THE TWO CLASSES OF INSTINCTS

We have already said that, if the differentiation we have made of the

mind into an id, an ego, and a super-ego represents any advance in our

knowledge, it ought to enable us to understand more thoroughly the

dynamic relations within the mind and to describe them more clearly. We

have also already reached the conclusion that the ego is especially

affected by perception, and that, speaking broadly, perceptions may be

said to have the same significance for the ego as instincts have for the

id. At the same time the ego is subject to the influence of the

instincts, too, like the id, of which it is in fact only a specially

modified part.

I have lately developed a view of the instincts[20] which I shall here

hold to and take as the basis of further discussions. According to this

view we have to distinguish two classes of instincts, one of which, Eros

or the sexual instincts, is by far the more conspicuous and accessible

to study. It comprises not merely the uninhibited sexual instinct proper

and the impulses of a sublimated or aim-inhibited nature derived from

it, but also the self-preservative instinct, which must be assigned to

the ego and which at the beginning of our analytic work we had good

reason for setting in opposition to the sexual object-instincts. The

second class of instincts was not so easy to define; in the end we came

to recognize sadism as its representative. As a result of theoretical

considerations, supported by biology, we assumed the existence of a

death-instinct, the task of which is to lead organic matter back into

the inorganic state; on the other hand, we supposed that Eros aims at

complicating life by bringing about a more and more far-reaching

coalescence of the particles into which living matter has been

dispersed, thus, of course, aiming at the maintenance of life. Acting in

this way, both the instincts would be conservative in the strictest

sense of the word, since both would be endeavouring to re-establish a

state of things that was disturbed by the emergence of life. The

appearance of life would thus be regarded as the cause of the

continuance of life and also as the cause of the striving towards death;

and life itself would be a conflict and compromise between these two

trends. The problem of the origin of life would remain a cosmological

one; and the problem of the purpose and goal of life would be answered

dualistically.

On this view a special physiological process (of anabolism or

katabolism) would be associated with each of the two classes of

instincts; both instincts would be active in every particle of living

substance, although in unequal proportions, so that some one substance

might be the principal representative of Eros.

This hypothesis throws no light whatever upon the manner in which the

two classes of instincts are fused, blended, and mingled with each

other; but that this takes place regularly and very extensively is an

assumption indispensable to our conception. It appears that, as a result

of the combination of unicellular organisms into multicellular forms of

life, the death-instinct of the single cell can successfully be

neutralized and the destructive impulses be diverted towards the

external world through the instrumentality of a special organ. This

special organ would seem to be the musculature; and the death-instinct

would thus seem to express itself—though probably only in part—as an

instinct of destruction directed against the external world and other

living organisms.

Once we have admitted the conception of a fusion of the two classes of

instincts with each other, the possibility of a—more or less

complete—‘defusion’ of them forces itself upon us. The sadistic

component of the sexual instinct would be a classical example of

instinctual fusion serving a useful purpose; and the perversion in which

sadism has made itself independent would be typical of defusion, though

not of absolutely complete defusion. From this point we obtain a new

view of a great array of facts which have not before been considered in

this light. We perceive that for purposes of discharge the instinct of

destruction is habitually enlisted in the service of Eros; we suspect

that the epileptic fit is a product and sign of instinctual defusion;

and we come to understand that defusion and the marked emergence of the

death-instinct are among the most noteworthy effects of many severe

neuroses, e.g. the obsessional neuroses. Making a swift generalization,

we might conjecture that the essence of a regression of libido, e.g.

from the genital to the sadistic-anal level, would lie in a defusion of

instincts, just as, conversely, the advance from an earlier to the

definitive genital phase would be conditioned by an accession of erotic

components. The question also arises whether ordinary ambivalence, which

is so often unusually strong in the constitutional disposition to

neurosis, should not be regarded as the product of a defusion;

ambivalence, however, is such a fundamental phenomenon that it more

probably represents a state of incomplete fusion.

It is natural that we should now turn with interest to inquire whether

there may not be instructive connections to be traced between the

formations we have assumed to exist in the mind—the ego, the super-ego,

and the id—and the two classes of instincts; and, further, whether the

pleasure-principle which dominates mental processes can be shown to have

any constant relation both to the two classes of instincts and to these

differentiations which we have drawn within the mind. But before we

discuss this, we must clear away a doubt which arises concerning the

terms of the problem itself. There can be no doubt about the

pleasure-principle, and the differentiations within the ego have good

clinical justification, but the distinction between the two classes of

instincts does not seem sufficiently assured and it is possible that

facts of clinical analysis may be found to conflict with it.

One such fact appears to exist. Instead of the opposition between the

two classes of instincts let us consider the polarity of love and hate.

(There is no difficulty in finding a representative of Eros; but we must

be grateful that we can find a representative of the elusive

death-instinct in the instinct of destruction, for which hate points the

way.) Now, clinical observation shows not only that love is with

unexpected regularity accompanied by hate (ambivalence), and not only

that in human relationships hate is frequently a forerunner of love, but

also that in many circumstances hate changes into love and love into

hate. If this change is anything more than a mere succession in time,

then clearly the ground is cut away from under a distinction so

fundamental as that between erotic instincts and death-instincts, one

which presupposes the existence of physiological processes running

counter to each other.

Now the case in which someone first loves and then hates the same person

(or the reverse), because that person has given him cause for doing so,

has obviously nothing to do with our problem. Nor has the other case in

which feelings of love that have not yet become manifest express

themselves to begin with by enmity and aggressive tendencies; for it may

be that here the destructive components in the object-cathexis have

outstripped the erotic and are only later on joined by the latter. But

we know of several instances in the psychology of the neuroses in which

there are better grounds for assuming that a transformation does take

place. In persecutory paranoia the sufferer takes a particular way of

defending himself against an unduly strong homosexual attachment to a

given person, with the result that the person he once loved most is

changed into a persecutor and then becomes the object of aggressive and

often dangerous impulses on the part of the patient. Here we have

grounds for interposing an intermediate phase in which the love is

transformed into hate. Analytic investigation has only lately revealed

that the sources of homosexuality and of desexualized social feelings

include very intense feelings of rivalry giving rise to aggressive

desires, which, after they have been surmounted, are succeeded by love

for the object that was formerly hated or by an identification with it.

The question arises whether in these instances we are to assume a direct

transformation of hate into love. It is clear that here the changes are

purely internal and an alteration in the behaviour of the object plays

no part in them.

There is another possible mechanism, however, which we have come to know

of by analytic investigation of the processes concerned in the change in

paranoia. An ambivalent attitude is present from the outset and the

transformation is effected by means of a reactive shifting of cathexis,

by which energy is withdrawn from the erotic impulses and used to

supplement the hostile energy.

Not quite the same thing but something like it happens when a hostile

attitude of rivalry is overcome and leads to homosexuality. The hostile

attitude has no prospect of gratification; consequently—i.e. as an

economic measure—it is replaced by a loving attitude for which there is

more hope of satisfaction, that is, possibility of discharge. So we see

that we are not obliged in either of these cases to assume a direct

transformation of hate into love which would be incompatible with a

qualitative distinction between the two classes of instincts.

It appears, however, that by including in our calculations this other

mechanism by means of which love can be changed into hate, we have

tacitly made another assumption which deserves to be formulated

explicitly. We have reckoned as though there existed in the mind—whether

in the ego or in the id—a displaceable energy, which is in itself

neutral, but is able to join forces either with an erotic or with a

destructive impulse, differing qualitatively as they do, and augment its

total cathexis. Without assuming the existence of a displaceable energy

of this kind we can make no headway. The only question is where it comes

from, what it belongs to, and what it signifies.

The problem of the quality of instinctual impulses and of its

persistence throughout their vicissitudes is still very obscure and has

hardly been attacked up to the present. In the sexual

component-instincts, which are especially accessible to observation, it

is possible to perceive the working of processes which are in the same

category as what we are discussing; e.g. we see that some degree of

communication exists between the component instincts, that an instinct

deriving from one particular erotogenic source can make over its

intensity to reinforce another component-instinct originating in another

source, that gratification of one instinct can take the place of

gratification of another, and many more facts of the same nature—all of

which must encourage us to venture upon certain assumptions.

In the present discussion, moreover, I am putting forward nothing but a

supposition; I have no proof to offer. It seems a plausible view that

this neutral displaceable energy, which is probably active alike in the

ego and in the id, proceeds from the narcissistic reservoir of libido,

i.e. that it is desexualized Eros. (The erotic instincts appear to be

altogether more plastic, more readily diverted and displaced than the

destructive instincts.) From this we can easily go on to assume that

this displaceable libido is employed in the service of the

pleasure-principle to obviate accumulations and to facilitate discharge.

It is clear, incidentally, that there is a certain indifference about

the path along which the discharge takes place, so long as it takes

place somehow. We know this trait; it is characteristic of the cathectic

processes in the id. It is found in erotic cathexes, where a peculiar

indifference in regard to the object displays itself; and it is

especially evident in the transferences arising in analysis, which

develop inevitably no matter who the analyst may be. Rank has recently

published some good examples of the way in which neurotic acts of

revenge can be directed against the wrong people. Such behaviour on the

part of the unconscious reminds one of the comic story of the three

village tailors, one of whom had to be hanged because the only village

blacksmith had committed a capital offence. The penalty must be exacted

even if it does not fall upon the guilty.

It was in studying dream-work that we first came upon this kind of

looseness in the displacements brought about by the primary process. In

that case it was the objects that were thus relegated to a position of

no more than secondary importance, just as in the case we are now

discussing it is the paths of discharge. It would seem to be

characteristic of the ego to be more particular both about the choice of

an object and about the path of discharge.

If this displaceable energy is desexualized libido, it might also be

described as sublimated energy; for it would still retain the main

purpose of Eros—that of uniting and binding—in so far as it helped

towards establishing that unity, or tendency to unity, which is

particularly characteristic of the ego. If the intellectual processes in

the wider sense are to be classed among these displacements, then the

energy for the work of thought itself must be supplied from sublimated

erotic sources.

Here we arrive again at the possibility which has already been discussed

that sublimation may take place regularly through the mediation of the

ego. The other case will be recollected, in which the ego deals with the

first object-cathexes of the id (and certainly with later ones too) by

taking over the libido from them into itself and binding it to the

ego-modification produced by means of identification. The transformation

of erotic libido into ego-libido of course involves an abandonment of

sexual aims, a desexualization. In any case this throws light upon an

important function of the ego in its relation to Eros. By thus obtaining

possession of the libido from the object-cathexes, setting itself up as

sole love-object, and desexualizing or sublimating the libido of the id,

the ego is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing

itself at the service of the opposing instinctual trends. It has to

acquiesce in some of the other object-cathexes of the id; it has to go

hand in hand with them, so to speak. We shall come back later to another

possible consequence of this activity of the ego.

This would seem to imply an important amplification of the theory of

narcissism. At the very beginning all the libido is accumulated in the

id, while the ego is still in process of formation or far from robust.

Part of this libido is sent out by the id into erotic object-cathexes,

whereupon the ego, now growing stronger, attempts to obtain possession

of this object-libido and to force itself upon the id as a love-object.

The narcissism of the ego is thus seen to be secondary, acquired by the

withdrawal of the libido from objects.

Over and over again we find on tracing instinctual impulses back that

they disclose themselves as derivatives of Eros. If it were not for the

considerations put forward in _Beyond the Pleasure Principle_, and

ultimately for the sadistic constituents which have attached themselves

to Eros, we should have difficulty in holding to our fundamental

dualistic point of view. But since we cannot escape that view, we are

driven to conclude that the death-instincts are by their nature mute and

that the clamour of life proceeds for the most part from Eros.[21]

And from the struggle against Eros! It can hardly be doubted that the

pleasure-principle serves the id as a compass in its struggle against

the libido—the force that introduces such disturbances into the process

of life. If it is true that life is governed by Fechner’s principle of

constant equilibrium, it consists of a continuous descent towards death;

but the falling of the level is delayed and fresh tensions are

introduced by the claims of Eros, of the sexual instincts, as expressed

in instinctual needs. The id, guided by the pleasure-principle, that is,

by the perception of ‘pain’, guards itself against these tensions in

various ways. It does so in the first place by complying as swiftly as

possible with the demands of the non-desexualized libido, i.e. by

striving for the gratification of the directly sexual trends. But it

does so further, and in a far more comprehensive fashion, in relation to

one particular form of gratification which subsumes all component

claims—that is, by discharge of the sexual substances, which are

saturated conductors, so to speak, of the erotic tensions. The ejection

of sexual substances in the sexual act corresponds in a certain degree

with the separation of soma and germ-plasm. This accounts for the

likeness between dying and the condition that follows complete sexual

satisfaction, and for the fact that death coincides with the act of

copulation in some of the lower animals. These creatures die in the act

of reproduction because, after Eros has been eliminated through the

process of gratification, the death-instinct has a free hand for

accomplishing its purposes. Finally, as we have seen, the ego, by

sublimating some of the libido for itself and its purposes, assists the

id in its work of mastering the tensions.

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V