II

In its development from crude to expert forms judgment exhibits three

typical stages--_the impersonal_, _the reflective_, and _the intuitive_.

These we shall consider in order of development. But first it is to be

noticed that these stages of judgment are not to be regarded as hard and

fast distinctions of the kind that no indications of the higher are to

be found in the lower types, but rather as working distinctions within a

process of continuous development.

1. _The impersonal judgment._--Ever since the days of the Greek

grammarians the impersonal judgment has been considered an anomaly in

logic. And the reason is not far to seek. From the time of Aristotle it

has been customary to maintain that judgments, when analyzed, disclose a

subject and a predicate. Logically considered, these appear to be

entirely correlative, for, as Erdmann puts it,[55] "an event without a

substrate, a quality without a subject, is altogether unpresentable."

But there is in all languages a class of judgments, such as, "It rains,"

"It snows," "Fire!" in which no directly asserted subject is

discoverable. To these the name impersonal and subjectless has been

given. Here then is the difficulty. If we admit that the impersonal

expression involves predication, we must, in all consistency, search for

a subject, while at the same time the subject refuses to disclose

itself. In ancient days the orthodox logician confined his search to

language and to the spoken or written proposition. The unorthodox critic

maintained, in opposition to this, that a subject was provided only by

warping and twisting the natural sense of the impersonal expression. And

thus the matter stood until the development of modern comparative

philology. It was then demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt that

the "it" (or its equivalent) of the impersonal is a purely contentless

form word. Language provides no subject whatsoever. So strong, however,

is the hold of tradition that the search has been renewed. Attention has

been turned upon the mental processes involved, and this time with more

apparent result. Although there has been no general agreement with

reference to the subject, a classification of the different views may

still be made. (_a_) The subject is universal and undetermined; (_b_) it

is individual and more or less determined; (_c_) between these extremes

lies almost every intermediate degree conceivable.

Ueberweg maintains that the subject of the impersonal is the actual

totality of present experience. When we ask, "What rains?" we must

understand a reference to our general environment, in which no special

element is singled out. Sigwart, on the other hand, maintains that the

subject can be construed only as the actual sense-impression. This

diversity of opinion might seem to indicate that, were it not for the

constraining power of theory, a subject would scarcely be thought of

for the impersonal. Still it must be admitted that when we examine the

impersonal expression closely we can discover a sense-impression,

whether definite or indefinite, combined with an idea. This would seem

to give the case to the orthodox logician, for he will at once claim the

sense-impression as the subject and the idea as the predicate of the

judgment. But we must have a care. Predication is usually held to

consist in a _reference_ of predicate _to_ subject. The factors of the

judgment are, as it were, held apart. In the impersonal no such thing as

this can be discovered. The meaning is so close a unity that impression

and idea are entirely fused. We may analyze the expression and find them

there, but by so doing we destroy the immediacy which is an essential

characteristic of the impersonal. In other words, the impersonal does

not analyze itself. It is entirely unconscious of its make-up. And yet

it is definite and applies itself with precision: If I am in a

lecture-hall and hear the fire-alarm, the thought "Fire!" which enters

my mind leads to an immediate change in my conduct. I arise, move

quietly out, and prepare for duty. If, on the other hand, I open the

street door and the rain strikes my face, I ejaculate "Raining!" turn,

reach for my umbrella, and pass out protected. In both cases I act

_knowingly_ and with _meaning_, but I do not analyze the movement either

of thought or of action. A correlate to the unreflective impersonal

judgment is found in early custom. Custom embodies social ideas and is

an instrument for the determination and control of action. Individuals

moved by custom know what they are about and act with precision

according as custom may demand. But it is notorious that custom is

direct and unreflective. It represents social instruments of control

which have grown up without method and which represent the slow

accretion of rule-of-thumb activities through many ages. So in the

impersonal judgment we have a type of intellectual instrument which has

been brought to a high degree of precision in use, but which still

retains the simplicity and certainty of an unquestioned instrument of

action. For this reason, whatever complexity of elements the impersonal

may present to a reflective view, it does not contain to itself.

Consequently it may be best to say that to the impersonal there is

neither subject, predicate, nor reference of the one to the other. These

are distinctions which arise only when the instrument of action has been

questioned and the mind turns back upon the meaning which it has

unhesitatingly used, analyzing, investigating, constructing, laying bare

the method and function of its tools. Thus arises a new and distinctive

type of judgment, viz., the reflective.

2. _The reflective judgment._--By the reflective judgment is to be

understood that form of meaning whose structure and function have become

a problem to itself. The days of naïve trust and spontaneous action have

gone by. Inquiry, criticism, aloofness, stay the tendency to immediate

action. Meaning has grown worldly wise and demands that each situation

shall explain itself and that the general principles and concrete

applications of its own instruments shall be made manifest. Hence in the

various forms of reflective thought we find the progressive steps in

which meaning comes to full consciousness of its function in experience.

The demonstrative judgment (the simplest of the reflective type) carries

doubt, criticism, construction, and assertion written on the face of it.

For example, in the expression, "That is hot," we do not find the

directness and immediacy of response characteristic of the simpler

impersonal "hot." Instead, we note a clash of tendencies, a suspension

of the proposed action, a demand for and a carrying out of a

reconsideration of the course of action, the emergence of a new meaning,

and the consequent redirection of activities. An iron lies upon the

hearth; I stretch out my hand to return it to its place; I stop

suddenly, having become conscious of signs of warmth; the thought arises

in my mind, "That is hot;" I experiment and find my judgment correct; I

search for a cloth, and thus protected carry out my first intention.

Again, a hunter notes a movement in the thicket, quickly raises his gun,

and is about to fire. Something in the movement of the object arrests

him. He stops, thinking, "That is a man, perhaps." What has caught the

eye has arrested his action, has become a demand, and not until the

situation has become clear can the hunter determine what to do. In other

words, he must reflectively assure himself what the object is before he

can satisfy himself as to how he should act. Subject and predicate have

arisen and have consciously played their parts in the passage from doubt

to decision.

Under the heading "individual judgments" are classed such expressions

as, "That ship is a man-o'-war," "Russia opposes the policy of the open

door in China." In both these cases it is evident that an advance in

definiteness of conception and of complexity of meaning has been made,

while at the same time we recognize that the instrumental

characteristics of the thought-movement remain the same. In considering

the subject of the judgment we note that the stimulus presents itself

partly as a determinate factor and partly as a problem--an insistent

demand. The expression, "That ship is a man-o'-war," might be written,

"That is a ship and of the kind man-o'-war," and it thus constitutes

what Sigwart calls a "double synthesis." As used in actual judgment,

however, the two are held together and constitute the statement of a

single stimulus of which a certain portion is evident and a certain

portion is in doubt. The working out of the difficulty is given in the

predicate "is a man-o'-war," in which we at once detect the instrumental

characteristics fundamental to all judgment. To illustrate: At the

close of the battle of Santiago, in the Spanish-American war, smoke

appeared upon the horizon revealing the presence of a strange ship.

Instantly attention was directed to it, and it became a problem for

action--a demand for instrumental information. Soon it was identified as

a man-o'-war, and the American ships were cleared for action. Closer

approach raised a further question with reference to its nationality.

After some debate this also was resolved, and hostile demonstrations

were abandoned.

The universal judgment is sometimes said to exhibit two distinct forms.

Investigation, however, has proved this statement to be incorrect.

Instances taken in themselves and apart from their character are of no

logical significance. Advance is made by weighing instances and not by

counting them. In short, the true universal is the hypothetical

judgment, and the reason for this may be readily shown. The hypothetical

judgment is essentially double-ended. On the one hand, it is a statement

of the problem of action in terms of the conditions which will turn the

problem into a solution. On the other hand, it is an assertion that once

the conditions of action have been determined the result desired may be

attained. Here we note that the judgment has come to clear consciousness

of itself and of the part which it plays in experience. It has now

obtained an insight into the criterion of its legitimate employment,

_i. e._, of its truth and falsity. And this insight makes the

justification of its claim almost self-evident. For, inasmuch as the

hypothetical judgment says, "If such and such conditions be realized,

such and such a result will be obtained," the test of the claim is made

by putting the conditions into effect and watching whether the promised

experience is given. And further, since it has been found that the

judgment formulated as a hypothesis actually accomplishes what it

promises, we must admit that the hypothetical judgment is also

categorical. These two factors cannot be separated from each other. It

is true that the hypothetical judgment reduces every valid meaning to

the form, "_If_ certain conditions be realized," but it as plainly and

positively asserts, "such and such results _will_ be obtained." When we

grasp the absolute correlativity of the hypothetical and categorical

aspects of judgment, we realize at once the essentially instrumental

character of judgment, when it comes to consciousness of its structure

and function. It arises in the self-conscious realization of a problem.

This it reflects upon and sizes up. When the difficulty has been

apprehended, the judgment emerges as the consciousness of the conditions

which will attain the desired end of action freed and unimpeded. This

may be illustrated by reference to the work of Pasteur cited above. His

investigations began in a problem set for him by agricultural conditions

in France. A certain disease had made the profitable rearing of sheep

and cattle almost an impossibility. After long and careful examination

he discovered the beneficial effects of vaccination. To him the

conditions which governed the presence of the disease became apparent,

and this knowledge furnished him with an instrument by means of which

one difficulty was removed from the path of the stock-raiser. In this

illustration we have an epitome of the work accomplished everywhere by

the scientist. It is his task to develop and to reduce to exact terms

instruments of control for the varied activities of life. In its parts

and as a whole each instrument is intelligently constructed and tested

so that its make-up and function are exactly known. Because of this,

reasoned belief now takes the place of unreflective trust as that was

experienced in the impersonal stage of judgment. What at first hand

might appear to be a loss was in reality a gain; the breakdown of the

impersonal was the first step in the development of an instrument of

action conscious of its reason for being, its methods and conditions of

action. These latter constitute the distinctive subject and predicate of

the reflective judgment.

This brings us to the connection between the hypothetical character of

this form of judgment and its universality. And this perhaps will now be

quite apparent. The reflective judgment lays bare an objective

connection between the conditions and outcomes of actions. It proves its

point by actually constructing the event. Such being the case,

universality is no more than a statement of identical results being

predictable wherever like conditions are realized. If it be true that

"man is mortal," then it is an identical statement to insist that,

"Wherever we find men there we shall also find mortality."

And this point brings us naturally to the treatment of the disjunctive

judgment: "A is either B or C or D." In the disjunctive judgment the

demand is not for the construction of a reliable instrument of action,

but for the resolution of a doubt as to which instrument is precisely

fitted to the circumstances. In fact, the disjunctive judgment involves

the identification of the practical problem. When we say of a man, "He

is either very simple or very deep," we have no doubt as to our proper

course of action in either case. If he is simple, then we shall do so

and so; if he is deep, then another course of action follows. We can lay

out alternative courses beforehand, but the point of difficulty lies

here: "But just which is he?" In short, the disjunctive judgment is the

demand for and the attempt at a precise diagnosis of a concrete problem.

To illustrate: A patient afflicted with aphasia is brought to a

physician. The fact that the trouble is aphasia may be quite evident.

But what precisely is the form and seat of the aphasia? To the mind of

the educated physician the problem will take on the disjunctive form:

"This is either subcortical or cortical aphasia. If subcortical,

intelligence will not be impaired; if cortical, the sensor and motor

tracts will be in good condition." Appropriate tests are made and the

subcortical possibilities are shut out. The disjunction disappears and

the judgment emerges: "This is a case of cortical aphasia." But now a

new disjunction arises. It is either the sensory or motor form of

cortical aphasia, and, whichever one of these, it is again one of

several possibilities. As the alternatives arise, the means for

discriminating them arise also; determinate symptoms are observed, and

in due time the physician arrives at the final conclusion: "This is

sensory cortical aphasia of the visual type." Having determined this,

his method of action is assured, and he proceeds to the appropriate

operation. Thus, finally, we are brought to a form of judgment aware not

only of its motive, method, and justification, but also to one aware of

its specific application to individual cases. Thus it would seem as

though judgment had returned upon itself and had completed the

determination of its sphere of action. And in one sense this is true. In

the disjunctive judgment, as inclusive of the motives of the

hypothetical and categorical forms, the reflective judgment would appear

to have come to its limit of development. One thing, however, remains to

be considered, viz., the development from crude to expert uses of

intellectual instruments.

3. _The intuitive judgment._--As stated above, the intuitive type of

judgment depends upon efficiency in the use of judgment. In this regard

there is a great similarity between the impersonal and the intuitive

judgments. Both are immediate and precise. But there is a radical and

essential difference. The impersonal judgment knows nothing of the

strict analysis, insight, and constructive power of the reflective

judgment. The intuitive judgment, on the other hand, includes the

results of reflection and brings them to their highest power.

Paradoxically put, in the intuitive judgment there is so much reflection

that there is no need for it at all. To the intuitive judgment there is

no hesitation, no aloofness. Action is direct, but entirely

self-conscious. That such a type of judgment as the intuitive exists

there can be no doubt. There is all the difference in the world between

the quality of consciousness of a mere layman and that of an expert, no

matter what the line. The layman must size up a situation. It is a

process whose parts are successive, whether much or little difficulty be

experienced. For the expert situations are taken in at a glance, parts

and whole are simultaneous and immediate. Yet the meaning is entirely

exact. The expert judgment is self-conscious to the last degree. While

other individuals are thinking out what to do, the expert has it, sees

the advantage, adjusts, and moves. Demand and solution jump together.

How otherwise can we explain, for example, the action of an expert

ball-player? Witness his rapid reactions, his instantaneous adjustments.

Mistakes of opponents which would never be noticed by the average player

are recognized and seized upon. On the instant the new opening is seen,

the adjustment is evident, the movement made. Illustrations to the same

effect could be drawn from other modes of life, _e. g._, music, the

military life, etc. That intuitive judgments are not more common is a

proof in itself of their distinctive character and value. Only in so far

as we become experts in our special fields of experience and have

reduced our instruments of action to precise control, can we expect the

presence of intuitive judgments. They remain, therefore, as the final

outcome of the judgment-function made perfect in its technique and use.

In conclusion we shall make a brief summary of our investigation and a

criticism of certain current theories of judgment.

Judgment is essentially instrumental. Its function is to construct,

justify, and refine experience into exact instruments for the direction

and control of future experience through action. It exhibits itself

first in the form of instruments developed unsystematically in response

to the hard necessities of life. In a higher stage of development the

instrumental process itself is taken into account, and systematically

developed until in the methodical procedure of science the general

principles of knowledge are laid bare and efficient instruments of

action constructed. Finally, constant, intelligent use results in

complete control, so that within certain spheres doubt and hesitancy

would seem to disappear as to the character of the tools used, and

remain only as a moment in determining their wisest or most appropriate

employ.

The criticism indicated is based upon the instrumental character of

judgment and is directed against all theories which contend that

knowledge is a "copying" or "reproducing" of reality. In whatever form

this "copy" theory be stated, the question inevitably arises how we can

compare our ideas with reality and thus know their truth. On this

theory, what we possess is ever the copy; the reality is beyond. In

other words, such a theory logically carried out leads to the breakdown

of knowledge. Only a theory which contains and constructs its criterion

within its own specific movement can verify its constructions. Such a

theory is the instrumental. Judgment constructs a situation in

consciousness. The values assigned in this situation have a determining

influence upon values further appreciated. The construction arrived at

concerns future weal and woe. Thus gradually a sense of truth and

falsity attaches to the construing of situations. One sees that he

_must_ look beyond _this_ situation, because the way he estimates _this_

situation is fraught with meaning beyond itself. Hence the critically

reflective judgment in which hesitancy and doubt direct themselves at

the attitude, elements, and tools involved in defining and identifying

the situation, instead of at the situation itself _in toto_. Instead of

developing a complex of experience through assigning qualities and

meanings to the _situation_ as such, some one of the quales is selected,

to have _its_ significance determined. It becomes, _pro tempore_, the

situation judged. Or the same thing takes place as regards some "idea"

or value hitherto immediately fastened upon and employed. In either case

we get the reflective judgment, the judgment of pure relationship as

distinct from the constructive judgment. But the judgment of relation,

employing the copula to refer a specified predicate to a specified

object, is after all only for the sake of controlling some immediate

judgment of constructive experience. It realizes itself in forming the

confident habit of prompt and precise mental adjustment to

individualized situations.