Mr. Royce begins with the traditional definition of truth, which he then
proceeds to reinterpret:
Truth is very frequently defined in terms of external meaning as
_that about which we judge_.... In the second place, truth has
been defined as the _correspondence between our ideas and their
objects_[179].... When we undertake to express the objective
validity of any truth, we use judgment. These judgments, if
subjectively regarded, that is, if viewed merely as processes of
our own present thinking, whose objects are external to
themselves, involve in all their more complex forms, combinations
of ideas, devices whereby we weave already present ideas into more
manifold structure, thereby enriching our internal meaning; but
the act of judgment has always its other, its objective aspect.
The ideas when we judge are also to possess external meaning....
It is true, as Mr. Bradley has well said, that the intended
subject of every judgment is reality itself. The ideas that we
combine when we judge about external meanings are to have value
for us as truth only in so far as they not only possess internal
meaning, but also imitate, by their structure, what is at once
other than themselves, and, in significance, something above
themselves. That, at least, is the natural view of our
consciousness, just in so far as, in judging, we conceive our
thought as essentially other than its external object, and as
destined merely to correspond thereto. Now we have by this time
come to feel how hard it is to define the Reality to which our
ideas are thus to conform, and about which our judgments are said
to be made, so long as we thus sunder external and internal
meanings.[180]
_The universal judgment._--The problem is, then, to discover just the
nature and ground of this relation between the internal and external
meaning, between the idea and its object. This relation is established
in the act of judgment. Taking first _the universal judgment_, we find
here that the internal meaning has at best only a negative relation to
the external meaning.
To say that all A is B is in fact merely to assert that the real
world contains no objects that are A, but that fail to be of the
class B. To say that no A is B is to assert that the real world
contains no objects that are at once A and B.[181]
The universal judgments then "tell us indirectly what is in the realm of
external meaning; but only by first telling us what is not."[182]
However, these universal judgments have after all a positive value in
the realm of internal meaning; that is, as mere thought.
This negative character of the universal judgments holds true of
them, as we have just said, just in so far as you sunder the
external and internal meaning, and just in so far as you view the
real as the beyond, and as the merely beyond. If you turn your
attention once more to the realm of ideas, viewed as internal
meaning, you see, indeed, that they are constantly becoming
enriched in their inner life by all this process. To know by inner
demonstration that 2+2=4 and that this is necessarily so, is not
yet to know that the external world, taken merely as the Beyond,
contains any true or finally valid variety of objects at all, any
two or four objects that can be counted.... On the other hand, so
far as your internal meaning goes, to have experienced within that
which makes you call this judgment necessary, is indeed to have
observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems to
you very positive.[183]
This passage deserves especial attention. In the light of Kant, and in
view of Mr. Royce's general definition of the judgment as the reference
of internal to external meanings, one is puzzled to find that for the
mathematician the positive value of the judgment "two and two are four"
is confined to the realm of internal meaning. To be sure, Mr. Royce says
that this limitation of the positive value of the universal judgment to
the world of internal meaning occurs only when the external and internal
meaning are sundered. But the point is: Does the mathematician or anyone
else ever so sunder as to regard the judgment "two and two are four" as
of positive value only as internal meaning? Indeed, in another
connection Mr. Royce himself shows most clearly that mathematical
results are as objective and as empirical as the astronomer's star.[184]
Nor would it appear competent for anyone to say here: "Of course, they
are not internal meanings _after_ we come to see, through the kind
offices of the epistemologist, that the internal meanings are valid of
the external world." We are insisting that they are never taken by the
mathematician and scientists at first as merely internal meaning whose
external meaning is then to be established. Surely the mathematical
judgment, or any other, does not require an epistemological midwife to
effect the passage from internal to external meaning. The external
meaning is there all the while in the form of the diagrams and motor
tensions and images with which the mathematician works. The difficulty
here again seems to be that the distinction above discussed between the
idea in the logical sense, as purpose, and the immediate fulfilling
experience is lost sight of. The relation between two and four is not
first discovered as a merely internal meaning. It is discovered in the
process of fulfilling some purpose involving the working out of this
relation. So the sum of the angles of a triangle is not discovered as a
mere internal meaning whose external meaning is then to be found. It is
found _in working with_ the triangle. It is discovered _in_ the
triangle. And, once more, it matters not if the triangle here is a mere
memory image. In relation to the purpose, to the logical idea, it is as
truly external and objective as pine sticks or chalk marks. The streams
of motor, etc., images that flow spontaneously under the stimulus of the
purpose are just as immediate fulfilling experiences as the manipulation
of sticks or chalk lines.
The difficulty in keeping the universal judgment, as a judgment, in
terms of merely internal meaning may be seen from the following:
As to these two types of judgments, the universal and the
particular, they both, as we have seen, make use of experience.
The universal judgments arise in the realm where experience and
idea have already fused into one whole; and this is precisely the
realm of internal meanings. Here one constructs and observes the
consequences of one's construction. But the construction is at
once an experience _of fact and an idea_.... Upon the basis of
such ideal constructions one makes universal judgments. These in a
fashion still to us, at this stage, mysterious, undertake to be
valid of that other world--the world of external meaning.[185]
One is somewhat puzzled to know just what is meant by the fusion "of
experience and idea." We must infer that it means the fusion of some
aspect of experience which can be set over against idea, and this has
always meant the external meaning, and this interpretation seems
further warranted by the statement immediately following which describes
the fusion as one "of _fact_ and idea." The situation then seems to be
this: An internal and an external meaning, a fact and an idea, "fuse
into one whole" and thus constitute that which is yet "precisely the
realm of internal meanings," which aims to be valid of still another
world of external meanings. And this waives the question of how
experience fused into one whole can be an internal meaning, since as
such it must be in opposition and reference to an external meaning; or
conversely, how experience can be at once fact _and_ idea and still be
"fused into one whole."
Nor does the difficulty disappear when we turn to the aspects of
universality and necessity. What is the significance and basis of
universality and necessity as confined merely to the realm of internal
meaning?
So far as your internal meaning goes, _to have experienced within
that which makes you call this judgment necessary_ is, indeed, to
have observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems
to you very positive.[186]
But what is it that we "experience within" which makes us call this
judgment necessary? In the discussion of the relation of the universal
judgment to the disjunctive judgment, through which the former is shown
to get even its negative force, there is an interesting statement:
One who inquires into a matter upon which he believes himself able
to decide in universal terms, _e. g._, in mathematics, has present
to his mind, at the outset, questions such as admit of alternative
answers. "A," he declares, "in case it exists at all, is either B
or C." Further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is
B.
The last sentence is the statement referred to. What is meant by
"further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is B"? What kind
of "research," internal or external, can show this? In short, there
appears to be as much difficulty with universality and necessity in the
realm of internal meaning as in the reference of internal to external
meaning.[187]
Instead, however, of discussing this point, Mr. Royce pursues the
problem of the relation of the external and internal meaning, and finds
that regarded as sundered there is no basis so far for even the negative
universality and necessity in the reference of the internal meaning to
the external.
For at this point arises the ancient question, How can you know at
all that your judgment is universally valid, even in this ideal
and negative way, about that external realm of validity, in so far
as it is external, and is merely your Other,--the Beyond? Must you
not just dogmatically say that that world must agree with your
negations? This judgment is indeed positive. But how do you prove
it? The only answer has to be in terms which already suggest how
vain is the very sundering in question. If you can predetermine,
even if but thus negatively, what cannot exist in the object, the
object then cannot be merely foreign to you. It must be somewhat
predetermined by your Meaning.[188]
But in the universal judgment this determination, as referred to the
external meaning, is only negative.
_The particular judgment._--It is then through the particular judgment
that the universal judgment is to get any positive value in its
reference to the external meaning.
As has been repeatedly pointed out in the discussions on recent
Logic, the particular judgments--whose form is Some A is B, or
Some A is not B--are the typical judgments that positively assert
Being in the object viewed as external. This fact constitutes
their essential contrast with the universal judgments. They
undertake to cross the chasm that is said to sunder internal and
external meanings; and the means by which they do so is always
what is called "external experience."
It is now high time to ask why the internal meaning seeks this external
meaning. Why does it seek an object? Why does it want to cross the
chasm? In other words, what is the significance of the demand for the
particular judgment? In the introduction we have been told, as a matter
of description, that the internal meanings do seek the external meaning,
but why do they? We have also been told that universal judgments
"develop and enrich the realm of internal meaning." Why, then, should
there be a demand for the external meaning, for a further object? The
answer is:
We have our internal meanings. We develop them in inner
experience. There they get presented as something of universal
value, _but always in fragments_. They, therefore, so far
dissatisfy. We conceive of the Other wherein these meanings shall
get some sort of final fulfilment.[189]
It is, then, the incomplete and fragmentary character of the internal
meaning that demands the particular judgment. The particular judgment is
to further complete and determine the incomplete and indeterminate
internal meaning. And yet no sooner is this particular judgment made
than we are told that "it is a form at once positive, and very
unsatisfactorily indeterminate." Again:[190]
The judgments of experience, the particular judgments, express a
positive but still imperfect determination of internal meaning
through external experience. The limit or goal of this process
would be an individual judgment wherein the will expressed its own
final determination.[191]
Apparently, then, the particular judgment to which the internal meaning
appeals for completion and determination only succeeds in increasing the
fragmentary and indeterminate character.
This brings us to another "previous question." Just what are we to
understand by this "fragmentary" and "indeterminate" character of the
internal meaning? In what sense, with reference to what, is it
incomplete and fragmentary? Later we shall be told that it is with
reference to "its own final and completely individual expression." This
is to be reached in the individual judgment. And if we ask what is meant
by this final, complete, and individual expression--which, by the way,
no human being can experience--we read, wondering all the while how it
can be known, that it is simply "the expression that seeks no other,"
that "is satisfied," that "is conclusive of the search for
perfection."[192] Waiving for the present questions concerning the basis
of this satisfaction and perfection, all this leaves unanswered our
query concerning the other end of the matter, viz., the meaning and
criterion of the fragmentary and indeterminate character of these
internal meanings.
If we here return to the first definition of internal meaning of the
idea as a purpose in the sense of "a plan of action," such as "singing
in tune," or getting the properties of a geometrical figure, it does not
seem difficult to find a basis and meaning for this fragmentary and
indeterminate character. First we may note in a general way that it is
of the very essence of a plan or purpose to lead on to a fulfilling
experience such as singing in tune, or reaching a mathematical equation.
But here this fulfilling experience to which the plan points is not a
mere working out of detail inside the plan itself, although, indeed,
this does take place. If this were all the fulfilling experience meant,
it is difficult to see how we should escape subjective idealism.[193] We
start with a relatively indeterminate idea and end with a more
determinate _idea_, though, indeed, there is yet no criterion for this
increased determination. To be sure, the idea as a plan of action, as
has already been stated, does undergo change and does become, if you
please, more definite and complete as a plan; but this does not
constitute its fulfilment. Its fulfilment surely is to be found in the
immediate experiences of singing, etc., to which the idea points and
leads.
The fragmentary and incomplete character of the internal meaning as a
plan of action does not, then, after all, so much describe the plan
itself as it does the general condition of experience out of which the
idea arises. Experience takes on the form of a plan, of an idea,
precisely because it has fallen apart, has become "fragmentary." It is
just the business of the internal meaning, as Mr. Royce so well shows,
to form a plan, an ideal, an hypothetical synthesis that shall stimulate
an activity, which shall satisfactorily heal the breach. "Fragmentary"
is a quality, then, that belongs, not to the idea in itself considered,
but to the general condition of experience, of which the idea as a plan
is an expression.
If, now, the fragmentary character of the internal meaning is determined
simply with relation to the fulfilling experiences, such as singing in
tune, adjustments of geometrical figures, etc., to which it points and
leads, it seems as if the completion of the internal meaning must be
defined in the same terms. And this would appear to open a pretty
straight path to the redefinition of truth and error.