Though the outlook for Washington was brightened by his success in New
Jersey, it was still depressing enough. The British had taken New York,
they could probably take Philadelphia when they liked, and no place
near the seacoast was safe. According to the votes in Parliament, by the
spring of 1777 Britain was to have an army of eighty-nine thousand men,
of whom fifty-seven thousand were intended for colonial garrisons and
for the prosecution of the war in America. These numbers were in fact
never reached, but the army of forty thousand in America was formidable
compared with Washington's forces. The British were not hampered by the
practice of enlisting men for only a few months, which marred so much of
Washington's effort. Above all they had money and adequate resources.
In a word they had the things which Washington lacked during almost the
whole of the war.
Washington called his success in the attack at Trenton a lucky stroke.
It was luck which had far-reaching consequences. Howe had the fixed idea
that to follow the capture of New York by that of Philadelphia, the most
populous city in America, and the seat of Congress, would mean great
glory for himself and a crushing blow to the American cause. If to this
could be added, as he intended, the occupation of the whole valley of
the Hudson, the year 1777 might well see the end of the war. An acute
sense of the value of time is vital in war. Promptness, the quick
surprise of the enemy, was perhaps the chief military virtue of
Washington; dilatoriness was the destructive vice of Howe. He had so
little contempt for his foe that he practised a blighting caution. On
April 12, 1777, Washington, in view of his own depleted force, in a
state of half famine, wrote: "If Howe does not take advantage of our
weak state he is very unfit for his trust." Howe remained inactive and
time, thus despised, worked its due revenge. Later Howe did move, and
with skill, but he missed the rapid combination in action which was the
first condition of final success. He could have captured Philadelphia
in May. He took the city, but not until September, when to hold it had
become a liability and not an asset. To go there at all was perhaps
unwise; to go in September was for him a tragic mistake.
From New York to Philadelphia the distance by land is about a hundred
miles. The route lay across New Jersey, that "garden of America" which
English travelers spoke of as resembling their own highly cultivated
land. Washington had his headquarters at Morristown, in northern New
Jersey. His resources were at a low ebb. He had always the faith that
a cause founded on justice could not fail; but his letters at this time
are full of depressing anxiety. Each State regarded itself as in danger
and made care of its own interests its chief concern. By this time
Congress had lost most of the able men who had given it dignity and
authority. Like Howe it had slight sense of the value of time and
imagined that tomorrow was as good as today. Wellington once complained
that, though in supreme command, he had not authority to appoint even
a corporal. Washington was hampered both by Congress and by the State
Governments in choosing leaders. He had some officers, such as Greene,
Knox, and Benedict Arnold, whom he trusted. Others, like Gates and
Conway, were ceaseless intriguers. To General Sullivan, who fancied
himself constantly slighted and ill-treated, Washington wrote sharply to
abolish his poisonous suspicions.
Howe had offered easy terms to those in New Jersey who should declare
their loyalty and to meet this Washington advised the stern policy of
outlawing every one who would not take the oath of allegiance to the
United States. There was much fluttering of heart on the New Jersey
farms, much anxious trimming in order, in any event, to be safe. Howe's
Hessians had plundered ruthlessly causing deep resentment against the
British. Now Washington found his own people doing the same thing.
Militia officers, themselves, "generally" as he said, "of the lowest
class of the people," not only stole but incited their men to steal. It
was easy to plunder under the plea that the owner of the property was a
Tory, whether open or concealed, and Washington wrote that the waste
and theft were "beyond all conception." There were shirkers claiming
exemption from military service on the ground that they were doing
necessary service as civilians. Washington needed maps to plan his
intricate movements and could not get them. Smallpox was devastating his
army and causing losses heavier than those from the enemy. When pay day
came there was usually no money. It is little wonder that in this spring
of 1777 he feared that his army might suddenly dissolve and leave him
without a command. In that case he would not have yielded. Rather, so
stern and bitter was he against England, would he have plunged into the
western wilderness to be lost in its vast spaces.
Howe had his own perplexities. He knew that a great expedition under
Burgoyne was to advance from Canada southward to the Hudson. Was he to
remain with his whole force at New York until the time should come to
push up the river to meet Burgoyne? He had a copy of the instructions
given in England to Burgoyne by Lord George Germain, but he was himself
without orders. Afterwards the reason became known. Lord George Germain
had dictated the order to coöperate with Burgoyne, but had hurried off
to the country before it was ready for his signature and it had been
mislaid. Howe seemed free to make his own plans and he longed to
be master of the enemy's capital. In the end he decided to take
Philadelphia--a task easy enough, as the event proved. At Howe's elbow
was the traitorous American general, Charles Lee, whom he had recently
captured, and Lee, as we know, told him that Maryland and Pennsylvania
were at heart loyal to the King and panting to be free from the tyranny
of the demagogue. Once firmly in the capital Howe believed that he would
have secure control of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. He could
achieve this and be back at New York in time to meet Burgoyne, perhaps
at Albany. Then he would hold the colony of New York from Staten Island
to the Canadian frontier. Howe found that he could send ships up the
Hudson, and the American army had to stand on the banks almost helpless
against the mobility of sea power. Washington's left wing rested on
the Hudson and he held both banks but neither at Peekskill nor, as yet,
farther up at West Point, could his forts prevent the passage of ships.
It was a different matter for the British to advance on land. But the
ships went up and down in the spring of 1777. It would be easy enough to
help Burgoyne when the time should come.
It was summer before Howe was ready to move, and by that time he had
received instructions that his first aim must be to coöperate with
Burgoyne. First, however, he was resolved to have Philadelphia.
Washington watched Howe in perplexity. A great fleet and a great army
lay at New York. Why did they not move? Washington knew perfectly well
what he himself would have done in Howe's place. He would have attacked
rapidly in April the weak American army and, after destroying or
dispersing it, would have turned to meet Burgoyne coming southward from
Canada. Howe did send a strong force into New Jersey. But he did not
know how weak Washington really was, for that master of craft in war
disseminated with great skill false information as to his own supposed
overwhelming strength. Howe had been bitten once by advancing too far
into New Jersey and was not going to take risks. He tried to entice
Washington from the hills to attack in open country. He marched here and
there in New Jersey and kept Washington alarmed and exhausted by counter
marches, and always puzzled as to what the next move should be. Howe
purposely let one of his secret messengers be taken bearing a despatch
saying that the fleet was about to sail for Boston. All these things
took time and the summer was slipping away. In the end Washington
realized that Howe intended to make his move not by land but by sea.
Could it be possible that he was not going to make aid to Burgoyne his
chief purpose? Could it be that he would attack Boston? Washington
hoped so for he knew the reception certain at Boston. Or was his goal
Charleston? On the 23d of July, when the summer was more than half gone,
Washington began to see more clearly. On that day Howe had embarked
eighteen thousand men and the fleet put to sea from Staten Island.
Howe was doing what able officers with him, such as Cornwallis, Grey,
and the German Knyphausen, appear to have been unanimous in thinking
he should not do. He was misled not only by the desire to strike at
the very center of the rebellion, but also by the assurance of the
traitorous Lee that to take Philadelphia would be the effective signal
to all the American Loyalists, the overwhelming majority of the people,
as was believed, that sedition had failed. A tender parent, the King,
was ready to have the colonies back in their former relation and to give
them secure guarantees of future liberty. Any one who saw the fleet
put out from New York Harbor must have been impressed with the might of
Britain. No less than two hundred and twenty-nine ships set their sails
and covered the sea for miles. When they had disappeared out of sight
of the New Jersey shore their goal was still unknown. At sea they might
turn in any direction. Washington's uncertainty was partly relieved on
the 30th of July when the fleet appeared at the entrance of Delaware
Bay, with Philadelphia some hundred miles away across the bay and up the
Delaware River. After hovering about the Cape for a day the fleet again
put to sea, and Washington, who had marched his army so as to be near
Philadelphia, thought the whole movement a feint and knew not where the
fleet would next appear. He was preparing to march to New York to menace
General Clinton, who had there seven thousand men able to help Burgoyne
when he heard good news. On the 22d of August he knew that Howe
had really gone southward and was in Chesapeake Bay. Boston was now
certainly safe. On the 25th of August, after three stormy weeks at sea,
Howe arrived at Elkton, at the head of Chesapeake Bay, and there landed
his army. It was Philadelphia fifty miles away that he intended to have.
Washington wrote gleefully: "Now let all New England turn out and
crush Burgoyne." Before the end of September he was writing that he was
certain of complete disaster to Burgoyne.
Howe had, in truth, made a ruinous mistake. Had the date been May
instead of August he might still have saved Burgoyne. But at the end
of August, when the net was closing on Burgoyne, Howe was three hundred
miles away. His disregard of time and distance had been magnificent. In
July he had sailed to the mouth of the Delaware, with Philadelphia near,
but he had then sailed away again, and why? Because the passage of his
ships up the river to the city was blocked by obstructions commanded by
bristling forts. The naval officers said truly that the fleet could not
get up the river. But Howe might have landed his army at the head of
Delaware Bay. It is a dozen miles across the narrow peninsula from the
head of Delaware Bay to that of Chesapeake Bay. Since Howe had decided
to attack from the head of Chesapeake Bay there was little to prevent
him from landing his army on the Delaware side of the peninsula and
marching across it. By sea it is a voyage of three hundred miles round
a peninsula one hundred and fifty miles long to get from one of these
points to the other, by land only a dozen miles away. Howe made the
sea voyage and spent on it three weeks when a march of a day would have
saved this time and kept his fleet three hundred miles by sea nearer to
New York and aid for Burgoyne.
Howe's mistakes only have their place in the procession to inevitable
disaster. Once in the thick of fighting he showed himself formidable.
When he had landed at Elkton he was fifty miles southwest of
Philadelphia and between him and that place was Washington with his
army. Washington was determined to delay Howe in every possible way.
To get to Philadelphia Howe had to cross the Brandywine River. Time was
nothing to him. He landed at Elkton on the 25th of August. Not until the
10th of September was he prepared to attack Washington barring his way
at Chadd's Ford. Washington was in a strong position on a front of two
miles on the river. At his left, below Chadd's Ford, the Brandywine is
a torrent flowing between high cliffs. There the British would find no
passage. On his right was a forest. Washington had chosen his position
with his usual skill. Entrenchments protected his front and batteries
would sweep down an advancing enemy. He had probably not more than
eleven thousand men in the fight and it is doubtful whether Howe brought
up a greater number so that the armies were not unevenly matched. At
daybreak on the eleventh the British army broke camp at the village
of Kenneth Square, four miles from Chadd's Ford, and, under General
Knyphausen, marched straight to make a frontal attack on Washington's
position.
In the battle which followed Washington was beaten by the superior
tactics of his enemy. Not all of the British army was there in the
attack at Chadd's Ford. A column under Cornwallis had filed off by a
road to the left and was making a long and rapid march. The plan was to
cross the Brandywine some ten miles above where Washington was
posted and to attack him in the rear. By two o'clock in the afternoon
Cornwallis had forced the two branches of the upper Brandywine and was
marching on Dilworth at the right rear of the American army. Only then
did Washington become aware of his danger. His first impulse was to
advance across Chadd's Ford to try to overwhelm Knyphausen and thus
to get between Howe and the fleet at Elkton. This might, however, have
brought disaster and he soon decided to retire. His movement was ably
carried out. Both sides suffered in the woodland fighting but that night
the British army encamped in Washington's position at Chadd's Ford, and
Howe had fought skillfully and won an important battle.
Washington had retired in good order and was still formidable. He now
realized clearly enough that Philadelphia would fall. Delay, however,
would be nearly as good as victory. He saw what Howe could not see, that
menacing cloud in the north, much bigger than a man's hand, which, with
Howe far away, should break in a final storm terrible for the British
cause. Meanwhile Washington meant to keep Howe occupied. Rain alone
prevented another battle before the British reached the Schuylkill
River. On that river Washington guarded every ford. But, in the end,
by skillful maneuvering, Howe was able to cross and on the 26th of
September he occupied Philadelphia without resistance. The people were
ordered to remain quietly in their houses. Officers were billeted on the
wealthier inhabitants. The fall resounded far of what Lord Adam Gordon
called a "great and noble city," "the first Town in America," "one of
the Wonders of the World." Its luxury had been so conspicuous that the
austere John Adams condemned the "sinful feasts" in which he shared.
About it were fine country seats surrounded by parklike grounds, with
noble trees, clipped hedges, and beautiful gardens. The British believed
that Pennsylvania was really on their side. Many of the people were
friendly and hundreds now renewed their oath of allegiance to the King.
Washington complained that the people gave Howe information denied to
him. They certainly fed Howe's army willingly and received good British
gold while Washington had only paper money with which to pay. Over the
proud capital floated once more the British flag and people who did not
see very far said that, with both New York and Philadelphia taken, the
rebellion had at last collapsed.
Once in possession of Philadelphia Howe made his camp at Germantown, a
straggling suburban village, about seven miles northwest of the city.
Washington's army lay at the foot of some hills a dozen miles farther
away. Howe had need to be wary, for Washington was the same "old fox"
who had played so cunning a game at Trenton. The efforts of the British
army were now centered on clearing the river Delaware so that supplies
might be brought up rapidly by water instead of being carried fifty
miles overland from Chesapeake Bay. Howe detached some thousands of men
for this work and there was sharp fighting before the troops and the
fleet combined had cleared the river. At Germantown Howe kept about nine
thousand men. Though he knew that Washington was likely to attack him he
did not entrench his army as he desired the attack to be made. It might
well have succeeded. Washington with eleven thousand men aimed at a
surprise. On the evening of the 3d of October he set out from his camp.
Four roads led into Germantown and all these the Americans used.
At sunrise on the fourth, just as the attack began, a fog arose to
embarrass both sides. Lying a little north of the village was the solid
stone house of Chief Justice Chew, and it remains famous as the central
point in the bitter fight of that day. What brought final failure to the
American attack was an accident of maneuvering. Sullivan's brigade
was in front attacking the British when Greene's came up for the same
purpose. His line overlapped Sullivan's and he mistook in the fog
Sullivan's men for the enemy and fired on them from the rear. A panic
naturally resulted among the men who were attacked also at the same
time by the British on their front. The disorder spread. British
reinforcements arrived, and Washington drew off his army in surprising
order considering the panic. He had six hundred and seventy-three
casualties and lost besides four hundred prisoners. The British loss
was five hundred and thirty-seven casualties and fourteen prisoners.
The attack had failed, but news soon came which made the reverse
unimportant. Burgoyne and his whole army had surrendered at Saratoga.