I. We scarce ever hear the antients talked of, with that judgment and
moderation which good sense dictates. They are either treated with
excessive veneration, or else they are scoffed at and despised, and this
is generally governed by the subject matter on which you discourse.
If this happens to be science or learning, the antient professors are
talked of, as men much superior in abilities and comprehension to any
of the moderns; and it will scarcely be admitted, that these last have
discovered any thing, which was not known to the others long before. But
when political sagacity or industry becomes the subject of conversation,
all the advantage is given to these latter times; and to such an
excessive degree, that the men of former ages, compared to the moderns,
are considered as a sort of demi-brutes, who were actuated by a blind
ferocity, and who exercised power, unrestrained by reason, and with a
daring hardiness, void of all address.
II. I am of opinion, that this comparison between the antients and
moderns should be inverted, and the things placed in a quite opposite
point of view. I say, the moderns should be considered as superior to
the antients in science, but not in political industry. The reason is,
because science is communicated by books; and as we find expressed in
those all which the antient professors ever attained, we by them are
enabled to enrich our minds with the discoveries, not only of one, but
many learned men. Thus a modern, of equal application and ingenuity with
an antient, may consider himself as a river, which is enlarged by the
stock flowing from all those fountains, and who has over and above this,
a source in his own reason, with which he may add somewhat to the whole.
III. But this is not the case with political industry. For there is
scarce any man who possesses a greater stock of policy, than what arises
from the funds he has within himself. It is true, that you will find
books full of political documents, and histories which exhibit numerous
examples of them, which are still more instructive than the documents,
because they represent more strikingly the application of them to
practice, when circumstances for applying them to practice occur. But if
we attend to the thing with subtle reflection, we shall find, that this
instruction is only apparent; and although it makes a figure in theory,
is useless in practice.
IV. The reason is, because when we are desirous of carrying those
precepts into execution, there never occurs in the contingent we would
apply them to, the same complex of circumstances which we find in the
book. Never? Is it not possible that in one or another case we may meet
with the same? No certainly, for it is absolutely necessary that one
must always be wanting, which is the intervention of the agent who acted
in the business. This circumstance, which nobody adverts to, is of the
greatest weight. The same political maxim, which in the hands of one man
may be most beneficial, conduced by another, may be found useless, and
even pernicious.
V. The manner of doing things is of as much importance, and sometimes
of more, than the substance of the things themselves; and this is
hardly ever to be imitated. Every man has a peculiar, and an especial
something, which is characteristic of himself, and distinguishes him from
all others; and this is apt to vary in the same individual, according to
the different temperament or disposition of his body or mind. A frank
sentence, delivered with energy and grace, may be capable of exciting
the admiration, respect, and applause, of the same person, whom it
might offend, if spoken in a different manner; and the very same thing,
pronounced timidly, ungraciously, and with an unpleasant countenance,
might excite contempt, or indignation.
VI. A pirate who had fallen into the hands of Alexander, told the
conqueror to his face, that he was a greater robber than himself, which
was so far from exciting the indignation of that prince, that he rather
seemed pleased with the man’s frankness. The liberty that Clitus took
with him, was not near so insolent or injurious, and Alexander run him
through with a lance. From whence could this extreme difference in
Alexander’s feelings arise? Why from the pirate’s speaking with an heroic
and serene firmness; and from Clitus his having spoken with a coarse
impatience, and rustic impetuosity. This difference of manner is never to
be acquired by study, but is the production and effect of innate genius.
VII. It is commonly said, that flattery is one of the most certain
means by which a man can make his fortune; but with all this, how many
thousands of flatterers do we see despised and neglected? The reason is,
because there are very few of them, who know how to give to flattery that
nice application which communicates strength to it, and makes it appear
meritorious. Nor is it of any avail, to those who are so unfortunate as
not to hit upon the mode of doing this, to study by detail the motions,
the words, the air, and gestures of the fortunate, as the application we
have mentioned, depends upon an innate genial quality, which can never be
counterfeited by imitation; for how many people do we see make themselves
ridiculous, by imitating the very thing, which when done by others, makes
them respected?
VIII. Every political negotiation, may be compared to a machine, composed
of many wheels, every one of which, by being more rigid, or more pliant,
than is consistent with its just proportion, renders the whole machine
useless; or it may be compared to a chemical process of long duration,
whose success depends upon the different degrees of heat, to be applied
with great nicety and precision, in the different stages of the process.
But all the books that were ever written, either upon chemistry or
mechanics, can never teach how to preserve this exact proportion of
rigidity or pliability in the metals, or to apply this nice degree of
heat to the fire, which is necessary for the completion of the business,
and to answer the purposes intended. Even in these material operations,
where the most nice and delicate parts of them, and the ultimate degree
of exactitude in their execution, must be confided to a gift or innate
talent in the artificer, we find that precepts are unequal to teach their
performance; how then in political ones, where there is neither rule nor
limits to determine their extension, their degrees of suspension, delay,
or acceleration, with a thousand other contingent circumstances, can
modes be prescribed for their execution?