Beginning in 1837, Massachusetts adopted the first of the so-called
Personal Liberty Laws, which were followed by others of like import
enacted by Vermont, New York and Connecticut. The ostensible object of
these statutes was to protect free negroes, but as no such laws were
necessary until the rise of the Abolitionists and the operations of
the Underground Railroad, they were generally accepted as efforts on
the part of these states to assist these agencies and defeat the
clause of the constitution of the United States which provided for the
return of fugitive slaves.
In 1842, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that so much
of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 as authorized or required state
officials to assist in executing the law was unconstitutional, and
that upon Federal authorities must rest the whole burden.[294] This
decision was followed by a new series of statutes in Massachusetts,
Vermont, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.[295]
On the 18th of September, 1850, Congress passed another Fugitive Slave
Law amending the act of 1793 so as to charge Federal officials with
the whole duty of carrying into effect the clause in the constitution
providing for the return of fugitive slaves, and to remedy the
difficulties resulting from the action of the Abolitionists and the
acts passed by certain states as above referred to. This aroused fresh
antagonism to the constitution and the efforts of the Federal
Government to carry the same into effect. The constitutionality of the
new law was denied and though affirmed by the Supreme Court, its
execution in the foregoing states was much embarrassed by a new series
of state statutes. Laws of like import, with like results, were also
enacted by Wisconsin, Michigan, Connecticut and Maine.
In some instances, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States affirming the constitutionality of the statute was challenged
by the legislative department of state governments, and the right of
the former tribunal to fix the obligations of states and citizens with
respect to the law strenuously denied.
Thus, in Wisconsin one Sherman M. Booth had been indicted in the
Federal Court for a violation of the Fugitive Slave Law enacted by
Congress, and, after trial and conviction, was sentenced for the
offense. An application for a writ of habeas corpus was presented by
Booth to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and his release prayed for on
the ground that the Federal statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin took cognizance of the case and discharged the
prisoner from the custody of the Federal authorities.[296]
An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States where
the constitutionality of the Federal statute was affirmed, the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and Booth remanded
to custody.[297] Thereupon, the General Assembly of Wisconsin on the
16th of March, 1859, adopted a series of resolutions in which, after
denying the right of the United States Supreme Court to take
cognizance of the above mentioned case, they declared:
"That the government, formed by the constitution of the United
States, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the powers
delegated to itself: but that as in all other cases of compact among
parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to
judge for itself as well of infractions as of the mode and measure
of redress.
"That the principle and construction contended for by the party
which now rules in the councils of the nation, that the General
Government is the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers
delegated to it, stop nothing short of despotism; since the
discretion of those who administer the government, and not the
constitution, would be the measure of their powers; that the several
states which formed that instrument being sovereign and independent
have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction and that a
positive defiance by those sovereignties of all unauthorized acts
done or attempted to be done under color of that instrument is the
right remedy."[298]