CHAPTER IX.

TROUBLE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ALGIERS.--THE WAR WITH

FRANCE.--WHAT OUR NAVY DID.--FROM GIBRALTAR TO MARSEILLES.

"The first time our government ran against Algerine pirates," said

Haines, "was in 1785, when they captured two vessels from the United

States, and sold their crews--twenty-one men altogether--into slavery.

The President set about getting these men released just as soon as

he heard of the capture of the ships. The diplomatic agents of the

United States in Europe were instructed to make arrangements in that

direction; but the Dey of Algiers believed that he had found a new mine

of wealth, and demanded an enormous price for the ransom of the unhappy

sailors."

"Did our government pay it?" I asked, as Haines paused.

"No, they did not," was the reply; "they determined that they would

not establish a precedent for such exorbitant demands. In France there

was a religious society called the Mathurins, that was established

hundreds of years ago for the purpose of releasing Christian captives

who were held by the infidels. Our government employed the chief of

the Mathurins to negotiate the liberation of our men, but he didn't

succeed. Several other attempts were made, but the Dey refused to come

down in his price, because he thought the Americans would pay anything

rather than let their citizens be slaves, or, at any rate, their white

citizens, as we had plenty of negro slaves in our country and thought

that kind of slavery was all right.

"Well, the thing dragged along a good while. Our government

appropriated forty thousand dollars to ransom those men. One after

another two commissioners were appointed to negotiate the business, but

each of 'em died before he got to Algiers.

"Before the negotiations for these twenty-one men were concluded, ten

more American ships had been captured, and more than a hundred sailors

sold from them into slavery. It was not till 1795 that we brought the

miserable business to an end, and got the release of the prisoners by

paying eight hundred thousand dollars in cash, with a promise of an

annual tribute of twenty-five thousand dollars, and a ship-of-war worth

one hundred thousand dollars."

"Do you mean that we were to give them a ship-of-war every year?" I

asked.

"Oh, no," replied Haines; "not a ship-of-war every year, but a single

one as soon as we could build her, after giving the eight hundred

thousand dollars down."

"Oh, I understand," I answered. "Why didn't we take that eight hundred

thousand dollars and build ships-of-war with it, and then go and blow

the Algerines sky high?"

"That's what we ought to have done," said Haines, "and it's a big shame

we didn't do it. What we did every other nation of Europe had been

doing, and some of them for hundreds of years. It is like paying a

chicken thief five dollars a month to let alone robbing your hen-roost."

"Well, if we've been paying twenty-five thousand dollars a year to the

Dey of Algiers to let us alone, how is it that he is capturing our

ships now?"

"We were not very prompt in making our payments, I believe," Haines

answered; "and besides, them pagans don't pay any attention to their

treaties. They make an agreement that is to last five or ten years, and

get a certain amount of money; but when they've used that money up and

want more they go to capturing our ships again, and simply tell us that

they are out of money and must raise it somehow.

"I'm getting off the track a little," said Haines, after a pause, "as

I promised to tell you how we owe our present navy to the Algerine

pirates. The capture of our ships was a very bad blow to American

commerce, as it drove the American flag out of the Mediterranean, and

limited our trade altogether to the West Indies. Matters had come to a

very bad state. Mr. Humphreys was appointed Commissioner for the United

States in 1793, to negotiate with the Dey of Algiers. He was treated

with great contempt by that chief of pirates, and what do you suppose

the beggar said when he talked with the American about the business?"

"I don't know, I'm sure," was the reply of all of us.

"Well, he said, 'If I were to make peace with everybody what should I

do with my corsairs? They would take off my head for the want of other

prizes, not being able to live on their miserable allowance.'

"Mr. Humphreys did not waste any time in writing to President

Washington and telling him what the barbarian scoundrel said, and he

added this comment at the end of his letter. 'If we mean to have a

commerce we must have a navy to defend it.'

"Well, the President in his next message to Congress suggested that

we must have a navy, and he gave his reasons for the suggestion.

I disremember 'em exactly; but the substance of 'em was that the

United States would never have any rank among nations if she had the

reputation of weakness. We would be sure to be insulted if we hadn't

the strength to hit back, and the only way we could have peace was to

let everybody know we were always ready to fight.

"Congress took the words of the President in good part," Haines

continued, "and passed a bill authorizing the building of six frigates,

four of them forty-four gunners, and the two thirty-six gunners; and

that's the way we owe our navy to the Algerine pirates. Would you

believe it, there were a good many members of Congress who opposed

building the navy, and thought it would be better and cheaper to make

a trade with the Dey of Algiers by paying him ransom and tribute money

instead of spending our money on ships. They made a clause in the bill

appropriating a million dollars toward buying a peace with the Dey, and

in case they did so, the building of the ships was to be stopped.

"And that's just what happened. In 1795 we made a treaty of peace with

this sea-robber which cost the government a million of dollars, as I've

already told you about. They stopped work on the ships, but they were

pretty well along by that time; and when, in 1797, we got into trouble

with France and things looked very squally, it didn't take a great

while to finish the ships and get them ready for sea."

"How did the trouble with France come about? Please tell me."

"As near as I can remember," said Haines, "this was the way of it,--

"France and England were at war, and the French government took offense

at a treaty we had made with Great Britain. They issued a secret order

authorizing French ships-of-war to capture neutral ships in the West

Indies, if they were found carrying supplies to British ports. The

French cruisers, under this authority, began to seize American ships,

and treated their crews with great cruelty. We had felt very friendly

to the French down to that time, owing to the way they helped us

during the Revolution, but they acted so badly that we didn't feel so

well afterward. Next they issued a decree which almost amounted to a

declaration of war, and I don't believe you can guess what it was."

"I have read somewhere," I said, "that the French not only authorized

the capture of American ships trading between the United States and

Great Britain and its colonies, but declared further that any American

found on board of a hostile ship, though placed there without his

consent by impressment, should be hanged as a pirate! Wasn't that it?"

"Yes, it was," said Haines; "just think of it! British ships were

constantly impressing American seamen. Suppose an English war-ship

with impressed Americans on board should be captured by a French

cruiser; those Americans were liable to be hanged as pirates! Did you

ever hear of anything so outrageous?"

"Certainly I never did," I answered; "it's difficult to believe that

such an order was possible. Did the United States declare war against

France after that?"

"They didn't do it in the regular form of a declaration," said Haines;

"but they sent out war-ships as fast as they could get them ready,

with orders to capture French ships, and at the same time they passed

a law for raising a land-force to defend our seaports. A good many

French privateers were fitted out to capture American ships, and

American privateers to capture French ships. As fast as we could get

our war-ships ready we sent them out, and the fighting very soon became

lively. The frigates United States, Constitution, and Constellation

were the first to get to sea, and the Constellation captured a French

cruiser a few days after she sailed. She was the first vessel captured

in the war, and, in fact, the first ever captured by the navy of the

United States.

"There's a funny thing about that cruiser," continued Haines, and I

listened attentively to hear what he was saying; "she was called Le

Croyable, that's what I think it was, and carried fourteen guns; she

was taken into port, where she was condemned by a prize-court, and

added to the United States navy. They named her the Retaliation, and

sent her out with two other small ships to cruise in the West Indies.

"One day they sighted two ships that they thought were British, and

sailed up within shooting distance. They discovered their mistake when

it was too late; what they had thought to be English ships turned

out to be Frenchmen, and big ones too. The French ships captured the

Retaliation, and the other two started to sail away. One of the big

French ships started after them, and she was one of the fastest sailers

in the world.

"Captain Bainbridge of the Retaliation had been taken on board the

other French ship as a prisoner. When he got there the French captain

asked him the strength of the two ships that were running away.

He promptly answered, 'Twenty-eight twelve-pounders, and twenty

nine-pounders,' which was more than double what their armament really

was. The French captain immediately signaled to the other Frenchman to

give up the chase and come back. As the one who signaled was the senior

officer the other one was obliged to obey his orders, which he did very

reluctantly, as he had got near enough to the American ships to see

that they were very much inferior to him, and he was pretty certain to

capture them."

"Didn't they punish Captain Bainbridge for telling such a falsehood?" I

asked.

"No, not at all," said Haines; "you know the old saying, 'All's fair

in love and war;' they used a few hard words about him, and then the

French captain complimented him on the success of his deception and

asked him to take a glass of wine. The trick was by no means a new one,

either on sea or on land.

"There was another hard-fought battle in February, 1800," continued

Haines, "between Commodore Truxton's ship, the Constellation,

thirty-eight guns, and a French ship called the Vengeance, of

fifty-two guns. It began at eight o'clock in the evening and lasted

till one in the morning. The ships sailed along side by side all that

time, and kept firing broadsides into each other. The rigging of the

Constellation was so cut away that her mainmast fell overboard, and

just before that happened the French ship sheered off and disappeared

in the darkness. The Constellation had fourteen men killed and

twenty-five wounded, while the Vengeance had fifty killed and one

hundred and ten wounded. Her captain said that he had lowered his flag

twice during the engagement, endeavoring to surrender, but the American

hadn't discovered it."

Haines further told me that from the beginning to the end of the

war about fifty ships, large and small, were captured by American

privateers. The frigates and other war-ships made a good many captures;

and, on the other hand, the French ships took a considerable number of

American craft.

Just as he told me this, there was a commotion outside of the room

where we were, and the same officer whom I have mentioned as wearing

so much uniform appeared at our door, accompanying the keeper of the

jail. The keeper unlocked the door, and opened it, and then we were

called into the corridor of our prison. The officer questioned us as

to whether we belonged to the crew of the Washington, and we promptly

answered that we did.

"You'd better go back to your ship at once," said he; "and if you come

ashore again try to behave yourselves. If you get into trouble here a

second time you may not get off so easily. That's all; you can go now."

We didn't stop to thank him; and, in fact, we could hardly have done

so had we thought of it, as he turned on his heel and walked away the

instant he pronounced the last word of his little speech that I have

quoted. We were only too willing to go back to the ship, and hurried to

the landing place as fast as we could go.

We gave a boatman a shilling to take us to the Washington, and you

can believe we scrambled up the side in a hurry. We reported to the

mate, who was on duty at the time, and he gave us a sharp ratting for

over-staying our liberty on shore. I endeavored to explain matters,

that our liberty had been mostly passed in jail, at which he smiled and

ordered us to go below.

Captain Dawson was ashore at the time we got back, and didn't return

for several hours. Soon after he came back he sent for Haines to come

aft and tell the story of our experience. None of the rest of us were

sent for, and we were somewhat solicitous as to the treatment Haines

would receive. The captain heard his story; and when Haines explained

that we had been set upon and provoked by the English sailors with whom

we got into the fight, and also that we had done our full share of

the knocking down before we were arrested, the captain appeared quite

satisfied, and did not make any reproof of us for over-staying our

liberty. He did say, however, that he thought it would be well for us

to heed the advice of the British officer--and not go on shore again.

Then he told Haines to "go forward," and we heard nothing more about

the matter.

We remained four or five days at Gibraltar, taking in water and

fresh provisions, repairing a few damages resulting from the gale I

have told about, and also disposing of a part of our cargo to good

advantage. There were no docks where we could lie, and our cargo was

unloaded into lighters which came alongside. Two or three times we

got into wordy altercations with the lighter men; and if order hadn't

been maintained by the captains of the lighters and our own officers,

I think we might have indulged in some hand-to-hand fighting. The men

on the lighters were mostly English, and as we were all Americans you

can readily understand that it would have been quite easy to provoke

a fight. After all our arrangements had been completed, I supposed

we would sail away at once; but to the surprise of all the crew we

continued to lie at our anchorage. The captain didn't choose to tell us

why we were delaying; and, of course, we couldn't ask him.

We lay there the next day and the next, and then the reason for our

delay became apparent. An English cruiser got up sail and proceeded out

of the harbor. When she began operations for leaving port, we followed

her example, and left our anchorage not many minutes after she had

left hers. As she reached the end of the peninsula she turned to the

eastward, and we followed her example. It then became plain to all of

us that we were sailing in her company, and she would protect us from

any further attack by the Algerines.

England was then at peace with Algiers, having made a truce with the

Dey, the real object being to concentrate the attacks of the pirates

upon the French, and also to break up American commerce in the

Mediterranean. The Dey had ordered his people not to plunder any ship

bearing the English flag. I've no doubt it caused them many a pang in

their hearts to see a large and apparently valuable ship sailing by,

and they forbidden by the orders of their ruler to capture it.

We were headed for Marseilles; and for a considerable part of the way

the coast of Spain and of southern France was in sight. We saw two or

three corsairs from the Barbary coast. Whenever they were sighted the

British war-ship slackened her speed, so that we easily closed in upon

her, and were literally under her protection. The maritime force of

Algiers at that time consisted of four frigates with an aggregate of

one hundred twenty-four guns, one polacca with eighteen guns, one brig

of twenty, four xebecs with an aggregate of one hundred sixty-eight

guns, three _galliotas_ or galiots with four guns each, and sixty

gunboats. The vessels were all manned at the rate of twelve men for

each gun. Tunis had at the same time twenty-two corsairs, mounting from

four to twenty-two guns each. So, you see, those Barbary coast pirates

had a large fleet of ships; and, bear in mind, I've not included the

fleets of Morocco and Tripoli, which were equal to about half of the

combined force of Algiers and Tunis.

I ought to explain, perhaps, that a polacca is a vessel with three

short masts, without tops, caps, or cross-trees to the upper yards. A

xebec is a small three-masted vessel used in the Mediterranean; and

a galliota is a vessel with one mast, and has from sixteen to twenty

seats for rowers. This sort of vessel is very useful for piratical

purposes, as it can be propelled at a fair speed by means of oars when

the weather is calm, which is impossible with a ship of the ordinary

build of England or the United States. As the piratical craft always

carry plenty of men they can use the oars to great advantage.

We got to Marseilles without trouble, though our convoy left us when

we were just within sight of land. It was fortunate that we did not

encounter a French fleet while on the way from Gibraltar to Marseilles,

else we might have lost our convoy and been left to take care of

ourselves.

Ordinarily, when either the French or the English ships ventured out

of port at that time they went in fleets of considerable size, for the

double purpose of offense and defense. Several ships together could

make themselves reasonably sure of capturing any straggling vessel

of the enemy; and in case of attack by an enemy's fleet they might

possibly cut some of the ships off singly, even though the enemy's

fleet was stronger than their own number. I presume it was in order to

avoid drawing an attack from the French that our British convoy turned

away at the time he did. Moreover, there was little chance that the

Algerine corsairs would venture very near the French coast for fear of

capture, and therefore we were fairly safe.

We sold our cargo to good advantage at Marseilles, and very quickly

obtained a return one. As soon as we could make ready after our cargo

was completed, we hauled out of Marseilles and headed for the Straits

of Gibraltar.

Captain John Crane, 1800-1815 · 第 9 / 21 章