man of high character and attainments; Varro came of plebeian stock,
was overbearing and self-sufficient. The Roman and Carthaginian armies
lay facing each other near the Aufidus, Hannibal backing on Cannæ.
His position here had been the result of an admirable manœuvre. The
consuls commanded on alternate days. There had been a serious combat
on the last day of Varro’s command, in which the Carthaginians had
been outnumbered two to one, and been defeated. This had greatly
elated Varro, and whetted his appetite for battle. He left the troops
at evening in such a manner that next day his associate was badly
placed. Æmilius scarcely wished to withdraw, lest his men should be
disheartened; he could not remain where he was, as he was exposed
to Hannibal’s better cavalry. He took a middle course, on the whole
unwise. He sent a third of his force to the north of the Aufidus, a
trifle up-stream, to sustain some foragers he had there, and make a
secondary camp, from which to annoy Hannibal’s parties in search of
corn. This division of forces was very risky. Hannibal had long been
trying to bring the consuls to battle, and now saw that the moment had
come, for Varro was precipitate, and would probably draw Æmilius into
active measures.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF CANNÆ B.C. 216, I]
Each general made a stirring address to his army. Polybius gives both.
Hannibal’s has the true ring of the great captain. “Let us hasten into
action. I promise you victory, and, the gods willing, I will make my
promise good.” Two days later Hannibal offered Æmilius battle. But
Æmilius declined it, and Hannibal sent his Numidians to the other side
to annoy the Roman foragers. The succeeding day, knowing Varro to be
in command, Hannibal again offered battle, aware that the hot-tempered
Roman would be burning to avenge the yesterday’s taunt. He left eight
thousand men to guard his camp.
There has been much discussion as to which bank of the Aufidus was
the scene of the battle. It seems to me that the plan in the diagram
comes nearest to fitting all the statements, however conflicting, of
the several authorities. Near Hannibal’s camp the Aufidus makes a
bold, southerly sweep. Here Hannibal forded the stream in two columns,
drew up his army, and leaned his flanks on the river-banks so as to
prevent the Romans, with their numerical superiority, from overlapping
them. His front he covered with archers and slingers, so as to hide
his formation from the Roman generals. Varro, as Hannibal anticipated,
thought the Carthaginians were crossing to attack the lesser camp,
and leaving eleven thousand men to guard the larger one, with orders
to attack Hannibal’s camp during the battle, he also crossed and drew
up in the plain opposite the Carthaginians, he and every Roman in the
ranks craving to come to blows with the hated invaders.
Varro also threw out his light troops in advance. He had sixty-five
thousand foot and seven thousand horse, to Hannibal’s thirty-two
thousand foot and ten thousand horse. He could not overlap Hannibal’s
flanks, so he determined to make his line heavier, and seek to crush
him at the first impact. He changed the formation of the maniples so
as to make them sixteen men deep and ten men front, instead of sixteen
men front by ten deep, as usual. This was a grievous error. His men
were unapt to manœuvre or fight well in this unwonted form. He should
have employed his surplus, say twenty-five thousand men, as a reserve
for emergencies. His army was in the usual three lines, fifteen legions
in all, the Roman on the right, the allied on the left. The intervals
between the maniples always equalled their front, and the distance
between the lines the depth of the maniples. The Roman cavalry,
twenty-four hundred strong, was on the right. The allied, forty-eight
hundred strong, on the left. It would have been better massed in one
body. But such was the only formation then known. Æmilius commanded the
right, Varro the left wing.
Hannibal placed on his left, opposite the Roman cavalry, his heavy
Spanish and Gallic horse, eight thousand strong, two-thirds in a
first, and one-third in a second line. This body was strong enough to
crush the Roman horse, and thus cut off the retreat of the legions
to their camps and towards Rome. In other words, Hannibal’s fighting
was to be forced on the Romans’ strategic flank. He had a perfectly
lucid idea of the value of a blow from this direction. On his right,
facing the allied cavalry, were his Numidians, two thousand strong. Of
the infantry, the Spaniards and Gauls were in the centre in alternate
bodies. His best troops, the African foot, he placed on their either
flank. He expected these veterans to leaven the whole lump. The foot
was all in phalanxes of one thousand and twenty-four men each, the
African foot in sixteen ranks, as usual, the Spaniards and Gauls in
ten. Hannibal had been obliged thus to make his centre thin, from
lack of men, but he had seething in his brain a manœuvre by which he
proposed to make this very weakness a factor of success. He had been
on the ground and had seen Varro strengthen the Roman centre. This
confirmed him in his plan.
Hannibal commanded the centre in person, Hanno the right, Hasdrubal the
left, Maharbal the cavalry of the left. Hannibal relied on Maharbal to
beat the Roman cavalry, and then, riding by the rear of the Roman army,
to join the Numidians on the Carthaginian right, like Coenus at the
Hydaspes. His cavalry was superior in numbers, and vastly outranked in
effectiveness the Roman horse.
Hannibal was, no doubt, familiar with Marathon. He proposed to better
the tactics of that day. Remember that Miltiades had opposed to him
Orientals; Hannibal faced Roman legions. His general plan was to
withdraw his centre before the heavy Roman line,--to allow them to
push it in,--and then to enclose them in his wings and fall on their
flanks. This was a highly dangerous manœuvre, unless the withdrawal of
the centre could be checked at the proper time; but his men had the
greatest confidence in him; the river in his rear would be an aid, if
he could but keep his men steady; and in war no decisive result can be
compassed without corresponding risk. Hannibal had fully prepared his
army for this tactical evolution, and rehearsed its details with all
his subordinates. He not only had the knack of making his lieutenants
comprehend him, but proposed to see to the execution of the work
himself.
The Carthaginians faced north, the Romans south. The rising sun was on
the flank of either. The wind was southerly, and blew the dust into the
faces of the Romans. The light troops on either side opened the action,
and fiercely contested the ground for some time. During the preliminary
fighting, Hannibal advanced his centre, the Spanish and Gallic foot,
in a salient or convex order from the main line, the phalanxes on the
right and left of the central one being, it is presumed, in _echelon_
to it. The wings, of African foot, kept their place.
While this was being done, Hannibal ordered the heavy horse on his
left to charge down on the Roman horse in their front. This they
did with their accustomed spirit, but met a gallant resistance. The
Roman knights fought for every inch with the greatest obstinacy, when
dismounted, continuing the contest on foot. The fighting was not
by shocks, it was rather hand to hand. But the weight and superior
training of the Carthaginian horse soon told. They rode down the Romans
and crushed them out of existence. Æmilius was badly wounded, but
escaped the ensuing massacre and made his way to the help of the Roman
centre, hoping there to retrieve the day. On the Carthaginian right the
Numidians had received orders to skirmish with the allied horse and
not come to a decisive combat till they should be joined by the heavy
horse from the Carthaginian left. This they did in their own peculiar
style, by riding around their opponents, squadron by squadron, and by
making numberless feigned attacks. The battle in the centre had not yet
developed results, when Maharbal, having destroyed the Roman cavalry,
and ridden around the Roman army, appeared in the rear of the allied
horse. The Numidians now attacked seriously, and between them, in a few
minutes, there was not a Roman horseman left upon the field alive. The
Numidians were then sent in pursuit, Maharbal remaining upon the field.
While this was going on, the light troops of both sides had been
withdrawn through the intervals, and had formed in the rear and on
the flanks of legion and phalanx, ready to fill gaps and supply the
heavy foot with weapons. This had uncovered Hannibal’s salient. Varro
had committed still another blunder. In the effort to make his line so
strong as to be irresistible, he had ordered his maniples of principes
from the second line forward into the intervals of the maniples of
hastati in first line, thus making one solid wall and robbing the
legionaries of their accustomed mobility, as well as lending them
a feeling of uncertainty in their novel formation. Still, with its
wonted spirit, the heavy Roman line advanced on Hannibal’s salient. The
Carthaginian wings could not yet be reached, being so much refused.
Striking the apex, the fighting became furious. Hannibal’s salient, as
proposed, began to withdraw, holding its own in good style. Varro, far
too eager, and seeing, as he thought, speedy victory before him, was
again guilty of the folly of ordering the third line, the triarii, and
even the light troops, up to the support of the already overcrowded
first and second lines. The Carthaginian centre, supported by its
skirmishers, held the ground with just enough tenacity to whet the
determination of the Romans to crush it. Varro now insanely ordered
still more forces in from his wings to reënforce his centre, already
a mass so crowded as to be unable to retain its organization, but
pressing back the Carthaginians by mere weight of mass. He could not
better have played into Hannibal’s hands. The Romans--three men in the
place of one--struggled onward, but became every moment a more and more
jumbled body. Its maniple formation, and consequent ease of movement,
was quite lost. Still, it pushed forward, as if to certain victory,
and still the Carthaginian salient fell back, till from a salient it
became a line, from a line a reëntering angle or crescent. Hannibal,
by great personal exertions, had in an extraordinary manner preserved
the steadiness and formation of his centre, though outnumbered four to
one. The Carthaginian wings he now ordered slowly to advance, which
all the more edged the Roman centre into the _cul-de-sac_ Hannibal had
prepared. The Roman legionaries were already shouting their eager cry
of victory; but so herded together had they got that there was no room
to use their weapons. Hannibal had kept the Carthaginian centre free
from any feeling of demoralization, and ready at his command to turn
and face the enemy. The wings, by their advance, had hustled the Roman
legions into the form of a wedge without a vestige of maniple formation
left. The decisive moment had come. Hannibal seized it with the eye
of the born soldier. Arresting the backward movement of the centre,
which still had elbow-room to fight, as the Romans had not, he gave
the orders to the wings which they were impatiently awaiting. These
veteran troops, in perfect order, wheeled inward to right and left, on
the flanks of the struggling mass of legionaries. The Roman army was
lost beyond a ray of hope, for, at the same instant, Maharbal, having
finished the destruction of the cavalry, rode down upon its rear. The
cry of victory changed to a cry of terror. Defeat degenerated into mere
slaughter. The Carthaginian cavalry divided into small troops and rode
into the midst of the Roman soldiers, sabring right and left. Some
squadrons galloped around to the flanks and lent a hand to the African
phalanx in its butchery. No quarter was given, or indeed asked. The
Romans died with their faces to the foe. The bloody work continued
till but a handful was left. Livy and Polybius place the killed at
from forty to seventy thousand men. Varro had already escaped with a
mere squad of horse. Æmilius Paullus died, sword in hand, seeking to
stem the tide of disaster. Three proconsuls, two quæstors, twenty-one
military tribunes, a number of ex-consuls, prætors, and ædiles, and
eighty senators, perished with the army.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF CANNÆ B.C. 216, II]
Hannibal’s loss had been barely six thousand men, but he had
annihilated the splendid army of eighty-seven thousand men--the flower
of Rome. It had vanished as if swallowed up in an earthquake. The
battle had been won by crisp tactical skill and the most effective use
of cavalry,--as fine as that at the Hydaspes. It was, indeed, the
gorgeous handling of the cavalry which made the infantry manœuvre
possible.
Few battles in history are more marked by ability on the one side and
crass blundering on the other than the battle of Cannæ. The handling
of the cavalry was quite beyond praise. The manner in which the far
from reliable Spanish and Gallic foot was advanced in a wedge in
_echelon_, and, under the mettlesome attack of the Roman legions, was
first held there, and then withdrawn step by step, until it had reached
the converse position of a reëntering angle and was then steadied
in place by ordering up the light troops into its intervals,--all
this being done under the exultant Roman shouts of victory--is a
simple _chef d’œuvre_ of battle-tactics, due solely to Hannibal’s
magnificent personality; and the advance at the decisive instant of the
African infantry, and its wheel right and left upon the flanks of the
disordered and overcrowded legionaries, caps the master-stroke. The
whole battle, from the Carthaginian standpoint, is a consummate piece
of art, having no superior, few equals in the history of war.
It is usual for historians to blame Hannibal for not at once marching
on Rome after this victory. Let us see what his chances were. We have
no hint of what he himself thought, of what his reasons were for not so
doing. We must content ourselves with collecting a few guesswork items,
and endeavoring to argue as he did.
Two facts are peculiarly prominent in Hannibal’s campaign in Italy.
First, he had opposed to him the troops of the strongest and most
intelligent military power of the world, some of which were, to be
sure, comparatively raw in active duty, but yet trained to war from
their youth, mixed with legionaries of many campaigns, and instinct
with the ardor of fighting for their household gods. It is often
assumed that Hannibal’s troops were veterans, the Romans levies of a
day. During the first three years this was in part true, and defeat
had somewhat drawn the temper of the Roman blade; but throughout the
rest of Hannibal’s campaigns the Roman army was much superior to his
own in all but one quality,--that strange influence which a great man
exercises over men. It will be noticed that whenever the fighting
was on equal terms, from the beginning the Roman soldier gave a good
account of himself. But Hannibal’s victories were won by stratagem,
or by tactical genius and skilful use of his cavalry arm, not by
brute fighting. In the latter act the legionary was fully the equal
of the phalangite. One cannot compare the task of any other great
captain with that of Hannibal. No one ever faced such odds. Secondly,
Hannibal had calculated absolutely upon being able to detach the
allies--the socii--from their fealty. We cannot imagine him to have
set out on his marvellous expedition without having made this the
prime factor in his calculations. Hannibal was no madman. He was a
keen, close calculator. But he would have been insane, indeed, if he
had undertaken his hazardous campaign without such expectation. He was
well justified in reckoning on such defection. There had always been
a good deal of opposition to high-handed Rome among all her allies,
municipal cities, and colonies, and it was a fair assumption that
many, if not most, of them would be glad to free themselves and humble
their proud conqueror and mistress. In this expectation Hannibal had
been entirely disappointed. None of the socii, who were the brawn of
the Roman body, had shown any disposition to meet him otherwise than
with the sword; none of the colonies, except in distant Gaul, had
met him even half way. He had captured towns and territory and had
garrisoned citadels. But the aid he received was not that which enables
a conqueror to hold what he takes except with the strong hand. And
without just such aid, Hannibal could not only not win, but could not
be otherwise than defeated, in his contest with the mighty republic. To
assume that Hannibal did not see all this, and that he was not fighting
against hope almost from the second year, is to underrate this man’s
intellectual ability. No one ever fathomed Hannibal’s purpose. He was
so singularly reticent that Roman historians called him perfidious,
because no one could, from his face or conduct, gauge either his
thought or intention, or calculate upon his acts. He had no Hephæstion
as had Alexander. But no doubt he was keenly alive to the failure, so
far, of his calculation on the disaffection of the allies.
And now, after the overwhelming victory of Cannæ, he had to weigh
not only the strategic and tactical difficulties, but the still more
serious political ones. If the allies, or a good part of them, could
be induced to join his cause, Rome would fall sooner or later. If not,
he could never take Rome, nor permanently injure the Roman cause. The
chances were, in a military sense, all against his capturing Rome by a
_coup de main_. Rome was over two hundred miles distant, well walled,
and with a large force which could be quietly gathered to protect it.
If he failed, the game was lost. It was far wiser for him to still
try to influence the allies, which he could now do with a record of
wonderful victories such as the world had not yet seen. Hannibal was
not a military gambler. He never risked his all on a bare chance, as
some other soldiers have done. He always reckoned his chances closely.
And every reason prompted him not to risk the loss of his all on the
chances of a brilliant march on the enemy’s capital, which had only
its boldness to commend it, and every military reason as well as the
stanch Roman heart to promise failure as its result; for there was no
obsequious satrap to open its gates and welcome the conquering hero,
as it had been Alexander’s fortune to meet. If Hannibal marched on
Rome, he must be prepared to besiege the city; and he had neither siege
equipment, nor were sieges consonant with his peculiar ability. If the
story be true that Maharbal asked of Hannibal, after Cannæ, that he
might march on Rome with five thousand horse, promising that he should
sup in the Capitol in four days, and that on Hannibal’s declining,
Maharbal exclaimed, “Truly, Hannibal, thou knowest how to win a
victory, but knowest not how to use one!” it may tend to show that
Maharbal possessed indeed the daring recklessness of a true general of
cavalry, but it also proves that Hannibal had the discretion, as he had
shown in abundant measure the enterprise, of the great captain.
Hannibal probably at this time harbored the hope that, after this
fourth and overwhelming defeat of the Romans, the allies would
finally see that their interests lay with him. In fact, Capua, the
Samnites, Lucanians, and many cities of Lower Italy did join his cause,
and the unexplained time which he spent in the vicinity of his late
battle-field was no doubt devoted to political questions, the favorable
solution of which could be better brought about by not for the moment
risking his now unquestioned military supremacy.
The institutions and laws which gave Rome strength never demonstrated
her greatness so well as now. The people which had created these
institutions, which had made these laws, never rose superior to
disaster, never exhibited the strength of character of which the whole
world bears the impress, so well as now. The horrible disaster to both
state and society--for there was not a house in which there was not
one dead--by no means changed the determination of the Roman people,
however horrified the cool-headed, however frightened the many. Not
that among the ignorant there was not fear and trembling; but it was
not the ignorant who had made or ruled Rome. The more intelligent and
courageous element spoke with a single voice. The prætors at once
called the Senate together to devise means of defence, and it remained
in constant session. All Rome was in affliction, but this must not
interfere with the necessity of saving the city, and courage must be
outward as well as in the heart. The word _peace_ was forbidden to be
pronounced. Mourning was limited to thirty days. Tears were prohibited
to women in public. New energies were at once put at work. In view
of the alarming circumstances and the impossibility of carrying out
the requirements of the law, the Senate itself made M. Junius Pera
dictator, who chose Titus Sempronius Gracchus as master of cavalry. The
entire male population above seventeen years of age was enrolled. Four
new legions and one thousand horse were added to the city garrison. All
mechanics were set to work to repair weapons. The walls were already
in a state of excellent defence. The Senate purchased and armed eight
thousand slaves and four thousand debtors or criminals, with promise of
freedom and pardon. Naught but stubborn resistance to the last man was
thought of. It was indeed well that Hannibal did not march on Rome.
Cannæ was the last great victory of Hannibal, but the beginning of his
most masterly work. He had up to this moment conducted a brilliant
offensive. There is nothing in the annals of war which surpasses his
crossing of the Alps, his victories at the Ticinus and Trebia, his
march through the Arnus marshes, his victory at Lake Trasymene, his
manœuvres up to Cannæ, and that wonderful battle. But this splendid
record had not helped his cause. Yet, against all hope, he stuck to
his task for thirteen long years more, waiting for reënforcements from
Carthage, or for some lucky accident which might turn the tide in his
favor. Up to Cannæ Fortune had smiled upon him. After Cannæ she turned
her back on him, never again to lend him aid.
Livy asserts that Hannibal’s want of success came from his exposing his
troops to a winter in Capua, where debauch destroyed their discipline.
Many historians have followed this theory. But the soldier who looks
at the remarkable work done by Hannibal from this time on, knows that
nothing short of the most exemplary discipline can possibly account
for it, and seeks his reasons elsewhere. Livy’s statements will bear
watching.
Hannibal soon became too weak to afford the attrition of great battles.
He had sought to impose on the allies by brilliant deeds. He had
failed, and must put into practice whatever system would best carry out
his purpose. From this time on he avoided fighting unless it was forced
upon him, but resorted to manœuvring to accomplish his ends. He seized
important towns, he marched on the Roman communications, he harassed
the enemy with small war. He did the most unexpected and surprising
things. He appeared at one end of southern Italy before the enemy had
any idea that he had left the other. He was teaching the Romans the
trade of war. They were not slow to see wherein Hannibal’s superiority
lay, and profited by it. He educated their best generals, and these now
came to the front.
The Romans raised annually from one hundred and fifty thousand to two
hundred and forty thousand men, of which one-half to two-thirds were
in Hannibal’s own front, and they were of the bone and sinew of Rome.
He himself never had more than thirty-five thousand to forty thousand
effective, and these far from as good. The Carthaginian Senate, under
lead of the Hanno faction, forsook him, nor sent him men nor money,
except one small reënforcement. He was cast on his own resources in
the enemy’s country. While the Roman legions grew in numbers and
experience, his own veterans gradually disappeared and left but a
ragged force behind. And yet, during most of this time, he marched over
the length and breadth of Italy, ravaging and destroying, and not one
nor all the Roman armies could prevent him from acting out his pleasure.