From this brief outline may be seen how tremendous and important a role
was played by Russia in the world conflict. Summing up the general
facts cited above, we arrive at the following definite conclusions:
1.) Russia's role in the World War was bound to be very serious and
important for this reason alone, that the participation of a nation
numbering 180 million souls could not fail to be significant in itself,
and was therefore bound to exercise a tremendous influence upon the
outcome of the World War.
2.) Accordingly, Russia's role became apparent even at the very
beginning of the War, in the important aid she rendered in frustrating
the initial and most dangerous plan of the Germans, by her early
offensive in aid of the Allies. Russia, having diverted against herself
the entire Austrian army and part of the German, at the time of the
battle on the Marne, through her offensive in East Prussia and Galicia,
deprived the enemy of the opportunity to realize the fundamental idea
of Moltke's plan to fling "all forces into France." The enemy, having
contrary to his plan moved on France with only a part of his forces,
inevitably suffered defeat. This cooperation on the part of Russia was
of tremendous significance, for the Germans based their plan on the
idea that they would at first have to deal only with France alone, on
one front only, whereas Russia compelled them at once to start the
War on two fronts, both with Russia and France. This made the initial
German war plan useless because strategy says plainly: "Errors in the
strategic deploying of forces in the beginning of a war have a decisive
influence and cannot be rectified until the war is over." From this
rule of strategy it is plain that Russia's operations in the beginning
of the war at the outset condemned Germany to lose the war.
3.) At the following attempt of the enemy to find a decision in France,
to break through to Calais, at Ypres, Russia, by the blows she
delivered in Galicia, at Warsaw and in East Prussia, contributed to the
early termination of this second offensive in France, so dangerous to
England, and compelled the Germans for more than a year to abstain from
their main operations on the main decisive front of the War--in France.
4.) In 1915 Russia, having shouldered alone the whole burden of the
struggle against Germany, Austria and Turkey, although forced to
abandon Poland, still gave the Allies the opportunity to prepare
throughout a whole year for the coming German offensive at Verdun.
At the same time, having compelled the Germans during 1915 to spend
all their fresh formations and reserves on the Russian front, Russia
thereby deprived the Germans of the reserves they needed for Verdun and
their other operations in France.
5.) In 1916 Russia, thanks to the Brusilov offensive, saved Italy at
that critical moment when the Austrians, through their successful
offensive from Tyrol in the rear of the Italians, threatened to cut
off a considerable portion of the Italian Army, at the same time
menacing Venice. Together with this, Russia by this offensive greatly
facilitated the operations of the Allies on the Somme, and was
instrumental in the final clearing of the Verdun forts.
6.) In 1916 Russia took upon herself the blows of Mackensen's and
Falkenhayn's armies which had invaded Roumania, stopped the further
advance of the Germans, and undertook the defense of a considerable
stretch of the Roumanian front.
7.) Through a period of three years of struggle against Germany,
Austria and Turkey, Russia, having diverted the forces of the enemy,
afforded the Allies a long period of quiet for the preparation and
strengthening of the Allied Armies and for the systematic creation of
a new 4 million British Army.
8.) Throughout this period of three years of struggle _Russia compelled
the enemy to spend on the Russian front such a stupendous amount of
force, reserves and munitions_ as to hasten the inevitable fall of
the enemy, and _this immensely facilitated the delivery of the final,
decisive blows by the Allies_.
9.) Russia, incessantly drawing upon herself the forces of the enemy,
did not give him the opportunity for one minute from the very beginning
of the War to gather sufficient force for a decisive blow on the main,
decisive front--in France. The role of Russia, therefore, was clearly
apparent in the fact that she deprived Germany throughout the War of
the possibility to win and rendered futile every effort of the enemy in
this respect.
10.) Corresponding with the most important role that Russia played in
the War are her enormous sacrifices in men, material and treasure.
Her losses in men, amounting to 12,000,000, exceed several times the
casualties of any of the Allies; are almost equal to the losses of
all the Allies combined; exceed several times the total number of men
mobilized by any one of the Allies....
11.) Russia's role in the recent war was so important and extraordinary
that _without Russia the very idea of a struggle with German militarism
would have been impossible_. Germany would have been able to crush any
combination of the European Powers if Russia had not participated in
such combination. Were it not for Russia, Germany would now dominate
not only Europe, but probably the rest of the world as well.
12.) Russia's great role in the World War is so much the greater since
she fought under extraordinary circumstances, lacking so indispensable
an asset as a great network of railways, with a backward technique,
industry, etc. In the hard first years of the War the Russian Armies,
as we have seen, in extraordinary circumstances and frequently without
arms and munitions, did everything possible, and, together with
failures, had also their successes.
Ludendorf was able to achieve success on the Russian front only when
the Germans outnumbered their adversaries by at least three to two. At
Tannenberg the Germans had twice as many and, at certain stages, even
three times as many men as the Russians. Against Rennenkampf Ludendorf
had three men to every two of his enemy, and probably even as many
as two to one, as Rennenkampf had suffered severe losses during the
preceding days.
It is equally true that the Russians were able to defeat the Germans
whenever they had even a small superiority of force. Near Warsaw
the Russians had less than five men to every four Germans and they
succeeded in defeating the latter and throwing them clear across all
Poland.
It may seem strange that the Germans should have managed to have
numerical superiority over the Russians all the time. Regrettable as
it may be, it is nevertheless true, for the strength of an army is
determined not by the number of its men, but by the number of bayonets
(infantry), sabres (cavalry) and guns (artillery). The Russian Army
consisted of millions, but bayonets and guns it had only for one-tenth
of its number. In 1915 some Russian divisions numbered, instead of
20,000 bayonets, only a mere thousand, owing to disastrous losses. The
only employment of infantry during those days was as a screen for the
artillery, while the latter was quite useless for fighting purposes
because it had no ammunition whatever. Under such conditions many of
our corps often did not exceed the strength of a single regiment and
some armies numbered no more effectives than a single division. We
had plenty of men, but no arms and ammunition. Therefore, the Germans
frequently surpassed us not in men, but in bayonets and guns.
The tragedy of the Russian situation lay in the cruel fact that Russia,
while only one-tenth of her Armies were armed, was facing Germany
and Austria, who were armed from head to foot. Not Ludendorf and not
his ordinary military skill were the causes of Russia's failures in
the first year of the War, but that simple and terrible truth which
Brusilov once expressed in the following words: "_The Russians had no
shells with which to blast their way across barbed-wire entanglements
before an attack; so it became necessary for them to break down the
wires with the bodies of Russian soldiers, and to form a bridge across
these dead bodies for the next attacking column._"
[Illustration: The black line represents the Russian front in 1917. The
front stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The Roumanian
front was held also primarily by Russian troops.]
We have concluded our sketch of Russia's participation in the World War
with 1917. But 1918 also has its story: in that year Russia was denied
a voice at the conference on that peace in the name of which Russia had
offered up so many sacrifices and made such efforts.
We have seen how important and essential a part Russia played in the
overthrow of German militarism. Russia's tremendous role confirms
once more the elementary truth that in the future also Russia will
inevitably be a colossal factor of political and military equilibrium
in Europe. Whatever does happen to Russia, however they may dismember
her living body, the immense Russian nation, with 125 million souls of
pure Russian blood alone, will always remain that heavy military weight
which inevitably lowers that particular scale upon which it descends.
It is true, Germany is now crushed and enfeebled. But we know that
victorious countries are now suffering not less, and some of them even
more, from the consequences of the most stupendous world conflict.
Years will pass, and possibly but a few years, and again the world
will recuperate. We have no reason to expect that the active German
people will lag behind the rest in this work of reestablishing normal
conditions of life and labor.
The Treaty of Versailles has not solved a good many problems, and among
them also those that were the cause of the World War. Notwithstanding
all partitioning, Germany still retains up to 60 million souls, but
France only a little more than 40 million. The population of Germany
has always been growing, while that of France, if it has not decreased,
has not increased. _After all, Germany has and will have a numerical
superiority over France of one and a half times._
France, well aware of that, tries to maintain an alliance with England,
and reckons upon the aid of America. But the statesmen of the West
realize how insufficient all this is, for they still remember well that
first critical month of the War when France was all alone and saved
herself only through extraordinary efforts.
Until the United States arrives on the scene! Why, that inevitably
means months and months of waiting. Until the British Army is mobilized
and transported! Why, we know how difficult and tedious are the
conditions of embarkation and landing of troops, artillery, transport
columns, munitions, etc. We know that the 150,000 soldiers of the
British Army alone required, in August, 1914, more than three weeks for
disembarkation. And where? In three ports where everything was equipped
for disembarkation purposes, where ideal conditions prevailed such as
were hard to find in any other ports.
Thus France, in the event of a new conflict with her old foe, will
again find herself for quite some time left all alone to face the
numerically superior enemy. Where will Russia be then?
No Poland, no combination of any group of small States will be able to
take the place of Russia, for that would be a mere 15-20 millions; it
will be not Russia, but only one-seventh, a sixth, or fifth part of
that which Russia gave during the past War. These weak nations will
only become additional trophies to the enemy, just as Roumania, Serbia
and Belgium became his easy prey in the past War.
Where will Russia be then? Not the present-day Russia bleeding to death
in its struggle against Bolshevism, but the future, once more powerful,
Russia?...
Bolshevism, an abnormal phenomenon, is bound to come to an
end--somewhat earlier, or somewhat later. No matter how much may be
cut off from Russia, she will always remain an immense, great, rich,
and therefore powerful, country. Too much will depend upon what this
coming Russia may have to say, for any sensible statesman to refuse to
reckon with that eventuality.
This question the statesmen of the West must ask of themselves clearly
and plainly--not those statesmen who think no further than the
following day and of the success of their fight against their political
opponents--but those wise leaders of the nations who really have at
heart the interests of their own countries, as well as of the entire
civilized world. "Ostrich politics" may least of all be applied in
dealing with that tremendous military and political factor which covers
one-sixth of the land surface of the globe and is called Russia.