R.F. JOHNSTON

Like political upheavals in other ages and other lands, the Chinese

revolution has been the outcome of the hopes and dreams of impetuous

and indomitable youth. Herein lies one of its main sources of strength,

but herein also lies a very grave danger. Young China to-day looks to

Europe and to America for sympathy. Let her have it in full measure.

Only let us remind her that the work she has so boldly, and perhaps

light-heartedly, undertaken is not only the affair of China, not only

the affair of Asia, but that the whole world stands to gain or lose

according as the Chinese people prove themselves worthy or unworthy to

carry out the stupendous task to which they have set their hands.

The grave peril lies, of course, in the tendency of the Chinese

"Progressives"--as of all hot-headed reformers, whether in China or in

England--to break with the traditions of past ages, and to despise what

is old, not because it is bad, but because it is out of harmony with

the latest political shibboleth. Those of us who believe in the

fundamental soundness of the character of the Chinese people, and are

aware of the high dignity and value of a large part of their inherited

civilization and culture, are awaiting with deep anxiety an answer to

this question: Is the New China about to cast herself adrift from the

Old?

But surely, many a Western observer may exclaim, the matter is settled

already! Surely the abolition of the monarchy is in itself a proof that

the Chinese have definitely broken with tradition! Was not the Emperor

a sacred being who represented an unbroken political continuity of

thousands of years, and who ruled by divine right? Was not loyalty to

the sovereign part of the Chinese religion?

These questions can not be answered with a simple yes or no. Reverence

for tradition has always been a prominent Chinese characteristic in

respect of both ethics and politics. We must beware of assuming too

hastily that the exhortations of a few frock-coated revolutionaries

have been sufficient to expel this reverence for tradition from Chinese

hearts and minds; yet we are obliged to admit that the national

aspirations are being directed toward a new set of ideals which in some

respects are scarcely consistent with the ideals aimed at (if rarely

attained) in the past.

The Chinese doctrine of loyalty can not be properly understood until we

have formed a clear conception of the traditional Chinese theory

concerning the nature of Political Sovereignty. The political edifice,

no less than the social, is built on the Confucian and pre-Confucian

foundation of filial piety. The Emperor is father of his people; the

whole population of the empire forms one vast family, of which the

Emperor is the head. As a son owes obedience and reverence to his

parent, so does the subject owe reverence and obedience to his

sovereign.

In the four thousand years and more that have elapsed since the days of

Yü, over a score of dynasties have in their turn reigned over China.

The _Shu Ching_--the Chinese historical classic--gives us full accounts

of the events which led to the fall of the successive dynasties of Hsia

(1766 B.C.) and Shang (1122 B.C.). In both cases we find that the

leader of the successful rebellion lays stress on the fact that the

_T'ien-ming_ (Divine right) has been forfeited by the dynasty of the

defeated Emperor, and that he, the successful rebel, has been but an

instrument in the hands of God. Thus the rebel becomes Emperor by right

of the Divine Decree, and it remains with his descendants until by

their misdeeds they provoke heaven into bestowing it upon another

house.

The teachings of the sages of China are in full accordance with the

view that the sovereign must rule well or not at all. Confucius

(551-479 B.C.) spent the greater part of his life in trying to instruct

negligent princes in the art of government, and we know from a

well-known anecdote that he regarded a bad government as "worse than a

tiger." We are told that when one of his disciples asked Confucius for

a definition of good statecraft, he replied that a wise ruler is one

who provides his subjects with the means of subsistence, protects the

state against its enemies, and strives to deserve the confidence of all

his people. And the most important of these three aims, said Confucius,

is the last: for without the confidence of the people no government can

be maintained. If the prince's commands are just and good, let the

people obey them, said Confucius, in reply to a question put by a

reigning duke; but if subjects render slavish obedience to the unjust

commands of a bad ruler, it is not the ruler only, but his sycophantic

subjects themselves, who will be answerable for the consequent ruin of

the state. So far from counseling perpetual docility on the part of the

governed, Confucius clearly indicates that circumstances may arise

which make opposition justifiable. The minister, he says, should not

fawn upon the ruler of whose actions he disapproves: let him show his

disapproval openly.

Mencius, the "Second Sage" of China (372-289 B.C.), is far more

outspoken than Confucius in his denunciation of bad rulers. There was

no sycophancy in the words which he uttered during an interview with

King Hsuan of the State of Ch'i. "When the prince treats his ministers

with respect, as though they were his own hands and feet, they in their

turn look up to him as the source from which they derive nourishment;

when he treats them like his dogs and horses, they regard him as no

more worthy of reverence than one of their fellow subjects; when he

treats them as though they were dirt to be trodden on, they retaliate

by regarding him as a robber and a foe." It is interesting to learn

that this passage in Mencius so irritated the first sovereign of the

Ming dynasty (1368-1398 A.D.) that he caused the "spirit-tablet" of the

sage to be removed from the Confucian Temple, to which it had been

elevated about three centuries earlier; but the remonstrances of the

scholars of the empire soon compelled the Emperor to revoke his decree,

and the tablet of Mencius was restored to its place of honor, from

which it was never subsequently degraded. It is no matter for surprize

that the people have reverenced the "Second Sage," for he it was who

has come nearest in China to the enunciation of the somewhat doubtful

principle, _Vox populi vox Dei_.

It was unmistakably the view of Mencius that a bad ruler may be put to

death by the subjects whom he has misgoverned. King Hsuan was once

discussing with him the successful rebellions against the last

sovereigns of the Hsia and Shang dynasties, and, with reference to the

slaying of the infamous King Chou (1122 B.C.), asked whether it was

allowable for a minister to put his sovereign to death. Mencius, in his

reply, observed that the man who outrages every principle of virtue and

good conduct is rightly treated as a mere robber and villain. "I have

heard of the killing of a robber and a villain named Chou; I have not

heard about the killing of a king." That is to say, Chou by his

rascality had already forfeited all the rights and privileges of

kingship before he was actually put to death.

On another occasion Mencius was questioned about the duties of

ministers and royal relatives. "If the sovereign rules badly," he said,

"they should reprove him; if he persists again and again in

disregarding their advice, they should dethrone him." The prince for

whose edification the philosopher uttered these daring sentiments

looked grave. "I pray your Majesty not to take offense," said Mencius.

"You asked me for my candid opinion, and I have told you what it is."

Several other passages of similar purport might be cited from Mencius,

but two more will suffice. "Let us suppose," said the sage, "that a man

who is about to proceed on a long journey entrusts the care of his wife

and family to a friend. On his return he finds that the faithless

friend has allowed his wife and children to suffer from cold and

hunger. What should he do with such a friend?" "He should treat him

thenceforth as a stranger," replied King Hsuan. "And suppose,"

continued Mencius, "that your Majesty had a minister who was utterly

unable to control his subordinates: how would you deal with such a

one?" "I should dismiss him from my service," said the King. "And if

throughout all your realm there is no good government, what is to be

done then?" The embarrassed King, we are told, "looked this way and

that, and changed the subject."

The last of Mencius's teachings on kingship to which we shall refer is

perhaps the most remarkable of all. "The most important element in a

State," he says emphatically, "is the people; next come the altars of

the national gods; least in importance is the king."

These citations from the revered classics should be sufficient to prove

that the people of China are not necessarily cutting themselves adrift

from the traditions of ages and the teachings of their philosophers

when they rise in their might to overthrow an incompetent dynasty. For

it can not be denied that China has known little prosperity under the

later rulers of the Manchu line, and when the revolutionary leaders

declared that the reigning house had forfeited the _T'ien-ming_ we must

admit that they had ample justification for their belief that such was

the case. But many Western friends of China, while fully recognizing

the right of the people to remove the Manchus, entertain very grave

doubts as to the wisdom of abolishing the monarchy altogether and the

establishment of a republican government in its stead. The _T'ien-ming_

has always passed from dynasty to dynasty, never from dynasty to

people. From the remotest days of which we have record, the Chinese

system of government has been monarchic. If the revolutionaries can

break tradition to the extent of abolishing the imperial dignity, what

guaranty have we that they will not break with tradition in every other

respect as well, and so destroy the foundations on which the whole

edifice of China's social, political, and religious life has rested

through all the centuries of her known history?

Whether the Chinese people--as distinct from a few foreign-educated

reformers--do, as a matter of fact, honestly believe that a republican

government is adapted to the needs of the country, is a very different

question. It certainly has not been proved that "the whole nation is

now inclined toward a republic"--in spite of the admission to that

effect contained in the imperial Edict of abdication. Perhaps it would

be nearer the truth to say that the overwhelming majority of the people

of China have not the slightest idea what a republic means, and how

their lives and fortunes will be affected by its establishment, and

therefore hold no strong opinions concerning the advantages or

disadvantages of republican government.

It can not be denied, however, that the social system under which the

Chinese people have lived for untold ages has in some ways made them

more fit for self-government than any other people in the world. It

would be well if Europeans--and especially Englishmen--would try to rid

themselves of the obsolete notion that every Oriental race, as such, is

only fit for a despotic form of government. Perhaps only those who have

lived in the interior of China and know something of the organization

of family and village, township and clan, are able to realize to how

great an extent the Chinese have already learned the arts of

self-government. It was not without reason that a Western authority

(writing before the outbreak of the revolution) described China as "the

greatest republic the world has ever seen."

The momentous Edict in which the Manchu house signed away its imperial

heritage was issued on the twelfth day of February, 1912. It contains

many noteworthy features, but the words which are of special interest

from the constitutional point of view I translate as follows: "The

whole nation is now inclined toward a republican form of government.

The southern and central provinces first gave clear evidence of this

inclination, and the military leaders of the northern provinces have

since promised their support in the same cause. _By observing the

nature of the people's aspirations we learn the Will of Heaven

(T'ien-ming)._ It is not fitting that We should withstand the desires

of the nation merely for the sake of the glorification of Our own

House. We recognize the signs of the age, and We have tested the trend

of popular opinion; and We now, with the Emperor at Our side, invest

the Nation with the Sovereign Power and decree the establishment of a

constitutional government on a republican basis. In coming to this

decision, We are actuated not only by a hope to bring solace to Our

subjects, who long for the cessation of political tumult, but also by a

desire to follow the precepts of the Sages of old who taught that

political sovereignty rests ultimately with the people."

Such was the dignified and yet pathetic swan-song of the dying Manchu

dynasty. Whatever our political sympathies may be, we are not obliged

to withhold our tribute of compassion for the sudden and startling

collapse of a dynasty that has ruled China--not always

inefficiently--for the last two hundred and sixty-seven years.

The Abdication Edict can not fail to be of interest to students of the

science of politics. The Throne itself is converted into a bridge to

facilitate the transition from the monarchical to the republican form

of government. The Emperor remains absolute to the last, and the very

Republican Constitution, which involves his own disappearance from

political existence, is created by the fiat of the Emperor in his last

official utterance. Theoretically, the Republic is established not by a

people in arms acting in opposition to the imperial will, but by the

Emperor acting with august benevolence for his people's good. The cynic

may smile at the transparency of the attempt to represent the

abdication as entirely voluntary, but in this procedure we find

something more than a mere "face-saving" device intended for the

purpose of effecting a dignified retreat in the hour of disaster.

Perhaps the greatest interest of the decree centers in its appeal to

the wisdom of the national sages, and its acceptance of their theory as

to the ultimate seat of political sovereignty. The heart of the drafter

may have quailed when he wrote the words that signified the surrender

of the imperial power, but the spirit of Mencius guided his hand. It

now remains for us to hope that the teachings of the wise men of old,

which have been obeyed to such momentous issues by the last of the

Emperors, will not be treated with contempt by his Republican

successors.

The Great Events by Famous Historians, Volume 21 The Recent Days (1910-1914) · 第 96 / 142 题