Pathological research has centred our interest too exclusively on the
repressed. We wish to know more about the ego, now that we know that it,
too, can be unconscious in the proper sense of the word. Hitherto the
only guide we have had while pursuing our investigations has been the
distinguishing mark of being conscious or unconscious; and in the end we
have come to see that this quality itself is ambiguous.
Now all our knowledge is invariably bound up with consciousness. Even
knowledge of the Ucs can only be obtained by making it conscious. But
stop, how is that possible? What does it mean when we say ‘making it
conscious’? How can that come about?
We already know the point from which we have to start in this
connection. We have said that consciousness is the _superficies_ of the
mental apparatus; that is, we have allocated it as a function to the
system which is situated nearest to the external world. Incidentally, on
this occasion the topographical terminology does not merely serve to
describe the nature of the function, but actually corresponds to the
anatomical facts.[4] Our investigations too must take this surface organ
of perception as a starting-point.
All perceptions which are received from without (sense-perceptions) and
from within—what we call sensations and feelings—are Cs from the start.
But how is it with those internal processes which we may—vaguely and
inexactly—sum up under the name of thought-processes? They represent
displacements of mental energy which are effected somewhere in the
interior of the apparatus as this energy proceeds on its way towards
action. Do they advance towards the superficies, which then allows of
the development of consciousness? Or does consciousness make its way
towards them? This is clearly one of the difficulties that spring up
when one begins to take the spatial or ‘topographical’ conception of
mental life seriously. Both these possibilities are equally
unimaginable; there must be a third contingency to meet the case.
I have already, in another place,[5] suggested that the real difference
between a Ucs and a Pcs idea (thought) consists in this: that the former
is worked out upon some sort of material which remains unrecognized,
whereas the latter (the Pcs) has in addition been brought into
connection with verbal images. This is the first attempt to find a
distinguishing mark for the two systems, the Pcs and the Ucs, other than
their relation to consciousness. It would seem, then, that the question,
‘How does a thing become conscious?’ could be put more advantageously
thus: ‘How does a thing become preconscious?’ And the answer would be:
‘By coming into connection with the verbal images that correspond to
it’.
These verbal images are memory-residues; they were at one time
perceptions, and like all memory-residues they can become conscious
again. Before we concern ourselves further with their nature, it dawns
upon us like a new discovery that only something which has once been a
Cs perception can become conscious, and that anything arising from
within (apart from feelings) that seeks to become conscious must try to
transform itself into external perceptions: this can be done by way of
memory-traces.
We conceive of memory-residues as contained in systems which are
directly adjacent to the system Pcpt-Cs, so that the cathexes pertaining
to the memory-residues can readily extend outward on to the elements of
the latter system. We are immediately reminded of hallucinations here,
and of the fact that the most vivid memory is always distinguishable
both from a hallucination and from an external perception; but it will
also occur to us that when a memory is revived the cathexis in the
memory-system will remain in force, whereas a hallucination which is not
distinguishable from a perception can arise when the cathexis does not
merely extend over from the memory-trace to the Pcpt-element, but passes
over to it entirely.
Verbal residues are derived primarily from auditory perceptions, so that
the system Pcs has, as it were, a special sensory source. The visual
components of verbal images are secondary, acquired through reading, and
may to begin with be left on one side; so may the sensori-motor images
of words, which, except with deaf-mutes, play an auxiliary part. The
essence of a word is after all the memory-trace of a word that has been
heard.
We must not be led away, in the interests of simplification perhaps,
into forgetting the importance of optical memory-residues—those of
_things_ (as opposed to _words_)—or to deny that it is possible for
thought-processes to become conscious through a reversion to visual
residues, and that in many people this seems to be a favourite method.
The study of dreams and of preconscious phantasies on the lines of J.
Varendonck’s observations gives us an idea of the special character of
this visual thinking. We learn that what becomes conscious is as a rule
only the concrete subject-matter of the thought, and that the relations
between the various elements of this subject-matter, which is what
specially characterizes thought, cannot be given visual expression.
Thinking in pictures is, therefore, only a very incomplete form of
becoming conscious. In some way, too, it approximates more closely to
unconscious processes than does thinking in words, and it is
unquestionably older than the latter both ontogenetically and
phylogenetically.
To return to our argument: if, therefore, this is the way in which
something that is in itself unconscious becomes preconscious, the
question how something that is repressed can be made (pre)conscious
would be answered as follows. It is done by supplying through the work
of the analysis Pcs connecting-links of the kind we have been
discussing. Consciousness remains where it is, therefore; but, on the
other hand, the Ucs does not rise up into the Cs.
Whereas the relation between external perceptions and the ego is quite
perspicuous, that between internal perceptions and the ego requires
special investigation. It gives rise once more to a doubt whether we are
really justified in referring the whole of consciousness to the single
superficial system Pcpt-Cs.
Internal perceptions yield sensations of processes arising in the most
diverse and certainly also in the deepest strata of the mental
apparatus. Very little is known about these sensations and feelings; the
best examples we have of them are still those belonging to the
pleasure-pain series. They are more fundamental, more elementary, than
perceptions arising externally and they can come into being even when
consciousness is clouded. I have elsewhere expressed my views about
their great economic significance and its metapsychological foundation.
These sensations are multilocular, like external perceptions; they may
come from different places simultaneously and may thus have different or
even opposite qualities.
Sensations of a pleasurable nature are not characterized by any
inherently impelling quality, whereas ‘painful’ ones possess this
quality in a high degree. The latter impel towards change, towards
discharge, and that is why we interpret ‘pain’ as implying a heightening
and pleasure a lowering of energic cathexis. Suppose we describe what
becomes conscious in the shape of pleasure and ‘pain’ as an undetermined
quantitative and qualitative element in the mind; the question then is
whether that element can become conscious where it actually is, or
whether it must first be transmitted into the system Pcpt.
Clinical experience decides for the latter. It shows us that this
undetermined element behaves like a repressed impulse. It can exert
driving force without the ego noticing the compulsion. Not until there
is resistance to the compulsion, and blocking of the discharge-reaction,
does the undetermined element instantly become conscious as ‘pain’. In
the same way that tensions arising from physical need can remain
unconscious, so also can physical pain—a thing intermediate between
external and internal perception, which acts like an internal perception
even when its source is in the external world. It remains true again,
therefore, that sensations and feelings only become conscious through
reaching the system Pcpt; if the way forward is barred, they do not come
into being as sensations, although the undetermined element
corresponding to them is the same as if they did. We then come to speak,
in a condensed and not entirely correct manner, of ‘unconscious
feelings’, keeping up an analogy with unconscious ideas which is not
altogether justifiable. Actually the difference is that, whereas with
Ucs _ideas_ connecting-links must be forged before they can be brought
into the Cs, with _feelings_, which are themselves transmitted directly,
there is no necessity for this. In other words: the distinction between
Cs and Pcs has no meaning where feelings are concerned; the Pcs here
falls out of account, and feelings are either conscious or unconscious.
Even when they are connected with verbal images, their becoming
conscious is not due to that circumstance, but they become so directly.
The part played by verbal images now becomes perfectly clear. By their
interposition internal thought-processes are made into perceptions. It
is like a demonstration of the theorem that all knowledge has its origin
in external perception. It may sometimes happen that a hyper-cathexis of
the process of thinking takes place, in which case thoughts are
_perceived_ in the literal sense of the word—as if they came from
without—and are consequently held to be true.
After this clarifying of the relations between external and internal
perception and the superficial system Pcpt-Cs, we can go on to work out
our conception of the ego. It clearly starts out from its nucleus, the
system Pcpt, and begins by embracing the Pcs, which is adjacent to the
memory-residues. But the ego, as we have learnt, is also unconscious.
Now I think we shall gain a great deal by following the suggestion of
a writer who, from personal motives, vainly insists that he has
nothing to do with the rigours of pure science. I am speaking of Georg
Groddeck, who is never tired of pointing out that the conduct through
life of what we call our ego is essentially passive, and that, as he
expresses it, we are ‘lived’ by unknown and uncontrollable forces.[6]
We have all had impressions of the same kind, even though they may not
have overwhelmed us to the exclusion of all others, and we need feel
no hesitation in finding a place for Groddeck’s discovery in the
fabric of science. I propose to take it into account by calling the
entity which starts out from the system Pcpt and begins by being Pcs
the ego, and by following Groddeck in giving to the other part of the
mind, into which this entity extends and which behaves as though it
were Ucs, the name of _Id_ (_Es_).[7]
We shall soon see whether this conception affords us any gain in
understanding or any advantage for purposes of description. We shall now
look upon the mind of an individual as an unknown and unconscious id,
upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus the
Pcpt-system. If we make an effort to conceive of this pictorially, we
may add that the ego does not envelop the whole of the id, but only does
so to the extent to which the system Pcpt forms its surface, more or
less as the germinal layer rests upon the ovum. The ego is not sharply
separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it.
But the repressed merges into the id as well, and is simply a part of
it. The repressed is only cut off sharply from the ego by the
resistances of repression; it can communicate with the ego through the
id. We at once realize that almost all the delimitations we have been
led into outlining by our study of pathology relate only to the
superficial levels of the mental apparatus—the only ones known to us.
The state of things which we have been describing can be represented
diagrammatically (Fig. 1); though it must be remarked that the form
chosen has no pretensions to any special applicability, but is merely
intended to serve for purposes of exposition. We might add, perhaps,
that the ego wears an auditory lobe—on one side only, as we learn from
cerebral anatomy. It wears it crooked, as one might say.
[Illustration: FIG. 1 — see images/fig1.png]
It is easy to see that the ego is that part of the id which has been
modified by the direct influence of the external world acting through
the Pcpt-Cs: in a sense it is an extension of the
surface-differentiation. Moreover, the ego has the task of bringing the
influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies,
and endeavours to substitute the reality-principle for the
pleasure-principle which reigns supreme in the id. In the ego perception
plays the part which in the id devolves upon instinct. The ego
represents what we call reason and sanity, in contrast to the id which
contains the passions. All this falls into line with popular
distinctions which we are all familiar with; at the same time, however,
it is only to be regarded as holding good in an average or ‘ideal’ case.
The functional importance of the ego is manifested in the fact that
normally control over the approaches to motility devolves upon it. Thus
in its relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold
in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that
the rider seeks to do so with his own strength while the ego uses
borrowed forces. The illustration may be carried further. Often a rider,
if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where
it wants to go; so in the same way the ego constantly carries into
action the wishes of the id as if they were its own.
It seems that another factor, besides the influence of the system Pcpt,
has been at work in bringing about the formation of the ego and its
differentiation from the id. The body itself, and above all its surface,
is a place from which both external and internal perceptions may spring.
It is seen in the same way as any other object, but to the touch it
yields two kinds of sensations, one of which is equivalent to an
internal perception. Psychophysiology has fully discussed the manner in
which the body attains its special position among other objects in the
world of perception. Pain seems also to play a part in the process, and
the way in which we gain new knowledge of our organs during painful
illnesses is perhaps a prototype of the way by which in general we
arrive at the idea of our own body.
The ego is first and foremost a body-ego; it is not merely a surface
entity, but it is itself the projection of a surface.[8] If we wish to
find an anatomical analogy for it we can easily identify it with the
‘cortical homunculus’ of the anatomists, which stands on its head in the
cortex, sticks its heels into the air, faces backwards and, as we know,
has its speech-area on the left-hand side.
The relation of the ego to consciousness has been gone into repeatedly;
yet there are still some important facts in this connection which remain
to be described. Accustomed as we are to taking our social or ethical
standard of values along with us wherever we go, we feel no surprise at
hearing that the scene of the activities of the lower passions is in the
unconscious; we expect, moreover, that the higher any mental function
ranks in our scale of values the more easily it will find access to
consciousness assured to it. Here, however, psycho-analytic experience
disappoints us. On the one hand, we have evidence that even subtle and
intricate intellectual operations which ordinarily require strenuous
concentration can equally be carried out preconsciously and without
coming into consciousness. Instances of this are quite incontestable;
they may occur, for instance, during sleep, as is shown when some one
finds, immediately after waking, that he knows the solution of a
difficult mathematical or other problem with which he had been wrestling
in vain the day before.[9]
There is another phenomenon, however, which is far stranger. In our
analyses we discover that there are people in whom the faculties of
self-criticism and conscience—mental activities, that is, that rank as
exceptionally high ones—are unconscious and unconsciously produce
effects of the greatest importance; the example of resistances remaining
unconscious during analysis is therefore by no means unique. But this
new discovery, which compels us, in spite of our critical faculties, to
speak of an ‘unconscious sense of guilt’, bewilders us far more than the
other and sets us fresh problems, especially when we gradually come to
see that in a great number of neuroses this unconscious sense of guilt
plays a decisive economic part and puts the most powerful obstacles in
the way of recovery. If we come back once more to our scale of values,
we shall have to say that not only what is lowest but also what is
highest in the ego can be unconscious. It is as if we were thus supplied
with a proof of what we have just asserted of the conscious ego: that it
is first and foremost a body-ego.
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