was suffering the greatest torments, should
appear cheerful and serene; and that he should seem no more affected with
all the vexations that can be given him by mankind, than the sun seems
to be, with the arrows that are discharged against Heaven; or, than the
gods are with the blows that are given to their statues. Both the one and
the other of these similies, are made use of by Seneca; from whence, it
may evidently be inferred, that the virtue he recommended, was not only
an ideal, but a chimerical one. The behaviour of Dionysius of Heraclea,
shews very plainly, the extravagance of the Stoic philosophy. This
philosopher, was for a long while a disciple and a sectary of Zeno’s,
during all which time, he enjoyed a good state of health; but became
afterwards afflicted with a severe disorder in his eyes, or as some say,
in his kidneys; and indeed Cicero mentions them both: and finding that it
was impossible under these afflictions, for him to enjoy that calmness
and serenity of mind, which was so much recommended by Zeno, he abandoned
his master’s school, and gave himself up to all sorts of debauchery.
XXXIII. Virtue is not only good, but even capable of making a man happy,
if considered as a means; but contemplated according to the system of the
Stoics, as the sum of all happiness, independent of any reward, except
what results from itself, it is arduous and toilsome. I suppose that
Saint Paul, was full as virtuous a man, as either Seneca or Zeno. And
what did he say of virtue, as standing by itself, and considered, without
relation to the reward of eternal happiness? Why the very reverse of
what was said by those philosophers: _Si in hac vita tantùm in Christo
sperantes sumus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus_. (1 ad Corinth.
15.) _If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most
miserable._ And why the most miserable? can it be because we are the most
virtuous?
XXXIV. The point of religion, is the most tender one in all the doctrine
of Epicurus. He admitted that there were gods, but maintained, that
they had no hand in the direction, or management of human affairs. I,
in truth, can conceive no error more absurd, than that of denying the
existence of a deity, except it is, that of admitting there is such a
being, and denying his providence. Some suppose that Epicurus, thought
differently from what he spoke on this subject; that is, that he did
not believe in the Heathen divinities; but, only acknowledged their
existence, for fear of being punished if he had done otherwise. But
the truth is, that he frequented the temples, and assisted devoutly
at the sacrifices, insomuch, that Diogenes Laertius, extols him for
his eminent devotion to, and respect for the gods: _Sanctitatis quidem
in Deos, et charitatis in patriam fuit in eo affectus ineffabilis._ I
say, some suppose that this was all hypocrisy: it may have been so, but
there seems no reason to suspect, that he did not both speak and act
with sincerity. For, admitting there have been philosophers, who have
denied the existence of any deity, there can be no great difficulty in
supposing, that there might be another, who conceived the existence
of such a sort of deity only, as was idle and inactive, and who was a
titular or honorary being, that was happy in himself, and divested of
all care. The conceptions of men, are exceedingly strange and various; of
which truth, we have an instance in Pliny the elder. This great man, who
was sufficiently enlightened to be convinced, that the gods the Gentiles
worshiped, were fabulous; and to be fully satisfied, that if there was
a God, it must be one only God: yet, notwithstanding all this, he fell
into the same error that Epicurus did; for, he said positively, that in
case there was such a deity, he never interfered either little or much,
with human affairs; and asserted, that it was ridiculous for any man
to suppose he did: _Irridendum verò agere curam verum humanarum illud
quid quid est summum._ But what is more, he looked upon this neglect
of the government of the world, not as a defect, but as an excellence,
precisely appertaining to the deity; and declared, that the admitting
of his providence, was a degradation of his dignity: _Anne tam tristi,
multiplicique ministerio non pollui credamus, dubitemusve?_ If then
one of the greatest men of antiquity, which Pliny unquestionably was,
conceived inaction to be a perfection necessarily belonging to the deity,
why should we be surprized that Epicurus adopted the same error? He, let
this proceed from what principle it would, either the extravagance of
his imagination, or artifice to disguise what the Athenians held to be
impiety, lived unmolested in Athens, nor was there ever any prosecution
instituted against him in that city, on the score of religion. If
Diagoras had conducted himself in the same manner, he might have vented
his furious choler, without danger of the Athenians pursuing him with
fire and sword, and setting a price upon his head by proclamation; but
this philosopher having continued for the greatest part of his life,
superstitiously devoted to the gods, when he was advanced in years, all
of a sudden turned Atheist; and his motive for doing this, was one of
the most ridiculous in the world. Diagoras, was both a philosopher and
a poet; and it happened, that one of the same profession, had purloined
from Diagoras, certain verses which he had composed; for this, he
convened him before the judges to answer for the plagiary; where the
accused person was examined upon oath; and he swore falsely, that the
verses were of his own composing. Diagoras could produce no witnesses
to prove the fact against him, so the man was acquitted, and afterwards
published the verses as his own, receiving the applauses for them, which
were properly due to Diagoras; whose indignation was so inflamed at this,
that it in a manner turned his head; and he, in the fulness of his wrath,
began to write against the Grecian deities; and to publish to the world,
that it was the most foolish thing imaginable, to suppose that there
were gods; for if such beings had existed, they, instead of suffering
the man who had injured him, to be crowned with unjust applause, would
either not have permitted, or else would have punished his insolence. I
say, that Diagoras, by adopting the theological system of Epicurus, might
have vented his anger without endangering his head; as for the purpose
of letting wickedness go unpunished, and reign triumphant in the world,
the want of providence in the deity, would have the same effect, as the
actual want of a deity, and the Athenians would have winked at that
blasphemy, as they did at the blasphemy of Epicurus.
XXXV. But what is most to the point, will be to examine whether the
theological error of Epicurus tended to produce any consequences, that
might promote the disorderly life, which his rivals attribute, and which
is vulgarly imputed to him. I confess, that he who would say of a man,
who denies the existence of a deity, or if he admits of his existence,
denies his providence, that he is a person of perverse manners, would
generally be right in his judgment with regard to the facts, but would
mistake in point of the propriety of his decision, if he only considered
the error as the necessary consequence of an erroneous dogma. The reason
is, because there are men who are without vices, only because they
are without passions; and temperament has the same effect with them,
that virtue has with other people. Vice necessarily supposes a man to
be actuated by a depraved inclination, and the desires depend on the
complexion of the individual. Thus he who is naturally of a very placid
disposition, seldom shews any inclination to run into the excesses, of
either gluttony, or lust, and whether he believed there was, or was not a
God, and that if there was, he would not punish those excesses, he would
still be temperate and chaste. I say the same of all other vices, and
vicious passions. In reality, an atheist of good customs and manners,
if he is a monster, is a monster we have sometimes seen. Pliny doubted
whether there was a Deity, or if he did not doubt it, disbelieved his
Providence; but with all this, nobody could cast the least imputation on
his customs or manners; for he was temperate, sincere, and a lover of
justice; and his writings are full of invectives against vice, which are
expressed with such force and energy, that we can hardly doubt of their
coming from his heart. To sum up the whole, two of the best emperors
that were known in Rome in the days of paganism, Titus, and Vespasian,
esteemed him much, and always confided to him most important employments.
The famous atheist of these latter times, Benito Spinosa, always led a
retired life, and kept himself constantly employed, either in study,
or making telescopes and microscopes, and was a sober, continent, and
pacific man. There were strong suspicions of atheism, against the
Englishman Thomas Hobbes, but he never was accused of being addicted
to any vice. Then why might not Epicurus, notwithstanding his mistaken
faith, have lived exempt from the vices, of which he has been vulgarly
accused? and this being not improbable, why should not we believe he
did so, upon the credit of the many and grave testimonies that have
been exhibited in his favour? If to this it should be replied, that the
lives of atheists were made up of mere appearances, and deceptions, to
escape either infamy or punishment; I answer, that for my purpose, this
is sufficient, for that I never meant to insist, that Epicurus was a
man truly virtuous, but only to shew, that what had been said of the
turpitude of his moral doctrines, and of his gluttonies, and obscenities,
was false and groundless.
XXXVI. The last presumptive charge against Epicurus, which is founded
upon the dissolute lives of some of his sectaries, is totally
contemptible. The argument urged against Epicurus, that some of the
debauched pupils of his school interpreted his doctrines in favour
of vice, is like that which is brought against the catholic church,
on account of some introducers of novelties, having misunderstood or
misinterpreted the gospel. There were two sorts of Epicureans known to
antiquity, one of which were termed the rigid, and the others the relaxed
ones. These last, were considered as the heretics of Epicurianism, and as
deserters of the doctrine of Epicurus, although they retained the name
of his sectaries. The authority of Cicero seems strongly to confirm this
sentiment, who (lib. 2. de Finibus) says; _Ac mihi quidem quod et ipse
(Epicurus) bonus vir fuit, et multi Epicurei fuerunt, et hodie sunt, et
amicitiis fideles, et in omni vita constantes, et graves, nec voluptate,
sed consilio consilia moderantes, hoc videtur major vis honestatis, et
minor voluptatis._ If Epicurus then, was a good and an honest man, why
should not those who under the name of his sectaries, led scandalous
lives, be rejected as bastard Epicureans? And if among those who were
called his sectaries, there were many good men, although there were many
bad ones likewise; which of these should we esteem as the true and
sincere expounders of the doctrine of Epicurus? ought it to be the first,
or the last?