Was it Possible for Germany to Win the War?
In discussing Russia's role in the past World War, it is customary to
cite the losses sustained by the Russian Army, losses numbering many
millions. There is no doubt that Russia's sacrifices were great, and
it is just as true that her losses were greater than those sustained
by any of the other Allies. Nevertheless, these sacrifices are by far
not the only standard of measurement of Russia's participation in
this gigantic struggle. Russia's role must be gauged, first of all,
by the efforts made by the Russian Army to blast the German war plans
during the first years of the War, when neither America, nor Italy, nor
Roumania were among the belligerents, and the British Army was still in
the process of formation.
Russia's role must in addition be gauged by the efforts put forth by
the Russian Army to save the situation at other critical moments of
the War. And of such, we know, there were not a few until the Allies
succeeded in gaining their victory over the stubborn and powerful enemy.
Lastly, and this is the main thing, the role played by the Russian Army
must be considered also in this respect that the strenuous campaign
waged by Russia, with her 180 millions of inhabitants, for three years
against Germany, Austro-Hungary and Turkey, sapped the resources of
the enemy and thereby made possible the delivery of the final blow.
This weakening of the powers of the enemy by Russia was already bound
at various stages of the War to facilitate correspondingly the various
operations of the Allies. Therefore at the end of the War three years
of effort on the part of Russia, which had devoured the enemy's forces,
were destined to enable the Allies finally to crush the enemy. The
final catastrophe of the Central Powers was the direct consequence
of the offensive of the Allies in 1918, but Russia made possible this
collapse to a considerable degree, having effected, in common with the
others, the weakening of Germany, and having consumed during the three
years of strenuous fighting countless reserves, forces and resources of
the Central Powers.
Could Germany have won the war? A careful analysis of this question
brings home the conviction that Germany was very close to victory, and
that it required unusual straining of efforts on the part of France and
Russia to prevent Germany from "winning out."
The plan of the old Field Marshal, Moltke, was far from worthless.
It is a fact that it took from six weeks to two months to mobilize
the armed forces of Russia, during which period Russia was unprepared
for action. The population of Germany was 70 million and that of
Austria-Hungary 52 million, a total of 122 million persons. During
these two months of forced inaction those 122 millions of Teutons were
faced only by 40 million Frenchmen, for Russia was not yet ready. A
threefold superiority in numbers, in addition to an equal degree of
military skill, technical equipment and culture, was bound to crush
lone France.
It is true that for the complete realization of this scheme it was
necessary that the Austrian Army, as well, involve France. This should
have been anticipated, as military science does not admit of the
division of forces. Just to the contrary, it demands "the concentration
of all forces in the decisive hour and at the deciding point,"--in
France, upon this particular occasion.
It may be said that Russia could have occupied Galicia and East Prussia
had the Austrian Army left for France. Well, the fact is that both
these provinces were occupied by Russia anyhow. But if in the first
battle of the Marne, when the Germans felt the shortage of the two or
three corps dispatched back into Prussia, they would have had these
troops at their disposal in addition to half a million Austrians,
Joffre's condition would have been rendered critical. The loss of the
Marne would have been equivalent to the loss of the War by France,
and, consequently, to the loss of the entire War.
The outcome was different. The concentrated attack upon France failed
because of the fact that of the 104 German divisions and the 50
Austrian divisions only about 92 or 94 divisions were on the scene
of action in France. The Russian Army, unprepared for action for
another 40 days, nevertheless rushed into East Prussia in an impulse
of self-sacrifice and received in addition the full strength of the
blow from the Austro-Hungarian Army. This generous move on the part of
Russia destroyed the Moltke plan and his basic idea "the concentration
of _all forces_ against France", as a part of the German force had
been diverted from that front. The plan collapsed, and the only actual
chance which the Germans had of winning a victory was lost with it.
Later, when Russia was prepared, when the English Army began to grow,
and Italy, Roumania and America had abandoned their neutrality,
Germany's chances for a final victory vanished.
It is the recognition of these facts that should prompt every impartial
historian of the War to admit that the self-sacrifice of the unprepared
Russian Army during the first days of the War played an enormous role
in the only period when Germany had victory almost within her grasp. It
is to be regretted that the extraordinary conditions which developed
in Russia towards the end of the War are obscuring the true historic
role of Russia in the sanguine World struggle. It is simple enough
to understand that during the two or three years, while the British
Army was still in the process of formation, and Italy, Roumania and
America were neutral, the entire burden of fighting the Central Powers
devolved upon the Armies of France and Russia. It is just as simple to
understand that during that period, when the enemy was most powerful
and undemoralized, when he was operating with his best troops, that the
most difficult and responsible part of the problem had to be performed.
It is just as easy--from an examination of the maps of the first three
years of the War, maps which speak only of two principal fronts, the
French and the Russian, and no other--to grasp the significance of the
gigantic role played in this War by great Russia and the millions of
sacrifices she consecrated to the common cause of the Allies. Sadly
enough, this only correct criterion of Russia's historic role in the
War is becoming more and more obscured from the public opinion of the
world.
In the recently published memoirs of General Ludendorf, the defeated
German military leader, in an endeavor to clear himself, attempts
to slander the Russian Army and discredit all the great sacrifices
and heroic efforts contributed by Russia to the Allied cause. Taking
advantage of the scant familiarity of the general public with military
matters, Ludendorf uses false data, cites wrong figures and consciously
distorts the historic perspective of the War.
It is difficult to understand how a serious-minded military leader can
stoop to employ, in a supposedly serious work, methods fit for the
yellow press, such as accusing Russian generals of treason, etc., etc.
These memoirs, as a whole, were met at the time of their publication by
sharp and adverse criticism in the foreign, and even the German, press.
Ludendorf's memoirs are especially misleading in the part describing
the first Russian advance in East Prussia, the advance that played such
a decisive role in the defeat which the Germans suffered on the Marne.
It should never be forgotten that this event proved fatal and brought
about the final defeat of the Germans in this sonov.[2]