believing that such a course would bring Ferdinand to terms. But so
far Gustavus’ successes had come from a systematic plan of campaign
which embraced the whole of Germany in its scope. He had secured each
step and had risked nothing unnecessarily. He saw the chances pointed
out, but he also saw that if he advanced south, his right rear would
be threatened by Tilly, who had, after his defeat, retired toward the
Rhenish provinces and there made a new base. The king preferred his
own plan of first gaining a firm footing in western Germany. He held
interior lines and saw that he could operate against his enemies in
detail. To complete his plan would secure him from the lower Elbe to
the middle and upper Rhine, and he could then turn against Bavaria and
Austria from the west, as his advisers would now have him do from the
north, and with distinctly better effect. Meanwhile the Saxons could
operate towards Silesia and Bohemia to secure Gustavus’ left in his
advance, and Hesse Cassel could hold head against Tilly on Gustavus’
right. The scheme was wise and far-sighted, took into calculation all
the political and military elements of the situation, and was based on
broad, sound judgment. For seventeen hundred years, no one had looked
at war with so large an intelligence.
It may be said that war is a game of risks. But to play a gambler’s
game was not Gustavus’ _forte_. When the occasion demanded, he could
disregard every danger. What he has taught us is method, not temerity.
His mission was to abolish the Quixotism of his day.
The Saxon Elector, with a mixed army over twenty thousand strong,
accordingly marched into Bohemia and Silesia (Oct., 1631) and pushed
the Imperialists back from Prague on Tabor. Everything promised
success. But all at once the Elector appeared to lose heart, arrested
his advance, and opened negotiations with the Emperor, who, seeing that
threats had not succeeded, had tried conciliation. This part of the
operation was nullified.
Gustavus moved to Würzburg. Franconia joined the Protestant cause as
Thuringia had already done. Tilly, having recovered from his late
defeat, and his present position being no threat to Gustavus, marched
southerly. With allies he collected over fifty thousand men and
proposed to seek battle. But the Elector of Bavaria, fearful for his
territory, kept Tilly on the defensive.
Gustavus was now firmly established on the Main, and in Thuringia and
Franconia, and he presently moved down the river to fully secure the
Rhineland, leaving a sufficient force opposite Tilly in Franconia. His
men marched along both banks with the baggage on boats. He crossed the
Rhine, took Mainz and transformed it into an allied fortress.
Germany was metamorphosed. The allies had one hundred and fifty
thousand men in the field. Recruiting was lively. All Protestants
were united in sentiment, purpose, and efforts. France was helpful
in keeping the Catholic princes along the Rhine in a condition of
neutrality, while Gustavus lay in a central position between the
Emperor and these same princes. Bavaria was an uncertain element. The
Emperor had a total of but eighty thousand men, and of these the bulk
were protecting the Danube instead of carrying desolation into the
Protestant territory.
Gustavus now concentrated on the middle Main to the number of
forty-five thousand men and marched on Nürnberg, where he was received
with enthusiasm. Tilly crossed the Danube and took up a position over
against Rain, behind the Lech, with forty thousand effective. From
Nürnberg Gustavus marched to Donauwörth, also crossed the Danube and
sent out a detachment to take Ulm.
The king was daring at the proper time. His whole campaign so far
had been cautious and systematic, neglecting no point in his general
scheme. He was now face to face with the army he had driven from
northern and western Germany, and was ready for battle. He could not
draw Tilly from his entrenched camp; and he determined to impose on
him by boldly crossing the river in his front and attacking it,--then
simply an unheard-of proceeding. He believed that the moral advantage
to be gained by a stroke of audacity would more than compensate for
the danger, and danger was to Gustavus an incentive. He erected a
battery of seventy-two guns on the left bank of the Lech, opposite
Rain, and under cover of its fire set over a portion of the troops
in boats, built in two days a bridge and a bridge-head, led over the
infantry, and sent the cavalry up stream to ford the river above the
enemy’s position (April, 1632).
Tilly and the Elector of Bavaria sought too late to interrupt these
fearless proceedings. They issued from their camp with a select body
of troops and attacked the Swedes, who were backing on the Lech. But
the crossfire of the admirably posted Swedish batteries was severe; the
Swedish infantry held its own, and the cavalry rode down upon their
flank. In this obstinate combat Tilly was mortally wounded. His second
in command suffered a like fate. The Imperial troops lost heart and
took refuge within their breastworks. Oncoming darkness forestalled
pursuit. But Gustavus had gained his object. The Imperial army had lost
_morale_ and organization, and his own had gained in abundant measure.
This is the first instance of forcing the passage of a wide and rapid
river in the teeth of the enemy.
The Elector retired to Ratisbon. The Swedes took possession of many
towns in Bavaria, including Munich. But the country population was so
hostile that a permanent occupation seemed a waste of energy; Gustavus
retired to Ingolstadt.
A disturbing element now arose in a curious suspicion of the ulterior
motives of Gustavus. Both Protestants and Catholics--Germans
alike--began to fear that the king might be tempted by his successes
to make himself autocrat of Germany. This feeling soon begot a
half-heartedness among the king’s supporters. Richelieu feared that
Gustavus, instead of Ferdinand, was reaching a point which might
make him dangerous to France. The Emperor, meanwhile, went back
to Wallenstein, who had been so successful before his deposition
from command. Wallenstein made hard terms, but he was a power which
could no longer be disregarded. Ferdinand, to gain his aid, gave him
uncontrolled authority over the army he should raise and all its
operations.
Wallenstein began recruiting. He soon had forty thousand men. The
Catholics grew braver when the reconciliation of Wallenstein and the
Emperor became known. This, added to the suspicions of the allies,
constrained Gustavus to cease his successful offensive for a cautious
holding of what he already had.
Wallenstein marched into Bohemia, the Saxons offering no resistance,
and took Prague. He then moved to Bavaria and joined the Elector.
Seeing that Wallenstein by this manœuvre had gained a position from
which he might endanger his communications with northern Germany,
Gustavus marched summarily on Nürnberg, which was the “cross-roads” of
that section of the country, to head Wallenstein off from Saxony, and
ordered his outlying detachments to concentrate there. He had under
his immediate command but one-third of Wallenstein’s total, and could
not assume the offensive. But he would not abandon southern Germany
until driven from it. He entrenched a camp near the town. Despite
superior numbers, Wallenstein did not attack. He could not rise above
the prejudice of the day. He deemed hunger a more efficient ally than
assault. He sat down before Nürnberg (July, 1632). The small-war
indulged in generally ran in favor of the king, who patiently awaited
reënforcements, having provided two months’ provisions for his army and
the town. Oxenstiern meanwhile collected thirty-eight thousand men and
advanced to the aid of his chief. Gustavus marched out to meet him.
Wallenstein did not interfere. The king was prepared for battle should
he do so. It was a grave military error that Wallenstein took no means
to prevent this junction.
Soon after Gustavus had received his reënforcements, he determined to
bring Wallenstein to battle, for famine had begun to make inroads in
Nürnberg and in both camps. He accordingly marched out and drew up in
the enemy’s front, but Wallenstein could not be induced to leave his
entrenchments (Aug., 1632). Failing in this, the king at last resorted
to an assault on the Imperial fortifications. But after a gallant
struggle he was driven back with a loss of two thousand men. He has
been blamed for this assault. He deserves rather the highest praise for
his effort to show the world that gallantry and enterprise are among
the best characteristics of war. After him, Frederick proved that good
troops can more often take entrenchments than fail. His grenadiers
were accustomed to assault works held by two to one of their own
number,--and take them, too, under the king’s stern eye.
After ten weeks of this futile struggle, and much loss on both
sides, Gustavus, fairly starved out by want of rations and of battle,
determined to regain his communications with northern Germany. He left
five thousand men in Nürnberg, and marching past Wallenstein’s camp
unchallenged, moved to Würzburg. He had but twenty-four thousand men
left. Wallenstein, who again neglected an admirable chance of falling
on Gustavus’ flank, soon after marched to Bamberg with the relics of
his army, reduced to about the same number (Sept., 1632).
Learning that Wallenstein had left Nürnberg, Gustavus, in the belief
that his opponent would seek repose for a period, marched back to the
Danube to resume the thread of his own work. The Nürnberg incident
had interrupted, not discontinued his general plan. Wallenstein, as
he had anticipated, sat quietly in Bamberg. He had shown singular
disinclination to come to blows with the king, and exhibited far less
activity, though, in truth, Wallenstein was both a distinguished and
able soldier.
On other fields the Swedes and allies were generally successful, but
finally thirty thousand Imperialists concentrated in Saxony, and
Wallenstein joined them and took Leipsic. Gustavus (Sept., 1632) feared
for his Saxon alliance, without which he could scarcely maintain
himself. He again put off the prosecution of his general scheme, to go
where lay the most imminent danger. Oxenstiern again advised a summary
march on Vienna, but Gustavus wisely rejected the advice. At that day
Vienna had not its importance of 1805. The king left a suitable force
in Bavaria (Oct., 1632), marched northward and entrenched a camp at
Naumberg. Wallenstein turned to meet him. His evident duty was to
concentrate and attack. But, according to the idea of that day, he
parcelled out his army in detachments, sending Pappenheim to Halle
while he marched to Merseburg. The Imperial general had blundered
into a cardinal position in the midst of the allies. The Swedes,
twenty-seven thousand strong, were at Naumberg, the Saxons, with
eighteen thousand, at Torgau, and ten thousand allies were marching up
the left bank of the Elbe. Wallenstein’s manifest operation was to fall
on each of these forces singly--on Gustavus first, as the strongest.
But he appeared to lose both head and heart when facing Gustavus.
He grew weaker as Gustavus grew more bold. He made no use of his
advantage, even if he comprehended it.
The king had got possession of the crossing of the Saale, but
Wallenstein stood between him and the Saxons. Gustavus’ generals
advised a manœuvre to join these allies, but the king was instinct with
mettle, and determined upon action.
The ensuing battle of Lützen has little which is remarkable, beyond
the fiery ardor which ended in the death of Gustavus Adolphus. It
was a battle in simple parallel order, but the better discipline of
the Swedish army and the greater mobility of its organization showed
as marked superiority over Wallenstein’s masses as the Roman legion,
for the same reason, had shown over the Macedonian phalanx eighteen
centuries before. The Swedes won the victory, but they lost their king,
and Germany its protector and champion.
As is the case with all great captains, Gustavus Adolphus gave the
impulse to every action while on the theatre of operations of the
Thirty Years’ War. For many centuries war had been conducted without
that art and purpose which Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar so markedly
exhibited. But in the operations of the Swedish king we again find the
hand of the master. We recognize the same method which has excited
our admiration in the annals of the noted campaigns of antiquity, and
from now on we shall see generals who intelligently carry forward what
Gustavus Adolphus rescued from the oblivion of the Middle Ages.
The operations of the king, from his appearance in Germany, showed
his exceptional genius for war. He had no military guide, except his
study of the deeds of the ancients, for modern war up to his day had
altogether lacked depth and directness. During the first fourteen
months, he secured his foothold in the northern coast provinces,
in a most clear-witted and orderly manner. Every circumstance was
against him. He had weak forces to oppose to the Emperor’s might.
The half-hearted, fear-ridden Protestants yielded him little aid and
comfort; yet he reached his goal, step by step, seizing and holding
strong places at key points, and accumulating supplies where he could
count on their safety. But once, during his entire German campaign,--at
Nürnberg,--was he out of rations, and this without ravaging the
country. He carefully secured his communications with the base he
had established and with Sweden, and never manœuvred so as to lose
them. He gradually strengthened himself with allies and recruits.
Unlike the armies of the day, who behaved as if the populations of
the countries they traversed were of less consequence than the beasts
of the field, Gustavus dealt with them in a spirit of kindliness and
Christian charity which won them over to his side. He kept his troops
under strict discipline, and by supplying all their wants and paying
them regularly, could rightfully prohibit marauding and plunder. He
understood how to avoid battle with an enemy too strong to beat, how to
lead him astray on the strategic field, how to manœuvre energetically
against an enemy, his equal or inferior in strength; how to make the
tactical mobility of his troops and his own ardor on the battle-field
tell; how to improve victory; and how to heighten and maintain the
morale of his troops under victory and defeat alike.
When, by his cautious and intelligent plan, the king stood firmly
planted between the sea, the Oder, and the Elbe, with flanks and rear
well guarded, he at once altered his conduct. He crossed the Elbe and
boldly attacked the enemy, adding to his strength by beating him;
and, leaving the allies to protect his flanks and communications, he
advanced with spirit and energy. In thirty days he had established
himself firmly on the Main; in little over four months more he had
moved down the Main, and had possessed himself of or neutralized the
whole middle Rhine; and in twelve weeks thence had crossed the Danube,
beaten the enemy at the Lech, and occupied almost all Bavaria. Thus
in less than nine months (Sept., 1631 to June, 1632) he had overrun a
much larger territory than he had previously gained in fourteen, and
had added vastly to his standing. He had been bold and decisive, and
yet never lacking in the method and caution which were his guide. He
had established himself as firmly in southern Germany as previously in
northern.
At the height of his reputation and success, he was now ready to attack
Austria from the west. But the policy of France changed, his allies
became suspicious, and Wallenstein moved toward his rear. The scene
changed. Gustavus had no longer the security of whole-hearted allies to
connect him with Sweden, and his policy at once shifted to the cautious
one he had first shown. The thing for him to consider, if he was to be
thrown on his own resources, was first and foremost his communications.
With forces inferior to Wallenstein’s, he acted on the defensive. With
the accessions which made his army equal to Wallenstein’s, he again
went over to an offensive at that day startling in its audacity. This
failing, and provision having given out, he moved, not to Bavaria, but
to the Main, to protect his line of retreat, which naturally traversed
Hesse Cassel. So soon as Wallenstein retired to Bamberg, Gustavus,
leaving a lieutenant to observe him, felt at liberty to take up his
old thread in Bavaria. He had gauged his opponent aright. When again
Wallenstein, by his Saxon affiliations, threatened, and this time more
seriously, the king’s allies, and remotely the security of his advanced
position, Gustavus again resorted to decisive operations. His march to
Saxony and his attack on the enemy at Lützen were equally bold, rapid,
and skilful.
Herein is a peculiarly intelligent adaptation of work to existing
conditions. From the king’s landing to the passage of the Elbe, while
securing his base, a cautious, but by no means indecisive policy; from
crossing the Elbe to Nürnberg, while moving upon the enemy, a singular
quickness and boldness, but by no means lacking in intelligent and
methodical caution; from Nürnberg to Lützen an alternation from caution
to boldness as circumstances warranted. After Cæsar’s day, Gustavus was
the first who firmly and intelligently carried through a campaign on
one well considered, fully digested, broad, and intelligent plan, and
swerved therefrom only momentarily and partially to meet exigencies
which could not be foreseen. The advice of his most trusted aides was
often opposed to what he did; but they could not see as far as he saw.
Each variation had its definite object, which attained, the general
plan was at once resumed. There was an entire freedom from blind
subservience to the rules of war as then laid down; an intelligent
sequence and inter-dependence of movement on a plan elastic enough
to meet unexpected obstacles; these produced a perfectly systematic
whole, in which the unity of plan was never disturbed; and with this
broad scheme went hand in hand a careful execution of detail upon which
depended the success of the whole. His occupation remained firm; his
victualling was sufficient to his needs; his movements accomplished
what he sought.
In pursuance of his cautious plan he neglected no essential fortress or
city; he held the passages of important rivers by erecting bridge-heads
or occupying towns; he kept upon his line of operations suitable
detachments, or met descents upon it by a prompt movement towards the
enemy. He so managed the division of his forces as not to endanger his
strength nor to lose the ability to concentrate. He used his allies
for the work they could best perform. He kept the main offensive in his
own hands, generally so ordering that his lieutenants should act on the
defensive, unless they outnumbered the enemy, and then made them push
with vigor. He uniformly did the right thing at the right moment.
The secret of Gustavus’ success lay in his breadth of plan, in his
constancy to the work cut out, and in his properly adapting boldness or
caution to the existing circumstances. As with Alexander, Hannibal, and
Cæsar, it was the man himself whose soul illumined his work; and this
man had those transcendent qualities which produce incomparable results
in war, whenever they coexist with great events. Equal as monarch and
soldier, he united in his one person the art of both. His nation and
army were devoted to him soul and body. His motives were the highest
and purest which have ever inspired a great captain; his pursuit of
them was steadfast and noble, open-handed and above-board, prudent and
intrepid. In weighing his intelligence, sound judgment, strong will,
elevated sentiment, energy and vigilance, he is properly put in the
highest rank. But though his record cannot perhaps vie with the others
in the brilliancy of his tactics, in the splendor of his victories,
in extent of conquest, in immensity of ambition, in the surmounting
of all but impossible natural or artificial barriers, in resisting
overwhelming disaster with heroic constancy,--still, if we look at the
man, upon the results of what he did, at the purposeless and barbarous
nature of war as conducted up to his day; if we weigh the influence
of his short campaigns upon all modern war, and consider how his
nobility of character and his life-work has made toward civilization,
we cannot rate Gustavus Adolphus too high. His pointing out the
importance of key-points in holding a country; the value of feeding an
army by careful accumulation of supplies, instead of by ravaging every
territory it enters; the advantage of a carefully drawn plan extending
over the entire theatre of operations; and the propriety of waging war
in a more Christian and civilized spirit,--marks the first step towards
the modern system. Gustavus Adolphus must be called the father of the
modern art of war; and is acknowledged as the one of all others who
re-created systematic, intellectual war, and stripped war of its worst
horrors.
After his death, his lieutenants tried fruitlessly to carry on his
methods. They retained a part of what he gave them; in many things they
slid back into the old ruts; and war (except with masters like Turenne,
Prince Eugene, and Marlborough) resumed its character of isolated
raids, until Frederick once more elevated it and stamped upon it a
permanence which it cannot now lose.
Among his enemies, during the remainder of the Thirty Years’ War there
was nothing but the extremity of barbarous methods, over which it is
well to draw a veil.
Gustavus Adolphus was tall, handsome, and strong. In his later years
he grew so heavy that none but well-bred horses of great bone and
endurance could carry him. But he rode fast and far. His bearing was
noble, full of simple complaisance, and genuine. His quick mind robbed
work of effort; his ideas were clear, and he expressed them crisply
and in happy words; his voice was rich, his manner convincing.
A remarkable memory served to retain the names and merits of his
subordinate officers and numberless worthy men. He maintained stern
discipline in a just and kindly spirit. His religious fervor was as
honest as his courage was high-pitched. The Bible was his constant
companion and guide. He began all his acts with unaffected prayer,
and ended with thanksgiving. The Christian virtues never resided in a
more princely soul. He was sober, of simple habit, and upright life.
Towering over all around him in mind and heart, and inflexible withal,
he was yet modest and ready to weigh the opinions of others. A tireless
worker, he demanded equal exertion from his officials and aides. But
in his intercourse with all men were kingly condescension and dignity
joined. He was more than monarch,--he was a man.
What has Gustavus Adolphus done for the art of war? In a tactical
sense, many things. Before him, not a few noted generals had introduced
improvements naturally growing out of the introduction of gunpowder.
Gustavus made various changes towards greater mobility. The cumbrous
armies of the day were marshalled in battalia, which were huge, dense
squares or phalanxes of deep files of musketeers and pikemen mixed,
awkward and unwieldy. The recruiting of the day assembled many men
of many minds, and the three arms worked at cross-purposes. Gustavus
began by reducing the pikemen to one-third the entire infantry, and
later (1631) formed whole regiments of musketeers alone. He lightened
the musket, did away with the crutch-rest, till then used in firing,
introduced wheel-locks, paper cartridges, and cartridge-boxes. He
taught his men a much quicker manual of aims. The times and motions
of loading and firing had been some one hundred and sixty; Gustavus
reduced them to ninety-five, which sounds absurdly slow to us to-day.
But his men none the less vastly exceeded the enemy in rapidity of
fire. He lightened the guns of his artillery, and made the drill of
other arms conform to its manœuvres, so that his whole army worked with
one purpose. His batteries became active and efficient. In the Thirty
Years’ War he generally had a preponderance of artillery over the
Imperialists.
To secure better fire, Gustavus reduced his musketeers to six ranks,
which to fire closed into three. This it was which principally gave
it so much greater nimbleness of foot. The troops were well armed and
equipped, and uniformed for the first time. Few wagons were allowed per
regiment, and effectual discipline prevailed. Severe regulations were
enforced. The behavior of the Swedish troops was the marked reverse of
that of Wallenstein’s and Tilly’s forces. Service and seniority alone
secured promotion; nepotism was unknown. The force Gustavus created was
the first truly national regular army.