Secretary Seward, in the course of an extended reply, wrote:
"If it were possible to peaceably provision Fort Sumter, of course, I
should answer that it would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt
it. But the facts of the case are known to be that the attempt must be
made with the employment of military and marine force which would
provoke combat and probably initiate a civil war which the Government
of the United States would be committed to maintain, through all
changes, to some definite conclusion."...
Continuing, Mr. Seward said:
"Suppose the expedition successful, we have then a garrison in Fort
Sumter that can defy assault for six months. What is it to do then? Is
it to make war by opening its batteries to demolish the defenses of
the Carolinians? Can it demolish them if it tries? If it cannot, what
is the advantage we shall have gained? If it can, how will it serve to
check or prevent disunion? In either case, it seems to me, that we
will have inaugurated a civil war by our own act, without an adequate
object, after which reunion will be hopeless, at least under this
Administration or in any other way than by a popular disavowal both of
the war and of the Administration which unnecessarily commenced it.
Fraternity is the element of union; war the very element of disunion."
...
In conclusion, he said: "If this counsel seems to be impassive and even
unpatriotic, I console myself by the reflection that it is such as
Chatham gave to his country under circumstances not widely
different."[392]
Secretary Cameron wrote he would advise such action if he "did not
believe the attempt to carry it into effect would initiate a bloody and
protracted conflict."[393]
Secretary Welles wrote:
"By sending or attempting to send provisions into Fort Sumter, will
not war be precipitated? It may be impossible to escape it under any
course of policy that may be pursued, but I am not prepared to advise
a course that would provoke hostilities.... I do not, therefore, under
all the circumstances, think it wise to provision Fort Sumter."[394]
Secretary Smith wrote:
"The commencement of civil war would be a calamity greatly to be
deplored and should be avoided if the just authority of the Government
may be maintained without it. If such a conflict should become
inevitable, it is much better that it should commence by the
resistance of the authorities or the people of South Carolina to the
legal action of the Government in enforcing the laws of the United
States....
"If a conflict should be provoked by the attempt to reinforce Fort
Sumter, a divided sentiment in the North would paralyze the arm of the
Government, while the treason in the Southern States would be openly
encouraged in the North.... I, therefore, respectfully answer the
inquiry of the President by saying that in my opinion it would not be
wise, under all the circumstances, to attempt to provision Fort
Sumter."[395]
Attorney General Bates wrote:
"I am unwilling, under all the circumstances, at this moment, to do
any act which may have the semblance before the world of beginning a
civil war, the terrible consequence of which would, I think, find no
parallel in modern times.... For these reasons, I am willing to
evacuate Fort Sumter, rather than be an active party in the beginning
of civil war.... Upon the whole I do not think it wise now to attempt
to provision Fort Sumter."[396]
Postmaster General Blair and Secretary Chase united in the opinion that
it would be wise to make the effort to provision Fort Sumter.
Mr. Blair wrote:
"I believe that Fort Sumter may be provisioned and relieved by Captain
Fox with but little risk; and General Scott's opinion that, with its
war complement, there is no force in South Carolina which can take it,
renders it almost certain that it will not then be attempted. This
would completely demoralize the rebellion.... No expense nor care
should therefore be spared to achieve this success."[397]
Secretary Chase wrote:
"A correct solution must depend, in my judgment, on the degree of
possibility, on the combination of reinforcement with provisioning and
on the probable effects of the measure on the relations of the
disaffected states to the National Government.
"I shall assume what the statements of the distinguished officers
consulted seem to warrant, that the possibility of success amounts to
a reasonable degree of probability; and also that the attempt to
provision is to include an attempt to reinforce; for it seems to be
generally agreed that the provisioning without reinforcements
notwithstanding hostile resistance, will accomplish no substantially
beneficial purpose.
"The probable political effects of the measure allow room for much
fair difference of opinion, and I have not reached my own conclusion
without much difficulty."
The Secretary then proceded to declare, that, if such a step would
produce civil war, he could not advise in its favor, but that, in his
opinion, such a result was highly improbable, especially if accompanied
by a proclamation from the President reiterating the sentiments of his
inaugural address. "I, therefore," concluded Mr. Chase, "return an
affirmative answer to the question submitted to me."[398]
It will be seen, from the foregoing extracts, that five of the seven
members of the Cabinet concurred in the opinion that no attempt should
be made to provision or reinforce Fort Sumter, and that such an attempt
would in all probability precipitate civil war. As Mr. Seward expressed
it: "We will have inaugurated a civil war by our own act without an
adequate object"; or in the language of Secretary Welles, "By sending or
attempting to send provisions into Fort Sumter, will not war be
precipitated?... I am not prepared to advise a course that would provoke
hostilities."
If such were the opinions of leading members of President Lincoln's
Cabinet, expressed in confidential communications to their chief, as to
the character of the proposed action, can it be deemed unreasonable that
the people of Virginia held similar views?
Fourteen days later, the President made a verbal request to his Cabinet
for an additional expression of their views upon the same subject.
Seward and Smith adhered to their former opinions. Chase and Blair were
joined by Welles. Bates was noncommittal, and no reply was made by
Cameron, so far as the records show.