CHAPTER XIV

SHOALS AND ROCKS AHEAD

Unless the economic situation improves again with a rapidity beyond even

sanguine expectations, Government will have to lay before the Indian

Legislature next winter a budget scarcely less unpleasant than the last

one. Even if expenditure does not outrun the estimates, revenue can

hardly fail to fall short of them. Mr. Hailey, with perhaps forced

optimism, seems to have reckoned upon taxation old and new continuing to

yield at much the same rate during a year which began and is likely to

end in great depression as during the preceding year, a great part of

which had been a "boom" year. In the same way he budgeted on a 1s. 8d.

rupee, though the rate of exchange for the rupee was then under, and has

only quite recently[4] risen above, 1s. 4d. This means an inevitable and

considerable loss to the Government of India on all the home charges

which it has to remit to London. Another deficit to be met by another

increase of taxation would be a strain upon the Assembly far more trying

than that to which this year's Budget subjected it. Indian opinion will

press for further steps towards complete fiscal autonomy. Scarcely a

single Indian is a convinced free trader. In the old Indian National

Congress the desire not to estrange the sympathies of the Liberal party

in England, and the lack of interest then taken by Indian politicians in

economic questions, kept the issue somewhat in the background until the

Extremists raised it in the form of _Swadeshi_ and in an attempt to

organise a boycott of British imported goods. The immense development of

Indian industries during the war has made protection once more a very

live issue, for if that development is arrested or languishes as the

result of the general economic situation, the louder will be the demand

for protection. Even the outcry at first raised last winter in

Lancashire against the increase of the Indian import duties as an

intolerable blow to British textile industries, though at once firmly

checked by the Secretary of State, provoked enough irritation in India

to show how deeply engrained is the suspicion that, from the days of the

East India Company onward, the industrial and commercial interests of

India have always been deliberately or instinctively sacrificed to those

of Great Britain. Indians regard complete fiscal autonomy as one of the

first steps towards the fulfilment of the pledge of self-government, and

indeed as the logical consequence of the recommendation already made by

the Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament. To believe that

in such matters the Government of India would now place itself in

opposition to the views of the Indian Legislature is to ignore the whole

spirit of the constitutional changes.

To the economic factors that react unfavourably upon a difficult

political situation must be added the growth of labour troubles, which

Extremist agitators know how to exploit to the utmost even when they do

not actually foment them. Strikes are as common to-day in India as they

are in England, and the epidemic has sometimes spread from industrial

workers to those employed by municipalities and by the State. There have

been strikes not only in the big cotton mills and jute mills and other

large manufacturing industries, but also amongst postmen, and amongst

railwaymen on State as well as on private-owned lines, amongst tram-car

drivers and conductors, and even amongst city scavengers. Lightning

strikes without any notice are of growing frequency. Some are

short-lived, others very obstinate, dragging on for weeks and months.

Some are grotesquely frivolous, others by no means lack justification or

excuse. Intimidation often not unaccompanied by violent assaults on

non-strikers is an ugly feature common to most of them. They sometimes

lead to very serious riots and bloodshed. They have played a prominent

part in the worst disorders of the last few years. Nowhere have they

assumed at times a more threatening shape than in the Bombay Presidency,

for in the cotton mills of Bombay itself and of the Ahmedabad district,

which employ over 200,000 hands, are collected the largest

agglomerations of factory workers in India.

Labour troubles were bound to come with the introduction of Western

methods of industrial development and Western machinery. It has led, and

very rapidly, to a demand for labour which the urban population could

not supply. But the wages soon attracted immigrants from the more or

less distant countryside, where at certain seasons of the year there is

little work to be done on the land. It became the custom for an

increasingly large number of rural districts to send their men into the

towns, where they worked for a few months. Then they went away after

they had put by a little money and came back again when they had

exhausted their hoard. These migrations became more and more regular and

on a larger scale as the demand for labour increased, and they

constitute to-day the feature which radically differentiates the problem

of Indian labour from that of British labour. There has not yet grown up

in India an industrial population permanently rooted in the towns. It is

still largely migratory, returning from time to time for more or less

lengthy periods to field-work in the villages, which remain the real

home. The Indian factory operative has not yet ceased to be a man of the

country rather than of the town. Hence perhaps the conditions under

which he is sometimes content to live whilst he is working in a town--in

Bombay, for instance, for the most part in huge overcrowded blocks,

known as _chawls_, ill lighted, ill ventilated, in a foul atmosphere and

unspeakable dirt--may seem to him less intolerable as he can look

forward to exchanging them again some day for the light and air which

surround even the most squalid village hovels. If there were reason to

believe that improved housing conditions such as are now assured to

Bombay by the huge city improvement schemes which, under Sir George

Lloyd's energetic impulse, are expanding the limits and transforming

almost beyond recognition the appearance of the most congested quarters

of the most congested of modern Indian cities, or even that increased

wages would substantially affect the temper of Indian labour, one might

look forward to the future in this respect with less apprehension. But

in Bombay labour troubles have been scarcely less rife in the best- than

in the worst-conducted mills. In Calcutta the British jute-mill owners

have set a splendid example to Indian employers of labour, and the

mill-hands, now largely imported from other provinces, not only work

under the best possible conditions of light and air, but are housed in

spacious quarters specially built for them, well ventilated and

scientifically drained, with playing-fields and elementary schools for

the swarms of children who certainly look healthy and well-fed and

happy. The Birmingham mills in Madras are recognised to be, from the

same point of view, second to none in the world. But the most humane and

generous employers--whether European or Indian--are as liable as the

most grasping and callous to see their workers suddenly carried away by

a great wave of unreasoning discontent and passion.

The greater the general unrest amongst these excitable and terribly

ignorant masses, the more urgent is the need for the establishment of

some effective means of determining the social and economic justice of

the claims of labour, as well as for the adjustment of actual conflicts

by bringing employers and employed together in a friendly atmosphere. A

real organisation of labour in its own sphere of interests and the

constitution of responsible trades unions would probably go far to

prevent labour from turning for encouragement and support to agitators

who have never been workers themselves, who have no personal knowledge

of its processes or of its needs, and who exploit its discontent,

reasonable or unreasonable, for purposes as disastrous, if fulfilled, to

its permanent interests as to those of the employers and of the whole

community. A Congress which called itself the first "All-India Trades

Union Congress" met this year in Bombay. The present organisation of

labour in India can hardly be said to justify the title it assumed, and

in answer to a deputation which waited on the Governor, Sir George Lloyd

expressed a legitimate desire for more information than was contained in

its high-flown address as to the status of these unions, their method of

formation, their constitution, their system of ballot and election, and

the actual experience in the several trades of those who claimed to

represent them. That information was not and could not be furnished,

because the ninety-two Trades Unions alleged to have been represented

are at present little more than embryonic. Their spokesmen have not

risen to the leadership of labour out of its own ranks by superior

industry and knowledge. Their organisation has not been a spontaneous

growth from within, but artificially promoted from without. The vast

majority of unskilled workers are illiterate, and even amongst ordinary

skilled labour the level of education is still extremely low. The actual

workers are therefore quite unable to organise, or even to think out the

simplest labour problems for themselves, and they easily become the

dupes and tools of outsiders--frequently lawyers or professional

politicians--who are not always disinterested sympathisers, but more

often stimulate and exploit grievances which may in themselves be

legitimate for purposes which have little to do with the real interests

of labour.

The economic causes of the growing frequency of strikes during recent

years have not yet been all explored, and Sir George Lloyd responded to

a crying need when, in his reply to the deputation, he announced that

the Bombay Government was about to establish a Labour Bureau under a

competent official from the British Board of Trade to advise it in the

interests of labour. One of the greatest difficulties in dealing with

industrial disputes in India is, the Governor rightly observed, the

absence of all trustworthy materials for forming an accurate judgment on

the actual cost of living for the working man, and the ever fluctuating

relations between the wages he receives and the expenditure he has to

incur even for the mere necessaries of life.

With a two-and three-fold appreciation, during and especially since the

war, in the cost both of the cotton stuffs which the working man needs

even for his scanty apparel and of the foodstuffs which constitute his

meagre fare, discontent grew steadily more acute, and wages, though more

than once enhanced, did not always keep pace with that appreciation. If

in circumstances, often of undoubted hardship, labour had been

sufficiently equipped to state its own case, or had found disinterested

friends to state it clearly and temperately, it would have been easier

to admit that economic causes sufficed, in some cases at least, to

explain, and perhaps even to justify, the increasing use of the strike

weapon. But there is unhappily very abundant evidence to show that

strikes would not have been so frequent, so precipitate, and so

tumultuous, had not political agitation at least contributed to foment

them as part of a scheme for promoting a general upheaval. The

Extremists, who, with few exceptions, have no part or lot in labour,

either as employers or as workers, began to carry on in Mr. Tilak's days

amongst the mill-hands of Bombay an active propaganda which originally

had little to do with labour. The mill-hands played an evil part in the

worst excesses committed during the outbreak in and around Ahmedabad in

April 1919, and twice within the last two years they have seriously

threatened the peace of Bombay itself and held up for weeks together the

normal life of the great city, necessitating the employment of large

military forces to overawe them, and to avert through the exercise of

disciplined forbearance collisions with which the police alone would

have been unable to cope, and which, when once started, could probably

have been quelled only at the cost of considerable bloodshed. Mr. Gandhi

has a great personal hold over the factory workers, especially in

Western India. Sometimes he uses it to restrain them, sometimes, though

one may hope less deliberately, he works dangerously on their emotions.

His influence when he preaches temperance to them on temperate lines may

be all to the good, and except that, when he denounces tea also, because

it is tainted with Western capitalism, he is waging war against a

popular substitute for spirits, one need not quarrel with the solemn

processions of mill-hands proceeding to a favourite shrine to break a

symbolical teapot in the presence of the deity as a pledge of

renunciation. But not all Mr. Gandhi's followers can be credited with

his earnest sympathies for labour, largely inspired by his detestation

of a "machine age," and he himself lapses into language that seems to

preach more rigid abstention from drink than from violence.

Factory legislation has never been neglected in India, though until

recently the chief impulse has had to proceed from Government itself. A

great increase of public interest has taken place in the last years, and

in India perhaps even more than anywhere else the activity in this

respect of the League of Nations and of the International Labour Office

has elicited prompt and vigorous response. The Secretary of State has

created at the India Office a new department for dealing with labour and

industry. India has had her own representation at international labour

conferences, and the Government of India is now engaged on a new Factory

Act in accordance with the draft covenants and recommendations of the

Washington Conference. Indeed in some directions the Bill is in advance

of Washington. The statutory definition of a child presents special

difficulties in India, where physical development is more precocious

than in Western countries, but, instead of making the general limit of

age for juvenile work lower, the Bill proposes to raise it not to

fourteen but to fifteen years, whilst still permitting the employment of

younger children on special and very stringent conditions. Provisions

are also made for securing longer daily intervals during the working

hours as well as a weekly holiday. Further legislation will be

introduced for the benefit of industrial workers, more particularly as

regards Trade Union rights and compensation for accidents. But however

excellent such measures may be, only the spread of education and the

better organisation with it of labour itself can be expected to give any

real stability to large struggling masses invested by the new economic

forces that have sprung so rapidly into existence with tremendous powers

for mischief, but with no individual or collective sense of

responsibility.

But the most dangerous rocks ahead are the questions which directly or

indirectly raise the racial issue. Even during the first session of the

Indian Legislature it could be seen underlying the attitude of Indian

members towards military expenditure, and military expenditure, not

likely to diminish, will be a sore subject again when the next budget is

introduced at Delhi. If one looks merely at the growth of such

expenditure, the enormously increased cost of the British Army which, in

respect of the British forces serving in India, falls upon the Indian

exchequer, furnishes Indians with a specious plea for reducing the

number of British troops as a measure of mere economy. But even if one

could concede the Indian argument that, in a contented India marching

towards self-government under the new constitution, there can no longer

be the same necessity for large British garrisons to guarantee the

safety of British rule, any considerable reduction of the proportion of

British to Indian forces in India would disturb the foundations of our

own military organisation in peace time, based for the last fifty years

on a certain fixed proportion of British regulars serving at home and

abroad. That an Indian territorial army would, on paper at least, be

less costly is beyond dispute, and if ultimately officered entirely or

almost entirely by Indians, it would meet the Indian demand for a

military career for those of the educated classes who regard themselves

now as shut out in practice from the profession of arms. That demand

cannot be met merely by the granting of British commissions to a few

Indian officers, which is already raising many difficult regimental

problems not easily grasped by Indians familiar only with the civil

administration. The difficulties do not arise so much out of objections

taken by the British officers, however repugnant still is to most of

them the idea of ever having to take orders from an Indian superior

officer, as out of the feelings, even if they be mere prejudices, of the

existing class of native officers and of the rank and file who belong to

the old and have no liking for the new India. Most of the politically

minded Indians are beginning, too, to measure the demands made upon

India for her military contribution to the needs of the Empire by those

that are made upon the self-governing Dominions. "We are quite willing,"

they say, "to bear our share of the military burdens of the Empire as

equal partners in it, and"--as some at any rate add--"we recognise that

in view of our geographical position, which lays us almost alone amongst

the Dominions open to the dangers of invasion on our land frontiers, we

require a larger army for our own defence. But even taking that into

account, as well as our inability at present to make any contribution in

kind to the naval defence of the Empire, can we be expected to submit to

military expenditure absorbing almost half our revenues? Can you point

to a single Dominion that is asked to make an annual sacrifice

comparable to that? Are we not at least entitled to claim that the

Indian tax-payer's money should not be spent merely on the maintenance

of British garrisons that are here to-day and gone to-morrow, and of an

Indian army that is so constituted as to lack all the essentials of a

national army, but should go to the building up of an army really worthy

to take its place on equal terms when India attains to self-government

with the other armies of a commonwealth of free nations?"

The racial issue dominates in a far graver form the whole question of

the status and treatment of Indians in the Dominions and Crown Colonies.

For there it enters a much larger field which extends far beyond India.

In India so far, in speaking of the racial issue, Indians and Europeans

alike have hitherto had in mind chiefly the relations between the ruling

and the subject race. When the rulers all belong to one race and come

from a far distant country not to settle permanently but chiefly to

maintain, each one in his own sphere and during his appointed time, the

continuity of rulership over millions of subjects of another and very

different race with a different civilisation, an additional element of

discord is introduced into their relations. But since Great Britain

achieved dominion over India the main issue between rulers and ruled has

been how far on the one hand British rulers should devolve on to their

Indian subjects a share in the government and administration of the

country, and how far on the other hand their Indian subjects could

hasten such devolution by various forms of pressure. Whatever part any

purely racial antagonism may have played in the controversy, the British

rulers of India have at least since 1833, and still more since the

Queen's Proclamation in 1858, debarred themselves from basing on racial

differences their refusal or reluctance to meet the growing aspirations

of their Indian subjects. They have been content to plead the political

immaturity of the Indian people and the lack of individual

qualifications amongst all but a few Indians, and even these

disabilities they had deliberately undertaken and expressed their

anxiety to remove by the introduction of Western education. Neither

colour nor descent, it was specifically declared, were to constitute

any barrier. It is quite otherwise with the question of the right of

Indians to immigrate into other parts of the Empire, and of the measure

of rights they are to enjoy as settlers there. It brings us face to face

with the racial issue pure and simple and in its widest aspects. There

is an open and declared conflict between the claims of the Dominions to

exclude or to restrict the rights of Indian settlers on grounds of

colour and descent for the avowed purpose of maintaining the paramount

ascendancy of one race over another, and the claims put forward by

Indians as British subjects to have access to all parts of the Empire

and to possess the same rights as other British subjects already enjoy

there. Some of the arguments employed to justify the attitude of the

Dominions allege inferior social standards of Indian life, but behind

them and quite undisguised is the supreme argument that Indians belong

to a coloured race and, in consequence, have no interests or rights that

can possibly prevail against those of a superior white race.

The magnitude of the issue and the resentment which it has caused in

India are, it is true, out of all proportion to the actual number of

Indians who have immigrated into other parts of the Empire. The Indians

are not a migratory people. Mostly engaged in agriculture, they cling,

as peasants are apt to do all over the world, to their own bit of land

and familiar surroundings. It is difficult even to induce them to move

from one part of India to another, and, intensely conservative in their

habits and outlook, with no horizon wider than their own village, they

generally prefer, even under the stress of economic pressure, the ills

they know of. But that does not affect the issue raised in the most

acute and naked form in some of the States now forming the South African

Union. To Mr. Gandhi's experiences and struggles in Natal and the

Transvaal can be traced back, as I have already shown, a great deal of

the bitterness which has now led him to denounce British rule as

"Satanic." It is only about fifty years ago that Indians began to go

across to South Africa, when the Government of Natal with the consent

and assistance of the Government of India sought to engage Indians to

work as indentured labourers on sugar and tea plantations. In 1911, the

year of the last census, the number of Indians in the Union was about

150,000, and, immigration having been since then checked and finally

stopped, they cannot have increased by more than 10 per cent during the

last decade. Of the total in 1911, 133,000 were in Natal, 11,000 in the

Transvaal, and 7000 in the Cape, with barely 100 in the Orange Free

State. The proportion of Indians to the total European population of the

Union, which was then about 1,400,000, was therefore only just over one

to ten. But they had not remained merely indentured labourers as at the

beginning. When their labour contracts expired many settled in the

country, acquiring small plots of land as their own or becoming petty

traders, artisans, etc., and, being frugal and hard-working and of a

higher type than the Kaffir and other natives, they throve as a whole.

The white population, who had found them at first very useful, began to

see in them either dangerous competitors or an undesirable element

calculated to complicate the social problems in a country in which the

European formed anyhow but a small minority face to face with 6,000,000

natives. Both the old Boer Government in the Transvaal and the Colonial

Government of Natal set to work to curtail by legislative enactments and

local regulations the rights which Indians had been at first allowed to

enjoy, and to assimilate their treatment to that of the lowest and most

backward natives. The Indians were systematically subjected to the

disabilities and indignities against which Mr. Gandhi for the first time

led them to organise a violent agitation and finally to offer passive

resistance.

The agreement arrived at between General Smuts and Mr. Gandhi in 1914

was in the nature of a compromise which gave the Indians some relief

without conceding the principle of equal rights, and it only brought the

long struggle to a temporary close. The old sore was reopened with the

Asiatics' Trading and Land Act of 1919, which, the Indians contend,

wantonly violated both the terms and the spirit of the 1914 settlement

and which Europeans have declared to be "necessary in the interests of a

white population." The chief grievances of the Indians are the denial of

representation and franchise (except in Cape Colony), their segregation

within appointed areas, and the curtailment of their "inherent right to

trade." Some Europeans would fain deny that colour prejudice affects

their view of the problem, which they regard as essentially eugenic and

economic. As far as the mixture of races is concerned the European's

objections to it should be readily understood by the Indians, whose own

caste laws are as rigidly directed as any in the world against the

drawbacks of miscegenation. The European, however, has legislated not to

prevent mixed marriages but to arrest the general depression of the

standards of life--low wages, a lower standard of skill in skilled

trades, and low housing conditions which, he alleges, have resulted from

the unrestricted influx of a large coloured population into the

towns--and he uses the term "coloured" to include the Indians. With

regard to the restrictions of trade licences he deduces the necessity

for them from the economic effects of unrestricted competition which has

led, he declares, to the bankruptcy of European firms, to their

displacement in the same premises by Indians, and to the depreciation of

European property. But, the Indian replies, if Indians have thriven in

South Africa in the past it is because they work harder and live more

frugally, and if they flourish more especially as traders it is because

Europeans, finding it to their interest to trade with them, have been

their best customers. Apart from the material ruin which South African

legislation has brought upon many Indians, what they most deeply resent

is unquestionably its specifically racial character. They may suffer

fewer personal disabilities as to travelling on railways and in

tram-cars and walking on street pavements than they did a few years

ago, when very special precautions had to be taken to prevent such a

distinguished Indian as Mr. Gokhale being exposed to them during his

visit to South Africa. But they still suffer, they complain, under the

supreme indignity of racial discrimination with which South African

legislation is openly stamped. Repatriation could only take place slowly

even if the cost of compensation, which no fair-minded European could

then reasonably deny, were not in itself an almost insurmountable

obstacle. From the merely practical point of view the question therefore

is now reduced to the discovery of a _modus vivendi_ for the Indian

community now in South Africa, and it would be very near a solution if

legislation to secure the economic and eugenic standards on which the

Afrikander lays so much stress were so framed as to apply to the whole

population, even should it in practice bear more heavily on the Indian

than on the European, if the former less frequently rose to the required

standards. A similar solution would remove the sense of grievance

arising out of the denial of the franchise in Natal and the Transvaal,

of which the injustice seems to Indians to be merely heightened by the

fact that it has been given to them in Cape Colony, where they form a

much smaller minority. But there is no sign that the temper of the South

African Union, in which British and Dutch are united on no issue more

firmly than on this one, will abate its claim to treat the Indians

within its borders as an inferior race that has no rights to be weighed

against the interests, real or assumed, of the superior white race.

The Government of India has never questioned the reality of Indian

grievances in South Africa. In 1903, shortly after the Boer war, Lord

Curzon strongly urged the British Government to enforce their redress in

the Transvaal whilst it was still governed as a Crown Colony. At the end

of 1913, when the struggle was most acute, Lord Hardinge expressed his

sympathy with a frankness and warmth which fluttered Ministerial

dovecots both at home and in the Union. Since then Indian troops have

fought during the war side by side with South African troops, and the

representatives of India have sat in the War and Peace Councils of the

Empire side by side with Ministers of the South African Union. So long

as South African legislation bears the impress of racial discrimination

the Government of India is bound to maintain its opposition to it, and

the more fully it voices Indian opinion under the new constitution, the

more emphatic its opposition must be.

In other Dominions the Indian question is much less acute, as there has

never been anything like the same amount of Indian immigration, and it

is now practically stopped. But it must be remembered that it was the

return to India of a large number of Sikhs who were refused permission

to land in British Columbia that was the signal for grave disorders in

the Punjab in the second year of the war. And not so long ago the Aga

Khan, as well known in London as in India, had to give up visiting

Australia in view of the many humiliating formalities to which as an

Asiatic he would have been subjected before being allowed to land there.

It is surely not beyond the resources of statesmanship to devise at

least a scheme by which Indians of good repute who wish to travel for

purposes of business or study, or for the mere satisfaction of a

legitimate curiosity to see other parts of the Empire, should be free to

do so without any restraints on the score of race. The attitude of the

other Dominions seems certainly to be at present far less uncompromising

than that of the South African Union, and one may look forward with some

confidence to an agreement by which the rights of Indians already

settled in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada will obtain sufficient

recognition to satisfy Indian self-respect.

The Indian question is not, however, confined to the Dominions. It is

unfortunately in some of the Crown Colonies that it has recently assumed

an even more serious aspect than in South Africa, inasmuch as in the

Crown Colonies the British Government is directly responsible for the

treatment of Indians, whilst only indirectly in a Dominion, where the

primary responsibility rests with the Dominion Government. The question

of Indian indentured labour in Fiji, British Guiana, and some other

smaller colonies is of lesser importance, though Indians have been

deeply moved by stories of ill-treatment inflicted upon them by European

planters, and indenture itself is held nowadays to connote a state

almost of servitude incompatible with Indian national self-respect.

There the Government of India has a remedy in its own hands. It can

stop, and is stopping, the export of Indian labour to those colonies.

Far graver is the situation that has only recently been created for

Indians in the Crown Colony of East Africa, known since the war as

Kenia. Indians were settled in that part of Africa even before British

authority was ever established there, and Mr. Churchill, now Secretary

of State for the Colonies, himself admitted some years ago, after his

travels in that part of the world, that without the Indians the country

would never have reached its present stage of development and

prosperity. Whilst if in the case of a self-governing Dominion the

British Government can at least urge, as an excuse for its acquiescence

in the disabilities imposed upon Indians, that it cannot override the

constitutionally expressed will of the Dominion people, it can plead no

such excuse where a Crown Colony is concerned over which its authority

is absolute and final. This is indeed the point on which the Government

of India laid stress last winter in a long and closely reasoned despatch

elaborating the view already formally enunciated by the Viceroy that in

a Crown Colony Indians have a constitutional right to equality of status

with all other British subjects. That right has, it is contended, been

violated in Kenia in regard more especially to the three major questions

of franchise, segregation, and land ownership. At the very moment when,

in India, elected assemblies have been created under a new constitution

on the broadest possible franchise, the Legislative Council of Kenia,

with a population of 35,000 Indians and only 11,000 Europeans, is so

constituted that it has only two Indian members out of fourteen, whilst

of the remaining twelve, eleven are European and one represents the very

backward Arab community. Land ownership in the uplands has been reserved

exclusively for Europeans on the plea that the climate of the lowlands

to which the Indians are relegated is more suitable for them than for

Europeans. Yet the climatic argument is itself disregarded when, even in

the lowlands, racial segregation is enforced in areas reserved there too

for Europeans alone. The representations of the Government of India have

commanded the attention they deserve, and the Colonial Office has sent

out instructions to the Kenia authorities to suspend all segregation

measures. The whole question will, one may hope, be reopened and settled

on a new basis of justice for Indians. The British settlers will surely

themselves recognise, on further consideration, that their interests

cannot be allowed to override the far larger obligations of Great

Britain to the people of India.

The question of the treatment of Indians in the Crown Colonies is one

that has to be settled between the British Government and the Government

of India, and it could not therefore come before the Imperial

Cabinet--or Conference--recently attended by the Prime Ministers of all

the Dominions assembled in London. But in regard to that question in the

Dominions, Mr. Srinivasa Sastri, one of India's representatives, laid

down in their presence firmly and plainly the principle on which all

Indians are at one:

There is no conviction more strongly in our minds than this, that a

full enjoyment of citizenship within the British Empire applies not

only to the United Kingdom but to every self-governing Dominion

within its compass. We have already agreed to a subtraction from

the integrity of the rights by the compromise of 1918 to which my

predecessor, Lord Sinha, was a party--that each Dominion and each

self-governing part of the Empire should be free to regulate the

composition of its population by suitable immigration laws. On that

compromise there is no intention whatever to go back, but we plead

on behalf of those who are already fully domiciled in the various

self-governing Dominions according to the laws under which those

Dominions are governed--to these peoples there is no reason

whatever to deny the full rights of citizenship--it is for them

that we plead, where they are lawfully settled, that they must be

admitted into the general body of citizenship, and no deduction

must be made from the rights that other British subjects enjoy.

In commending the matter to his audience for earnest consideration and

satisfactory settlement, Mr. Srinivasa Sastri spoke with the added

authority of his position as a member of the Indian Legislature and one

of the ablest leaders of the Moderate party. "It is," he said, "of the

most urgent and pressing importance that we should be able to carry back

a message of hope and of good cheer." He will have to report to the

Legislature on his mission when he returns to India, and no part of his

report will be looked for with more anxiety or more closely scrutinised.

Indians have already demonstrated their willingness to recognise

accomplished facts and to accept in practice any reasonable settlement

which does not strike fatally at the principle laid down by Mr.

Srinivasa Sastri, not only on behalf of his fellow-countrymen, but in

the name of the Government of India, which here again has acted as a

national Indian Government. South Africa, it may be, will nevertheless

persist in subordinating to a narrow conception of her own interests the

higher interests of Imperial unity, which, if it ever ceased to include

India, would assuredly be a much poorer thing. It is all the more

essential that if India's faith in the Empire is not to be, perhaps

irretrievably, shaken, South Africa should remain, in her refusal to

honour the pledge of partnership given to India on behalf of the whole

Empire, a solitary exception amongst the self-governing Dominions, and

that the United Kingdom, whose responsibility to India is most directly

involved, should insist that the pledge be redeemed to the full in the

Crown Colonies which are under the immediate and direct control of the

Imperial Government.

FOOTNOTES:

[4] August 1921.

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