THIRD OR GREAT MITHRIDATIC WAR. B.C. 74-61.
When Sulla returned to Italy after the First Mithridatic War, he left L.
Murena, with two legions, to hold the command in Asia. Murena, who was
eager for some opportunity of earning the honor of a triumph, pretending
that Mithridates had not yet evacuated the whole of Cappadocia, not only
marched into that country, but even crossed the Halys, and laid waste
the plains of Pontus itself (B.C. 83). To this flagrant breach of the
treaty so lately concluded the Roman general was in great measure
instigated by Archelaus, who, finding himself regarded with suspicion by
Mithridates, had consulted his safety by flight, and was received with
the utmost honors by the Romans. Mithridates, who was wholly unprepared
to renew the contest with Rome, offered no opposition to the progress of
Murena; but finding that general disregard his remonstrances, he sent to
Rome to complain of his aggression. When, in the following spring (B.C.
82), he saw Murena preparing to renew his hostile incursions, he at once
determined to oppose him by force, and assembled a large army, with
which he met the Roman general on the banks of the Halys. The action
that ensued terminated in the complete victory of the king, and Murena,
with difficultly, effected his retreat into Phrygia, leaving Cappadocia
at the mercy of Mithridates, who quickly overran the whole province.
Shortly afterward A. Gabinius arrived in Asia, bringing peremptory
orders from Sulla to Murena to desist from hostilities, whereupon
Mithridates once more consented to evacuate Cappadocia. Thus ended what
is commonly called the Second Mithridatic War.
Notwithstanding the interposition of Sulla, Mithridates was well aware
that the peace between him and Rome was in fact only suspension of
hostilities, and that the haughty Republic would never suffer the
massacre of her citizens in Asia to remain ultimately unpunished. Hence
all his efforts were directed toward the formation of an army capable of
contending, not only in numbers, but in discipline, with those of Rome;
and with this view he armed his barbarian troops after the Roman
fashion, and endeavored to train them up in that discipline of which he
had so strongly felt the effect in the preceding contest. In these
attempts he was doubtless assisted by the refugees of the Marian party,
who had accompanied Fimbria into Asia, and on the defeat of that general
by Sulla had taken refuge with the King of Pontus. At their instigation,
also, Mithridates sent an embassy to Sertorius, who was still
maintaining his ground in Spain, and concluded an alliance with him
against their common enemies. But it was the death of Nicomedes III.,
king of Bithynia, at the beginning of B.C. 74, that brought matters to a
crisis, and became the immediate occasion of the war which both parties
had long felt to be inevitable. That monarch left his dominions by will
to the Roman people, and Bithynia was accordingly declared a Roman
province; but Mithridates asserted that the late king had left a
legitimate son by his wife Nysa, whose pretensions he immediately
prepared to support by his arms.
The forces with which Mithridates was now prepared to take the field
were such as might inspire him with no unreasonable confidence of
victory. He had assembled an army of 120,000 foot-soldiers, armed and
disciplined in the Roman manner, and 16,000 horse, besides a hundred
scythed chariots. His fleet, also, was so far superior to any that the
Romans could oppose to him as to give him the almost undisputed command
of the sea. These preparations, however, appear to have delayed him so
long that the season was far advanced before he was able to take the
field, and both the Roman Consuls, L. Licinius Lucullus and M. Aurelius
Cotta, had arrived in Asia. Neither of them, however, was able to oppose
his first irruption. He traversed almost the whole of Bithynia without
encountering any resistance; and when at length Cotta ventured to give
him battle under the walls of Chalcedon, his army and fleet were totally
defeated. Mithridates now proceeded to lay siege to Cyzicus both by sea
and land. But Lucullus, who had advanced from Phrygia to the relief of
Cotta, and followed Mithridates to Cyzicus, took possession of an
advantageous position near the camp of the king, where he almost
entirely cut him off from receiving supplies by land, while the storms
of the winter prevented him from depending on those by sea. Hence it was
not long before famine began to make itself felt in the camp of
Mithridates, and all his assaults upon the city having been foiled by
the courage and resolution of the besieged, he was at length compelled
(early in the year B.C. 73) to abandon the enterprise and raise the
siege. In his retreat he was repeatedly attacked by the Roman general,
and suffered very heavy loss at the passage of the Æsepus and Granicus.
By the close of the year the great army with which he had commenced the
war was annihilated, and he was not only compelled to retire within his
own dominions, but was without the means of opposing the advance of
Lucullus into the heart of Pontus itself. But he now again set to work
with indefatigable activity to raise a fresh army; and while he left the
whole of the sea-coast of Pontus open to the invaders, he established
himself in the interior at Cabira. Here he was again defeated by
Lucullus; and despairing of opposing the farther progress of the Romans,
he fled into Armenia to claim the protection and assistance of his
son-in-law Tigranes.
[Illustration: Coin of Tigranes.]
Tigranes was at this moment the most powerful monarch of Asia, but he
appears to have been unwilling to engage openly in war with Rome; and on
this account, while he received the fugitive monarch in a friendly
manner, he refused to admit him to his presence, and showed no
disposition to attempt his restoration. But the arrogance of the Romans
brought about a change in his policy; and Tigranes, offended at the
haughty conduct of Appius Claudius, whom Lucullus had sent to demand the
surrender of Mithridates, not only refused this request, but determined
at once to prepare for war.
While Lucullus was waiting for the return of Claudius, he devoted his
attention to the settlement of the affairs of Asia, which was suffering
severely from the oppressions of the farmers of the public taxes. By
various judicious regulations he put a stop to their exactions, and
earned the gratitude of the cities of Asia; but at the same time he
brought upon himself the enmity of the Equites, who were the farmers of
the revenue. They were loud against him in their complaints at Rome,
and by their continued clamors undoubtedly prepared the way for his
ultimate recall.
Meanwhile community of interests between Mithridates and Tigranes had
led to a complete reconciliation between them, and the Pontic king, who
had spent a year and eight months in the dominions of his son-in-law
without being admitted to a personal interview, was now made to
participate in all the councils of Tigranes, and appointed to levy an
army to unite in the war. But it was in vain that in the ensuing
campaign (B.C. 69) he urged upon his son-in-law the lessons of his own
experience, and advised him to shun a regular action with Lucullus:
Tigranes, confident in the multitude of his forces, gave battle at
Tigranocerta, and was defeated, before Mithridates had been able to join
him. But this disaster, so precisely in accordance with the warnings of
Mithridates, served to raise the latter so high in the estimation of
Tigranes, that from this time forward the whole conduct of the war was
intrusted to the direction of the King of Pontus.
In the following summer (B.C. 68) Lucullus crossed the Taurus,
penetrated into the heart of Armenia, and again defeated the allied
monarchs near the city of Artaxata. But the early severity of the
season, and the discontent of his own troops, checked the farther
advance of the Roman general, who turned aside into Mesopotamia. Here
Mithridates left him to lay siege to the fortress of Nisibis, which was
supposed to be impregnable, while he himself took advantage of his
absence to invade Pontus at the head of a large army, and endeavor to
regain possession of his former dominions. The defense of Pontus was
confided to Fabius, one of the lieutenants of Lucullus; but the
oppression of the Romans had excited a general spirit of disaffection,
and the people crowded around the standard of Mithridates. Fabius was
totally defeated, and compelled to shut himself up in the fortress of
Cabira. In the following spring (B.C. 67), Triarius, another of the
Roman generals, was also defeated with immense loss. The blow was one of
the severest which the Roman arms had sustained for a long period: 7000
of their troops fell, among whom were an unprecedented number of
officers, and their camp itself was taken.
The advance of Lucullus himself from Mesopotamia prevented Mithridates
from following up his advantage, and he withdrew into Lesser Armenia,
where he took up a strong position to await the approach of Tigranes.
But the farther proceedings of Lucullus were paralyzed by the mutinous
and disaffected spirit of his own soldiers. Their discontents were
fostered by P. Clodius, whose turbulent and restless spirit already
showed itself in its full force, and were encouraged by reports from
Rome, where the demagogues who were favorable to Pompey, or had been
gained over by the Equestrian party, were loud in their clamors against
Lucullus. They accused him of protracting the war for his own personal
objects, either of ambition or avarice; and the soldiery, whose appetite
for plunder had been often checked by Lucullus, readily joined in the
outcry. Accordingly, on the arrival of Tigranes, the two monarchs found
themselves able to overrun almost the whole of Pontus and Cappadocia
without opposition.
Such was the state of affairs when ten legates arrived in Asia to reduce
Pontus to the form of a Roman province, and they had, in consequence, to
report to the Senate that the country supposed to be conquered was again
in the hands of the enemy. The adversaries of Lucullus naturally availed
themselves of so favorable an occasion, and a decree was passed
transferring to M. Acilius Glabrio, one of the Consuls for the year, the
province of Bithynia, and the command against Mithridates. But Glabrio
was wholly incompetent for the task assigned to him. On arriving in
Bithynia he made no attempt to assume the command, but remained within
the confines of his province, while he still farther embarrassed the
position of Lucullus by issuing proclamations to his soldiers,
announcing to them that their general was superseded, and releasing them
from their obedience. Before the close of the year (B.C. 67) Lucullus
had the mortification of seeing Mithridates established once more in the
possession of his hereditary dominions. But it was still more galling to
his feelings when, in the spring of the following year (B.C. 66), he was
called upon to resign the command to Pompey, who had just brought to a
successful termination the war against the pirates.
The Mediterranean Sea had long been swarming with pirates. From the
earliest times piracy has more or less prevailed in this sea, which,
lying between three continents, and abounding with numerous creeks and
islands, presents at the same time both the greatest temptations and the
greatest facilities for piratical pursuits. Moreover, in consequence of
the Social and Civil wars, and the absence of any fleet to preserve
order upon the sea, piracy had reached an alarming height. The pirates
possessed fleets in all parts of the Mediterranean, were in the habit of
plundering the most wealthy cities on the coasts, and had at length
carried their audacity so far as to make descents upon the Appian Road,
and carry off Roman magistrates, with their lictors. All communication
between Rome and the provinces was cut off, or at least rendered
extremely dangerous; the fleets of corn-vessels, upon which Rome to a
great extent depended for its subsistence, could not reach the city, and
the price of provisions in consequence rose enormously. Such a state of
things had become intolerable, and all eyes were now directed to Pompey.
At the beginning of B.C. 67 the Tribune A. Gabinius brought forward a
bill which was intended to give Pompey almost absolute authority over
the greater part of the Roman world. It proposed that the people should
elect a man with consular rank, who should possess unlimited power for
three years over the whole of the Mediterranean, a fleet of 200 ships,
with as many soldiers and sailors as he thought necessary, and 6000
Attic talents. The bill did not name Pompey, but it was clear who was
meant. The aristocracy were in the utmost alarm, and in the Senate Cæsar
was almost the only person who came forward in its support. Party spirit
ran to such a height that the most serious riots ensued. Even Pompey
himself was threatened by the Consul, "If you emulate Romulus, you will
not escape the end of Romulus." Q. Catulus and Q. Hortensius spoke
against the bill with great eloquence, but with no effect. On the day
that the bill was passed the price of provisions at Rome immediately
fell, a fact which showed the immense confidence which all parties
placed in the military abilities of Pompey.
Pompey's plans were formed with great skill, and were crowned with
complete success. He stationed his lieutenants with different squadrons
in various parts of the Mediterranean to prevent the pirates from
uniting, and to hunt them out of the various bays and creeks in which
they concealed themselves; while, at the same time, he swept the middle
of the sea with the main body of his fleet, and chased them eastward. In
forty days he drove the pirates out of the western seas, and restored
communication between Spain, Africa, and Italy. After then remaining a
short time in Italy, he sailed from Brundusium, cleared the seas as he
went along, and forced the pirates to the Cilician coast. Here the
decisive action was fought; the pirates were defeated, and more than
20,000 prisoners fell into his hands. Those on whom most reliance could
be placed were distributed among the small and depopulated cities of
Cilicia, and a large number were settled at Soli, which was henceforward
called Pompeiopolis. The second part of this campaign occupied only
forty-nine days, and the whole war was brought to a conclusion in the
course of three months. Pompey remained in Cilicia during the remainder
of this year and the beginning of the one following. Meantime the
Tribune C. Manilius brought forward a bill (B.C. 66) giving to Pompey
the command of the war against Mithridates, with unlimited power over
the army and the fleet in the East, and with the rights of a Proconsul
in the whole of Asia as far as Armenia. As his Proconsular power already
extended over all the coasts and islands of the Mediterranean in virtue
of the Gabinian law, this new measure virtually placed almost the whole
of the Roman dominions in his hands. But there was no power, however
excessive, which the people were not ready to intrust to their favorite
hero; and the bill was accordingly passed, notwithstanding the
opposition of Hortensius, Catulus, and the aristocratical party. Cicero
advocated the measure in an oration which has come down to us (_Pro Lege
Manilia_), and Cæsar likewise supported it with his growing popularity
and influence.
On receiving intelligence of this new appointment, Pompey immediately
crossed the Taurus, and took the command of the army from Lucullus.
The power of Mithridates had been broken by the previous victories of
Lucullus, and the successes which the king had gained lately were only
of a temporary nature, mainly owing to the disorganization of the Roman
army. In the plan of the campaign Pompey displayed great military skill.
One of his first measures was to secure the alliance of the Parthian
king, which not only deprived Mithridates of all hopes of succor from
that quarter, but likewise cut him off from all assistance from the
Armenian king Tigranes, who was now obliged to look to the safety of his
own dominions. Pompey next stationed his fleet in different squadrons
along the coasts of Asia Minor, in order to deprive Mithridates of all
communication from the sea, and he then proceeded in person at the head
of his land-forces against the king. Thus thrown back upon his own
resources, Mithridates sued for peace, but, as Pompey would hear of
nothing but unqualified submission, the negotiation was broken off. The
king was still at the head of 30,000 foot and 2000 horse; but he knew
too well the strength of a Roman army to venture an engagement with
these forces, and accordingly withdrew gradually to the frontiers of
Armenia. For a long time he succeeded in avoiding a battle, but he was
at length surprised by Pompey in Lesser Armenia, as he was marching
through a narrow pass. The battle was soon decided; the king lost the
greater number of his troops, and escaped with only a few horsemen to
the fortress of Synorium, on the borders of the Greater Armenia. Here he
again collected a considerable force; but as Tigranes refused to admit
him into his dominions, because he suspected him of fomenting the
intrigues of his son against him, Mithridates had no alternative but to
take refuge in his own distant dominions in the Cimmerian Bosporus. To
reach them he had to march through Colchis, and to fight his way through
the wild and barbarous tribes that occupied the country between the
Caucasus and the Euxine. He succeeded, however, in this arduous
enterprise, and reached the Bosporus in safety in the course of next
year. Pompey abandoned at present all thoughts of following the
fugitive king, and resolved at once to attack Tigranes, who was now the
more formidable of the two monarchs.
On entering Armenia Pompey met with no opposition. He was joined by the
young Tigranes, who had revolted against his father, and all the cities
submitted to them on their approach. When the Romans drew near to
Artaxata, the king, deserted by his army and his court, went out to meet
Pompey, and threw himself before him as a suppliant. Pompey received him
with kindness, acknowledged him as King of Armenia, and demanded only
the payment of 6000 talents. His foreign possessions, however, in Syria,
Phoenicia, Cilicia, Galatia, and Cappadocia, which had been conquered
by Lucullus, were to belong to the Romans. To his son Tigranes, Sophene
and Gordyene were given as an independent kingdom; but as the young
prince was discontented with this arrangement, and even ventured to
utter threats, Pompey had him arrested, and kept him in chains to grace
his triumph.
After thus settling the affairs of Armenia, Pompey proceeded northward
in pursuit of Mithridates. But the season was so far advanced that he
took up his winter quarters on the banks of the River Cyrus. Early in
the spring (B.C. 65) he resumed his march northward, and advanced as far
as the River Phasis, but, obtaining here more certain information of the
movements of Mithridates, and of the wild and inaccessible nature of the
country through which he would have to march in order to reach the king,
he retraced his steps, and led his troops into winter quarters at
Amisus, on the Euxine. He now reduced Pontus to the form of a Roman
province.
In B.C. 64 Pompey marched into Syria, where he deposed Antiochus
Asiaticus, and made the country a Roman province. He likewise compelled
the neighboring princes, who had established independent kingdoms on the
ruins of the Syrian empire, to submit to the Roman dominion. The whole
of this year was occupied with the settlement of Syria and the adjacent
countries.
Next year (B.C. 63) Pompey advanced farther south, in order to establish
the Roman supremacy in Phoenicia, Coele-Syria, and Palestine. The
latter country was at this time distracted by a civil war between
Hyrcanus and Aristobulus. Pompey espoused the side of Hyrcanus, and
Aristobulus surrendered himself to Pompey when the latter had advanced
near to Jerusalem. But the Jews refused to follow the example of their
king, and it was not till after a siege of three months that the city
was taken. Pompey entered the Holy of Holies, the first time that any
human being, except the high-priest, had penetrated into this sacred
spot. He reinstated Hyrcanus in the high-priesthood, but compelled him
to pay an annual tribute to Rome; Aristobulus accompanied him as a
prisoner. It was during this war in Palestine that Pompey received
intelligence of the death of Mithridates.
During the last two years Mithridates had been making the most extensive
preparations for a renewal of the contest. He had conceived the daring
project of marching round the north and west coasts of the Euxine, and
penetrating even into Italy. With these views, he was busily engaged in
assembling such a fleet and array as would be sufficient for an
enterprise of this magnitude; but his proceedings were delayed by a long
and painful illness, which incapacitated him for any personal exertion.
At length, however, his preparations were completed, and he found
himself at the head of an army of 36,000 men and a considerable fleet.
But during his illness disaffection had made rapid progress among his
followers. The full extent of his schemes was probably communicated to
few; but enough had transpired to alarm the multitude, and a formidable
conspiracy was organized by Pharnaces, the favorite son of Mithridates.
He was quickly joined both by the whole army and the citizens of
Panticapæum, who unanimously proclaimed him king, and Mithridates saw
that no choice remained to him but death or captivity. Hereupon he took
poison, which he constantly carried with him; but his constitution had
been so long inured to antidotes that it did not produce the desired
effect, and he was compelled to call in the assistance of one of his
Gaulish mercenaries to dispatch him with his sword.
Pompey now devoted his attention to the settlement of affairs in Asia.
He confirmed Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates, in the possession of the
kingdom of Bosporus; Deiotarus, tetrarch of Galatia, was rewarded with
an extension of territory; and Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, was
restored to his kingdom. After an absence of seven years, Pompey arrived
in Italy toward the end of B.C. 62. His arrival had been long looked for
by all parties with various feelings of hope and fear. It was felt that
at the head of his victorious troops he could easily play the part of
Sulla, and become the ruler of the state. Important events had taken
place at Rome during the absence of Pompey, of which it is necessary to
give an account before following him to the city.
[Illustration: Cicero.]