H. N., IX, 30.]
[Footnote 232-4: _Seneca_, De Benef., VII, 9; _Plin._, N.
N., VIII, 74.]
[Footnote 232-5: _Valer. Max._, IX, 1; _Seneca_, Epist, 122.
Thus Hortensius sprinkled his trees with wine. _Macrob._,
Sat., III, 13.]
[Footnote 232-6: Besides Cleopatra, Caligula especially did
this frequently. Compare also _Horat._, Serm., II, 3, 239
ff. Similarly, the luxury of the actor Aesopus, when he
placed a dish worth 6,000 _louis d'or_ before his guests,
consisting entirely of birds which had been taught to sing
or speak. _Pliny_, H. N., X, 72. Compare _Horat._, loc.
cit., 345.]
[Footnote 232-7: _Sueton._., Caligula, 37. _Hoc est luxuriae
propositum, gaudere perversis. Seneca_., Epist., 122.
According to the same letter of Seneca, the luxury of Nero's
time had its source rather in vanity than in sensuality and
gluttony.]
[Footnote 232-8: _Martial_, V, 79; _Plin_., H. N. XIII, 5.
_Seneca_, De Brev. Vitæ. I, 12.]
[Footnote 232-9: _Seneca_, Cons. ad Helviam 10, _Martial_,
III, 22.]
[Footnote 232-10: Hence, early limited by law. _Sueton._.
Caes. 10. Augustus limited the exiles to taking 20 slaves
with them: _Dio Cass._ VII, 27. Special value attached to
dwarfs, buffoons, hermaphrodites, eunuchs, precisely as
among the moderns in the times of the degenerated absolutist
courts, the luxury of which is closely allied in many
respects to that of declining nations.]
[Footnote 232-11: Caligula's wife wore, on ordinary
occasions, 40,000,000 sesterces worth of ornaments. _Plin._
H. N. IX, 58.]
[Footnote 232-12: _Gibbon_, History of the Decline and Fall
of the Roman Empire, ch. 27. What a parallel between this
later Roman luxury and the literary taste represented for
instance by Seneca!
Let any one who would embrace the three periods of luxury in
one view, compare the funeral ceremonies of the Greek age of
chivalry (_Homer_, Il.), with those in _Thucyd._ (II, 34,
ff.), _Demosth._ (Lept., 499 seq.), and the interment of
Alexander the Great and, of his friend Hephaestion
(_Diodor._, XVII, 115, XVIII, 26 ff.) Sullas (Serv. ad
_Virgil_, Æneid VI, 861. _Plutarch_, Sulla, 38), and that of
the wife of the emperor Nero (_Plin._, H. N. XII, 41).
_Roscher_, loc. cit. 66 ff.]
SECTION CCXXXIII.
LUXURY-POLICY.
Sumptuary laws (_die Luxusgesetzgebung_) have been aimed, at all times,
principally at the outlay for clothing, for the table and for
funerals.[233-1] In most nations the policy of luxury has its beginning
in the transition from the first to the second period of luxury above
described.[233-2] The extravagant feasts, which remain of the first
period, seem vulgar to the new public opinion which is created. On the
other hand, the conveniences of life, the universality, the refinement
and variety of enjoyments characteristic of the second period are not
acceptable to the austerity of old men, and are put down as effeminacy.
In this period the bourgeoisie generally begin to rise in importance,
and the feudal aristocracy to decay. The higher classes see the lower
approximate to them in display, with jealous eyes. And, hence, dress is
wont to be graded in strict accordance with the differences of
class.[233-3] But these laws must be regarded as emanating from the
tendency, which prevails in these times, of the state to act as the
guardian of its wards, its subjects. The authority of the state waxes
strong in such periods; and with the first consciousness of its power,
it seeks to draw many things into its sphere, which it afterwards
surrenders.
[Footnote 233-1: Which of these three kinds of luxury
specially preponderated has always depended on the
peculiarities of national character. Thus, among the ancient
Romans, it was the second; among the French, the first. In
Germany the prohibitions relating to "toasts," or drinking
one another's health have played a great part. Thus the
well-known Cologne reformation of 1837. Compare _Seb.
Münster_, Cosmogr., 326.]
[Footnote 233-2: In Greece, _Lycurgus'_ legislation seems to
have contained the first prohibition relating to luxury. No
one should own a house or household article which had been
made with a finer implement than an ax or a saw; and no
Spartan cook should use any other spice than salt and
vinegar. (_Plut._, De Sanitate, 12; _Lycurg._, 13. On
Periander, see _Ephorus_, ed. _Marx_, fr. 106. _Heracb._,
Pont. ed.; _Köhler_, fr. 5; _Diog. Laert._, I, 96 ff.) The
luxury-prohibitions of Solon were aimed especially at the
female passion for dress and the pomp of funerals. Those who
had the surveillance of the sex watched also over the luxury
of banquets. _Athen._, VI, 245; _Demosth._ in _Macart._,
1070. In Rome, there were laws regulating the pomp of and
display at funerals, dating from the time of the Kings; but
especially are such laws to be found in the twelve tables.
Lex Oppia de Cultu Mulierum in the year 215 before Christ. A
very interesting debate concerning the abolition of this law
in _Livy_, XXXIV, 1 ff. About 189, prohibition of several
foreign articles of luxury. _Plin._, H. N., XIII, 5, XIV,
16. Measures of Cato the censor. (_Livy_, XXXIX, 44.) First
law relating to the table, L. Orchia, in the year 187;
afterwards L. Fannia, 161, L. Didia, 143 before Christ.
(_Macrob._, Sat. V, 13; _Gellius_, N. A., II, 24. _Plin._,
H. N., X, 7.) After a long pause, sumptuary laws relating to
food, funerals and games of chance, constitute an important
part of Sulla's legislation.]
[Footnote 233-3: _Latus clavus_ of the Roman senators;
_annulus_ of the knights. In the latter middle age, the
knights were wont to be allowed to wear gold, and esquires
only silver; the former, damask; the latter, satin or
taffeta; but when the esquires also used damask, velvet was
reserved for the knights alone. _St. Palaye_, Das
Ritterwesen, by _Klüber_, IV, 107; II, 153 seq. But towards
the end of the middle ages many sumptuary laws were enacted
in cities by plebeian jealousy of the rich. The Venetian
sumptuary laws were passed on account of the anxiety of the
state that some rich men might shine above the rest of the
oligarchs.]
SECTION CCXXXIV.
HISTORY OF SUMPTUARY LAWS.
As in Italy, Frederick II., in Aragon, Iago I., in 1234, in England,
Edward III., by 37, Edward III., c. 8 ff., so in France Philip IV. was
the first who busied himself seriously with sumptuary legislation;[234-1]
that is the same king who had introduced in so many things the modern
political life into France. (For instance, the ordinance of 1294,
regulating apparel and the luxury of the table.) In the 14th century, we
find sumptuary laws directed mainly against expense for furs, and in the
16th mainly against that for articles of gold and silver. From the
descriptions left us in such laws of the prohibited luxuries, we may learn
as much of the history of technology and of fashion, as we may of the
history of classes from the gradation of the things permitted. The fines
imposed for violations of these laws, under Philip IV. went for the most
part to the territorial lord; and in the 16th and 17th centuries to the
foundation of charitable institutions. The state, as a rule, took no share
of them; doubtless to avoid the odium which might attach to this kind of
revenue.
Beginning with the end of the 16th century, the sumptuary laws of France
relating to the luxuries permitted to the several classes of the people
disappear. The legislator ceases to be guided by moral considerations
and begins to be influenced by reasons partaking of a commercial and
police character; and here we may very clearly demonstrate the origin of
the so-called mercantile or protective system. Thus, in the declaration
of Louis XIV. dated December 12, 1644, we find a complaint, that not
only does the importation of foreign articles of luxury threaten to rob
France of all its gold and silver, but also that the home manufacture of
gold cloth, etc., which at Lyons alone ate up 10,000 livres a week, had
the same effect. Under Colbert, in 1672, it was specially provided for,
in the prohibition of coarser silver ware, that all such ware should be
brought to the mint.[234-2] In the edict of 1660, the king even says
that he has in view especially the higher classes, officers, courtiers,
etc., in whom it was his duty to be most deeply interested. To preserve
the latter from impoverishment was the main object of the law.
Under Louis XV. all sumptuary laws were practically a dead
letter.[234-3] Their enforcement is, indeed, exceedingly difficult, as
it is always harder to superintend consumption than production. The
latter is carried on in definite localities, not unfrequently even in
the open air. The former is carried on in the secrecy of a thousand
homes. Besides, sumptuary laws have very often the effect to make the
forbidden fruit all the sweeter. Where they are based on a difference of
class, not only the passion for pleasure, but the vanity of the lower
classes is an incentive to their violation.[234-4] Spite of the severity
of the penalties attached to the violation of these laws, of redoubled
measures of control, which are dreadful burdens on the intercourse
between man and man,[234-5] the French government has been compelled to
admit, after almost every internal commotion, and almost every external
war, that its sumptuary laws fell into disuse.
[Footnote 234-1: Ordonnances de France, I, 324, 531. Worms
law of 1220. (_Riehl_, Pfälzer, 246.) Braunschweig law of
1228, that at weddings there should not be over 12 plates
nor more than three musicians. (_Rehtmeyer_, Chron., 466.)
Danish sumptuary law of 1269. First law regulating dress in
Prussia in 1269. (_Voigt_, Gesch. von Preussen, V, 97.) On
Henry II., see _v. Raumer_, Hohenstaufen, VI, 585. Some of
the earlier restrictions on luxury, such as that of 190 in
England and France, against scarlet ermine, etc., may have
been related to the religious fervor of the crusades. _St.
Louis_, during the whole period of his crusades wore no
articles of luxury.]
[Footnote 234-2: The English prohibition against the wearing
of silk on hats, caps, stockings etc. (1 and 2 Phil. and
Mary, ch. 2.) was promulgated with the intention of
promoting the home manufacture of wool. And so _Sully_,
Economics, L, XII, XVI, was in favor of laws regulating
outlay mainly from "mercantilistic" reasons, that the
country might not be impoverished by the purchase of foreign
expensive articles. The police ordinance of the Empire of
1548, tit. 9, desired to guard against both the "excessive"
exportation of money and the obliteration of class
differences; that of 1530, tit. 9, and the Austrian police
ordinance of Ferdinand I. had only the second object in
view. (_Mailath_, Gesch., von Oesterreich, II, 169 ff.) How,
in Denmark, prohibitions of luxury grew very soon into
prohibitions of imports with a protective intention, see in
_Thaarup_, Dänische Statistik, I, 521 seq. On the
mercantilistic object of the greater number of prohibitions
of coffee, in the 18th century, see _Dohm_, über
Kaffeegesetzgebung, in the D. Museum, Bd., II, St. 8, No.
4.]
[Footnote 234-3: _Des Essart_, Dictionnaire universel de
Police, VI, 146. In Great Britain, the Scotch luxury-law of
1621 is the last. (_Anderson_, Origin of Commerce, a. 1621.)
In Germany, there were some such laws until the end of the
18th century; and the laws regulating mourning have lasted
longest. Compare that of Frederick the Great of 1777, the
Bamberg and Wurzberg laws of 1784, in _Schlözer_,
Staatsanzeigen, IX, 460; fol. 141 ff. There are many men who
have no desire to go to any heavy expense in mourning, but
do not dare to give expression thereto in certain cases, and
therefore look with favor on a law to which they may appeal
as an excuse.]
[Footnote 234-4: Compare _N. Montaigne_, 1580, Essais, I,
63. A striking instance in antiquity: _Macrob._, II, 13;
most recently in _Lotz_, Revision, I, 407.]
[Footnote 234-5: Compare especially the French sumptuary law
of 1567. Zaleucos went so far in his severity as to punish
with death the drinking of unmixed wine, without the
prescription of a physician. (_Athen._, IX, 429.) The effort
has sometimes been made to enlist the feeling of honor of
the people in the controlling of luxury. Thus old Zaleucos
forbade the wearing of gold rings or Milesian cloth unless
the wearer desired to commit adultery, or to be guilty of
sins against nature (_Diodor._, XII, 21); but such laws are
scarcely attended with success.]
SECTION CCXXXV.
DIFFICULTY OF ENFORCING SUMPTUARY LAWS.
The impossibility of enforcing sumptuary laws has been most strikingly
observed, where it has been attempted to suppress the consumption of
popular delicacies in the first stages of their spread among the people.
Thus, an effort was made in this direction in the sixteenth century, as
regards brandy; in the seventeenth, as regards tobacco; in the
eighteenth, as regards coffee; all which three articles were first
allowed to be used only as medicines.[235-1] When governments discovered
after some time the fruitlessness of the efforts, they gave up the
prohibition of these luxuries and substituted taxes on them
instead.[235-2] Thus an effort was made to combine a moral and a fiscal
end. But it should not be lost sight of that the lower these taxes are,
the greater the revenue they bring in; that is, the less the moral end
is attained, the more is the fiscal end. Even Cato took this course. His
office of censor, which united the highest moral superintendence with
the highest financial guidance, must of itself have led him in this
direction.[235-3] In modern times the most important excises and
financial duties of entry have been evolved out of sumptuary laws. Even
the Turks, after having long tried to prohibit tobacco-smoking in vain,
afterwards found in the duties they imposed on that plant a rich source
of income. That such taxes are among the best imposed, where they do not
lead to frauds on the government, become excessive, or diminish
consumption to too great an extent, is universally conceded.
Beyond this there is, on the whole, little left of the old police
regulations relating to luxury. Thus, governmental consent is, in most
countries, required for the establishment of places where liquors are
sold at retail, for the maintenance of public places of amusement, for
shooting festivals, fairs, etc.; and this consent should not be too
freely granted. The police power prescribes certain hours at which
drinking places shall be closed. Games of chance are wont to be either
entirely prohibited or restricted to certain places and times (bathing
places), or are reserved as the exclusive right of certain institutions,
especially state institutions. The object of this is, on the one hand,
to facilitate their supervision, and on the other, to diminish the
number of seductive occasions. Here, too, belongs the appointment of
guardians to spendthrifts, which is generally done on the motion of the
family by the courts; but which, indeed, occurs too seldom to have any
great influence on the national resources, or on national morals.[235-4]
[Footnote 235-1: Hessian law that only apothecaries should
retail brandy, 1530. English tobacco laws of 1604; _Rymer_,
Foedera, XVI, 601. Papal excommunication fulminated in
1624, against all who took snuff in church, and repeated in
1690. A Turkish law of 1610 provided that all smokers should
have the pipe broken against their nose. A Russian law of
1634, prohibiting smoking under penalty of death. In
Switzerland, even in the 17th century, no one could smoke
except in secret. Coffee had a hard struggle even in its
native place. (_Ritter_, Erdkunde, XIII, 574 ff.) Prohibited
in Turkey in 1633, under pain of death. _v. Hammer_,
Osmanische Staatsverwaltung, I, 75. In 1769, coffee was
still prohibited in Basel, and was allowed to be sold by
apothecaries only, and as medicine. (_Burkhardt_, C. Basel,
I, 68.) Hanoverian prohibition of the coffee trade in the
rural districts in 1780: _Schlözer_, Briefwechsel, VIII, 123
ff.]
[Footnote 235-2: According to _v. Seckendorff_,
Christenstaat, 1685, 435 seq., a decidedly unchristian
change.]
[Footnote 235-3: _Livy_, XXXIX, 44. In Athens, too, the
highest police board in the matter of luxury was the
areopagus, which was at the same time a high financial
court. Sully transformed the prohibition of luxury in regard
to banquets into a tax on delicacies. Similarly, in regard
to funeral-luxuries, at an earlier date. (_Cicero_, ad.
Att., XII, 35.)]
[Footnote 235-4: Customary even in the early Roman republic,
and adjudged _exemplo furioso_. (_Ulpian_, in L. 1 Digest,
XXVII, 10.) The immediate knights of the empire were in this
respect very severe towards those of their own order. See
_Kerner_, Reichsrittersch. Staatsrecht, II, 381 ff. _Sully_
ordered the parliaments to warn spendthrifts, to punish them
and place them under guardianship. (Economies royales, L,
XXVI.) According to _Montesquieu_, it is a genuine
aristocratic maxim to hold the nobility to a punctual
payment of their debts. (Esprit des Lois, V, 8.)]
SECTION CCXXXVI.
EXPEDIENCY OF SUMPTUARY LAWS.
To judge of the salutariness of sumptuary laws, we must keep the above
three social periods in view throughout. At the close of the first
period, every law which restricts the excesses of the immediately
succeeding age (the middle age) is useful because it promotes the noble
luxury of the second period.[236-1] And so, in the third period,
legislation may at least operate to drive the most immoral and most
odious forms of vice under cover, and thus to diminish their contagious
seduction. It is a matter of significance that, in Rome, the most
estimable of the emperors always endeavored to restrict luxury.[236-2]
But too much should not be expected of such laws. _Intra animum medendum
est; nos pudor in melius mutet._[236-3] It is at least necessary, that
the example given in high places should lend its positive aid, as did
that of Vespasian, for instance, who thus really opposed a certain
barrier to the disastrous flood of Roman luxury.[236-4]
But a strong and flourishing nation has no need of such leading
strings.[236-5] Where an excrescence has to be extirpated, the people
can use the knife themselves. I need call attention only to the
temperance societies of modern times (Boston, 1803), which spite of all
their exaggeration[236-6] may have a very beneficial effect on the
morally weak by the solemn nature of the pledge, and the control their
members mutually exercise over one another. It is estimated that, of all
who enter them, in the British Empire, at least 50 per cent. remain true
to the pledge. In Ireland the government had endeavored for a long time
to preserve the country from the ravages of alcohol by the imposition of
the highest taxes and the severest penalties for smuggling. Every
workman in an illegal distillery was transported for seven years, and
every town in which such a one was found was subjected to a heavy fine.
But all in vain. Only numberless acts of violence were now added to
beastly drunkenness. On the other hand, the temperance societies of the
country decreased the consumption of brandy between 1838 and 1842, from
12,296,000 gallons to 5,290,000 gallons. The excise on brandy decreased
£750,000; but many other taxable articles yielded so much larger a
revenue, that the aggregate government income there increased about
£91,000.[236-7] [236-8] The Puritanical laws which some of the United
States of North America have passed prohibiting all sales of spirituous
liquors except for ecclesiastical, medical or chemical purposes, have
been found impossible of enforcement.[236-9] [236-10]
[Footnote 236-1: Commendable laws relating to luxury in
Florence in the beginning of the 15th century. The outlay
for dress, for the table, for servants and equipages was
limited; but, on the other hand, it was entirely
unrestricted for churches, palaces, libraries, and works of
art. The consequences of this legislation are felt even in
our day. (_Sismondi_, Gesch. der Ital. Freistaaten im M. A.,
VIII, 261. Compare _Machiavelli_, Istor. Fior., VII, a.,
1472.)]
[Footnote 236-2: Thus Nerva (_Xiphilin._, exc. Dionis,
LXVIII, 2); Hadrian (_Spartian V. Hadrian_, 22); Antoninus
Pius (Capitol, 12); Marcus Aurelius (Capitol, 27); Pertinax
(Capitol, 9); Severus Alexander (_Lamprid_, 4); Aurelian
(_Lamprid_, 49); Tacitus (_Vopisc_, 10 seq).]
[Footnote 236-3: Extracted from the remarkable speech made
by the personally frugal Tiberius (_Sueton._, Tib., 34)
against sumptuary laws: _Tacit._, Annal., III, 52 ff.
Compare, however, IV, 63.]
[Footnote 236-4: _Tacit._, Ann., III, 55: but the
differences in fortune had, at the same time, become less
glaring. Henry IV. also dressed very simply for example's
sake, as did also Sully, and ridiculed those _qui portaient
leurs moulins et leur bois de haute-futaie sur leurs dos_.
(_Péréfixe_, Histoire du Roi Henry le grand, 208.)]
[Footnote 236-5: The gross luxuries of drunkenness and
gluttony are a direct consequence of universal grossness,
and disappear of themselves when higher wants and means of
satisfying them are introduced. (_v. Buch_, Reise durch
Norwegen und Lappland, 1810, I, 166; II, 112 ff.)]
[Footnote 236-6: While, formerly, they cared only to abstain
from spirits, the so-called "total abstinence" has prevailed
since 1832. Most teetotallers compare moderate drinking to
moderate lying or moderate stealing; they even declare the
moderate drinker worse than the drunkard, because his
example is more apt to lead others astray, and he is harder
to convert. (But, Psalm, 104, 15!) The coat of arms of the
English temperance societies is a hand holding a hammer in
the act of breaking a bottle. (Temperance poetry!)]
[Footnote 236-7: _McCulloch_, On Taxation, 342 ff. Speech of
_O'Connell_ in the House of Commons, 27 May 1842. The more
serious crimes decreased 1840-44, as compared with the
average number during the five previous years by 28, and the
most grievous by 50 per cent. (_Rau_, Lehrbuch, II, § 331.)
Recently, the first enthusiasm awakened by Father Matthew
has somewhat declined, and the consumption of brandy
therefore increased. Yet, in the whole United Kingdom in
1853, only 30,164,000 gallons were taxed; in 1835,
31,400,000; although the population had in the meantime
increased from 10 to 11 per cent. In 1834, there were in the
United States 7,000 temperance societies with a membership
of 1,250,000. The members of these societies are sometimes
paid higher wages in factories; and ships which allow no
alcohol on board are insured at a premium of five per cent.
less. (_Baird_, History of the Temperance Societies in the
United States, 1837.)]
[Footnote 236-8: In the princedom of Osnabrück, the number
of distilleries was noticeably diminished under the
influence of the temperance societies; but the consumption
of beer was rapidly increased twenty-fold. (Hannoverisches
Magazin, 1843, 51. _Böttcher_, Gesch. der M. V. in der
Norddeutschen Bundestaaten, 1841.)]
[Footnote 236-9: Even in 1838, Massachusetts had begun to
restrict the sale at retail. The agitation for the
suppression of the liquor shops begins in 1841. According to
the Maine law of 1851, a government officer alone had the
right to sell liquor, and only for the purposes mentioned in
the text. The manufacture or importation of liquor for
private use was left free to all. A severe system of
house-searching, imprisonment and inquisitorial proceedings
in order to enforce the law. Similarly in Vermont, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts and Michigan. (Edinburg Rev., July,
1854.) There are, however, numberless instances related in
which the law has been violated unpunished since 1856, and
still more since 1872. See _R. Russell_, North America, its
Agriculture and Climate, and Edinburg Rev., April, 1873,
404.]
[Footnote 236-10: From the foregoing, it is intelligible why
most modern writers, even those otherwise opposed to luxury,
are not favorably inclined towards sumptuary laws. "It is
the highest impertinence and presumption in kings and
ministers, to pretend to watch over the economy of private
people and to restrain their expense, either by sumptuary
laws or by prohibiting the importation of foreign luxuries.
They are themselves always, and without any exception (?)
the greatest spendthrifts in the society. If their own
extravagance does not ruin the state, that of their subjects
never will." (_Adam Smith_, I, ch. 3.) Compare _Rau_,
Lehrbuch II, § 358 ff. _R. Mohl_, Polizeiwissenschaft, II,
434 ff.
_Montesquieu's_ opinion that in monarchies luxury is
necessary to preserve the difference of class but that in
republics it is a cause of decline, is very peculiar. In the
latter, therefore, luxury should be restricted in every way:
agrarian laws should modify the too great difference in
property and sumptuary laws restrain the too glaring
manifestations of extravagance. (Esprit des Lois, VII, 4.)
As an auxiliary to the history of sumptuary laws, compare
_Boxmann_, De Legibus Romanorum sumptuarias, 1816. _Sempere
y Guarinos,_ Historia del Luxo y de las Leyes sumtuarias de
Espana, II, 1788; _Vertot_, Sur l'Establissement des Lois
somptuaires parmi les Français, in the Mémoires de
l'Academie des Inscr., VI, 737 seq, besides the sections on
the subject in _Delamarre_, Traité de la Police, 1772 ff.;
_Penning_, De Luxu et Legibus sumtuariis, 1826.
(_Holland._)]
CHAPTER III.
INSURANCE IN GENERAL.
SECTION CCXXXVII.
INSURANCE IN GENERAL.
The idea of societies for mutual assistance intended to divide the loss
caused by destructive accidents which one person would not be able to
recover from among a great many is very ancient. The insurance of their
members against causes of impoverishment was one of the principal
elements[237-1] of the strength of the medieval communities (_Gemeinden
und Körperschaften._) If we compare these insurance institutions of the
middle ages with those of the present, we discover the well-known
difference between a _corporation_ and an _association_. There the
members stand to one another in the relation of _persons_ who,
therefore, seek to guaranty their entire life in the one combination;
here, they appear only as the representatives of limited portions of
capital confronted with a definite risk, the average of which may be
accurately determined. Hence, the former are of small extent, mostly
local; the latter may extend over whole continents, and even over the
whole earth. The former have uniformly equal members; the latter embrace
men of the most different classes. While the former, therefore, simply
govern themselves, often only on the occasion of their festive
gatherings, the latter need a precise charter, an artificial tariff and
a board of officers.
As the absolute monarchical police-state constitutes, generally, the
bridge between the middle ages and modern times, so too the transition
from the medieval to the modern system of insurance has been frequently
introduced by state insurance.[237-2] [237-3] This was very natural at a
time when the guilds of the middle ages had lost their importance, and
private industry was not ripe enough to supply the void left by them.
The government of a country, far in advance intellectually of the
majority of its subjects, may, by force, induce them to participate in
the beneficent effects of insurance, and immediately provide
institutions extensive enough to guaranty real safety. While it may be
called a rule that mature private industry satisfies wants more rapidly,
in greater variety, and more cheaply than state industry; in the case of
insurance against accidents, especially of insurance against fire, there
are many peculiarities found which would make the entire cessation of
the immediate action of the state in this sphere, or its limitation
simply to a legislative and police supervision of insurance, seem a
misfortune. A dwelling is one of the most universal and urgent of wants,
and indeed a governing one in all the rest of the arrangements of life.
If it be destroyed, it is especially difficult to find a substitute for
it, or to restore it. And to the poorest class of those who need
insurance, private insurance will, perhaps, be never properly
accessible.[237-4] If German fire insurance and the German system of
fire prevention be so superior to the English and North American, etc.,
one of the principal causes is that German governmental institutions so
powerfully participate in it.[237-5]
[Footnote 237-1: The Icelandic _repps_ consisting as a rule
of 20 citizens subject to taxation, who mutually insured one
another against the death of cattle (to the extent of at
least one-fourth the value), and against damage from fire.
After every fire three chambers of each house were replaced;
so also the loss of clothing and of the means of
subsistence, but not other goods or articles of display.
(_Dahlmann_, Danisch Gesch., II, 281 ff.) Scandinavian
parish-duty, (_Gemeindepflicht),_ of assistance in case of
damage by fire: _Wilda_, Gesch. des deutschen Strafrechts,
I, 142. Similarly Capitul. a. 779 in _Pertz_, Leges, I, 37.
This matter plays an important part in the guilds out of
which a large portion of the ancient cities were evolved:
compare _Wilda_, Gildenwesen in M. Alter. 123.]
[Footnote 237-2: Proposed national fire insurance
(_Landesbrandversicherung_) in which for the time being
several villages should form a company, the surplus of which
was to go to the ærarian, and the deficit to be made up by
the same: _Georg Obrecht_, Fünf unterschiedliche Secreta,
Strasburg, 1617, No. 3. A similar proposition made on
financial grounds in 1609, and rejected in Oldenburg.
(_Beckmann_, Beitr. zur Gesch. der Erfind, I, 219 ff.) The
idea sometimes suggested in our day, of making the system of
insurance a government prerogative, arises as much from the
passion for centralization as from socialistic tendencies.
Compare the Belgian Bulletin de la Commission de Statist.
IV, 210, and _Oberländer_, Die Feuerversicherungsanstalten
vor der Ständeversammlung des k. Sachsen, 1857.]
[Footnote 237-3: Maritime insurance is much older than
insurance against risks on land; the Dutch institutions of
Charles V.'s time seem to have existed long before.
(Richesse de Hollande, I, 81 ff.) On Flemish, Portuguese and
Italian maritime insurance in the 14th century, see
_Sartorius_, Gesch. der Hanse, I, 215; _Schäfer_, Portug.
Gesch. II, 103 ff., and _F. Bald. Pegolotti_, Tratato della
Mercatura in Della decima, etc., della Moneta e della
Mercatura dei Fiorentini, 1765. The class engaged in
maritime commerce are indeed especially and early rich in
capital, speculative and calculating.]
[Footnote 237-4: In Berlin, in 1871, the movable property of
30.4 per cent. of all dwellings was insured; but with this
great difference, that of the smallest (without any heatable
rooms) only 5.3 per cent. were insured; while of dwellings
having 5-7 heatable rooms, 84 per cent. had taken this
precaution. (_Schwabe_, Volkszahlung von 1871, 169) But it
should not be forgotten that private insurance, especially
when speculative, is not in favor of having much to do with
persons of small means, while public institutions are, for
the most part, obliged to reject no proposition for
insurance in their own line, except when coming from a few
manufacturing quarters especially exposed to fire.]
[Footnote 237-5: Outside of Germany, public fire insurance
is to be still found only in German Austria, in Denmark,
Switzerland and Scandinavia. The Germans had, in 1871, an
insurance-sum of 5,908,760,000 thalers, while the mutual
private insurance companies had about 1,435,000,000 (of
which, at most, 200,000,000 to 300,000,000 were on immovable
property), and joint-stock insurance companies, after
deducting re-insurance (_Rückversicherung_), about
7,000,000,000. (Mittheilungen der öff. F. V. Anstalten,
1874, 84 ff.) Between 1865 and 1870, it was estimated that
the per capita insurance of the population was: in Saxony,
407 thalers; in Würtemberg, 410; in Baden, 365; in Prussia,
332; in Switzerland, 425. On the other hand, in the much
wealthier British Empire, only 325 per capita; in North
America, 215. (loc. cit., 92.) Even in the case of
joint-stock insurance companies, the average receipts of
premiums (1867-70) were, in Germany, 2 per 1,000 of the
insurance-sums; in the United Kingdom, 4.06 per 1,000; in
the United States, 10.77; and the damage respectively 1.25,
2.28, 5.92 per 1,000 of the insurance-sum. (loc. cit., 93.)]
SECTION CCXXXVII (_a_).
INSURANCE IN GENERAL.--MUTUAL AND SPECULATIVE INSTITUTIONS.
All insurance institutions fall into two classes:
A. Mutual insurance companies, in which the insured are also as a
society the insurers, and share the aggregate damage, of a year, for
instance, among themselves.
B. Speculative institutions, in which a party, generally a joint-stock
company, in consideration of a certain definite compensation (premium
agreed upon and paid in advance), assumes the risk.[237a-1]
So far as security is concerned, no absolute preference can be accorded
to either of these classes. Mutual insurance companies require to extend
their business very largely[237a-2] to be able to meet great damage. And
even where the liability of the members is unlimited, care must be taken
to distinguish between the legally and the actually possible.[237a-3]
The joint capital of a well organized[237a-4] premium-association
affords, in this respect sufficient security from the first, but the
ratio between its security-fund and the amount of its assumed
liabilities becomes less favorable as the business is extended, in case
the fund itself is not enlarged.[237a-5] Mutual insurance may accomplish
something analogous to that accomplished by a joint-stock fund by
collecting a reserve of yearly dues in advance, thus modifying the
burdensome vacillation of the amount payable each year.[237a-6]
Experience, however, teaches, that the strongest form of mutual
insurance, that supported either by municipalities or by the state, has
been able to meet extraordinary damage from fire much better than
premium-institutions, which are too quickly left in the lurch by the
stockholders when the damage is greater than the amount of the stock
subscribed. So also loss from fire caused by war or riots is for the
most part and on principle, excluded by speculative insurance
institutions.[237a-7]
In point of cheapness to the insured, mutual insurance seems to have the
advantage, since it contemplates no profit.[237a-8] From a
national-economical point of view, also, it is very much of a question,
whether the active competition of premium institutions, in a sphere
which affords little room for industry proper, is more of a spur to make
them "puff up" their claims (_Reclamen_) or to the simplification of
their administration.[237a-9] However, premium-institutions are more
easily capable of extending the circle of their business;[237a-10] which
of itself decreases the general expenses and strengthens their insuring
power. Premium-insurance supposes a greater development of capitalistic
speculation than does mutual insurance. But, even in the highest stages
of civilization, the competition of some mutual insurance companies is
desirable to protect the insured from a too high rate of profit to the
insurers.[237a-11] [237a-12] And since the principle of mutual insurance
has so little attraction for capitalists in a time like that in which we
live that it can be maintained perhaps only by the support of the state
or of municipalities, we may consider the desirableness of the state's
continuing to participate in some way in the matter of insurance as
established.
[Footnote 237a-1: We might, however, improperly add another
class, that of self-insurance, which lies in the proper
distribution of a large capital over a great many points.
When, for instance, a large state insures its buildings,
this seems a superfluous outlay of public money for the
benefit of private associations. Or does England insure its
ships? On this account, in Prussia, the insurance of
post-offices which Frederick William favored, has recently
been done away with. (_Stephan_, Gesch. der Preuss. Post,
195, 803.)]
[Footnote 237a-2: According to _Brüggemann_ (D. Allg. Ztg.,
1849, No., 75 ff.), 100 million thalers of an insurance-sum.
Actual American legislation prescribes in the case of mutual
insurance a minimum number of members of from 200 to 400, a
minimum amount of annual premiums of from $25,000 to
$200,000, of cash payments on the annual premium of from 10
to 40 per cent. of cash-paid yearly premiums, $5,000 to
$40,000; and a maximum amount of premium notes made by a
member of $500. (Compare Mittheilungen, 26 ff.)]
[Footnote 237a-3: Hence several mutual companies limit
themselves to a maximum liability. Thus, for instance, the
Gotha Fire Insurance Company requires from each member a
bond that in case of necessity, four times the amount of the
presumptive contribution paid in advance shall be paid
after; in Altona, six times the yearly premium is the
maximum.]
[Footnote 237a-4: In France, every premium-insurance-company
has to be approved by the government (Cod. de Comm., art
37), and the approval is not given until 1/5 of the
joint-stock capital has been deposited. (_Block_, Dictionn.
de l'administration, Fr. 153.) Many recent American laws
require that the shares of insurance companies should be
registered with the name of the owner.]
[Footnote 237a-5: The Aix-Munich Fire Insurance Association
raised its joint-stock capital after the Hamburg fire from 1
to 3 million thalers.]
[Footnote 237a-6: Usually so that the regular yearly
contribution is higher than the average damage and cost of
administration; this excess is then returned in the form of
a dividend, either immediately at the close of the yearly
account, or which is still safer, after several years. In
the Stuttgart private insurance company, the reserve must
amount to one per cent. of the amount insured, before the
premium-surplus is returned. The Gotha fire insurance
company, between 1821 and 1842, paid back an average of 46
per cent.; and even in 1842, after the Hamburg
conflagration, there was an after-payment of only 98 per
cent. necessary. This collection in advance of a fund for
extraordinary losses is more secure than borrowing in case
of need, and paying back in good years. Thus, the Baden
Landes-Brandkasse had a debt in 1837 of 800,000 florins.
(_Rau_, in the Archiv., III, 320 ff.) In a mutual insurance
company, where entrance and exit are free, this would be
scarcely possible.]
[Footnote 237a-7: Nearly three-fourths of the public
insurance institutions insure also against fire caused by
war (Mitth., 1874, 85), a matter of importance even as war
is waged in our own days, since in 1870-71, the damage from
fire by the Franco-Prussian war in France was estimated at
141,000,000 francs. (Mitth., 1873, 33.)]
[Footnote 237a-8: In Prussia, the mutual fire insurance
companies, in 1865 and 1866 had an administration outlay of
0.24 and 0.22 per 1,000 of the amount insured; the premium
insurance companies of 0.80 and 0.96; the latter doubtless
including large assessments for common purposes. (Preuss.
Statist. Ztschr., 1868, 269.) In all Germany, the outlay for
administration is, for public institutions, 4 per cent. of
the contributions; for premium institutions, inclusive of
their dividends, 37.1 per cent.; for the more important
French private institutions, even 68.8 per cent. (Mitth.,
1874, 89, 92.)]
[Footnote 237a-9: German public fire insurance institutions
generally have a territory of their own, in which that
institution is the only one of the kind. On the other hand,
the premium institutions in the whole empire keep about
80,000 agents, i. e., a number 50 times as large as the
number of officers of the former, (loc. cit. 90.)]
[Footnote 237a-10: Mutual insurance companies, as they have
extended, have sometimes split up into several; for
instance, the insurance companies against damage by hail at
Lübeck, Güstrow, Schwedt and Griefswald, daughters of that
at New Brandenburg.]
[Footnote 237a-11: The founder of the Mutual Fire Insurance
Company of Gotha expressed the hope that in it, it would be
possible to insure 60 per cent. cheaper than was customary
in the joint stock companies of the time. In the system of
agricultural _Einzelhöfe_ in Germany, small mutual insurance
companies are possible, and insurance then may be very
cheap.]
[Footnote 237a-12: On the premium associations, _Bernoulli_
Ueber die Vorzüge der gegenseitige Brandasscuranzen vor
Prämiengesellschaften, 1827. _Per contra_, _Masius_, Lehre
der Versicherung und Statische Nachweisung aller V.
Anstalten in Deutschland, 1846. In Prussia, premium
associations are growing more rapidly than mutual: the per
capita amount on the whole population insured in the former
against damage from fire in 1861 was 116.6 thalers; in 1866,
154.2; in 1869, 176.6; in the latter in 1861, 103.5; 1866,
124.3; 1869, 154.3 thalers. (_Engel_, Statist. Zeitschr.,
1868, 268 ff.; 1871, 284 ff.) In France, in the former, in
1857, almost 36 milliards of francs; in the latter, in 1864,
13 milliards. (Mitth., 1871, 51.)]
SECTION CCXXXVII (_b_).
INSURANCE IN GENERAL.--ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF INSURANCE.
The national-economic advantage of insurance consists in this, that the
damage which is divided among many, and which, therefore, is felt but
lightly by each one, is probably made up for, not by an inroad upon the
body of still existing original resources, but by savings made from
income. This, indeed, is unconditionally true only of such damage as
does not depend at all on the will of man, such as, for instance, the
damage caused by hail. On the other hand, there is especially in
maritime[237b-1] and fire insurance,[237b-2] a great temptation to
culpable and even criminal destruction; to the latter, when the object
insured is estimated at too high a value. (Speculation-fires!) And it is
difficult to say whether this drawback or that advantage is the greater.
But, on the other hand, every kind of insurance is attended by good
consequences to the credit of a people. It is of advantage to personal
credit, since it prevents sudden impoverishment; but it is by far more
advantageous to real-credit (_Realcredit_ = _material credit_) the
pledges of which, while their forms may be destroyed, it preserves the
value of; that is their economic essence. This last is most clearly
manifest in the case of public insurance institutions, with compulsory
participation; while in the case of entirely voluntary insurance, the
creditor can never be certain that his debtor has not neglected
something necessary. The aggregate danger is less than the sum of
individual dangers, for the reason that it is more certain, and that
uncertainty of itself is an element of danger.[237b-3] [237b-4]
[Footnote 237b-1: Even in Demosthenes' oration against
Zenothemis, we may see how easily the analogy of maritime
insurance may lead to criminal destruction of property.
Similar cases mentioned by _Pegolotti_ before the middle of
the 14th century. (Delia Decima dei Fiorentini, III, 132.)]
[Footnote 237b-2: French experience teaches that during a
commercial crisis there are more fires in mercantile
magazines than at other times; while in times when sugar is
a drug in the market, etc., many sugar factories are burned.
(Dictionnaire de l'Econ. polit, I, 88.) The style of our
house-building and fire-extinguishing institutions is wont
to improve with economic culture. Hence, for instance, in
Mecklenburg, 1651 to 1799, cities burned down, in whole or
in greatest part, 72 times; 1800 to 1850, only once.
(_Boll_, Gesch., von Mecklenb., II, 618 ff.) However, in
many countries the damage caused by fire has largely
increased: in Baden, for instance, by 100,000 florins a
year. Insurance capital, 1809 to 1818, 65 fl.; 1819 to 1828,
128 fl.; 1829 to 1836, 152 fl. (_Rau_, Archiv, III, 322.)
Similarly in Switzerland. In Bavaria, of every 10,000
buildings insured, in 1856-60, there were 4.6 fires per
annum; 1861-65, 5.04; 1866-69, 8.67. (Preuss. Statist.
Ztschr., 1871, 315.)
In Saxony, in 1849-53, there was one fire in every 290
buildings; 1854-58, in every 201; 1859-63, in every 180. Of
these fires, 68 per cent. of the whole number were from
known causes, i. e., 36.4 per cent. from incendiarism; 28.5
per cent. from negligence. (Sächs, Statist. Ztschr., 1866,
106, 115.) Even in antiquity, similar evil consequences
attended the generosity which gratuitously compensated
damage by fire. Compare _Juvenal_, III, 215 ff.; _Martial_,
III, 52. In England, of every 128 cases of damage by fire of
"farming stock," 49 were caused by incendiaries, for the
most part actuated by revenge. Hence, there, a notice is
posted on insured buildings by the insurance companies which
runs: "this farm is insured; the fire office will be the
only sufferer in the event of a fire." In London, of every
seven fires among the small trading class, one is estimated
to have been the work of an incendiary, and of all fires at
least one-third (Athenæum, 2, Nov., 1867), if not one-half
(Mitth., 1879, 100). One of the largest English fire
insurance companies estimates that the introduction of the
lucifer match has caused it a damage of £10,000 per annum.
Of 9,345 fires, 932 were ascribed to gas, 89 to certain, and
76 to doubtful, incendiarism, 127 to lucifer matches, 8 to
storms, 100 to negligence, 80 to drunkenness, 2,511 to the
catching fire of curtains, 1,178 to candles, 1,555 to
chimneys, 494 to stoves, 1,323 to unknown causes. (Quart.
Rev., Dec, 1854, 14 ff.) Fires originate from criminal
(_dolose_) causes most frequently when a new stage in the
politico-economical development of a people is reached,
which renders the buildings put up in a former and lower
stage of development insufficient.]
[Footnote 237b-3: A Prussian fire insurance regulation, as
far back as 1720, expressly says: "everybody scruples to
make the least loan on pledged houses in towns." "Every care
shall be taken to make the least possible amount of loans in
cities." (_Jacobi_, in _Engel's_ Zeitschr., 1862, 122.)
_Leib_, Dritte Periode, etc., 1708, cites a proverb to the
effect that, in Hamburg, "no house takes fire;" that is, at
a time that its fire-fund-system (_Brandkassenwesen_) had as
yet found few imitators, _v. Justi's_ proposition to combine
the insurance of houses against fire with a loaning-bank for
houses. (Polizeiwissenschaft, 1756, I, § 7, 8 ff.) In
Russia, in 1815, the loaning bank was the only fire
insurance company, which however assumed risks only on stone
houses at three-fourths of their value in consideration of
15 per 1,000 annual premium. (_Rau_, Lehrbuch, I, 229.)]
[Footnote 237b-4: _Spittler_, Politik., 441, objects to
insurance that it diminishes benevolence and approximates to
communism, thus hitting the dark side of all very high
civilization.]
SECTION CCXXXVII (_c_).
FIRE INSURANCE.
The present system of fire insurance has been introduced in many places by
the establishment of so-called domanial fire-guilds (_Domanial-Brandgilden_),
by which the country population on crown-lands bound themselves to mutually
assist one another by furnishing thatch, and horse and hand power in the
rebuilding of burned houses. Whatever was wanting after this was made up by
gratuitous supplies of wood from the public forests, by the granting of
governmental fire-licenses to beg (_begging letters_), by permission to
have collections made in the churches[237c-1] etc. The next step was
generally the establishment of public insurance (_Landes-Assecuranz_) only
for houses,[237c-2] but with compulsory membership. This compulsion was
justified by the continuing interest of the state in the payment of the
house-tax, as well as by the interest of the eventual owner of the estate,
and of hypothecation-creditors.[237c-3] [237c-4] The insurance of moveable
property is much more recent, both by reason of the nature of the property
itself, which becomes of importance only at a later date, and also on
account of the much greater difficulty of carrying on such
insurance.[237c-5] The thought of making this species of insurance
compulsory, or of turning it over to the state, has seldom been suggested.
[Footnote 237c-1: Thus in Austria, even after the middle of
the 18th century: _Schopf_, L. W. des öst. Kaiserstaates, I,
p. 175. In the mandate of the electorate of Saxony of Dec.
7, 1715; but the fire-fund (_Feuerkasse_) of 1729 depended
on voluntary but regular collections, besides which it
obtained certain contributions from the state and the
church. Those who gave nothing, however, were threatened
with getting nothing, or very little, in case of fire.
Parties desiring to rebuild massively had especially much to
expect. (Cod. August Forst., I, 538.) The charters of the
oldest German _Landesbrandkassen_ contain a provision that,
in future, no further fire-collections shall be allowed.]
[Footnote 237c-2: The English Hand-in-Hand Fire Office for
houses, founded in 1696; the Union Fire O., for houses and
movable property, in 1714: both mutual institutions. The
premium-institution, the Sun Fire Office, 1710
(_Frankenberg_, Europ. Herold, 1705, II, 181), mentions fire
insurance as a special characteristic of England. But we may
trace fire insurance on buildings and harvest supplies in
the low countries about the Vistula in Prussia, even as far
back as 1623. (_Jacobi_, loc. cit., 131.) Brandenburg
fire-fund, 1705, with voluntary admittance of all houses,
and fixed relation between the yearly contribution and the
insurance capital. If a fire happened, the fund repaired the
damage caused to the fullest extent its means allowed.
(_Mylius_, Corp. Const. March. V., I, 174 seq.) Even in
1706, it became necessary to prohibit speaking ill of the
institution. It was, therefore, abolished later. The first
Würtemberg private fire insurance company, 1754, founded on
similar principles, and which was still existing in 1760,
had a like fate (_Bergius_, Polizei und Camerelmagazin, III,
40 ff.), but it was exchanged in 1773 for a mutual public
company. In Berlin a mutual insurance company in 1718
(_Bergius_, Cameralistenbibliothek, 151); in Denmark, 1830
(_Thaarup_, Dän. Statist., II, 173 seq.); in Silesia, 1742;
Calenberg-Grubenhagen, 1750; in Baden, 1758; in Kurmark,
1765; in Hildesheim, 1765; in Hesse-Darmstadt, 1777. In
France, the Parisian institution of 1745 is considered the
oldest. (_Beckmann_, Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Erfindd., I, 218.)]
[Footnote 237c-3: In Galenberg-Grubenhagen only the
_Bauerhöfe_ subject to the common burthens were obliged to
enter, in Hildesheim, all houses subject to taxation; in
Darmstadt all house-owners who were allowed only a _dominium
utile_. In Kurmark, the subjects of the estate might be
compelled to enter by their lords, but could not be kept
out. Of Prussian companies in 1846, entrance was compulsory
only in those of East Prussia and Posen. In Würtemberg
compulsion since 1773; confirmed in 1853. Also in Zurich,
Jan. 24, 1832; in Schaffhausen Nov. 27, 1835. In Berne, only
for state, municipal and mortgaged houses; for the latter
only so far as it was not expressly left to the creditor.
Introduced into Baden in 1807, after most of the parishes
(_Gemeinden_) had voluntarily accepted it; confirmed in
1840. The provision that at least no judicial hypothecation
should be made on an un-insured house is found in the
Darmstadt law of 1777, § 13, and in that of Mainz of 1780,
art. I, § 15. _Rau_, Lehrbuch, II, § 25 a., finds compulsion
in the case of property in common and in that of property
belonging to other persons very appropriate. It is a matter
worthy of thought, that, in cities like Berlin, Breslau,
Thorn and Stettin, compulsory fire insurance is still
retained. In Upper Silesia, the abolition of compulsory
provisions has had for effect to cause 52 per cent. of all
buildings to be insured. (Press Zeitschr, 1867, 329).]
[Footnote 237c-4: Question of introducing state insurance
into Hungary. As a cultured land, and one rich in capital,
is better adapted to insurance, it would be folly to
"emancipate" ones self from Trieste, etc. in this respect.
But, on the other hand, only state-insurance can attract the
Hungarians and make them feel universally the want of
insurance. A reconciliation of these opposing views might be
effected by compelling the peasantry to insure their farm
houses, and allowing complete liberty in the cities and with
reference to movable property.]
[Footnote 237c-5: Even _Bergins_, Polizei und Cameralmag.,
III, 80, 1768 ff., doubts the possibility of the insurance
of movable property. Insurance of movable property of the
Evangelical clergy in the electorate of Mark, in which,
however, only movable property of the value of 400 thalers
is considered. But by this provision the changeableness of
the object, which so facilitates fraud, was done away with.
Hamburg joint-stock company for the insurance of movable
property, 1779. Electorate of Saxony fire-fund for movable
property, 1784-1818, which, however, made good, as a rule,
only 25 per cent. of the damage caused. In Prussia, in 1814,
there were only 12 insurance companies in which movable
property could be insured. In the aggregate even they were
but of little extent, and had generally a partnership,
guild, or communal basis. (_Jacobi_, loc. cit, 123.) On the
other hand, in 1869, there were in all the mutual insurance
companies, 530,600,000 thalers worth of movable property
insured, besides 2,814,800,000 thalers worth of immovable
property, and 366,100,000 thalers worth of property of a
mixed nature, partly movable and partly immovable. (Preuss.
Statist. Zeitschr., 1876, 298.)]
SECTION CCXXXVII (_d_).
REQUISITES OF A GOOD SYSTEM OF FIRE INSURANCE.
Among the chief requisites of a good fire insurance system are the
following:
A. The adoption in insuring of measures for the prevention of criminal
abuse on the part of the insured. No one should be benefited by the
burning of his insured goods.[237d-1] Hence, the rates of insurance
should be rigidly fixed according to the real value in exchange.[237d-2]
In the case of houses, the value of the incombustible elements of value
should be deducted; also the value of the ground and the value it
possesses from being advantageously situated, etc. The simultaneous
insurance of the same object in several companies without proper notice
being given should be unconditionally prohibited.[237d-3] The control of
all this may be greatly facilitated by requiring foreign insurance
companies to obtain a special permit to carry on their business in the
country, and to allow them to effect insurance only through responsible
home agents.[237d-4] Most insurance companies exclude from insurance
personal property which may be easily secreted, such, for instance, as
jewels, cash money, valuable documents, etc.
B. There should be a just proportion between the insurance premium and
the risk. This depends not only on the style of building of the houses
themselves and of those in the neighborhood,[237d-5] on the situation,
the too great intricacy (_Complicirung_) of which extends the ravages of
fire, as its too great isolation makes assistance difficult;[237d-6] but
also on the nature of the business carried on in them,[237d-7] and on
the condition of the local development of fire police. Highly cultured
places, especially large cities, are really much less exposed to damage
from fire. To not take this into account would be not only to
compulsorily dole out charity to the poorer classes of the people, and
to the less cultivated portions of the country,[237d-8] but it would
indirectly put an obstacle in the way of a transition to the massive
construction of houses, and of good, that is, as a rule, of costly
fire-extinguishing institutions.[237d-9] On the other hand,
administration must be rendered much more difficult by the taking of
risks of many degrees of danger, especially as it is scarcely possible,
for a long time, to even hope for a statistically unassailable basis of
a tariff graded in exact accordance with the risk.[237d-10] If those
objects especially exposed to danger should be excluded altogether, the
common utility of the institution would be largely diminished; and the
insured least exposed to danger would nevertheless have to complain of a
relatively too high contribution.[237d-11] If every peculiar class of
risks were to be treated as one whole, the insuring principle itself
would suffer.[237d-12] Where the nation or municipality engages in the
business of compulsory insurance, its too rigid system of rate-fixing
has something inequitable in it, inasmuch as it makes the most provident
housekeeper suffer from the danger from fire of his neighbor's
establishment, a gas factory, for instance.
C. The certainty of compensation for damage suffered. The government
should see to it that the institution does not promise more than it can
perform with its joint-stock capital and by means of its
premiums.[237d-13] The good will of foreign institutions to keep their
promises to the letter is best assured by requiring them as a condition
precedent of carrying on their business in a country, to bind themselves
to litigate only in the home courts. They protect themselves against the
risk of very large insurances by the system of re-insurance, by
transferring a portion of the premium as well as of the risk to one or
more other insurance companies.[237d-14]
D. In all highly cultured quarters, the almost entirely voluntary
fire-extinguishing system, in which the people turned out in a body to
battle with the flames, made way for the fire-militia system; and if the
latter should make place for what we may designate as a standing
fire-army which is most easily attained in connection with the
fire-insurance system, we should reach the ideal of such a system,
especially if the business of insurance was in the hands of the state or
of the municipality. Such a system would be in accordance with the
principle of the division of labor, and, also, with the fact that
usually the most vital interest is the greatest spur to action.[237d-15]
[Footnote 237d-1: The former almost unrestricted liberty of
the American system of insurance has recently been
curtailed, in most of the states, by a rigid governmental
superintendence, by special insurance boards with power to
permit companies to engage in the business of insurance, and
endowed with the right of imposing proper penalties, but of
declaring the privilege forfeited at the end of any year.
Compare _Brämer_ in III, Ergänzungshefte der Preuss.
Statist. Ztschr. und Mitth., 1871, No. 1.]
[Footnote 237d-2: The first fire insurance provisions or
regulations paid little attention to the danger of
over-valuation. Similarly _v. Justi_, Abh. von der Macht,
Glückseligkeit, etc., eines Staats. 1860, 81. Also
_Krünitz_, Oekonom. Encyclopædie, 1788, XIII, considers it
improbable that any one would have his home insured at a
higher than its real value. On the other hand, there were
formerly bitter complaints made in the United States that
the agents, on whom the determination of the rate of premium
and the control of the insurance-sum depended chiefly, were
led to make over-valuations in furtherance of their own
interests. (Mitth., 1871, 3; 1874, 95.)]
[Footnote 237d-3: If the valuation were made to depend on
the purchase price or on the cost of replacing or restoring
the damaged property, even this would be some temptation to
not entirely upright men. Hence the Baden law of 1840
expressly provides that instead of this, the selling price
shall be the basis; the law of 1852, § 17, the medium cost
of the combustible parts, after deduction made of the
diminution in value caused by age. The fixing of premiums in
the case of houses should be repeated from time to time on
account of wear. According to the Calenb. Grubenh. law of
1823, § 21, every 10 years. According to the Baden law of
1852, § 28, 33, and the Württemberg law of 1853, § 12, the
city council should examine annually in what cases a new
valuation was necessary. The more certainly over-insurance
is avoided, the less need is there of the superintendence
policy adapted to a rather barbarous state of insurance,
that only a part of the value shall be made good. The
Phoenix fire insurance company in Baden for the insurance
of movable property has reserved the right to investigate at
any time and to satisfy itself as to the value of the
insured object, and to lower the amount insured in
accordance with its own opinion. The provision that the
valuation shall be made by the authorities of the place, or
that it shall be approved by them is frequently found. In
Saxony, for instance (law of Nov. 14, 1835), the Leipzig
city council gives its approval when it finds the amount
insured in keeping with the means of the insured, and
entertains no suspicions as to his honesty. To what a bad
state of things a less liberal course leads, see in
_Masius_, loc. cit., 85. This indeed is only difficult in
large cities. It is also to be considered that it is not so
much the many small amounts, but the few large ones that are
dangerous to insurance. The Prussian scheme wanted to give
up the police superintendence of insurance, but to punish
over-insurance of more than 5 per cent. of the common value,
by imposing a fine equal to the amount of over-insurance on
the insured, the agents, and on the conductors of the
business. (_Jacobi_, in II. Ergänzhefte der Preuss. Statist.
Ztschr., 1869.) The provision that the amount paid as
damages for a burned house shall be immediately employed in
rebuilding, is to be explained in part by requisite A; in
part also by the same police-guardianship against presumed
negligence which introduced compulsory insurance.]
[Footnote 237d-4: Compare _Brügemann_, Die Mobiliar V. in
Preussen nach dem G. von 1837.]
[Footnote 237d-5: _Oberländer_, loc. cit. 108, calls
insurance without classification of risks, a "mutual
benevolent institution;" and one rigidly classified
according to the probable period of burning, "an institution
for the making of advances" (_Vorschuss-Anstalt._) In Baden,
even in 1737, there was no difference made between a massive
building and a wooden hut with a straw roof in the Black
forest. (_Rau_, Archiv., III, 324.) Here, there was in 1844
to 1849, an average damage by fire in houses with brick
roofs of 1,302 florins, with thatch roofs of 1,786 florins,
with shingle roofs of 2,292 florins, to say nothing of the
greater frequency of such damage in each succeeding class.
(_Rau_, Lehrbuch, II, 1, § 26, a.) In Württemberg, before
1843, the owners of insured personal property, in houses
with thatch roofs, had, in the same time, received 22 per
1,000 compensation for damage; in houses with brick roofs,
from 8 to 9 per 1,000. (_Rau_, loc. cit.) In 17 German
insurance companies, between 1866 and 1869, massive
buildings with hard roofs paid 1,003,000 thalers and
received 612,000 thalers; the not massive with hard roofs
paid 1,544,000 thalers and received 1,339,000; houses with
soft roofs paid 2,420,000 and received 2,792,000. (Preuss,
Statist. Zeitschr. 1861, 327.) Similar observations made in
Berne during 23 years.]
[Footnote 237d-6: While in most English insurance companies,
there are only three classes: common, hazardous, and doubly
hazardous, in Rhenish Prussian insurance companies, there
are seven, according to the style of building, and in each
class two subdivisions, according to the location.]
[Footnote 237d-7: According to an English average of 15
years, there is some damage from fire yearly in the
following classes of buildings and on the following
percentages:
_Of the whole number_.
Match factories, 30.00
Lodging houses, 16.5
Hat makers, 7.7
Cloth makers, 2.6
Candle makers, 3.8
Smiths, 2.4
Carpenters, 2.2
Oil and color dealers, 1.5
Book dealers, 1.1
Coffee houses, 1.2
Beer houses, 1.3
Bakeries, 0.75
Wine dealers, 0.61
Small dealers in spices, 0.34
Eating houses, 0.86
(Quart. Rev., 1854, 23.) There is indeed a difference in the
intensity of these fires. For instance, in inns, there have
been a great many; but the damage has been for the most part
insignificant.]
[Footnote 237d-8: In Paris the houses insured had a value of
2,370,000,000 francs, but the damage from fire amounted to
only 0.016 per 1,000! (Dictionn. d'Econ. politique, I, 89.)
On an average, the premiums in France amount to 0.85 per
1,000. In Prussia, 1867-69 on an average: in the province of
Prussia, 9.46 per 1,000; Posen, 3.75; Brandenburg, Berlin
not included, 2.82; Pomerania, 2.52; Westphalia, 2.15;
Schleswig-Holstein, 2.09; Hanover, 1.99; Silesia, 1.68;
Saxony, 1.47; Hesse-Nassau, 1.46; the Rhine country, 1.34;
Sigmaringen, 0.56; city of Berlin, 0.28 per 1,000. (Preuss.
Statist. Zeitschr., 1871, 289.) How largely a higher
civilization tends to arrest the spread of fire by the
reason of the great facilities of rendering assistance is
shown by the fact that for 100 buildings totally consumed in
Posen, in 1837-40, there were 13.4 only injured: in 1866-69,
32 were injured for 100 totally consumed. In Prussian
Saxony, 1839-44, 34; 1867-69, 57. (loc. cit., 329.) In
Baden, the district called the _Seekreis_ got from the
fire-fund, in 1845-49, 80 per cent. more than it contributed
to it; the middle Rhine district contributed 37 per cent.
more than it received. The Bavarian Reza district, 1828-29,
received only 11.4 per cent. for damages, and paid 19 per
cent. of all premiums; the Lower Danube district, 10 and 8.8
per cent. (_Rau_, Lehrbuch, II, § 28, 26.) The city of
Leipzig contributed from 1/19 to 1/17 of the insurance paid,
1864-68, to the insurance companies taking risks on real
property in the kingdom of Saxony, and received back only
from 1/662 to 1/114, although its fire extinguishing
institutions cost, in 1870, 26,182 thalers. (Official.)]
[Footnote 237d-9: Even premium-institutions have frequently
very different rates for the same risk, according as they
fear greater or less competition, or desire to recommend
themselves in a new place, etc. Hence the tricks of the
trade with which most of them surround their tariff.]
[Footnote 237d-10: In Würtemberg, theaters, powder mills,
places where brick and lime are burned, porcelain factories,
iron-works, etc. cannot be insured at all. In
Calenb-Grubenh. and Bremen-Verden, shingle-roofed houses can
be insured only at 2/3 of their real value.]
[Footnote 237d-11: Thus, for instance, in the electorate of
Mark, each of the four classes of houses bears its own loss
alone. To the fourth class, for instance, belong smithies,
brick factories, and buildings with steam engines, etc. The
Baden law of 1852 puts the same burthen in the same place,
upon houses exposed to danger in a greater or lesser degree;
but provides for 4 classes (_Gemeindeclassen_) with
different rates of contribution, and assigns each _Gemeinde_
every year, according to the relative magnitude of the
losses of the previous year, to one of those classes. How
risky it is for large cities to confine their insurance,
because of the ordinarily small amount of damage to them
from fire, only to insurance institutions of their own, is
shown by the case of Hamburg in the year 1842, where three
joint stock insurance companies could pay only from 75 to 80
per cent., and the Bieber Mutual Insurance Company, only 20
per cent.]
[Footnote 237d-12: In the case of buildings, the greater
risk is generally calculated by correspondingly multiplying
the insurance-value, but in case of damage by fire, it is
simply made good.]
[Footnote 237d-13: In the insurance companies specified by
_Masius_, loc. cit., 176, the aggregate amount of their
insurance, stood to the amount necessary to cover it, by
means of receipts from premiums, reserve, and joint-stock
capital:
In the Leipzig Fire Insurance Company, as 100:1.87
In the Trieste Fire Insurance Company, as 100:1.80
In the Elberfeld Fire Insurance Company, as 100:1.19
In the Aix-Munich Fire Insurance Company, as 100:1.15
In the Cologne Colonia Fire Insurance Company, as 100:2.44
In the Karlsruhe Phoenix Fire Insurance Company, as 100:3.7
In the Berlin Fire insurance Company, as 100:6.3
In the Gotha, about as 100:2.6
(including the four fold after payment note)
In the same companies the amount of damage and of expense
for the last preceding year were, on every 100 thalers, of
insurance, 46 pfennigs (1/300 thalers), 44, 29, 48, 67, 55,
35, 42; an average of 45, that is 1-1/2 per 1,000. Besides,
much depends on the degree to which the joint-stock capital
can be applied. Thus, for instance, in Berlin, on every
1,000 thalers 200 are paid in cash, and a note
(_Solawechsel_) given for the rest, payable in two months
after notice. Where the unpaid remaining stock is but a mere
book-debt, and may even be evaded by disclaiming the stock
itself, it of course affords very little security.]
[Footnote 237d-14: Compare _Volz._ Tübinger Zeitschr. 1847,
349 ff.]
[Footnote 237d-15: The preparatory steps towards this ideal
were taken long ago. Thus, for instance, the
personal-property insurance companies have offered premiums
for special merit in extinguishing fires (Calenb.-Grubenh.,
1814, § 35), saving things from a burning house is looked
after by the agents of personal property insurance
companies; compensation is almost universally made not only
for the damage done by fire, but also that caused while the
fire is being extinguished. The excellent fire-extinguishing
institutions of England are maintained by the common action
of the insurance companies. There have been complaints,
however, that they have shown a preference for insured
objects. (Mitth., 1874, 113.)]
BOOK V.
ON POPULATION.
CHAPTER I.
THEORY OF POPULATION.
SECTION CCXXXVIII.
INCREASE OF POPULATION IN GENERAL.
That amid the thousand dangers which threaten the existence of the
individual the species may endure, the Creator has endowed every class
of organic beings with such reproductive power, and so much pleasure in
propagating their kind, that if the action of these were entirely
unrestricted, it would soon fill up the earth.[238-1] In the case of the
human race, also, the physiological possibility of propagation has very
wide limits.[238-2] It would be nothing extraordinary that a healthy
pair, living in wedlock from the 20th to the 42nd year of the woman's
life, that is, during the whole time of her full capacity to bear
children, should rear six children to the age of puberty. This would,
therefore, suffice to treble the population in a single generation;
provided that all who had grown up should marry. According to
Euler,[238-3] when the births were 5 per cent. and the deaths 2 per
cent., the population doubled in not quite 24 years; when the increase
was 2-1/2 per annum, in 28 years; when 2, in 35 years, and when 1-1/2
per cent. in 47 years.
The United States furnish us with a striking illustration of this
doctrine, and on the grandest scale. There the natural increase of the
white population, from 1790 to 1840, was 400.4 per cent.; that is in the
first decade 33.9 per cent. of the population in 1790; in the second
33.1, in the third 32.1, in the fourth 30.9, in the fifth 29.6 per
cent.[238-4] [238-5]
[Footnote 238-1: Thus, for instance, the sturgeon can,
according to _Leuckart_, produce 3,000,000 eggs in a year.
According to _Burdach_, the posterity of a pair of rabbits
may be over 1,000,000 in four years; and that of a
plant-louse, according to _Bonnet_, over a 1,000,000,000 in
a few weeks. The prolificacy of a species of animals is wont
to be greater in proportion as the structure-material
(_Bildungsmaterial_) saved within a given time during the
course of individual life, is greater, and as material wants
during the embryonic period are limited; also
(teleologically), in proportion as to the danger the
individual is exposed to. Compare _Leuckart_ in _R.
Wagner's_ physiolog. Wörterbuch, Art. Zeugung.
Teleologically, _Bastiat_ says: _cette surabondance parait
calculée partout en raison inverse de la sensibilité, de
l'intelligence et de la force avec laquelle chaque espèce
résiste à la déstruction_. (Harmonies, ch. 16.)]
[Footnote 238-2: The researches of modern physiology make it
probable that an ovum is detached from the ovaries at each
period of healthy menstruation. (_Bischoff_, Beweis der von
der Begattung unabhängigen periodischen Reifung und Lösung
der Eier bei den Säugethieren und Menschen, 1844.) It is
hardly possible to ascertain how many of these ova are
capable of fecundation. Among the animals, on which the
greater number of accurate observations have been made, that
is in the case of horses, it has been found that, in the two
districts of Prussia most favorably conditioned, of 100
mares that had been lined, 63.3 became pregnant, and 53.5
gave birth to live foals; in the rest of the Prussian
monarchy, the births were only 46 per cent. Compare
_Schubert_, Staatskunde, VII, 1, 98. In the Belgian _haras_
(places for breeding horses), between 1841 and 1850, about
30 per cent. of the "leaps" proved fruitful, from 2 to 3 per
cent. aborted, the rest were either probably or certainly
unfruitful. (_Horn._, Statist. Gemälde, 171.) In the human
species, also, the great number of first-born generated in
the first weeks of marriage, bears witness to a high degree
of procreative susceptibility.
On the other hand, the healthy male semen ejected during a
single act of coition contains innumerable germs, a very few
of which are sufficient to produce fecundation. (_Leuckart_,
loc. cit, 907.) According to _Oesterlen_, Handbuch der
medicischen Statistik, 1865, 196, from 10 to 20 per cent. of
all marriages were childless. In the United Kingdom, _Farr_,
report on the Census of 1851, estimated that in a population
of 27,511,000, there were 1,000,000 childless families, when
the term is allowed to embrace widows and widowers as well
as married couples.]
[Footnote 238-3: See the exhaustive table in _Euler_,
Mémoires de l'Académie de Berlin 1756, in _Süssmilch_,
Göttl. Ordnung, I, § 160. Bridge has constructed the
following formula:
Log. A = Log. P + n x Log.(1+(m-b)/mb). Here P stands for
the actually existing population, 1/m = the ratio between
the annual mortality and the number of the living, 1/b, the
ratio of the number of annual births to the number of the
living, n the number of years, A, the population at the end
of three years, the quantity sought for.]
[Footnote 238-4: _Tucker_, Progress of the United States,
89, ff. 98. Here deduction is already made of immigrants and
their posterity, who after subtracting the loss by
emigration back to the old country, amounted to over
1,000,000. It probably amounted to more yet. If, as
_Wappäus_ does (Bevölekerungsstatistik, 1859, I, 93, 122
ff.), we calculate the rate of increase per annum, we have
an average during the first decade of 2.89, during the
second of 2.83, the third of 2.74, the fourth of 2.52, the
seventh of 2.39, the eighth (1860-70) of probably 2.25 per
cent. On the still greater ratio of increase in earlier
times, see _Price_, Observations on reversionary Payments,
1769, 4 ed. 1783, I, 282 seq., I, 260.
It was nothing unheard of to see an old man with a living
posterity of 100. (_Franklin_, Observations concerning the
Increase of Mankind, and the Peopling of New Countries,
1751.) It is said that in the region about Contendas, in
Brazil, there were on from 70 to 80 births a mortality of
from 3 to 4 per annum (how long?), and an unfortunate birth
(_unglücklichen_) was scarcely ever heard of. Mothers 20
years of age had from 8 to 10 children; and one woman in the
fifties had a posterity of 204 living persons. (_Spix und
Martius_, Reise III, 525).]
[Footnote 238-5: Immense increase of the Israelites in
Egypt. (Genesis 46, 27; Numbers, 1.)]
SECTION CCXXXIX.
LIMITS TO THE INCREASE OF POPULATION.
There is certainly one limit which the increase of no organic being can
exceed: the limit of the necessary means of subsistence. But, so far as
the human race is concerned, this notion is somewhat more extensive,
inasmuch as it embraces besides food, also clothing, shelter, fuel, and
a great many other goods which are not, indeed, necessary to life, but
which are so considered.[239-1] We may illustrate the matter by a simple
example in the rule of division. If we take the aggregate of the means
of subsistence as a dividend, the number of mankind as divisor; then the
average share of each is the quotient. Where two of these quantities are
given, the third may be found. Only when the dividend has largely
increased can the divisor and quotient increase at the same time
(prosperous increase of population). If, however, the quotient remains
unchanged, the increase of the divisor can take place only at the
expense of the quotient (proletarian increase of population).[239-2]
Hence it is to be expected that the quantity of the means of subsistence
being given and also the requirement of each individual, the number of
births and the number of deaths should condition each other. Where, for
instance, the number of church livings has not been increased, only as
many candidates can marry as clergymen who held such livings have died.
The greater the average age of the latter is, the later do the former
marry, in the average, and _vice versa_. And so, in the case of whole
nations, when their economic consumption and production remain
unaltered.[239-3] A basin entirely filled with water can be made to
contain more only in case it is either increased itself, or a means is
found to compress its contents. Otherwise as much must flow out on the
one side as is poured in on the other.
And so, everything else remaining stationary, the fruitfulness of
marriages must, at least in the long run, be in the inverse ratio of
their frequency. (See § 247.)[239-4] [239-5]
[Footnote 239-1: When it is known that, in the Hebrides,
one-third of all the labor of the people has to be employed
in procuring combustible material (_McCulloch_, Statist.
Account, I, 319), it will no longer excite surprise that,
according to Scotch statistics, some parishes increase in
population after coal has been found in them, and others
decrease when their turf-beds are exhausted.]
[Footnote 239-2: Compare _Isaias_, 9:3. According to
_Courcelle-Seneuil_, Traité théorique et pratique d'Economie
politique, I, 1858, the _chiffre nécessaire de la population
égal à la somme des revenus de la société diminuée de la
somme des inégalités de consommation et divisée par le
minimum de consommation_: P=(R-J)/M.]
[Footnote 239-3: Thus _Süssmilch_, Göttliche Ordnung in den
Veränderungen des menschlichen Geschlechts, 1st ed., 1742,
4th ed., 1775, I, 126 ff., assumes that one marriage a year
takes place, on from every 107 to every 113 persons living.
On the other hand, 22 Dutch towns gave an average of 1 in
every 64. This abnormal proportion is very correctly
ascribed by _Malthus_, Principles of Population, II, ch. 4,
to the great mortality of those towns: viz., a death for
every 22 or 23 persons living, while the average is 1:36.
The Swiss, _Müret_, (in the Mémoires de la Société
économique de Berne, 1766, I, 15 ff.), could not help
wondering that the villages with the largest average
duration of life should be those in which there were fewest
births. "So much life-power and yet so few procreative
resources!" Here too, _Malthus_, II, ch. 5, solved the
enigma. The question was concerned with Alpine villages with
an almost stationary cow-herd business: no one married until
one cow-herd cottage had become free; and precisely because
the tenants lived so long, the new comers obtained their
places so late. Compare _d'Ivernois_, Enquête sur les Causes
patentes et occultes de la faible Proportion de Naissances à
Montreux: yearly 1:46, of the persons living, while the
average in all Switzerland was 1:28.
In France according to _Quételet_, Sur l'Homme, 1835, I, 83
ff., there was:
===============+===================+============+================
| _One marriage_ | _Children_ | _One death_
_In_ | _a year_ | _to a_ | _yearly _
| _for every_ | _marriage_ | _for every_
---------------+-------------------+------------+----------------
4 Departments |110-120 inhabitants| 3.79 |35.4 inhabitants
15 " |120-130 " | 3.79 |39.2 "
23 " |130-140 " | 4.17 |39.0 "
18 " |140-150 " | 4.36 |40.6 "
10 " |150-160 " | 4.43 |40.3 "
9 " |160-170 " | 4.48 |42.7 "
6 " |170 and more " | 4.48 |46.4 "
=================================================================
The two departments of Orne and Finisterre present a very
glaring contrast: in the former, one birth per annum on
every 44.8 (1851 = 51.6), a marriage on every 147.5, a death
on every 52.4 (1851 = 54.1) living persons; in the latter,
on the contrary, on every 26 (1851 = 29.8), 113.9 and 30.4
(1851 = 34.2). In Namur, the proportions were 30.1, 141,
51.8; in Zeeland, 21.9, 113.2, 28.5. (_Quételet_, I, 142.)
The Mexican province, Guanaxuato, presents the most
frightful extreme: one birth per annum on every 16.08 of the
population living, and one death in every 19.7. (_Quételet_,
I, 110.)]
[Footnote 239-4: Compare even _Steuart_, Principles, I, ch.
13. _Sadler_, Law of Population, 1830, II, 514:
=======================================+=============+===========
|_Marriages_ |_Children_
| _per annum_ |_on every_
| _on every_ | _100_
| _10,000_ |_Marriages_
|_inhabitants_|
---------------------------------------+-------------+-----------
In the purely Flemish provinces | |
of Belgium | 128 | 481
In the purely Wallonic provinces | |
of Belgium | 139 | 448
In the mixed provinces of Belgium | 152 | 425
In Holland | 148 | 476
In Lombardy | 166 | 489
In Bohemia | 173 | 413
In the kingdom of Saxony | 170 | 410
=======================================+=============+===========]
[Footnote 239-5: Compare _Horn_, Bevölkerungswissenschaftliche
Studien, I, 162 ff., 191, 252 ff. In most countries, there
is a much larger number of children to a marriage in the
rural districts than in the cities; but at the same time,
marriages are much less frequent there. In Saxony, however,
where the cities show a greater marital productiveness, the
rural districts present a large number of marriages. Of the
10 countries compared by _Wappäus_, II, 481 ff., only
Prussia and Schleswig are exceptions to the rule.]
SECTION CCXL.
INFLUENCE OF AN INCREASE OF THE MEANS OF SUBSISTENCE.
The sexual instinct and the love for children are incentives of such
universality and power, that an increase of the means of subsistence is
uniformly followed by an increase in the numbers of mankind. _Partout,
où deux personnes peuvent vivre commodément, il se fait un mariage._
(_Montesquieu._) Thus after a good harvest, the number of marriages and
births is wont to considerably increase; and conversely to diminish
after bad harvests.[240-1] [240-2] [240-3] In the former case, it is
rather hope than actual possession which constitutes the incentive to
the founding of new families. Hence the greatest increase is not found
in connection with the absolutely lowest price of corn, but with those
prices which present the most striking contrast to those of a previous
bad year.[240-4]
The introduction of the potato has promoted the rapid increase of
population in most countries. Thus, the population of Ireland in 1695,
was only 1,034,000; in 1654, when the cultivation of the potato became
somewhat more common it was 2,372,000; in 1805, 5,395,000; in 1823,
6,801,827; in 1841, 8,175,000. In 1851, after the fearful spread of the
potato-rot it fell again to 6,515,000.[240-5] In general, every new or
increasing branch of industry, as soon as it yields a real net product
is wont to invite an increase of population. Machines, however, have not
this effect only when they operate to produce rather a more unequal
division of the national income than an absolute increase of that
income.[240-6]
[Footnote 240-1: That rich food directly increased
prolificacy is proved from the fact that, for instance, our
domestic animals are much more prolific than wild ones of
the same species. Compare _Villermé_, in the Journ. des
Economistes VI, 400 ff. The months richest in conceptions
fall universally in the spring, and again in the pleasant
season immediately following the harvest. On the other hand,
during the seasons of fast in the Catholic church the number
of cases of conception is below the average. (Jour. des
Econ., 1857, 808).]
[Footnote 240-2: Thus the annual mean number of marriages
amounted to:
=============================================
| _Between 1841_ | _In 1847_
| _and 1850._ | _alone._
--------------+----------------+-------------
In Saxony, | 15,505 | 14,220
In Holland, | 22,352 | 19,280
In Belgium, | 28,968 | 24,145
In France, | 280,330 | 249,797
=============================================
_Horn_, loc. cit. I, 167. In the governmental district
(_Regierungsbezirke_) of Düsseldorf, there was in the years
of scarcity, 1817 and 1818, one marriage for every 134 and
137 souls; on the other hand, in 1834 and 1835, in every 103
and 105. (_Viebahn_, I, 120 seq.) In England, the variations
in the yearly price of corn are reflected in the variations
in the number of yearly marriages. Thus, in 1800, 114
shillings per quarter; 1801, 122 shillings; 1802 (Peace of
Amiens), 70 shillings; 1803, 58 shillings. The number of
marriages in the four years respectively was 69,851, 67,288,
90,396, 94,379. (_Porter_, Progress of the Nation, III, ch.
14, 453.)
Similarly in Germany, in 1851, the conclusion of peace
increased the number of marriages, and the scarcity of 1817
diminished it. In Prussia, in 1816, there was one marriage
for every 88.1 of the population; in 1828, for every 121.4;
in 1834 (origin of the great Zollverein), for every 104; in
1855, for every 136.4; in 1858 (hope of a new era), in every
105.9. (_v. Viebahn_, Statistik des Zollvereins II, 206.)
In Austria, the price of rye was:
==============================================
| _Per Metze._ | _No. of_
| | _Marriages._
----------+--------------+--------------------
In 1851, | 2.47 florins | 336,800
In 1852, | 2.11 " | 316,800
In 1853, | 3.38 " | 283,400
In 1854, | 4.36 " | 258,000
In 1855, | 4.43 " | 245,400 (_Czörnig._)
==============================================
On Sweden, see Wargentin in _Malthus_, II, ch. 2.
The decreased number of births in consequence of a bad
harvest, and _vice versa_, appears of course only during the
following calendar year. Thus, in 1847, as compared with the
average of the years 1844 and 1845, there were fewer
children born in England by 4 per 1,000, in Saxony by 7 per
1,000, in Lombardy by 59, in France by 63, in Prussia by 82,
in Belgium by 122, in Holland by 159 per 1,000. (_Horn_, I,
239 ff.) In Germany, the conscription-years corresponding to
the scarcity time, 1816-17, gave a _minus_ of 25 per cent.
in many places below the average. (_Bernouilli_,
Populationistik, 219.) In the case of marriage, the relative
increase or decrease is still more characteristic, so far as
our purpose is concerned, than the absolute increase or
decrease. Thus in Belgium, for instance, against 1,000
marriages dissolved by death, there were, in 1846, only 971
new ones contracted, and in 1847 only 747; while in 1850
there were 1,500. The falling off in Flanders alone was
still greater. Thus, in 1847, there were only 447 marriages
contracted for 1,000 dissolved. (_Horn_, I, 170 ff.)
However, _Berg_, using Sweden as an illustration, rightly
calls attention to the fact, that the variations in the
number of marriages and births is determined in part by the
number of adults, that is, of the number of births 20 and
more years before. Compare _Engel's_ Statist. Zeitschr.,
1869, 7.]
[Footnote 240-3: Sometimes, a sudden increase in the
frequency of marriages may have very accidental and
transitory causes. Thus, for instance, in France in 1813,
when the unmarried were so largely conscripted, the number
of marriages rose to 387,000, whereas the average of the
five previous years was 229,000. (_Bernouilli_,
Populationistik, 103.)]
[Footnote 240-4: Thus, for instance, in nearly all countries
affected by the movement of 1848, there were, during the
last months of that year, an unusually large number of
conceptions. (_Horn_., I, 241 seq.) According to
_Dieterici_, Abh. der Berliner Akademie, 1855, 321 ff.,
there was one birth a year for the number of persons living.
========================================================
| _Ten years' average._ | _1849 alone._
------------+----------------------------+--------------
In France, | 36.19 | 35.79
In Tuscany, | 24.42 | 22.82
In Saxony, | 24.51 | 23.08
In Prussia, | 25.5 | 23.62
========================================================
The great majority of men at that time believed all they
liked to believe.]
[Footnote 240-5: _Marshall_, Digest of all Accounts, I, 15.
_Porter_, I, ch. I, 9.]
[Footnote 240-6: _Wallace_, in this respect, places industry
far behind agriculture. (On the Numbers of mankind in
ancient and modern Times.) The county of Lancashire had, in
1760, that is shortly before the introduction of the great
machine industry, 297,000 inhabitants; in 1801, 672,000; in
1831, 1,336,000; in 1861, 2,490,000. Saxony has, in almost
every place, a relatively large number of births in
proportion as in any locality, commerce and industry
preponderate over agriculture, and _vice versa_. See
_Engel_, Bewegung der Bevölkerung im K. Sachsen, 1854. But
this should not be generalized into a universal law. For
instance, Prussia and Posen have an average number of births
greater than that of the Rhine country and Westphalia. (_v.
Viebahn_, Statistik des L. V, II, 222.)]
SECTION CCXLI.
EFFECT OF WARS ON POPULATION.
We may now understand why it is that only those wars which are
accompanied by a diminution of the sources of the means of support
decrease population. The loss in the numbers of mankind produced by
wars, hardships, etc., would, as a rule, be readily made up for by
increased procreation.[241-1] Thus, for instance, in Holland, the long
Spanish war permitted an increase of the population for the reason that
the national wealth increased at the same time; while the short war with
Cromwell, which curtailed commerce, caused 3,000 houses in Amsterdam
alone to remain empty.[241-2] In England and Wales, the population
increased during the most frightful war of modern times, from 8,540,000
in 1790, to over 12,000,000 in 1821; in France, from, probably,
26,000,000 or 27,000,000 in 1791, to 29,217,000 in 1817. England,
indeed, was itself never the seat of war, and its commerce was increased
by the war in some directions as much as it was diminished by it in
others. France's own territory was devastated only in the first and in
the last years of the war. But the Revolution had, on the whole, once
the storms of the Reign of Terror were over, not only more equally
divided the means of subsistence in France, but it had developed them in
a higher degree.[241-3] [241-4]
It cannot even be unconditionally predicated of emigration, that it
hinders the increase of population. As soon as people have begun to
calculate upon emigration, as a resort for themselves in case of
distress, or upon the emigration of others, by which they would be left
a larger field for action at home, a number of marriages is contracted
and a number of children born; which would otherwise not have been the
case. Most men, especially when young and enamoured, hope for the
realization of all their wishes. Favorable chances, open to a great
number of men alike and which every one thinks himself competent to
calculate, are commonly over-estimated by the majority.[241-5] (See §
259.)
[Footnote 241-1: The war of 1870-71 cost Germany 44,890
lives. (Preuss. Statist. Ztschr., 1872, 293.) This number is
not quite 20 per cent. of the excess of births (794,206)
over deaths (563,065) in Prussia in the year 1865. On the
other hand, in from 1856 to 1861 there were 10,000 cases of
murder and manslaughter in all Europe, Turkey excepted.
(_Hausner_, Vergl. Statistik, I, 145.) About the end of the
last century, it was estimated that about 1,000,000 children
were born annually in France. (_Necker_, Administration des
Finances, I, 256.) Of these, about 600,000 outlived their
18th year. (_Peuschet_, Essai de Statistique, 31.) There
were, annually, about 220,000 marriages. Hence the number of
the unmarried was increased annually by 80,000 young men,
who, according to _Peucshet_ (32), amounted to over
1,450,000. According to this, the number of recruits, per
annum, might amount to hundreds of thousands without causing
any appreciable diminution in the number of births and
marriages. Compare _Malthus_, Principle of Population, II,
ch. 6. On the other hand, long continued wars have the
effect of keeping the men physically strongest from
marriage, and so to deteriorate the race.]
[Footnote 241-2: Richesse de Hollande, I, 149. During the
Amsterdam commercial crisis, from 1795 to 1814, there were
for every 4 births an average of 7 deaths. So that the
population, in 1795, was still 217,000, and in 1815, only
180,000. (_Bickes_, Bewegung der Bevölkerung Anhang, 28.)]
[Footnote 241-3: On the other hand, the population of East
Prussia, between 1807 and 1815 diminished 14 per cent. (_v.
Haxthausen_, Ländl. Verfassung der Preuss. Monarchie, I,
93.) The battles of the Seven Years' War are said to have
consumed 120,000 Russians, 140,000 Austrians, 200,000
Frenchmen, 160,000 Englishmen, Hanoverians, etc., 25,000
Swedes, 28,000 of the troops of the empire, and 180,000
Prussians. Yet the population of Prussia fell off 1,500,000.
(_Frédéric_, Oeuvres posthumes, IV, 414; Preuss. Gesch.
Friedrich's M., II, 349.) During the Thirty Years' War, the
population of Bohemia fell from 3,000,000 to 780,000.
(_Mailath_, Gesch. von Oesterr, III, 455.) Württemberg,
according to the military recruiting lists had a population,
in 1622, of 300,000 inhabitants. (_Spittler_, Werke, XII,
34.) In 1641, the population was only 48,000; according to a
promotion-speech of _J. B. Andreä_. But between 1628 and
1650, more than 58,000,000 florins were lost by war
contributions, and about 60,000,000 florins by plunder;
about 36,000 private houses were in ruins. (_Spittler_,
Württ. Gesch., 254.) On Alsace, Freisingen and Göttingen,
see _Londorp_, Bellum sexenn., II, 563; _Zschocke_,
Bayerische Geschichte, III, 302; _Spittler_, Hanov. Gesch.,
II, 37 ff., 114. On Germany generally, see _R. F. Hanser_,
Deutschland nach dem dreissigjährigen Kriege, 1862. However,
many estimates of the diminution of the population are
exaggerated, because it has not been considered that a great
part of the men who disappeared in one place fled to
another, for the time being more secure. Compare _Kius_ in
_Hildebrand's_ Jahrb., 1870, I ff.
The population of Massachusetts increased 8,310 yearly,
before the War of Independence; during the war, only 1,161,
although the enemy scarcely ever entered the country.
(_Ebeling_, Gesch. und Erdbeschreib. der V. Staaten I, 236.)
Russia had a mortality during the war years, 1853-55, of
2,272,000, 2,148,000, and 2,541,000; in the years of peace
previous, 2,000,000 at most.]
[Footnote 241-4: Besides the mere loss of men, war operates
destructively on production, since it affects especially the
most productive classes as to age, while pestilence, famine,
etc., carry off children, old people, and the feeble. Hence,
a people's public economy recovers more readily from the
last named misfortune than from war.]
[Footnote 241-5: Compare _Giov. Botero_, Della Cause della
Grandezza della Città, L. II, and Ragion di Stato, VIII, 95;
where colonization is compared to the swarming of bees. _W.
Raleigh_, Discourse of War in general, Works VIII. 257 ff.
Similarly _Child_, Discourse of Trade, 371 ff. _Ustariz_,
Teoria y Practica del Commercio, 1724, ch. 4. _Franklin_,
Observations on the Increase of Mankind, which reminds one
of the continued growth of polyps.]
SECTION CCXLII.
COUNTER TENDENCIES TO THE INCREASE OF POPULATION.
The extension of economic production is always a labor; the surrender of
one's ordinary means of subsistence to new comers, a sacrifice; but, on
the other hand, the procreation of children is a pleasure. Hence it
seems to be incontestably true that the powers of increase of
population, considered from an entirely sensuous point of view, tend to
go beyond the bounds of the field of food. Malthus gave expression to
this fact by saying that population had a tendency to increase in a
geometrical progression, but the means of subsistence, even under the
most favorable conditions, only in an arithmetical progression.[242-1]
If the word "tendency" be correctly understood in the sense in which
Malthus employed it, so that the reality appears as the product of
several and partly opposite tendencies,[242-2] the first half of his
allegation can scarcely be contested.[242-3] If a father has three sons,
and each of the three three in turn, the love of procreation and the
power of procreation, all being in the normal condition of health, are
precisely three times as great in the second generation as in the first,
and nine times as great in the third, etc. The second half of Malthus's
principle is more open to doubt. If it be true, as has been asserted,
that man's means of subsistence consist solely of animals and plants,
and these, as well as man, increase in a geometrical ratio, and usually
even with a much larger multiplier, yet it is here, surprisingly enough,
overlooked that their natural increase is interrupted by the consumption
of them by man. On the other hand, it is true that even raw material, by
means of more skillful technic processes (§ 134, 157), and the values by
which man ennobles them, may always increase in a greater ratio than a
merely arithmetical one. (§ 33).[242-4] But, that, in the long run, the
means of subsistence should keep pace with the extreme of sensuous
desire and of physiological power, is utterly incredible. Hence, the
latter tendency is limited by others.
A. And indeed, firstly, by repressive counter-tendencies. As soon as
there is a larger population in existence than can be supported, the
surplus population must yield to a mournful necessity; in a favorable
case, to that of emigration, but usually to hunger, disease and misery
generally.
"The earth," says Sismondi, "again swallows the children she cannot
support." It is the weakest especially who are elbowed off the bridge of
life, over which we pass from birth to the normal death from old age,
because there is not room enough on it for all. Hence the frightful
mortality among the poorer classes and in childhood. Now it is the
absence of a healthy habitation,[242-5] or of proper clothing, or, in
the case of children, of rational superintendence[242-6] which sows the
germs of a thousand diseases; and now the absence of proper care, rest
etc., which intensifies these diseases. Every bad harvest is wont, when
its consequences are not alleviated by a high and healthy civilization,
to increase mortality. (§ 246, 9). Thus, in Sweden, during the second
half of the 18th century, the average yearly mortality was = 1:39-40. On
the other hand, in the bad year 1771 = 1:35.7; 1772 = 1:26.7, and in
1773, as an after consequence, 1:19.3. In this last, although it was a
fertile year, there were only 48 births to every 100 deaths.[242-7]
Among nations low down in civilization, the repressive counter tendency
may assume a very violent character. How many cases of murder, human
sacrifice, and even war, have been occasioned by over-population and
famine.
B. Secondly, by preventive counter tendencies.[242-8] The person who
believes himself unable to support children refrains from begetting
them. This, we may call one of the most natural of duties. We might even
say that the person who begets a child which he knows he is not in a
condition to support, is guilty of a grievous sin against civil society,
and of a still more grevious one against his poor child. Strange! To
beget a child with countless wants, with an immortal soul! That is
certainly an act the most pregnant with consequences which any ordinary
man can perform in his life; and yet how thoughtlessly it is performed
by the majority!
This counter-tendency is to be found only in the case of man. Plants and
animals yield to the sexual instinct regardless of everything.[242-9]
Where there is no question whatever of having food enough to support
children, as is the case with the better-to-do classes, the dread of
losing the decencies of life, or of "losing caste," acts as a
preventive[242-10] [242-11] to the founding a family, or increasing the
numbers of one. Unfortunately, abstinence from the procreation of
children may be exercised not only in accordance with the moral
law,[242-12] but also, in contravention of it.[242-13] There is a
necessary connection between human reason and human freedom and the
possibility of misusing them. And it is certainly the inevitable fate of
man either to place a morally rational check on the sexual impulse, or
to be forcibly held within the limits of the means of subsistence, since
they cannot be over-stepped by him--through the agency of vice and
misery.[242-14] [242-15]
[Footnote 242-1: Principle of Population, I, ch. I. Adam
Smith also implicitly held the view that the demand for the
means of subsistence is always in advance of them. Wealth of
Nat., I, ch. II, pref. and P. I.]
[Footnote 242-2: This may be represented by what physicists
call the "parallelogram of forces." Compare _Senior_,
Outlines, 47. _Malthus'_ own explanation of "tendency," in
his letter at the end of _Senior_, Two Lectures on
Population, 1829.]
[Footnote 242-3: On the inaccuracy of the expression,
"geometrical progression," in the present case, see _Moser_,
Gesetze des Lebensdauer, 1839, 132.]
[Footnote 242-4: _Weyland_, Principles of Population and
Production, 1816, 25 ff.]
[Footnote 242-5: In Paris the mortality is greater in the
_arrondissements_ in proportion to their poverty, of which
the relative numbers of untaxed dwellings afford a
criterion. According to this, between 1822 and 1826,
=========================================================
_The | _Had a yearly mortality | _Locations
Arrondissement_| of 1 in every_ | non imposées._
---------------+-------------------------+---------------
II, | 71 of population. | 0.07
III, | 67 " | 0.11
I, | 66 " | 0.11
IV, | 62 " | 0.15
XI, | 61 " | 0.19
VI, | 58 " | 0.21
V, | 64 " | 0.22
VII, | 59 " | 0.22
X, | 49 " | 0.23
IX, | 50 " | 0.31
VIII, | 46 " | 0.32
XII, | 44 " | 0.38
=========================================================
_Villermé_, in the Journal des Econ., Novbr. 1853. The
average house-rent in _arrondissement_ II, amounted to 605
francs per annum; in III, to 426; in I, to 498; in IX, to
172; in VIII, to 173; in XII, to 148 francs. Doctor Holland
divided all the streets in Manchester into three classes,
and each class, in turn, into three sub-classes, according
to the qualities of the dwellings. The yearly mortality in I
a was 1:51; in I b = 1:45; I c = 36; II a = 1:55; II b =
1:38; III c = 1:25. (Report of Inquiry into the State of
large Towns and Populous Districts, 1843.)]
[Footnote 242-6: In Prussia, the Jewish population, between
1822 and 1840, increased 34-1/2 per cent.; the Christians
only 28-1/2 per cent.; although among the Jews there was
only one marriage a year in every 139, and one birth in
every 28; among the Christians, in every 112 and 25. This is
accounted for, mainly by the favorable circumstances that
Jewish mothers leave their homes seldomer to work outside,
and thereby devote more attention, even in the lower
classes, to the care of their children.]
[Footnote 242-7: _Wappäus_, Allg. Bevölkerungsstatistik, I,
315. In Thurgau, in 1815, the mortality was = 2,143, in 1817
= 3,440; in Luzerne, in 1820 = 1,543, in 1817 = 3,511.
(_Bernouilli_, Populationistik, 219.) And so in London
between 1601 and 1800, when the five dearest and five
cheapest years of each decade are taken together, the
aggregate mortality in the dearest was 1,971,076, in the
cheapest, 1,830,835. (_Farr_, in the Statist. Journal, 1846,
163 ff.) The rule did not apply to the time 1801-1820; but
it did again to the time 1821-1840 (l. c., 174). Compare
_Messance_, Recherches sur la Population, 311; _Roscher_,
Kornhandel und Theuerungspolitik, 54 ff. When scarcity
continues a longer time, the mortality sometimes decreases
on account of the largely diminished number of small
children. In Lancashire, the number of deaths during the
commercial crisis, 1846-47, was 36 per cent. greater than
the average of the three last preceding years; in 1857-8 it
was 11.9 per cent. greater. (_Ausland_, 1862, No. 44.)]
[Footnote 242-8: _Malthus_ uses the word "preventive check,"
while he calls the repressive counter-tendencies "positive."
_R. Mohl_, Polizeiwissenschaft, I, 88, speaks of preventive
and destructive causes. Anteriorly and subsequently
operating causes. (_Knapp_).]
[Footnote 242-9: Hence the infinite productiveness of
irrational organisms is limited only by their mutual
struggle for the means of support. That which cannot live
there dies. "In this case there can be no artificial
increase of food, and no prudential restraint from
marriage." (_Darwin_, Origin of species, 4 ed. 1866, 73.)
Compare _B. Franklin_, Observations concerning the Increase
of Mankind, § 21. _Lamennais_, indeed, asserts that no plant
and no animal takes away food from any other; that the earth
has room for all!]
[Footnote 242-10: The rule that population tends to extend
everywhere as far as the means of subsistence will permit,
_Sismondi_, N. Principes, VII, ch. 3, has taken occasion to
ridicule, basing himself on the example of the Montmorency
family. This family has, notoriously, always lived in
superabundance, and is, notwithstanding, on the verge of
extinction. _Sismondi_ here forgets the relativity of the
idea "means of subsistence." Persons occupying an exalted
social position not only think that they want more in this
respect, but they are wont in forming marriage contracts to
use the greatest and frequently exaggerated caution. Hence
it is that families of this rank become, relatively
speaking, frequently extinct; and, moreover, such a fact is
here most frequently taken notice of. _Sadler_, Law of
Population, 1830, infers from the frequent extinction of
English noble families, that wealth leads to sterility; and,
on the other hand, poverty (but not famine!) to prolificacy;
and _Doubleday's_ (True Law of Population, 12 ff.)
suggestion, in explanation hereof, that over-fed animals and
over-manured plants are sterile, as ably refuted in the
Edinburg Rev., LI. It is there shown that the marriages of
the English peers are fruitful above the average; that their
extinction is partly due to the fact that the younger sons
seldom married, and that hence there is a lack of collateral
relations. But, in great part, such extinction is only
apparent; since such a family is said to be extinct when
only the male stem is extinct. The French nobility, from the
9th to the 11th century, continually increased in number.
After this, the succession of females and cases of
extinction became more frequent, because the nobility, in
order to keep their estates together, began to not desire
many sons. _Sismondi_, Hist. des Français, V, 182. Compare
_Benoiston de Châteauneuf_, De la Durée des Familles nobles
en France, in the proceedings of the Académie des Sciences
morales et politiques, II, 792 ff. Besides, between 1611 and
1819, 763 English baronet families became actually extinct,
653 continued to exist, and 139 had been raised to the
peerage; an average of from 3 to 4 peer families became
extinct yearly. (Statist. Journal, 1869, 224.) There were,
about 1569 2,219 Venetian _nobili_; in 1581, 1,843 (_Daru_,
VI, 240 ff.); in Addison's time (1705), only 1,500. On the
decrease of the Roman patricians, see _Dionys._, Hal., I,
85; _Tacit._, Ann., XI, 25; on that of the Spartan knights:
_Clinton_, Fasti Hellenici, II, 407 ff.; of the _ehrbaren
Geschlechter_, at Nürnberg: _Hegel_, N. Stadtchroniken,
1862, 214. Compare, also, Westminster Rev., Oct., 1849.]
[Footnote 242-11: How, in England, not only many
distinguished persons, but also their servants, are kept
from marriage in this way, because they are sure of not
being able to satisfy the wants of their bachelorhood as
fathers of families, see in _Malthus_, P. of P., II, ch. 8.
A description of the general misery which would result if
all men consumed only that which was physically
indispensable, in _Senior_, Outlines, 39.]
[Footnote 242-12: See _Bastiat's_ beautiful words, in which
he characterizes the holy ignorance of children, the modesty
of young maidens, the severity of public opinion, etc., as a
law of limitation: (Harmonies, 437 seq.)]
[Footnote 242-13: Compare _Proudhon_, Contradictions, ch.
13.]
[Footnote 242-14: That want of employment or of business has
rather a preventive tendency, see _Malthus_, Principle of
Population, VII, ch. 14.]
[Footnote 242-15: _Malthus_, P. of P., II, ch. 13. I
formerly called this natural law by the name of the
investigator who earned the largest share of scientific
merit in connection therewith. It cannot, indeed, be said,
that he was the first to observe it. Compare even
_Machiavelli_, Discorsi (between 1515 and 1518), II, 5. And
so _Giovanni Botero_ taught that the number of the
population depended not so much on the number of
_congiungimenti_ so much as on the rearing of children.
(Ragion di Stato, 1592, VII, 93 ff.) The _virtù generativa
degli uomini_, which is always the same, is found face to
face with the _virtù nutritiva delle citta_. The former
would continue to operate _ad infinitum_, if the latter did
not limit it. The larger a city is, the more difficult it is
to provide it with the means of subsistence. In the last
instance, the slave-sales of Guinea, the cannibalism of the
Indians, the robber-system of the Arabians and the Tartars,
the migration of nations, crimes, litigation, etc., are
traced back to the narrowness of the means of subsistence.
(Delle Cause della Grandezza delle Città, 1598, Libr. III.)
Sir Walter Raleigh (ob. 1618), was of opinion that the earth
would not only be full but overflowing with human beings
were it not that hunger, pestilence, crime, war, abstinence
welcome sterility, etc. did away with the surplus
population. (History of the World, I, ch. 8, 4. Discourse of
war: Works, VII, 257 ff.) According to _Child_, Discourse of
Trade, 371 ff., 149, the population is always in proportion
to the amount of employment.
If England could employ only 100 men while 150 were reared,
50 would have to emigrate or perish; and so, too,
conversely, occasional vacancies would soon be filled.
Similarly _Davenaut_, Works II, 233, 185; who, however, in
the practical application of this law of nature, adopts the
error of his contemporary, G. King, the statistician,
according to whom the population of England would increase
to 11,000,000 (II, 176) only after 600 years. _Benjamin
Franklin's_ Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind,
Peopling of new Countries, etc., 1751, are very good.
Franklin here shows that the same tables of mortality do not
apply to town and country, nor to old nations and new ones.
The nation increases more rapidly in proportion as it is
easy to contract marriage. Hence the increase is smallest in
luxurious cities and thickly populated countries. Other
circumstances, being equal, hunting nations require the
largest quantity of land for the purpose of subsistence, and
industrial nations least. In Europe, there was a marriage in
every 100 of the population per annum; in America, on every
50; 4 children to a marriage in the former, and 8 in the
latter.
Population diminishes as a consequence of subjugation, bad
government, the introduction of slavery, loss of territory,
loss of trade and food. He who promotes the opposite
advantages may well be called the "father of his country."
Further, _D. Hume_, Of the Populousness of the Ancient
Nations: Discourses No. 10. _Per contra, Wallace_, On the
Numbers of Mankind in Ancient and Modern Times, in which the
superior populousness of antiquity is maintained, 1753.
_Wallace_ relied chiefly on the more equable distribution of
land, and the smaller luxury of the ancient nations.
_Herbert_, Essai sur le Police des Grains (1755), 319 ff.
Les Intérêts de la France mal entendus, par un Citoyen
(Amsterd., 1757), I, 197.
_Steuart_ threw light especially on the connection between
mortality and the number of marriages (Principles, I, 13);
and he claims, with the utmost confidence, that only the
want of the means of subsistence, using the expression in
its broadest sense (I, 15), can put a limit to the increase
of population (I, 14). He calls wrongful procreation
(_falsche Zeugung_) the chief cause of pauperism (II, 1),
and his views on public charity have a strong Malthusian
complexion (I, 14). Compare further _A. Young_, Political
Arithmetics (1774), I, ch. 7. _Townsend_, Dissertation on
the Poor Laws (1786), makes a happy use of the example of
the Island of Juan Fernandez, in which a colony of goats was
developed, first alone, and afterwards in a struggle with a
colony of dogs, to illustrate the laws of the development of
population as limited by the supply of food. Compare the
same author's Journey through Spain, II, 8 seq.; 358 ff.,
III, 107. _G. M. Ortes_, Riflessioni sulla Popolazione,
delle Nazione per rapporto all'Economia nazionale, 1790,
ascribes geometrical progression to the increase of
population (cap. I) precisely as in the case of other
animals; only, in the case of the latter, a limit is put to
their increase by _forza_, and in the case of man, by
_ragione_. When the population of a country has attained its
proper development, celibacy is as necessary in order to
keep it so as marriage. Otherwise the door would be opened
to extreme pauperism, to the debauchery of the "venus vaga,"
to eunuchism and polygamy (4). Strangely enough, _Ortes_
asserts that no people are richer per capita than any other.
The distribution of wealth among the apparently richer,
operates to make individuals heap wealth together in greater
quantities (8).
_Malthus_ himself wrote his classical work under the
influence of a very intelligible reaction (1st ed., 1798; 2d
ed., 1803). For a whole generation, the European public had
had no other view broached but that the tree of human kind
might keep on growing even until it reached the heavens, if
care were only taken to manure the ground, to water the
roots and prune the branches according to the latest
world-improving recipes. _Malthus_, in opposition thereto,
called attention to the limits placed by nature to the
number of mankind. He demonstrated that it was not merely
arbitrary laws which opposed the Utopian happiness of all,
but in part the niggardliness of nature; and in greater part
the passions and sins of men themselves. If he sometimes
described the limits as narrower than they really are, and
if an occasional coarse expression escaped him, we need not
wonder. His polemic was well founded, and he was at the time
still a young man (born 1766, ob. 1834). He modified much in
the later editions of his work. For instance, he stopped the
unsavory sentence in which he says that a man born into the
world already occupied, whose family cannot support him, and
whose labor society does not need, has not the smallest
right to demand the smallest particle of food, and is really
superfluous in the world; that there is no place for him at
the great banquet of nature; that nature bids him go hence
and does not hesitate herself to execute the command. _P.
Leroux_ in a small pamphlet in answer to _Malthus_, quotes
this sentence at least forty times. Moreover, _Möser_, who
certainly is not considered a misanthrope, was not only
acquainted with the Malthusian law, but develops it in
words, and with consequences which strongly recall the very
words which raised such a storm against _Malthus_. Compare
Patr. Phant. I, 42; II, 1; IV, 15 (against vaccination); V,
26.
The opinions of political economists in our own day are, as
might be expected, divided on some of Malthus' expressions
and on his practical counsels. He has indeed but few such
one-sided followers as _Th. Chalmers_, On Political Economy
in Connexion with the moral State and moral Prospects of
Society, 1832. Malthus' fundamental views, however, are
truly scientific. (Ktêma es aei!) Compare _Baudrillart_,
Manuel, 424 seq., and _A Walker_, Science of Wealth, who
strangely enough (452) opposes Malthus, and yet is (458)
virtually of the same opinion. Even the better class of
socialists base themselves on the same view, without,
however, thanking Malthus for it. Thus for instance, _K.
Marlo_, System der Weltökonomie (1848, 52), passim. For an
excellent history of the theory of population, see _R.
Mohl_, Gesch. und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften, III,
409 ff. (1858).]
SECTION CCXLIII.
OPPONENTS OF MALTHUS.
Of Malthus' opponents, John Stuart Mill has said, that a confused notion
of the causes which, at most times and places, keep the actual increase
of mankind so far behind their capacity for increase, has every now and
then given birth to some ephemeral theory, speedily forgotten; as if the
law of the increase of population were a different one under different
circumstances, and as if the fecundity of the human species, by direct
divine decree, was in keeping with the wants of society for the time
being.[243-1]