[Footnote 1: Reproduced in condensed form from _The World's Work_ by
the kind permission of Doubleday, Page & Co.]
In order to understand the situation in Mexico, it is necessary to get
firmly in our minds that there are in reality two Mexicos. One may be
called American Mexico and the other Mexican Mexico.
The representative of the new, half-formed northern or American Mexico
was Francisco Madero--rich, educated, well mannered, honest, and
idealistically inclined. The representative of the old Mexico is
Huerta--"rough, plain, old Indian," as he describes himself,
pugnacious, crafty, ignorant of political amenities, without
understanding of any rule except the rule of blood and powder.
By the law of 1894 Diaz changed the character of the land titles in
Mexico. Many smaller landowners, unable to prove their titles under the
new system, lost their holdings, which in large measure eventually fell
into the hands of a few rich men. In the feudal south this did not
cause so much disturbance. But in the north the growing middle class
bitterly resented it. Madero became the spokesman of this discontent.
In his books and in his program of reform, "the plan of San Luis
Potosi," he attacked the Diaz regime. And then in 1910 he joined the
rebel band organized by Pascual Orozco in the mountains of Chihuahua.
With his weakened army Diaz was unable to cope with this revolution,
and in October, 1911, Madero became President.
The country was then at peace, except for the band of robbers led by
Zapata in the provinces of Morelos and Guerrero. These are and have
been the most atrocious of the many bandits with which Mexico is
infested. No outrage or barbarity known to savages have they left
untried. Madero attempted to buy them off, but to no avail. He then
sent military forces against them, one column commanded by General
Huerta, but with no success.
In the mean time, Pascual Orozco, who emerged from the Madero
revolution as a great war hero in his own State, was given no post of
responsibility under the new Government, but was left as commander of
the militia in the State of Chihuahua. The adherents of the old Diaz
régime took this opportunity to win him over to their side, for
Orozco's fighting was done purely for profit, not for principle. A
reactionary movement, with Orozco at its head, broke out in February,
1912. Five thousand men were quickly got together. The Madero
Administration--a Northern Administration in the Southern country--was
not fully organized, and, with the army not yet rehabilitated, found
itself seriously embarrassed. Had Orozco been an intelligent and
competent leader he probably could have marched straight through to
Mexico City at that time, as the only governmental troops that were
available to fight him were only about sixteen hundred, which he
defeated and nearly annihilated at Rellano in Chihuahua. Their
commander, General Gonzalez Salas, Madero's war minister, committed
suicide after the defeat.
The only general available at the time who had had experience in
handling large forces in the field was Victoriano Huerta. Although he
had never especially distinguished himself, Huerta's record shows that
he was one of the most progressive members of the army.
Huerta's column encountered little resistance. Chihuahua City was
occupied on July 7th, and later, Juarez. The rebels were not pursued to
any extent away from the railroads. They separated into bands, keeping
up a guerrilla warfare, raiding American mining camps and ranches, and
seizing and holding Americans and others for ransom. Prominent among
these leaders of banditti was Inez Salazar, a former rock driller in an
American mine, who raised a force in Chihuahua and declared against
Madero. Little was done to destroy these rebel bands by the Federals,
and no engagements of any size took place. In fact, it was a current
rumor that the Federals did not wish to put them down. In the first
place, the regular army was the same old Diaz organization which
considered Madero largely as a usurper and which remained with the
established Government in a rather lukewarm manner. Besides, the bands
of Orozco, Salazar, and others were instigated and supported by the
adherents of the old regime, and, although opposed to the Mexican army,
both had many ideas in common regarding the Madero Administration.
Furthermore, the officers and men of the army were receiving large
increases of pay for the campaign.
An instance showing this disposition on the part of the Federals
occurred in the State of Sonora in October, 1912. General Obregon, now
the commander of the Sonora State forces, was at that time a colonel of
the army and had his battalion, composed largely of Maya Indians, at
Agua Prietá, just across the border from Douglas, Ariz. Salazar's band
of rebels had crossed the mountains from Chihuahua and had come into
Sonora. Popular clamor forced the Federal commander at Agua Prietá to
do something, and accordingly he ordered Obregon to take his battalion,
proceed south, get in touch with Salazar, and "remain in observation."
Salazar was looting the ranch of a friend of Obregon's near Fronteras.
The rebel had taken no means to secure his bivouac against surprise;
his men were scattered around engaged in slaughtering cattle, cooking,
and making camp for the night. Obregon deployed his force and charged
Salazar's camp. Forty of Salazar's men were killed, and a machine gun
and a number of horses, mules, and rifles were captured; whereupon
Salazar left that part of the country. Upon Obregon's return to Agua
Prietá he was severely reprimanded and nearly court-martialed for
disobeying his orders in not "remaining in observation" of Salazar, and
attacking him instead. Had Obregon been given a free hand, he
undoubtedly could have destroyed Salazar's force.
After Salazar's defeat at Fronteras, he moved east again, and about a
month later appeared near Palomas, a town about three miles from the
international boundary south of Columbus, N.M. At Palomas there was a
Federal detachment of about one hundred and thirty men under an old
colonel. They had been sent there to protect various cattle interests
in that vicinity; and they had a considerable amount of money,
equipment, and ammunition for maintaining and providing rations and
forage for themselves and for some outlying detachments. Salazar,
hearing of this, demanded that the money and equipment be immediately
surrendered. Upon being refused, Salazar, with about three hundred and
fifty men, attacked. A furious battle was fought, ending in a
house-to-house fight with grenades--cans filled with dynamite, with
fuse attached, which are thrown by hand. Salazar's force captured the
town after the Federals had suffered more than 50 per cent. in
casualties, including the Federal commander, who was wounded several
times; the rebels suffered more than 30 per cent. casualties. The town,
in the mean time, was wrecked. This particular instance shows that the
Mexicans fight and fight well from a standpoint of physical courage.
The general idea that the Mexicans would not fight, which Americans
obtained during this period, was obtained because they did not care to
in the majority of cases.
Meanwhile, General Huerta, having "finished" his Chihuahua campaign in
the autumn of 1912, was promoted to the rank of General of Division
(Major-General) and decorated for his achievement. It was rumored in
many places at that time that General Huerta was about to turn against
the Madero Government. Madero, suspecting his loyalty, ordered him back
to Mexico City. Huerta took his time about obeying this order, and,
when he reported in Mexico City, obtained a sick-leave to have his eyes
treated. Huerta was nearly blind when Felix Diaz's revolt broke out in
Vera Cruz in October, 1912, and probably thus escaped being drawn into
that unsuccessful demonstration.
From this time until the _coup d'etat_ of February 8, 1913, there was
no large organized resistance to the Madero Administration, although
banditism increased at an alarming rate in all parts of the Republic.
The Diaz-Reyes outburst, in Mexico City on February 8, 1913, which
resulted in the death of Madero and Suarez and the elevation of Huerta
to practical military dictatorship, was brought about by the adherents
of the old regime, who looked upon Madero's extinction as a punishment
meted out to a criminal who had raised the slaves against their
masters. This view prevailed to a considerable extent in Mexico south
of San Luis Potosi. In the North, however, the people almost as a whole
(at least 90 per cent. in Sonera, and only to a slightly lesser extent
in the other provinces) saw in it the cold-blooded murder of their
political idol at the hands of unscrupulous moneyed interests and of
adherents of the old regime of the days of Porfirio Diaz.
The resentment was general in the North--this new, largely Americanized
North, Venustiano Carranza, the governor of Coahuila, organized the
resistance in the provinces of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas,
while Maytorena, the governor of Sonora, and Pesqueira (later in
Washington, D.C., as Carranza's representative), with Obregon as the
head of their military forces, rapidly cleared that State of Federals,
with the exception of the port of Guaymas. These fights were no mere
bloodless affairs, but stubbornly contested, with heavy casualties, as
a decided principle was involved in the conflict. Villa, the old bandit
and personal enemy of Huerta, organized a force in Sonora, and Urbina
did likewise in northern Durango. Arms, and especially money to buy
them with, were hard to get. Funds were obtained from the tariff at
ports of entry, internal taxation, amounting at times to practical
confiscation, contributions, and gifts from various sources. It is said
that the Madero family put aside $1,000,000, gold, for this purpose.
Though a few individuals went over to the Constitutionalist cause, the
Mexican regular army remained true to the _ad interim_ Government. The
revolutionists either held or rapidly possessed themselves of the great
railroad lines in the majority of cases. Huerta, who is an excellent
organizer, soon appreciated the magnitude of the revolt and rushed
troops to the north as rapidly as possible, his strategy being to hold
all railroad lines and cities with strong columns which would force the
revolutionists to operate in the intervals between the railroads. Then
Huerta, with these columns as a supporting framework, pushed out mobile
columns for the destruction of the rebel bands.
The Carranzistas understood this plan and, to meet it, tore up all the
railroads that they could and adopted as their fixed plan never to risk
a general engagement of a large force. For the first few months, the
rebels, who had adopted the name of Constitutionalists, continued
recruiting their forces and destroying the railroads. The Federals
tried to repair the railroads and get enough troops into the north to
cope with this movement. They obtained new military equipment of all
descriptions, the army was increased, and old rebels, such as Orozco
and Salazar, sympathizers or tools of the old régime, were taken into
the Federal forces as irregulars and given commands.
To understand the apparent slowness of the Federals in moving from
place to place and their inability to pursue the rebels away from the
railroads, some idea must be given as to their system of operating. The
officers of the regular army are well instructed and quite competent.
The enlisted men, however, come from the lowest strata of society, and,
except in the case of a foreign war, have to be impressed into the
ranks. They bring their women with them to act as cooks and to
transport their food and camp equipage. Military transportation, that
is to say, baggage trains of four-mule wagons and excellent horses for
the artillery, does not exist in the Mexican army. In fact, when away
from a railroad, the "soldaderas," as the women are called, carry
nearly everything; and they obtain the food necessary for the soldiers'
rations. A commissariat, as we understand it, does not exist. This ties
the Federals to the railroads, as they can not carry enough ammunition
and food for any length of time.
On the other hand, those who first saw Obregon's rebel forces in Sonora
and Villa's in Chihuahua were surprised at their organization. There
were no women taken with them. They had wagons, regular issues of
rations and ammunition, a paymaster, and the men were well mounted and
armed.
With Obregon, also, were regiments of Yaqui Indians, who are excellent
fighting material. These forces were mobile, and could easily operate
away from the railroad. They lacked artillery, without which they were
greatly handicapped, especially in the attack on fortified places and
on stone or adobe towns. As most of the horses and mules were driven
away from the railroads, the insurgents could get all the animals they
wanted.
The first large battle occurred on May 9-10-11-12th outside of Guaymas,
between Ojeda's Federals and Obregon's Constitutionalists, at a place
called Santa Rosa. The Federal advance north consisted of about twelve
hundred men and eighteen pieces of artillery. They were opposed by
about four thousand men under Obregon, without artillery. Eight hundred
Federals were killed and all their artillery captured. The
Constitutionalists lost two hundred and fifty men killed and wounded.
Comparatively few Federals returned to Guaymas. Each side killed all
the wounded that they found, and also all captives who refused to
enlist in the captor's force. This success was not followed up and
Guaymas remained in the hands of the Federals. The artillery captured
by the Constitutionalists had had the breech blocks removed to render
them unserviceable; new ones, however, were made in the shops at
Cananca by a German mechanician named Klaus.
In the summer, Urbina captured the city of Durango, annihilating the
Federals. The city was given over to loot and the greatest excesses
were indulged in by the victors. Arson, rape, and the robbing of banks,
stores, and private houses were indiscriminately carried on. Horses
were stabled in the parlors of the homes of the prosperous citizens,
and many non-combatants were killed by the soldiers before order was
restored.
At this time the only points held by the Federals on the boundary
between the United States and Mexico were Juarez, in Chihuahua, and
Nuevo Laredo, in Tamaulipas. The railroads south of these points were
also in the physical possession of the Federals but subject to
continual interruption at the hands of the Constitutionalists.
Venustiano Carranza had established headquarters at Ciudad Porfirio
Diaz (Piedras Negras) across the Rio Grande from Eagle Pass, Tex. He
started on a trip, during the late summer, through the northern
provinces to confer with the leaders of the Constitutionalist movement
in order to bring about better coordination of effort on their part. He
went through the States of Coahuila, Durango, Chihuahua, and Sonora and
established a new headquarters in Sonora. Since then the efforts of the
Constitutionalists have been much better coordinated, with the result
that they have had much better success.
Jesus Carranza and Pablo Gonzalez were left in charge at Ciudad
Porfirio Diaz by Venustiano Carranza when he left on his trip. Shortly
after this a Federal column was organized under General Maas for the
capture of the railroad between Saltillo and Ciudad Porfirio Diaz. This
column slowly worked its way to Monclova and then to Ciudad Porfirio
Diaz, which it occupied on October 7th; the Constitutionalists ripped
up the railroad and destroyed everything that might be useful to the
Federals and a good deal that could not, and offered very little
resistance. Villa, in the mean time, having been reenforced by men from
Durango and some from Sonora, had been operating in Chihuahua with
considerable success. He had fallen on several small Federal columns,
destroyed them, and obtained about six pieces of artillery, besides a
fresh supply of rifles and ammunition. In September, he had interposed
his force between the Federals at Chihuahua City and Torreon, at a
place called Santa Rosalía. Villa and the Federals each had about four
thousand men. The Federals from the south were making a determined
attempt to retake Durango and had started two columns for Torreon of
more than two thousand men each, one west from Saltillo, another north
from Zacatecas. These had to repair the railroad as they went. Torreon
was being held by about one thousand Federal soldiers.
Villa was well informed of these movements, and also of the fact that,
in their anxiety to take Durango, a Federal force of about 800 men,
under General Alvirez, was to leave Torreon before the arrival of the
Saltillo and Zacatecas columns. Having the inner line, Villa with his
mobile force could maneuver freely against any one of these. He
accordingly left a rear guard in front of the Federals at Santa
Rosalía, and, marching south rapidly, met and completely defeated
General Alvirez's Federal column about eighteen miles west of Torreon,
near the town of Aviles. General Alvirez and 287 of his men were
killed, fighting to the last.
Villa then turned toward Torreon. The "soldaderas" of Alvirez's force
had escaped when the fight at Aviles began and reached Torreon, quickly
spreading the news. The Federal officer in command attempted to round
them up, but to no avail, and Torreon's weak garrison became panic
stricken, put up a feeble resistance, and evacuated the town. Villa
occupied it on the night of October 1st. He sent his mounted troops
against the Federal columns from Saltillo and Zacatecas, tearing up the
railroad around them, until they both retreated. He maintained splendid
order in Torreon; sent a detachment of one officer and twenty-five men
to the American consul to protect American interests, and stationed
patrols throughout the city with orders to shoot all looters. At first,
a few stores containing provisions and clothing were looted, and some
Spaniards who were supposed to be aiding the Federals were killed, but
the pillaging soon stopped. Villa's occupation of Torreon thus
contrasted strikingly with Urbina's occupation of Durango.
The capture of Torreon made precarious the military position of the
Federals in Chihuahua, as Torreon was their principal supply point.
When Villa's advance reached Santa Rosalía, the Federals evacuated
their fortified position at that place and concentrated all available
troops at Chihuahua City. They expected that a decided attempt would be
made by Villa to take it. The Federals did succeed in repelling small
attacks against Chihuahua on November 6th-9th and, to strengthen their
garrison, they reduced the troops in Juarez until only 400 remained.
Villa, while keeping up the investment of Chihuahua City, prepared a
force for a dash on Juarez, and on the night of November 14th-15th the
Federal garrison at that place was completely surprised and the city
was captured.
These are the main events (to December 1st) that marked this chapter in
the inevitable struggle between the new Mexico and the old, before the
United States by interfering actively in the tumult changed the entire
character of the war. The Carranza practise of killing the wounded
shows that even the North has much to learn in civilized methods of
warfare. On the other hand, the self-restraint exercised, in many
cases, against looting captured towns, indicates that progress has been
made. This account also indicates that the new Mexico, in aims as well
as in material things, is getting the upper hand.