himself seemed likely to come off. Marmont had all his army, save
Bonnet alone, collected by the 19th, at Fuente Sauco. On the following
day he came boldly forward and drove in the British cavalry vedettes.
He showed three columns moving on a parallel front, which observers
estimated at 18,000 foot and 2,000 horse--but there were more behind,
still invisible. At four in the afternoon he was drawing so close that
Wellington assumed his battle position. Five divisions and the two
independent Portuguese brigades formed the fighting-line, from San
Cristobal southward to Cabrerizos on the bank of the Tormes: the order
was (from right to left) 1st-7th-4th-Light-3rd-Pack and Bradford. The
reserve was composed of the 5th Division, of Hulse’s brigade of the
6th (of which the remainder was left to blockade the Salamanca forts),
and of Carlos de España’s 3,000 Spaniards. Alten’s cavalry covered the
British right, Ponsonby’s[429] the left, Bock’s and Le Marchant’s heavy
squadrons were in reserve.
[429] Acting vice G. Anson, absent.
It looked at first as though Marmont intended to force on the battle
that Wellington desired. Moving with great order and decision, his
three columns deployed opposite the heights, and advanced to within a
very moderate distance of them--not more than 800 yards at one point.
They were extremely visible, as the whole country-side below the
British position was a fine plain covered with ripening wheat. The
only breaks in the surface were the infrequent villages--in this part
of Spain they are all large and far apart--and a few dry watercourses,
whose line could be detected winding amid the interminable cornfields.
Warning to keep off the position was given to the French by long-range
fire from several of the British batteries on salient points of the
line. The enemy replied noisily and with many guns: Wellington’s
officers judged that he was doing his best to make his approach audible
to the garrison of the besieged forts.
At dusk the French occupied the village of Castellanos de Morisco, in
front of the right centre of the heights, and then advanced a regiment
to attack Morisco, which was absolutely at the foot of them, and had
been occupied by Wellington as an advanced post. It was held by the
68th regiment from the 7th Division, a battalion which had come out
from England in the preceding autumn, but had, by chance, never been
engaged before. It made a fine defence, and beat off three attacks
upon the village: but after dark Wellington called it back uphill to
the line of the position, abandoning Morisco[430]. Apparently he was
glad to see the French pressing in close, and looked for an attack upon
his position next morning. Standing on the sky-line above Castellanos
at dusk, with a map in his hand, he demonstrated to all the assembled
generals commanding divisions the exact part which they were to play,
till several French round-shot compelled him to shift his position a
little farther back[431]. The whole army slept that night in order of
battle, with strong pickets pushed down to the foot of the slopes.
[430] The 68th lost four officers and 46 men killed and wounded,
and one officer taken prisoner. For a good account of the fight
see the Memoirs of Green of the 68th, pp. 89-90.
[431] See Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 165.
There was, however, no attack at dawn. Marmont’s two rear divisions
(those of Foy and Thomières) and a brigade of dragoons were not yet on
the ground, and only got up in the course of the afternoon: hence he
was naturally unwilling to move, as he had a certain knowledge that
he was outnumbered. It would seem that Wellington had, that morning,
an opportunity of crushing his enemy, which he must have regretted to
have lost on many subsequent days of the campaign. Marmont’s position
was one of very great risk: he had pushed in so close to the British
heights, that he might have been attacked and brought to action in half
an hour, and could not have got away without fighting. His position
was visible from end to end--it had no flank protection, and its only
strong points were the two villages of Morisco and Castellanos de
Morisco on its left centre. Behind was an undulating sea of cornfields
extending to the horizon. Wellington (after deducting the two missing
brigades of the 6th Division) could have come down in a general charge
from his heights, with 37,000 Anglo-Portuguese infantry, and 3,500
horse--not to speak of Carlos de España’s 3,000 Spaniards. Marmont
had only five divisions of infantry (about 28,000 bayonets) on the
ground at daybreak, and less than 2,000 horse. He was in a thoroughly
dominated position, and it is hard to see what he could have done,
had Wellington strengthened his left wing with all his cavalry and
delivered a vigorous downhill assault on the unprotected French right.
The opportunity for an attack was so favourable that Wellington’s staff
discussed with curiosity the reasons that might be preventing it, and
formed varying hypotheses to account for his holding back[432]. As a
matter of fact, as his dispatch to Lord Liverpool explains[433], the
British Commander-in-Chief was still hoping for a second Bussaco. He
saw that Marmont was not going to attack till his rear had come up,
but hoped that he might do so that afternoon or next morning, when he
had all his men in hand. The daring way in which the Marshal continued
to hold on to an untenable position, within cannon shot of his enemy’s
line, seemed to argue an ultimate intention to bring on an action.
[432] Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 166.
[433] Wellington to Liverpool, Salamanca, June 25, in
_Dispatches_, ix. p. 252.
Nor was Wellington very far out in his ideas: Marmont was in a state of
indecision. When the missing 10,000 men came up he called a council of
war--the regular resort of generals in a difficulty. We have concerning
it only the evidence of Foy, who wrote as follows in his diary.
‘At dusk on the 21st there was a grand discussion, on the problem as
to whether we should or should not give battle to the English. The
Marshal seemed to have a desire to do so, but a feeble and hesitating
desire. Remembering Vimeiro, Corunna, and Bussaco, I thought that it
would be difficult to beat the English, our superiors in number, on
such a compact position as that which they were occupying. I had not
the first word: I allowed Maucune, Ferey[434], and La Martinière to
express their views, before I let them see what I thought. Then Clausel
having protested strongly against fighting, I supported his opinion.
Because we had left a small garrison in the Salamanca forts, we were
not bound to lose 6,000 killed and wounded, and risk the honour of the
army, in order to deliver them. The troops were in good spirits, and
that is excellent for the first assault: but here we should have a long
tough struggle: I doubted whether we had breath enough to keep it up
to the end. In short, I saw more chances of defeat than victory. I
urged that we ought to keep close to the English, “contain” them, and
wait for our reinforcements; this could be done by manœuvring along the
left bank of the Tormes above and below Salamanca. Clausel and I set
forth this policy from every aspect. The Marshal was displeased: he
fancied that his generals were plotting to wreck his plan: he wanted to
redeem the blunder which he saw that he had made in leaving a garrison
in Salamanca: he dreads the Emperor and the public opinion of the army.
He would have liked a battle, but he had not determination enough to
persist in forcing it on[435].’
[434] The first two were great fire-eaters, and always urged
action.
[435] Foy’s _Vie militaire_, ed. Girod de l’Ain, pp. 165-6.
It seems, therefore, certain that Wellington nearly obtained the
defensive general action that he had desired and expected, and was only
disappointed because Marmont was talked down by his two best divisional
generals. If the Marshal had made his attack, it is clear that his
disaster would have been on a far more complete and awful scale than
the defeat which he was actually to endure on July 22. For he would
have had behind him when repulsed (as he must have been) no friendly
shelter of woods and hills, such as then saved the wrecks of his army,
but a boundless rolling plain, in which routed troops would have been
at the mercy of a cavalry which exceeded their own in the proportion of
seven to five (or slightly more).
On the morning of the 22nd, the British general, who had now kept his
army in position for thirty-six hours on end, began to guess that he
was not to be attacked. Was it worth while to advance, since the enemy
refused to do so? The conditions were by no means so favourable as at
the dawn of the 21st, when Marmont had been short of 10,000 men. But
the allied army still possessed a perceptible superiority in numbers,
a stronger cavalry, and a dominating position, from which it would be
easy to deliver a downhill attack under cover of their artillery.
Wellington, however, made no decisive movement: he threw up some
_flèches_ to cover the batteries in front of the 1st and 7th Divisions,
of which the latter was pushed a little nearer to the Tormes. He
brought up the six heavy howitzers which had been used against the
forts, and placed them on this same right wing of his position. Then
he commenced a partial offensive movement, which was apparently
designed to draw Marmont into a serious bickering, if he were ready
to stand. The 7th Division began to make an advance towards Morisco:
the skirmishers of the Light Brigade of the King’s German Legion moved
down, and began to press in the pickets opposite them, their battalions
supporting. Soon after the 51st and 68th, from the other brigade of
the division, that of De Bernewitz, were ordered to storm a knoll
immediately above Morisco, which formed the most advanced point of the
enemy’s line. Wellington directed Graham to support them with the whole
1st and Light Divisions, if the enemy should bring up reinforcements
and show fight. But nothing of the kind happened: the two battalions
carried the knoll with a single vigorous rush, losing some 30 killed
and wounded[436]. But the French made no attempt to recapture it, drew
back their skirmishing line, and retired to the village, only 200 yards
behind, where they stood firm, evidently expecting a general attack. It
was not delivered: Wellington had been willing to draw Marmont into a
fight, but was not intending to order an advance of the whole line, and
to precipitate a general offensive battle.
[436] The 51st lost 3 killed and an officer and 20 men wounded:
the 68th 2 killed and 6 wounded, the K.G.L. Light Battalions 3
killed and 3 officers and 17 men wounded. There are narratives of
the combat in the Memoirs of Green of the 68th, and Major Rice
and Private Wheeler of the 51st.
There was no more fighting that day, and next morning the whole French
army had disappeared save some cavalry vedettes. These being pressed
in by Alten’s hussars, it was discovered that Marmont had gone back
six miles, to a line of heights behind the village of Aldea Rubia, and
was there in a defensive position, with his left wing nearly touching
the Tormes near the fords of Huerta. Wellington made no pursuit: only
his cavalry reconnoitred the new French position. He kept his army on
the San Cristobal heights, only moving down Anson’s brigade of the
4th Division to hold Castellanos, and Halkett’s of the 7th Division
to hold Morisco. Hulse’s brigade of the 6th Division was sent back
to Salamanca, as were also Dickson’s six howitzers, and Clinton was
directed to press the siege of the forts--notwithstanding the unhappy
fact that there was scarcely any ammunition left in the batteries.
Marmont had undoubtedly been let off easily by Wellington: yet he
hardly realized it, so filled was his mind with the idea that his
adversary would never take the offensive. His report to King Joseph
shows a sublime ignorance of his late danger. As the document has never
been published and is very short, it may be worth quoting.
‘Having concentrated the greater part of this army on the evening of
the 19th, I marched on Salamanca the same day. I seized some outlying
posts of the enemy, and my army bivouacked within half cannon-shot of
the English. Their army was very well posted, and I did not think it
right to attack yesterday (June 21) without making a reconnaissance of
it. The result of my observations has convinced me that as long as my
own numbers are not _at least equal_ to theirs, I must temporize, and
gain time for the arrival of the troops from the Army of the North,
which General Caffarelli has promised me. If they arrive I shall
be strong enough to take an enterprising course. Till then I shall
manœuvre round Salamanca, so as to try to get the enemy to divide his
army, or to move it out of its position, which will be to my advantage.
The Salamanca forts are making an honourable defence. Since we came up
the enemy has ceased to attack them, so that I have gained time, and
can put off a general action for some days if I think proper[437].’
[437] Marmont to Joseph, night of the 22nd June, from bivouac
before San Cristobal. Intercepted dispatch in the Scovell Papers.
Marmont’s plan for ‘manœuvring around Salamanca’ proved (as we shall
see) quite ineffective, and ended within a few days in a definite
retreat, when he found that the succours promised by Caffarelli were
not about to appear.
Meanwhile the siege of the Salamanca forts had recommenced, on the
23rd, under the depressing conditions that the artillery had only
60 rounds (15 apiece!) for the four heavy 18-pounders, which were
their effective weapons, and 160 for the six howitzers, which had
hitherto proved almost useless. The two light field-guns (6-pounders)
were also replaced on the first floor of San Bernardo to shell the
enemy’s loopholes--they were no good at all for battering. This time
the besiegers placed one of their heavy guns in the right flanking
battery near San Bernardo, to get an oblique enfilading fire against
the gorge of the San Cayetano fort. The new idea was to leave San
Vincente alone, as too hard a nut to crack with the small supply of
shot available, and to batter the lesser fort from flank and rear with
the few rounds remaining. The entire stock, together with a hundred
rounds of shell, was used up by the afternoon, when no practicable
breach had been made, though the palisades of San Cayetano had been
battered down, and its parapet much injured. Nevertheless Wellington
ordered an attempt to storm (or rather to escalade) the minor fort at
10 p.m. on the same evening. It was to be carried out by the six light
companies of Bowes’s and Hulse’s brigades of the 6th Division, a force
of between 300 and 400 men. ‘The undertaking was difficult, and the men
seemed to feel it,’ observes the official historian of the Peninsular
sieges[438]. The major of one of the regiments engaged remarks, ‘the
result was precisely such as most of the officers anticipated--a
failure attended with severe loss of life.’ The storming-column,
starting from the ruins near the left flanking battery, had to charge
for the gorge of San Cayetano, not only under the fire of that work,
but with musketry and artillery from San Vincente taking them in the
rear. The casualties from the first moment were very heavy--many men
never got near the objective, and only two ladders out of twenty
were planted against the fort[439]. No one tried to ascend them--the
project being obviously useless, and the stormers ran back under cover
after having lost six officers and 120 men, just a third of their
numbers[440]. Among the killed was General Bowes, commanding the
second brigade of the division, who had insisted on going forward with
his light companies--though this was evidently not brigadier’s work.
Apparently he thought that his personal influence might enable his
men to accomplish the impossible. He was hit slightly as the column
started, but bound up his wound, and went forward a second time, only
to be killed at the very foot of the ladders, just as his men broke and
retired.
[438] Jones, i. p. 281.
[439] The regimental history of the 53rd says that the ladders
were so badly made, of green wood, that many of them came to
pieces in the hands of their carriers long before they got near
the fort.
[440] The loss has got exaggerated in many reports, because the
casualties in the 7th Division at Morisco on the preceding day
are added to the total.
This, as all engaged in it agreed, was a very unjustifiable enterprise;
the escalade was impracticable so long as San Vincente was intact, and
able to cover the gorge of San Cayetano with an effective fire from
the rear. The siege now had a second period of lethargy, all the shot
having been used up. It was only on the morning of the 26th, three
days later, that the convoy from Almeida, ordered up on the 20th by
Wellington, arrived with 1,000 rounds carried by mules, and enabled the
battering to begin once more.
Meanwhile Marmont had been making persistent but ineffective diversions
against Wellington. The advantage of the position to which he had
withdrawn was that it commanded the great bend, or elbow, of the
Tormes, where (at the ford of Huerta) that river turns its general
course from northward to westward. Troops sent across the river
here could threaten Salamanca from the south, and, if in sufficient
strength, might force Wellington to evacuate part of the San Cristobal
position, in order to provide a containing force to prevent them from
communicating with and relieving the besieged forts. The Marshal’s
own statement of his intention[441] was that he hoped, by manœuvring,
to get Wellington either to divide his army or to leave his strong
ground, or both. He aimed, no doubt, at obtaining the opportunity for
a successful action with some isolated part of Wellington’s force, but
was still too much convinced of the danger of fighting a general action
to be ready to risk much. Moreover he was expecting, from day to day,
the 8,000 men of the Army of the North whom Caffarelli had promised
him: and it would be reckless to give battle before they arrived--if
only they were really coming.
[441] See above, p. 370.
Wellington could see, by his own eyes no less than by the map, for he
rode along Marmont’s new front on the 23rd, that the French position
gave good possibilities for a passage of the elbow of the Tormes at
Huerta: wherefore he detached Bock’s brigade of German Dragoons to the
south of the river, with orders to watch the roads debouching from the
fords, and to act as a detaining force if any hostile cavalry crossed
them. He also threw forward Alten’s hussars to Aldea Lengua, a village
and ford half-way between Cabrerizos and Aldea Rubia, with the object
of keeping a similar close watch on any attempt of Marmont’s to move
north of the river. One brigade of the Light Division came forward to
support Alten--the other was écheloned a little back, on hills above
Aldea Lengua.
On the late evening of the 23rd Marmont sent a squadron or two across
the Huerta fords, which turned back after running into Bock’s vedettes.
This was merely an exploring party to test the practicability of
the passage; but next morning, in a heavy fog, skirmishing fire and
occasional reports of cannon told Wellington that some more important
detachment was across the Tormes, and engaged with the Germans. The
British head-quarters staff rode to the hill above Aldea Lengua, which
commands a wide view over the south bank, and, when the morning vapours
rolled up at 7 o’clock, saw Bock retiring across the rolling plain in
very good order, pressed by a heavy force of all arms--two divisions
of infantry headed by a light cavalry brigade with a horse artillery
battery, which was doing some harm to the two dragoon regiments as they
retired in alternate échelons across the slopes.
Fortunately there was excellent defensive fighting-ground south of the
Tormes, in prolongation of the San Cristobal position north of it.
The ravine and brook[442] called the Ribera de Pelagarcia with wooded
heights above them, run in front of Santa Marta and its ford, for some
miles southward from the Tormes. There was a similar line of high
ground facing it, with the villages of Pelabravo and Calvarisa de Ariba
on its top, which the French might occupy, but on passing down from
them they would run against a formidable position. Along these hills,
indeed, Wellington’s first line of defence was to be formed a month
later, on the day of the battle of Salamanca. On seeing Bock’s careful
retreat in progress, the Commander-in-Chief ordered Graham to cross the
Tormes at Santa Marta with the 1st and 7th Divisions, and to occupy the
ground in front of him. This was a short move, and easily accomplished
while the French detachment was pushing the German dragoons slowly
backward. The 4th and 5th Divisions moved down to the north bank of the
Tormes, ready to follow if Marmont should support his advanced guard,
by sending more men over the Huerta fords. Le Marchant’s heavy brigade
crossed the river with a horse artillery battery, and went to reinforce
Bock, whom the French could now only push in by bringing forward
infantry. Their advance continued as far as the village of Calvarisa
de Abaxo, and a little beyond, where the whole 9,000 or 10,000 men
deployed, as if intending to attack Graham. But just as observers on
the Aldea Lengua heights were beginning to think that serious fighting
was probable[443], the whole fell back into column of march, and,
retiring to Huerta covered by their _chasseurs_, recrossed the river.
[442] I find the name Ribera de Pelagarcia only in the more
modern Spanish maps: contemporary plans do not give it.
[443] Tomkinson, p. 170: ‘Just before they began to retire, I
thought that their advance looked serious. Our position was good,
and if they had fought with what had crossed, our force would
have been the greater.’
The state of affairs at nightfall was just what it had been at dawn.
Graham and Le Marchant went back to their old ground north of the
river, and south of it cavalry alone was left--this time Alten’s
brigade, for Bock’s had had a heavy day, and needed rest. So ended a
spectacular but almost bloodless manœuvre--the German dragoons lost
three killed and two wounded: the French light horse probably no more.
In a dispatch written the same night Marmont frankly owns that he was
foiled by Wellington’s counter-move. This hitherto unpublished document
is worth quoting. It is addressed to General Caffarelli, and runs as
follows[444]. ‘The movement which I have made toward Salamanca has
caused the enemy to suspend his attack on the forts of that town. [An
error, as it was not the movement but the lack of ammunition which
stopped the bombardment.] This consideration, and the way in which I
found him posted to keep me off, and not least your assurance that your
powerful reinforcements would reach me very soon, have determined me
to suspend the attack which I was about to deliver against him. I stop
here with the object of gaining time, and in the expectation of your
arrival.’ From this it is clear that if Graham had not been found so
well posted, in a position where he could readily be reinforced from
San Cristobal, Marmont would have followed up his advanced guard with
the rest of his army, and have struck at Salamanca from the South. But
finding the ground on the left bank of the river just as unfavourable
to him as that on the north, he gave up the game and retired. He risked
a serious check, for Wellington might have ordered Graham to follow and
attack the retreating divisions, who would have had great difficulty
in recrossing the Tormes without loss, if they had been pursued and
attacked while jammed at the fords. But Wellington was still in his
defensive mood, and took no risks, contented to have foiled most
effectively his enemy’s manœuvre.
[444] This is one of the many cipher dispatches in the Scovell
Papers, which I have found so illuminating in a period when
Marmont’s writings, printed or in the French archives, are very
few.
On the 25th Marmont remained stationary, waiting for further advices
from Caffarelli, which failed to come to hand. Nor did Wellington make
any move, save that of sending orders that the siege of the forts was
to be pressed as early and as vigorously as possible. The guns were
back in their batteries, waiting for the ammunition which was yet to
appear. All that could be done without shot was to push forward a
trench along the bottom of the ravine between San Vincente and the
other two forts, to cut off communication between them. The French
fired fiercely at the workers, where they could look down into the
ravine, and killed some of them. But there was much ‘dead ground’ which
could not be reached from any point in the forts, and by dawn on the
26th the trench was far advanced, and a picket was lodged safely in it,
close under the gorge of San Cayetano.
On the morning of the 26th the convoy of powder and shot from Almeida
reached the front, and at three in the afternoon the besiegers
recommenced their fire. This time no guns were placed in the original
battery opposite the north front of San Vincente; the four 18-pounders
all went into the right flank attack, and were concentrated on the
gorge of San Cayetano. Four of the howitzers were placed in the left
flank battery, near the College of Cuenca, and directed to fire red-hot
shot into the roof and upper story of San Vincente. The field-guns in
San Bernardo, aided by one howitzer, took up their old work of trying
to keep down the fire of the forts.
The battering in of the gorge of San Cayetano made considerable
progress, but the most effective work was that of the red-hot shot,
which before night had set the tower of San Vincente and several points
of its roof in flames. By heroic exertions the garrison succeeded in
extinguishing them, but the besiegers’ fire was kept up all night, and
from time to time new conflagrations burst out. The governor afterwards
informed the British engineers that eighteen separate outbreaks were
kept down within the twenty-four hours before his surrender[445]. The
fort was very inflammable, owing to the immense amount of timber that
had been used for casemating, traverses, barricades, and parapets,
inside its walls. Still it was holding out at daybreak, though the
garrison was nearly exhausted: the governor signalled to Marmont that
he could not resist for more than three days--a sad over-estimate of
his power, as was to be shown in a few hours. As a subsidiary aid to
the work of the guns two mines were commenced, one from the ravine,
destined to burrow under San Cayetano, the other from the cliff by the
river, intended to reach La Merced. But neither was fated to be used,
other means sufficing.
[445] Jones, _Sieges of the Peninsula_, i. p. 285.
After four hours’ pounding on the morning of the 27th, the gorge of San
Cayetano had been battered into a real and very practicable breach,
while a new fire had broken out in San Vincente, larger than any one
which had preceded it. It reached the main store of gabions and planks
within the fort, and threatened the powder magazine. The garrison were
evidently flinching from their guns, as the counter-fire from the
place, hitherto very lively, began to flag, and the whole building was
wrapped in smoke.
Thereupon Wellington ordered San Cayetano to be stormed for the second
time. The column charged with the operation crept forward along the
trench at the bottom of the ravine, fairly well covered till it had
reached the spot immediately below the gorge of the fort. Just as the
forlorn hope was about to start out of the trench, a white flag was
shown from the breach. The captain commanding in San Cayetano asked for
two hours’ truce, to enable him to communicate with his chief in San
Vincente, promising to surrender at the end of that time. Wellington
offered him five minutes to march out, if he wished to preserve his
garrison’s lives and baggage. As the Frenchmen continued to haggle and
argue, he was told to take down his white flag, as the assault was
about to be delivered. When the stormers ran in, San Cayetano made
practically no defence, though a few shots were fired, which caused six
casualties in the assaulting column: the greater part of the garrison
threw down their muskets and made no resistance.
[Illustration: SALAMANCA FORTS]
At the same moment the white flag went up on San Vincente also: here
the conflagration was now burning up so fiercely that the French had
been able to spare no attention for the storming-party that captured
San Cayetano. The governor, Duchemin, asked for three hours’ suspension
of arms, and made a proposal of terms of surrender. Wellington, here
as at the smaller fort, refused to grant time, as he thought that the
fire would be subdued and the defence prolonged, if he allowed hours
to be wasted in negotiations. He sent in the same ultimatum as at San
Cayetano--five minutes for the garrison to march out, and they should
have all the ‘honours of war’ and their baggage intact. Duchemin, like
his subordinate, returned a dilatory message, but while his white flag
was still flying, the 9th Caçadores pushed up out of the ravine and
entered the battery on the east side of the work. They were not fired
on, no one in San Vincente being prepared to continue the defence, and
the French standard came down without further resistance.
Not quite 600 unwounded men of the garrison were captured. They had
lost just 200 during the siege, including 14 officers[446]. The
casualties among the British were, as might have been expected, much
heavier, largely owing to the unjustifiable assault of June 23rd. They
amounted to 5 officers and 94 men killed, and 29 officers and 302
men wounded. A considerable store of clothing, much powder, and 36
guns of all sorts were found in the three forts. The powder was made
over to Carlos de España, one of whose officers, having moved it into
the town on the 7th July, contrived to explode many barrels, which
killed several soldiers and twenty citizens, besides wrecking some
houses[447]. The three forts were destroyed with care, when they had
been stripped of all their contents.
[446] The total given by the governor to Warre of Beresford’s
staff (see his _Letters_, ed. Dr. Warre, p. 270) were 3 officers
and 40 men killed, 11 officers and 140 men wounded. Martinien’s
lists show 12 officers hit, 5 in the 65th, 2 each in the 15th and
17th Léger, 1 each in 86th, artillery, and engineers. But these
admirable lists are not quite complete.
[447] This is said to have been the result of the escort’s
smoking round the store!
The fall of the Salamanca forts happened just in time to prevent
Marmont from committing himself to a serious offensive operation
for their succour. It will be remembered that, on June 24th, he had
used the plea that Caffarelli’s troops must be with him, ere many
days had passed, as a justification for not pushing on to attack the
British divisions in front of Santa Marta. And this expectation was
reasonable, in view of that general’s last dispatch from Vittoria of
June 14th[448], which spoke of his appearance with 8,000 men as certain
and imminent. On the 26th, however, the Marshal received another letter
from the Army of the North, couched in a very different tone, which
upset all his plans. Caffarelli, writing on the 20th, reported the
sudden arrival on the Biscay coast of Sir Home Popham’s fleet, whose
strength he much exaggerated. In co-operation with the English, Longa,
Renovales, and Porlier had all come down from their mountains, and
Bilbao was in danger from their unexpected and simultaneous appearance.
It would probably be necessary to march to drive off the ‘7th Army’ and
the British expedition without delay. At any rate the transference of
any infantry towards the Douro for the succour of the Army of Portugal
had become impossible for the moment. The brigade of light cavalry and
the guns might still be sent, but the infantry division had become
indispensable elsewhere. ‘I am sorry,’ ended Caffarelli, ‘but I could
not have foreseen this development, and when I spoke of marching
towards you I was far from suspecting that it could arise.’
[448] Printed in Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. p. 410.
This epistle changed the whole aspect of affairs: if the infantry
division from Vittoria had been diverted into Biscay for an indefinite
period, and if even the cavalry and guns (an insignificant force so
far as numbers went, yet useful to an army short of horse) had not
even started on June 20th, it was clear that not a single man would
be available from the North for many days. Meanwhile the governor of
the forts signalled at dawn on the 27th that seventy-two hours was
the limit of his power of resistance. Thereupon Marmont came to the
desperate resolve to attempt the relief of San Vincente with no more
than his own 40,000 men. He tells us that he intended to move by the
south side of the Tormes, crossing not at Huerta (as on the 24th) but
at Alba de Tormes, seven miles higher up, where he had a small garrison
in the old castle, which protected the bridge. This move would have
brought him precisely on to the ground where he ultimately fought the
disastrous battle of July 22nd. He would have met Wellington with
7,000 men less than he brought to the actual battle that was yet to
come, while the Anglo-Portuguese army was practically the same in July
as it was in June[449]. The result could not have been doubtful--and
Marmont knew that he was taking a serious risk. But he did not fathom
its full danger, since he was filled with an unjustifiable confidence
in his adversary’s aversion to battle, and thought that he might be
manœuvred and bullied out of his position, by a move against his
communications[450]. He would have found out his error in front of the
Arapiles on June 29th if he had persevered.
[449] If Marmont had marched for Alba de Tormes on the 28th, as
he intended to do, Wellington would have had the 6th Division
in hand, as well as the rest of his troops, for a battle on the
29th: for the forts fell early on the 27th June.
[450] See his explanation of his intentions in _Mémoires_, iv.
pp. 219-20.
But he did not persevere: in the morning of June 27 the firing at
Salamanca ceased, and a few hours later it was known that the forts had
fallen. Having now no longer any reason for taking risks, the Marshal
changed his whole plan, and resolved to remove himself in haste from
Wellington’s neighbourhood, and to take up a defensive position till
he should receive reinforcements. Two courses were open to him--the
first was to retire due eastward toward Arevalo, and put himself in
communication, by Avila and Segovia, with the Army of the Centre and
Madrid. The second was to retire north-eastward toward Valladolid, and
to go behind the strong defensive line of the Douro. Taking this line
the Marshal would sacrifice his touch with Madrid and the South, but
would be certain of picking up the reinforcement under Bonnet which he
was expecting from the Asturias, and would also be able to receive
with security whatever succour Caffarelli might send--even if it turned
out to be no more than cavalry and guns.
This alternative he chose, probably with wisdom, for in a position on
the Douro he threatened Wellington’s flank if he should advance farther
eastward, and protected the central parts of the kingdom of Leon from
being overrun by the Army of Galicia and Silveira’s Portuguese, who
would have had no containing force whatever in front of them if he had
kept south of the Douro and linked himself with Madrid. His retreat,
commenced before daybreak on the 28th, took him behind the Guarena
river that night: on the 29th he crossed the Trabancos, and rested for
a day after two forced marches. On the 30th he passed the Zapardiel,
and reached Rueda, close to the Douro, on the following morning. From
thence he wrote to King Joseph a dispatch which explains sufficiently
well all his designs: it is all the more valuable because its details
do not entirely bear out the version of his plans which he gives in his
_Mémoires_.
‘The Salamanca forts,’ he said, ‘having surrendered, there was no
reason for lingering on the Tormes; it was better to fall back on his
reinforcements. If he had not done so, he would have been himself
attacked, for Wellington was preparing to strike, and pursued promptly.
He had detached one division [Foy] towards Toro and the Lower Douro to
keep off Silveira, who had passed that river at Zamora. Moreover the
Galicians had blockaded Astorga, and crossed the Orbigo. He felt that
he could defend the line of the Douro with confidence, being aided by
the line of fortified posts along it--Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas.
But to take the offensive against Wellington he must have 1,500 more
cavalry and 7,000 more infantry than he actually had in hand--since
the Anglo-Portuguese army was nearly 50,000 strong, and included 5,000
English horse.’ This reinforcement was precisely what Caffarelli had
promised, but by the 28th not one man of the Army of the North had
reached Valladolid. ‘If the general can trump up some valid excuse
for not sending me the infantry, there is none for keeping back the
cavalry--which is useless among his mountains--or the artillery, which
lies idle at Burgos.’ Would it not be possible for the Army of the
Centre to lend the Army of Portugal Treillard’s division of dragoons
from the valley of the Tagus, since Caffarelli sent nothing? If only
the necessary reinforcements, 1,500 horse and 7,000 foot, came to hand,
the Army of Portugal could take the offensive with a certainty of
success[451]; in eight days Wellington’s designs could be foiled, and
Salamanca could be recovered. But without that succour the Marshal must
keep to the defensive behind the Douro--’I can combat the course of
events, but cannot master them[452].’
[451] In this dispatch and that of July 6 following, Marmont
seems to understate his own force at the moment, saying that
he can dispose of only 30,000 infantry, and 2,000 cavalry or a
trifle over. Allowing for the artillery, engineers and sappers,
gendarmerie and train, which the monthly returns show, this would
give an army of some 35,000 or 36,000 in all. But the returns
(see Appendix) indicate a higher figure for the infantry; after
all deductions for detachments, garrisons, and sick have been
made, it looks as if there must have been 33,000 or even 34,000
available. Generals with a ‘point to prove’ are always a little
easy with their figures.
[452] This is again one of the Scovell intercepted
cipher-dispatches, captured and brought to Wellington a day or
two after it was written. It was a duplicate, and presumably the
other copy reached Madrid.
This interesting dispatch explains all that followed. Marmont was
prepared to fight whenever he could show a rough numerical equality
with Wellington’s army. He obtained it a few days later, by the arrival
of Bonnet with his 6,500 infantry, and the increase of his cavalry by
800 or 900 sabres owing to measures hereafter to be described. On July
15th he had got together nearly 50,000 men of all arms, and at once
took the offensive, according to the programme which he had laid down.
It is, therefore, unfair to him to say that he declared himself unable
to fight till he should have got reinforcements either from Caffarelli
or from Madrid, and then (in despite of his declaration) attacked
Wellington without having received them. He may have been presumptuous
in acting as he did, but at least he gave his Commander-in-Chief fair
notice, a fortnight beforehand, as to his intentions. It was the
misfortune of the French that some of their dispatches miscarried,
owing to the activity of the guerrilleros, while others came to
hand very late. Marmont and King Joseph--as we shall see--were very
imperfectly and intermittently informed as to each other’s doings. But
the Marshal cannot reasonably be accused of betraying or deluding
the King out of jealousy or blind ambition. When he had collected a
force very nearly equal to Wellington’s in numbers, and far superior
in national homogeneity, he cannot be blamed over-much for attacking a
foe whose fighting spirit and initiative he much undervalued. That his
conception of Wellington’s character and capacity was hopelessly wrong
cannot be denied: the estimate was to prove his ruin. But it had not
been formed without much observation and experiment: after what he had
seen on the Caya, and at Aldea da Ponte, and recently on the heights of
San Cristobal, he thought he could take liberties with his opponent. He
was to be undeceived in a very rude fashion before July was out.
SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER V
MARMONT TAKES THE OFFENSIVE. JULY 1812
On July 2nd Wellington had arrived at the end of the first stage of
his campaign. He had cleared the French out of the whole of southern
Leon as far as the Douro, had taken the Salamanca forts, and had beaten
off with ease Marmont’s attempts to meddle with him. All this had been
accomplished with the loss of less than 500 men. But the success,
though marked, was not decisive, since the enemy’s army had not been
beaten in the open field, but only manœuvred out of the considerable
region that it had evacuated. The most tangible advantage secured was
that Marmont had been cut off from Madrid and the Army of the Centre:
he could now communicate with King Joseph only by the circuitous line
through Segovia. All the guerrilleros of Castile, especially the bands
of Saornil and Principe, were thrown on the Segovia and Avila roads,
where they served Wellington excellently, for they captured most of the
dispatches which were passing between King Joseph and Marmont, who were
really out of touch with each other after the Marshal’s retreat from
the Tormes on June 27th.
But till Marmont had been beaten in action nothing was settled, and
Wellington had been disappointed of his hope that the Army of Portugal
would attack him in position, and allow him to deal with it in the
style of Bussaco. The Marshal had retired behind the Douro with his
host intact: it was certain that he would be joined there by Bonnet’s
division from the Asturias, and very possible that he might also
receive succour from the Army of the North. The junction of Bonnet
would give him a practical equality in numbers with the British army:
any considerable reinforcement from Caffarelli would make him superior
in force. And there was still a chance that other French armies might
intervene, though hitherto there were no signs of it. For it was only
during the first fortnight of the campaign that Wellington could reckon
on having to deal with his immediate adversary alone. He was bound to
have that much start, owing to the wide dispersion of the French, and
their difficulty in communicating with each other. But as the weeks
wore on, and the enemy became more able to grasp the situation, there
was a growing possibility that outlying forces might be brought up
towards the Douro. If Marmont had only been defeated on June 21st this
would have mattered little: and Wellington must have regretted more
and more each day that he had not taken the obvious opportunity, and
attacked the Army of Portugal when it placed itself, incomplete and in
a poor position, beneath the heights of San Cristobal.
Now, however, since Marmont had got away intact, everything depended
on the working of the various diversions which had been prepared to
distract the other French armies. One of them, Sir Home Popham’s,
had succeeded to admiration, and had so scared Caffarelli that not
a man of the Army of the North was yet in motion toward the Douro.
And this fortunate expedition was to continue effective: for another
three weeks Marmont got no succours from the army that was supposed
to constitute his supporting force by the instructions of the Emperor
and of King Joseph. But Wellington--not having the gift of prophecy,
though he could see further into the fog of war than other men--was
unable to rely with certainty on Caffarelli’s continued abstinence from
interference. As to Soult, there were as yet no signs of any trouble
from Andalusia. The Duke of Dalmatia had somewhat reinforced D’Erlon’s
corps in Estremadura, but not to such an extent as threatened any
real danger to Hill, who reported that he could keep D’Erlon in check
on the Albuera position, and was not certain that he might not be
able to attack him at advantage--a move for which he had his chief’s
permission[453]. If only Wellington had been fortunate enough to
receive some of Soult’s letters to King Joseph, written in the second
half of June, he would have been much reassured: for the Marshal was
(as we shall see) refusing in the most insubordinate style to carry
out the orders sent him to move troops northward. Two minor pieces
of intelligence from the South were of no primary importance--though
vexatious enough--one was that Ballasteros had ventured on a battle at
Bornos on June 1, and got well beaten: but his army was not destroyed.
The second was that General Slade had suffered a discreditable check at
Maguilla on June 11th in a cavalry combat with Lallemand’s dragoons.
But neither of these events had much influence on Soult’s general
conduct at the time, as we shall show in the proper place.
[453] See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 25. _Dispatches_,
ix. pp. 253-4, and to Hill, ix. pp. 256-7, and again to Lord
Liverpool, ix. pp. 261-2.
There remained one quarter from which Wellington had received
information that was somewhat disturbing. An intercepted letter from
King Joseph to D’Erlon showed that the latter had been directed to move
towards the Tagus, and that the King himself was evidently thinking of
bringing succour to Marmont, so far as his modest means allowed[454].
But since this projected operation seemed to depend on assistance being
granted by Soult, and since it was doubtful in the highest degree
whether Soult would give it, Wellington was not without hopes that it
might come to nothing. ‘I have requested the Empecinado,’ he writes
to Lord Liverpool, ‘to alarm the King for the safety of his situation
about Madrid, and I hope that Marshal Soult will find ample employment
for his troops in the blockade of Cadiz, the continued operations of
General Ballasteros, and those in Estremadura of Lieut.-General Hill,
whose attention I have called to the probable march of this corps of
the Army of the South through Estremadura.’ As a matter of fact Soult
prevented D’Erlon from giving any help to the King or Marmont; but a
contingency was to arise of which Wellington, on July 1st, could have
no expectation--viz. that, though refused all help from the South,
Joseph might come to the desperate but most soldier-like determination
to march with his own little army alone to the Douro, in order to bring
to bear such influence as he possessed on what was obviously a critical
moment in the war. The King and Jourdan were the only men in Spain who
showed a true appreciation of the crisis: but they made their move too
late: the fault was undoubtedly Soult’s alone. However, on July 1st,
Wellington was justified in doubting whether any danger would arise on
the side of Madrid. Joseph could not move the Army of the Centre to
the Douro, without risking his capital and abandoning all New Castile.
As late as July 11th Wellington suspected that he would not make this
extreme sacrifice, but would rather push a demonstration down the
Tagus to alarm central Portugal, a hypothesis which did not much alarm
him[455]. The King and Jourdan knew better than to make this indecisive
move, and marched where their 14,000 men might have turned the whole
course of the campaign--but marched too late.
[454] See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 18. _Dispatches_,
ix. p. 241, and June 25, p. 253. There was also in Wellington’s
hands an intercepted letter of Joseph to Soult of May 26,
distinctly saying that if Marmont is attacked in June, D’Erlon
must pass the Tagus and go to his help. This is in the Scovell
ciphers.
[455] Wellington to Hill, July 11. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 281.
The idea that Joseph might operate on his own account begins to
emerge in the correspondence on the 14th. _Dispatches_, ix. p.
283.
There was still a chance that Suchet might be helping the King--this
depended entirely on an unknown factor in the game, the diversion
which Lord William Bentinck had promised to execute on the coast of
Catalonia. If it had begun to work, as it should have done, by the
second half of June, there was little chance that any troops from the
eastern side of Spain would interfere in the struggle on the Douro. But
no information of recent date was yet forthcoming: it was not till July
14th that the vexatious news arrived that Lord William was faltering
in his purpose, and thinking of plans for diverting his expeditionary
force to Italy.
The situation, therefore, when Marmont went behind the Douro on
July 1st, had many uncertain points: there were several dangerous
possibilities, but nothing had yet happened to make ultimate success
improbable. On the whole the most disappointing factor was the conduct
of the Army of Galicia. It will be remembered that Wellington had
arranged for a double diversion on Marmont’s flank and rear. Silveira,
with the militia of the Tras-os-Montes and D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry
brigade, was to cross the Esla and besiege Zamora. Santocildes, with
the Army of Galicia, had been directed to attack Astorga with part of
his force, but to bring the main body forward to the Esla and overrun
the plains of northern Leon. Silveira had but a trifling force, and the
task allotted to him was small: but on July 1st he had not yet reached
Zamora with his infantry, and was only at Carvajales on the Esla[456].
On the other hand D’Urban’s cavalry had pushed boldly forward in front
of him, had swept the whole north bank of the Douro as far as Toro,
and reported that all the French garrisons save Astorga, Zamora, and
Toro had been drawn in--that Benavente, Leon, and all the northern
plain were unoccupied. On July 2 D’Urban was at Castronuevo, north of
Toro, right in the rear of Marmont’s flank--a very useful position,
since it enabled him to keep up communication between Silveira and
the Galicians, as well as to report any movement of the French right.
Moreover, though his force was very small, only 800 sabres, it was
enough to prevent any foraging parties from Marmont’s rear from
exploiting the resources of the north bank of the Douro. Some such
appeared, but were driven in at once, so that the Marshal had to live
on his magazines and the villages actually within his lines: in the end
these resources would be exhausted, and the old choice--starvation or
dispersion--would once more be presented to the Army of Portugal[457].
[456] By no fault of his own, according to D’Urban. The orders
for him to move were, by some delay at head-quarters, only
forthcoming on June 8th. Only two of the four Tras-os-Montes
militia regiments were then mobilized, and it took a long time to
collect the rest and the transport needed for moving across the
frontier.
[457] D’Urban’s manœuvres on both sides of the Douro are detailed
at great length in his very interesting diary, and his official
correspondence, both of which have been placed at my disposal. He
worked on both sides of the Douro, but went definitely north of
it after July 1.
But as a military body neither D’Urban’s 800 horse nor Silveira’s 4,000
militia had any threatening power against Marmont’s rear. They might
almost be neglected, while the real pressure which Wellington had
intended to apply in this quarter was not forthcoming. He had hoped
that, by the time that he and Marmont were at close quarters, the
Army of Galicia would have been taking a useful part in the campaign.
It was not that he intended to use it as a fighting force: but if it
could have appeared in the French rear 15,000 strong, it would have
compelled Marmont to make such a large detachment for the purpose of
‘containing’ it, that he would have been left in a marked numerical
inferiority on the Douro.
Unfortunately the Galicians moved late, in small numbers, and with
marked timidity. They exercised no influence whatever on the course of
the campaign, either in June or in July. Yet after Bonnet evacuated
the Asturias and went off eastward on June 15th, the Army of Galicia
had no field-force of any kind in front of it. The only French left in
its neighbourhood were the 1,500 men[458] who formed the garrison of
Astorga. Castaños, who had moved up to Santiago in June, and assumed
command, did not take the field himself, but handed over the charge of
the troops at the front to Santocildes. The latter sat down in front
of Astorga with his main body, and only pushed forward a weak division
under Cabrera to Benavente, where it was still too remote from Marmont
to cause him any disquiet. The siege of Astorga was only a blockade
till July 2nd, as no battering-train was brought up till that date.
First Abadia, and later Castaños had pleaded that they had no means for
a regular siege, and it was not till Sir Howard Douglas pointed out a
sufficient store of heavy guns in the arsenal of Corunna, that Castaños
began to scrape together the battering-train that ultimately reached
Astorga[459]. But this was not so much the weak point in the operations
of the Galician army, as the fact that, of 15,000 men brought together
on the Orbigo, only 3,800 were pushed forward to the Esla, while the
unnecessarily large remainder conducted a leisurely siege of the small
garrison of Astorga. Wellington had reckoned on having an appreciable
force, 10,000 or 12,000 men, at the front, molesting Marmont’s flank;
this would have forced the Marshal to make a large detachment to keep
it off. But not a man appeared on the east bank of the Esla, and the
operations of D’Urban’s small brigade were of far more service to the
main army than that of the whole of the Galicians. Marmont ignored the
presence of the few thousand men pushed forward to Benavente, and was
justified in so doing. Meanwhile Santocildes, with an optimism that
proved wholly unjustifiable, sent messages that Astorga would be taken
within a few days, and that he would then move forward with his main
body. As a matter of fact the place held out till the 18th of August.
[458] Two battalions of 23rd Léger and one of 1st Line from
Thomières’s division.
[459] For the curious story of their ignorance of their own
resources see Sir Howard Douglas’s _Life_, pp. 156-7.
Wellington, therefore, was building on a false hypothesis when he wrote
to Lord Bathurst, on July 7, that he was surveying all the fords of the
Douro, and waiting till the river should have fallen a little and made
them more practicable. ‘By that time I hope that the Army of Galicia
under General Santocildes will have been able to advance, the siege of
Astorga having been brought to a conclusion[460].’ Two days later he
added, ‘it would not answer to cross the river at all in its present
state, unless we should be certain of having the co-operation of the
Galician troops[461].’ His delay in making an attempt to force the line
of the Douro, therefore, may be attributed in the main to the tiresome
conduct of Santocildes, who played to him much the same part that
Caffarelli played to Marmont.
[460] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 274.
[461] Ibid., ix. p. 276.
While remaining in this waiting posture, Wellington placed his troops
opposite the various passages of the Douro, on a line of some fifteen
miles. His left, consisting of the 3rd Division, Pack’s and Bradford’s
Portuguese, and Carlos de España’s Spaniards, with Le Marchant’s and
Bock’s heavy dragoons, lay near the point where the Trabancos falls
into the Douro, holding the ford of Pollos, where the favourable
configuration of the ground enabled them to be sure of the passage, the
enemy’s line being perforce drawn back to some distance on the north
bank. It was always open to Wellington to use this ford, when he should
determine on a general advance. The Light, 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions,
forming the right wing, lay opposite Tordesillas, with Rueda and La
Seca behind them. Their front was covered by Alten’s cavalry brigade,
their right (or outer) flank by Anson’s. The reserve was formed by the
1st and 7th Divisions quartered at Medina del Campo, ten miles to the
rear. The whole could be assembled for an offensive or a defensive move
in a day’s march.
Marmont was drawn up, to face the attack that he expected, in an almost
equally close and concentrated formation: his front, extending from the
junction of the Pisuerga with the Douro near Simancas on his left, to
the ground opposite the ford of Pollos on his right, was very thickly
held[462]; but on the 5th he rightly conceived doubts as to whether it
would not be easy for Wellington to turn his western flank, by using
the ford of Castro Nuño and other passages down-stream from Pollos. He
then detached Foy’s division to Toro and the neighbourhood, to guard
against such a danger: but this was still an insufficient provision,
since Toro is fifteen miles from Pollos, and a single division of 5,000
men would have to watch rather than defend such a length of river-line,
if it were attacked in force. Therefore when Bonnet, so long expected
in vain, arrived from the North on July 7th, Marmont placed him in this
portion of his line, for the assistance of Foy. He still retained six
divisions massed around Tordesillas, whose unbroken bridge gave him
a secure access to the southern bank of the Douro. With this mass of
35,000 men in hand, he could meet Wellington with a solid body, if the
latter crossed the Douro at or below Pollos. Or he might equally well
take the more daring step of assuming a counter-offensive, and marching
from Tordesillas on Salamanca against his adversary’s communications,
if the allies threatened his own by passing the river and moving on
Valladolid.
[462] An interesting dispatch from D’Urban to Beresford describes
the information he had got on the 5th by a daring reconnaissance
along Marmont’s rear: there was not that morning any French force
west of Monte de Cubillos, six miles down-stream from Pollos.
A word to explain the tardiness of Bonnet’s arrival in comparison with
the earliness of his start is perhaps required. He had evacuated Oviedo
and Gijon and his other posts in the Asturias as early as June 14th,
the actual day on which Wellington commenced his offensive campaign.
This he did not in consequence of Marmont’s orders, which only reached
him when he had begun to move, but on his own responsibility. He had
received correct information as to the massing of the allied army round
Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the forward movement of the Galicians towards
Astorga. He knew of the dispersed state of Marmont’s host, and saw the
danger to himself. Should the Marshal concentrate about Salamanca,
he could never join him, if the whole Army of Galicia threw itself
between. Wherefore not only did he resolve to retreat at once, but he
did not move by the pass of Pajares and Leon--the obvious route to
rejoin the Army of Portugal. For fear that he might be intercepted,
he took the coast-road, picking up the small garrisons that he had
placed in one or two small ports. He reached Santander on the 22nd,
not molested so much as he might have been by the bands of Porlier and
Longa (whose haunts he was passing), because the bulk of them had gone
off to help in Sir Home Popham’s raid on Biscay. From Santander he
turned inland, passed Reynosa, in the heart of the Cantabrian Sierras,
on the 24th June, and arrived at Aguilar del Campo, the first town
in the province of Palencia, on the 29th. From thence he had a long
march of seven days in the plains, before he reached Valladolid on the
6th, and reported himself at Marmont’s head-quarters on the 7th of
July. He brought with him a strong division of 6,500 infantry, a light
field-battery, and a single squadron of Chasseurs--even 100 sabres[463]
were a welcome reinforcement to Marmont’s under-horsed army. It was an
odd fact that Bonnet’s division had never before met the English in
battle, though one of its regiments had seen them during the last days
of Sir John Moore’s retreat in January 1809[464]. For the three years
since that date they had always been employed in the Asturias.
[463] Ninety-four to be exact. See 28th Chasseurs in table of
Marmont’s army in Appendix.
[464] The 122nd Line had been in Mermet’s division, in January
1809, but they had been in reserve at Corunna, and had not fired
a shot in that battle.
The arrival of Bonnet brought up the total of Marmont’s infantry
to 43,000 men, and his guns to 78. The cavalry still remained the
weak point: but by a high-handed and unpopular measure the Marshal
succeeded, during his stay on the Douro, in procuring nearly 1,000
horses for the dismounted dragoons who were encumbering his dépôt
at Valladolid. In the French, as in the British, Peninsular army it
had become common for many of the junior officers of the infantry
to provide themselves with a riding-horse; most captains and many
lieutenants had them. And their seniors, _chefs de bataillon_ and
colonels, habitually had several horses more than they were entitled
to. Marmont took the heroic measure of proclaiming that he should
enforce the regulations, and that all unauthorized horses were
confiscated. He paid, however, a valuation for each beast on a moderate
scale--otherwise the act would have been intolerable. In this way,
including some mounts requisitioned from doctors, commissaries, and
suttlers, about 1,000 horses in all were procured. The number of
cavalry fit for the field had gone up by July 15th from about 2,200 to
3,200--a total which was only 300 less than Wellington’s full strength
of British sabres. It occurs to the casual observer that the horses,
having never been trained to squadron drill or to act in mass, must
have been difficult to manage, even though the riders were competent
horsemen. This may have something to do with the very ineffective part
played by the French cavalry in the next fortnight’s campaigning.
A quaint anecdote of the time shows us General Taupin, an old
Revolutionary veteran, with all the officers of his brigade called
together in a village church. ‘He ascended the pulpit and thundered
against the abuse of horses in the infantry: he would make an end of
all baggage carried on mules or asses, but most especially of the
officers’ riding-horses. “Gentlemen,” he cried, “in 1793 we were
allowed a haversack as our only baggage, a stone as our only pillow.”
Well--it was a long time since 1793: we were in 1812, and the speaker,
this old and gallant soldier, had _six_ baggage mules himself[465].’
[465] _Mémoires_ of Lemonnier-Delafosse of the 31st Léger, pp.
177-8.
During the first ten days after the deadlock on the Douro began, the
French were much puzzled by Wellington’s refusal to continue his
advance. Foy, the ablest of them, noted in his diary that he must
conclude either that the enemy was not numerous enough to take the
offensive--his strength might have been over-valued--or else that he
was waiting for Hill to bring up his corps from Estremadura. This last
idea, indeed, was running in the brains of many French strategists:
it obsessed Jourdan and King Joseph at Madrid, who were well aware
that Hill, marching by Alcantara and the passes of the Sierra de Gata,
could have got to the Douro in half the time that it would have taken
his opponent, D’Erlon, who would have had to move by Toledo, Madrid,
and Segovia. But the simple explanation is to be found in Wellington’s
dispatch to Lord Bathurst of July 13. ‘It is obvious that we could
not cross the Douro without sustaining great loss, and could not
fight a general action under circumstances of greater disadvantage....
The enemy’s numbers are equal, if not superior, to ours: they have in
their position thrice the amount of artillery that we have, and we are
superior in cavalry alone--which arm (it is probable) could not be used
in the sort of attack we should have to make[466].’ He then proceeds
to demonstrate the absolute necessity of bringing forward the Army of
Galicia against Marmont’s rear. Its absence was the real cause of the
deadlock in which he found himself involved. All offensive operations
were postponed--meanwhile the enemy might receive reinforcements and
attack, since he had not been attacked. ‘But I still hope that I shall
be able to retain, at the close of this campaign, those acquisitions
which we made at its commencement.’
[466] Wellington to Bathurst. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 284.
Meanwhile Marmont, having had a fortnight to take stock of his
position, and having received reinforcements which very nearly reached
the figure that he had named to King Joseph as the minimum which would
enable him to take the offensive, was beginning to get restless.
He had now realized that he would get no practical assistance from
Caffarelli, who still kept sending him letters exaggerating the terrors
of Sir Home Popham’s raid on Biscay. They said that there were six
ships of the line engaged in it, and that there was a landing-force of
British regulars: Bonnet’s evacuation of the Asturias had allowed all
the bands of Cantabria to turn themselves loose on Biscay--Bilbao was
being attacked--and so forth. This being so, it was only possible to
send a brigade of cavalry and a horse artillery battery--anything more
was useless to ask[467]. This was written on June 26th, but by July
11th not even the cavalry brigade had started from Vittoria, as was
explained by a subsequent letter, which only reached Marmont after he
had already started on an offensive campaign[468]. As a matter of fact,
Caffarelli’s meagre contribution of 750 sabres[469] and one battery
actually got off on July 16th[470]. Marmont may be pardoned for having
believed that it would never start at all, when it is remembered that a
month had elapsed since he first asked for aid, and that every two days
he had been receiving dispatches of excuse, but no reinforcements. He
had no adequate reason for thinking that even the trifling force which
did in the end start out would ever arrive.
[467] Caffarelli to Marmont, in the latter’s _Mémoires_, iv. p.
417.
[468] Ibid., pp. 421-2.
[469] He sent finally only two regiments, not three as he had
originally promised.
[470] Caffarelli to Marmont, in the latter’s _Mémoires_, iv. p.
425, announcing their departure.
Nor, as he demonstrates clearly enough in his defence of his
operations, had he any more ground for believing that Joseph and
Jourdan would bring him help from Madrid. They resolved to do so in
the end, and made a vigorous effort to collect as large a force as was
possible. But the announcement of their intention was made too late
to profit Marmont. The dispatch conveying it was sent off from Madrid
only on July 9th[471], and never reached the Marshal at all, for the
two copies of it, sent by separate messengers, were both captured by
guerrilleros between Madrid and Valladolid, and came into Wellington’s
instead of into Marmont’s hands. This was a consequence of the
insecurity of the communication via Segovia, the only one route open
when the Army of Portugal retired behind the Douro. On July 12th the
last piece of intelligence from Madrid which Marmont had received was a
dispatch from Jourdan dated June 30th--it had taken twelve days to get
150 miles, which shows the shifts to which its bearer had been exposed.
This letter is so important, as showing what the King and Jourdan
opined at the moment, that its gist is worth giving.
[471] Original is in the Scovell ciphers. It seems to be
unpublished.
Jourdan begins by complaining that on June 30 the last dispatch from
the Army of Portugal to hand was sixteen days old, of the date of
June 14th. It is clear, then, that no copies of the reports sent by
Marmont on June 22 and June 24 had got to Madrid--a circumstance to
be explained by the fact that Wellington had them instead of their
destined recipient[472]. Jourdan then proceeds to say that he is
informed that Wellington has 50,000 men, but only 18,000 of them
British. ‘The King thinks that if this is so, you are strong enough to
beat his army, and would like to know the motives which have prevented
you from taking the offensive. He charges me to invite you to explain
them by express messenger.’ In the South it was known that Hill, with
18,000 men, was advancing on June 18th against D’Erlon. That officer
was to be reinforced from Seville, and was probably at close quarters
with Hill. The King had sent orders that D’Erlon was to move northward
into the valley of the Tagus, if Hill marched up to join Wellington.
But, it being probable that the order would not be very promptly
executed, ‘his Majesty would like you to take advantage of the moment,
when Wellington has not all his forces in hand, to fight him. The King
has asked for troops from Marshal Suchet, but they will never be sent.
All that His Majesty can do at present is to reinforce the garrison of
Segovia, and order its governor, General Espert, to help the garrison
of Avila, if necessary, and to supply it with food.’
[472] They are both in the Scovell ciphers, and quoted above, p.
370.
This letter, which clearly gives no hope of immediate help for the
Army of Portugal from Madrid, and which might be taken as a direct
incitement to bring Wellington to action at once, must be read in
conjunction with the last epistle that Marmont had received from the
same quarter. This was a letter of the King’s dated June 18. The
important paragraph of it runs as follows:--
‘If General Hill has remained with his 18,000 men on the left (south)
bank of the Tagus, you ought to be strong enough to beat the English
army, more especially if you have received any reinforcements from the
Army of the North. You must choose your battlefield, and make your best
dispositions. But if Hill joins the main English army, I fancy they
are too strong for you. In that case you must manœuvre to gain time. I
should not hesitate to give you a positive order to defer fighting, if
I were certain that Count D’Erlon and his 15,000 men, and a division
from the Army of Aragon, were on their way to you: for on their arrival
the English army would be seriously compromised. But being wholly
uncertain about them, I must repeat to you that if General Hill is
still on the south side of the Tagus, you should choose a good position
and give battle with all your troops united: but if General Hill joins
Lord Wellington, you must avoid an action as long as possible, in
order to pick up the reinforcements which will certainly reach you in
the end[473].’
[473] Joseph to Marmont, June 18, in Ducasse’s _Correspondance_,
ix. pp. 28-39.
I think that there can be no doubt in the mind of any honest
critic that on the strength of these two dispatches from his
Commander-in-Chief, Marmont was justified in taking the offensive
against Wellington, without waiting for that help from Madrid which the
King had not offered him. Hill being far away, and Wellington having
no more than his own seven divisions of Anglo-Portuguese, Marmont is
decidedly authorized to bring him to action. The sole factor which the
second Madrid dispatch states wrongly, is the proportion of British
troops in the allied army: Jourdan guesses that there are 50,000 men,
but only 18,000 British. As a matter of fact there were 49,000 men at
the moment[474], but about 30,000 were British. This made a difference,
no doubt, and Marmont, if he had been determined to avoid a battle,
might have pleaded it as his justification. But he was not set on any
such timid policy: he had wellnigh attacked Wellington at San Cristobal
on June 21st, when he had not yet received his own reinforcements.
When Bonnet had come up, and the British had obtained no corresponding
addition to their strength, he was eager to take the offensive, and
Joseph’s and Jourdan’s dispatches distinctly authorized him to do so.
[474] Two battalions, the 1/38 and 1/5th, joined before the
battle of the 22nd, bringing up the total force by 1,500 bayonets
more.
After the disaster of Salamanca, Napoleon drew up an indictment of
Marmont, of which the three chief heads were:
(1) He took the offensive without waiting for reinforcements which were
to join him.
(2) He delivered battle without the authorization of his
Commander-in-Chief.
(3) He might, by waiting only two days longer, before he committed
himself to a general action, have received at least the cavalry and
guns which he knew that Caffarelli had sent him[475].
[475] See the letter of Clarke to Marmont enclosing the Emperor’s
indictment, in Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 453-4.
The very complete answer to these charges is that:
(1) When the Marshal took the offensive he had no reason to suppose
that any reinforcements were coming. Caffarelli had excused himself:
the King had promised succour only if Hill joined Wellington, not
otherwise. Hill had never appeared: therefore no help was likely to
come from the southward.
(2) He had clear permission from Joseph to give battle, unless Hill
should have joined Wellington.
(3) The succours from Caffarelli, a weak cavalry brigade and one
battery, were so small that their arrival would have made no practical
difference to the strength of the army. But to have waited two days for
them, after the campaign had commenced, would have given Wellington
the opportunity of concentrating, and taking up a good position. It
was only after the manœuvring had begun [July 15th] that this little
brigade started from Vittoria, on July 16th. The Army of Portugal had
already committed itself to offensive operations, and could not halt
for two days in the midst of them, without losing the initiative.
From his own point of view, then, Marmont was entirely justified in
recrossing the Douro and assuming the offensive. He had got all the
reinforcements that he could count upon: they made his army practically
equal to Wellington’s in numbers: in homogeneity it was far superior.
If he had waited a little longer, he might have found 12,000 men of the
Army of Galicia at his back, setting all Old Castile and Leon aflame.
Moreover Astorga was only victualled up to August 1st, and might fall
any day. He could not have foreseen King Joseph’s unexpected march to
his aid, which no dispatch received before July 12th rendered likely.
His misfortune (or fault) was that he undervalued the capacity of
Wellington to manœuvre, his readiness to force on an offensive battle,
and (most of all) the fighting value of the Anglo-Portuguese army.
It cannot be denied that Marmont’s method of taking the offensive
against Wellington was neat and effective. It consisted in a feint
against his adversary’s left wing, followed by a sudden countermarch
and a real attack upon his right wing.
On July 15th Foy and Bonnet, with the two divisions forming the French
right, received orders to restore the bridge of Toro, to drive in
Wellington’s cavalry screen in front of it, and to cross to the south
bank of the Douro. At the same time the divisions of the French
centre, opposite the fords of Pollos, made an ostentatious move
down-stream towards Toro, accompanied by the Marshal himself, and those
on the left, near Tordesillas, shifted themselves towards Pollos.
Almost the whole French army was clearly seen marching westward, and
the two leading divisions were actually across the river next morning,
and seemed to be heading straight for Salamanca by the Toro road.
Wellington was deceived, exactly as Marmont had intended. He drew the
obvious conclusion that his adversary was about to turn his left flank,
and to strike at Salamanca and his line of communications. It would
have been in his power to make a corresponding move against Valladolid,
Marmont’s base. But his own line of communications meant much more
to him than did Marmont’s. There was a great difference between the
position of an army living by transport and magazines, and that of an
army living on the country by plunder, like that of the French marshal.
Wellington had always been jealous of his left wing, and as early as
July 12 had drawn up an elaborate order of march, providing for the
contingency of the enemy crossing the Douro at Toro and the ford of
Castro Nuño. If his entire force seemed on the move, the whole British
army would make a corresponding shift westward--if only a division
or two, the mass transferred would be less in similar proportion. He
had no idea of defending the actual course of the river: in a letter
written a few days later to Lord Bathurst, he remarked that ‘it was
totally out of my power to prevent the enemy from crossing the Douro
at any point at which he might think it expedient, as he had in his
possession all the bridges [Toro and Tordesillas] and many of the
fords[476].’ His plan was to concentrate against the crossing force,
and fight a defensive action against it, wherever a good position might
be available.
[476] See _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 68.
There were two reasons for which Wellington regarded a genuine
offensive move of Marmont by Toro and Castro Nuño as probable. The
first was that he had received King Joseph’s dispatch of July 9th,
captured by guerrilleros, which gave him the startling news that the
King had resolved to evacuate all New Castile save Madrid and Toledo,
and to march with his field-force of some 14,000 men to join the Army
of Portugal[477]. Wellington wrote to Graham (who was now on his way
home) early on the 16th, that either the Galicians’ approach on his
rear had induced Marmont to collect his troops near Toro, or he had
heard that Joseph was gathering the Army of the Centre at Madrid, and
was threatening the allied left ‘in order to prevent us from molesting
the King.’ It was clear that if Wellington had to shift westward to
protect his line of communications, he could make no detachment to
‘contain’ King Joseph, who would be approaching from the south-east.
Another letter, written an hour or so later, says, ‘these movements of
Marmont are certainly intended to divert our attention from the Army
of the Centre (which is collecting at Madrid), if he knows of this
circumstance, _which I doubt_[478].’ The doubt was well grounded.
[477] See _Dispatches_, ix. p. 294.
[478] Wellington to Clinton, July 16, 7 a.m. _Dispatches_, ix. p.
291.
That the whole movement on Toro was a feint did not occur to
Wellington, but his orders of the 16th, given in the evening, after he
had heard that two French divisions were actually across the Douro on
his left, provide for the possibility that some serious force may still
remain at Tordesillas and may require observation.
The orders direct the transference of the great bulk of the allied
army to a position which will cover the road Toro-Salamanca. They were
issued in the evening to the following effect. The reserve (1st and
7th Divisions) was to march from Medina del Campo to Alaejos beyond
the Trabancos river, and subsequently to Canizal and Fuente la Peña
behind the Guarena river. The left wing, which was watching the fords
of Pollos (3rd Division, Bock’s cavalry, Bradford’s and Carlos de
España’s infantry), to Castrillo on the Guarena. Of the right wing
the 6th Division and two regiments of Le Marchant’s horse were to
move on Fuente la Peña, the 5th Division on Canizal. Alten’s cavalry
brigade was to follow the 1st Division. This left the 4th and Light
Divisions and Anson’s cavalry still unaccounted for. They were set
aside to act as a sort of rearguard, being directed to move westward
only as far as Castrejon on the Trabancos river, ten miles short of the
concentration-point on the Toro road, to which the rest of the army
was ordered to proceed. It is clear (though Wellington does not say
so) that they would serve as a containing force, if the enemy had left
any troops at Tordesillas, and brought them over the Douro there, or at
the fords of Pollos.
All these moves were duly executed, and on the morning of the 17th
Wellington’s army was getting into position to withstand the expected
advance of the enemy on Salamanca by the Toro road. This attack,
however, failed to make itself felt, and presently news came that the
two divisions of Foy and Bonnet, which had crossed the Douro at Toro,
had gone behind it again, and destroyed their bridge. What Marmont had
done during the night of the 16th-17th was to reverse the marching
order of his whole army, the rear suddenly becoming the head, and the
head the rear. The divisions to the eastward, which had not yet got
near Toro, countermarched on Tordesillas, and crossed its bridge,
with the light cavalry at their head. Those which had reached Toro
brought up the rear, and followed, with Foy and Bonnet, at the tail
of the column. This was a most fatiguing march for all concerned, the
distance from Toro to Tordesillas being about twenty miles, and the
operation being carried out in the night hours. But it was completely
successful--during the morning of the 17th the vanguard, consisting of
Clausel’s and Maucune’s divisions and Curto’s _chasseurs à cheval_,
was pouring over the bridge of Tordesillas and occupying Rueda and La
Seca, which the British had evacuated fifteen hours before. The rest
followed, the two rear divisions cutting a corner, and saving a few
miles, by crossing the ford of Pollos. This was a safe move, when the
cavalry had discovered that there were none of Wellington’s troops
left east of the Trabancos river. By night on the 17th the bulk of the
French army was concentrated at Nava del Rey, ten miles south-west
of Tordesillas. In the afternoon Wellington’s rearguard, the 4th and
Light Divisions, and Anson’s cavalry had been discovered in position at
Castrejon, where their commander had halted them, when he discovered
that he had been deceived as to his adversary’s purpose. The rest of
the British army had concentrated, according to orders, in the triangle
Canizal-Castrillo-Fuente la Peña, behind the Guarena river and in front
of the Toro-Salamanca road.
[Illustration: THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN]
Wellington’s first task was to drawback his rearguard to join his main
body, without allowing it to become seriously engaged with the great
mass of French in its front. This he undertook in person, marching at
daylight with all his disposable cavalry, the brigades of Bock and Le
Marchant, to join the force at Castrejon, while he threw out the 5th
Division to Torrecilla de la Orden to act as a supporting échelon on
the flank of the retiring detachment. The remaining divisions (1st,
3rd, 6th, 7th) took up a position in line of battle on the heights
above the Guarena, ready to receive their comrades when they should
appear.
The charge of the rearguard this day was in the hands of Stapleton
Cotton, the senior cavalry officer with the army, who outranked Cole
and Charles Alten, the commanders of the 4th and Light Divisions.
He had received no orders during the night, and his last, those of
the preceding afternoon, had directed him to halt, till his chief
should have discovered the true position and aim of the French army.
Wellington explained, in his next dispatch home, that the various
details of intelligence, which enabled him to grasp Marmont’s whole
plan, did not reach him till so late on the 17th that it was useless to
send Cotton orders to start. They could only be carried out at dawn,
and he himself intended to be present with the rearguard before the sun
was far above the horizon. He arrived at seven o’clock in the morning,
in time to find his lieutenant already engaged with the French van, but
not committed to any dangerous close fighting. Cotton had, very wisely,
sent out patrols before daylight to discover exactly what was in front
of him; if it was only a trifling body he intended to drive it in, and
advance towards La Nava and Rueda[479]; if Marmont was in force he
would take up a defensive position at Castrejon, and wait for further
orders.
[479] See report of one of the officers commanding patrols,
Tomkinson of the 16th L.D. in the latter’s _Memoirs_, p. 180.
The patrols soon ran into French cavalry advancing in force, and were
driven back upon Anson’s brigade, which was drawn up on a long front in
advance of the village of Castrejon. On seeing it, the enemy brought up
two batteries of horse artillery, and began to play upon the scattered
squadrons. Bull’s and Ross’s troops[480] were ordered out to reply, and
did so with effect, but the total strength of the French cavalry was
too great, and Anson’s regiments had presently to give way, though not
so much owing to the pressure on their front as to the sight of a large
column of French infantry turning the left of their line, and marching
on Alaejos, with the obvious intention of getting round to their left
rear and molesting their retreat towards the Guarena, where the main
body of the British army was awaiting them.
[480] Belonging one to the cavalry, the other to the Light
Division.
Wellington was involved in person in the end of the cavalry bickering,
and in no very pleasant fashion. He and Beresford, with their staffs,
had arrived on the field about seven o’clock, in advance of the two
heavy cavalry brigades, who were coming up to reinforce Cotton. He
rode forward to the left of the skirmishing line, where two squadrons,
one of the 11th and one of the 12th Light Dragoons, were supporting
two guns of Ross’s troop, on high ground above the ravine of the
Trabancos river. Just as the Commander-in-Chief came on the scene,
a squadron of French cavalry, striking in from the flank, rode at
the guns, not apparently seeing the supporting troops. They met and
broke the squadron of the 12th Light Dragoons, which came up the hill
to intercept them. ‘Some of Marshal Beresford’s staff, seeing this,
and conceiving the guns to be in danger, rode up to the retiring
squadron calling “Threes about[481]!”’ This unfortunately was heard by
the supporting squadron of the 11th, who, imagining the order to be
directed to themselves, went about and retired, instead of advancing
to relieve their broken comrades above. Therefore the mass of pursuers
and pursued from the combat on the flank, came hurtling down on the
guns, and on the head-quarters staff just behind them. Wellington and
Beresford and their followers were swept away in the rout, and had to
draw their swords to defend themselves. Fortunately the misdirected
squadron of the 11th soon saw their mistake; they halted and turned,
and falling on the scattered and exhausted French dragoons drove them
back with great loss; few, it is said, except their _chef d’escadron_,
who showed uncommon gallantry, got away[482]. It was a dangerous moment
for the allied army--a chance thrust in the _mêlée_ might have killed
or disabled Wellington, and have thrown the command into the hands of
Beresford or Stapleton Cotton.
[481] Tomkinson, p. 188.
[482] Compare Tomkinson’s narrative of this incident (pp.
180-1) with Napier’s vivid and well-told tale (iv. pp. 254-5).
Both agree that the French were inferior in numbers to the two
squadrons, and that there was deplorable confusion.
Wellington had no sooner detected the flank movement of Marmont’s
infantry towards Alaejos, than he ordered the 4th and Light Divisions
to retire towards the Guarena, covered by G. Anson’s brigade, while
Bock’s and Le Marchant’s heavy dragoons, farther to the left, drew
up in front of the infantry of the turning column, and detained it,
retiring, when pressed, by alternate brigades. Marmont’s whole army was
now visible, moving on in two long columns, of which the more southern
followed the 4th and Light Divisions, in the direction of Torrecilla
de la Orden, and tried to come up with their rear, while the other,
passing through Alaejos, made by the high-road for Castrillo on the
Guarena, where the British reserves were posted.
There was a long bickering fight across the eight miles of rolling
ground between the Trabancos and the Guarena, not without some exciting
moments for Wellington’s rearguard. After passing Torrecilla de la
Orden, and picking up there the 5th Division, which had been waiting
as a supporting échelon to cover their southern flank, all the British
infantry had to march very hard, for troops diverging from the northern
French column got close in upon their right, and, moving parallel with
them, bid fair to reach the Guarena first. In the retreat the 4th
Division moved on the right, and was therefore most exposed, the Light
Division next them, the 5th Division farther south and more distant
from the turning column of the French. The cavalry pursuit in the rear
of the retreating force was never really dangerous: it was held off
by Le Marchant’s Heavy and Anson’s Light Dragoons without any great
difficulty, and the 5th and Light Divisions only suffered from some
distant shelling by the French horse artillery. But the 4th Division,
though covered from the pursuit in their direct rear by Bock’s German
squadrons, found a dangerous point about a mile on the near side of
the Guarena, where two batteries from the French turning column had
galloped forward to a knoll, commanding the ground over which they
had to pass, and opened a teasing fire upon the flank of the brigades
as they marched by. General Cole, however, threw out his divisional
battery and all his light companies to form a screen against their
attack, and moved on, protected by their fire, without turning from
his route. The covering force fell in to the rear when the defiling
was over, and the division suffered small loss from its uncomfortable
march[483].
[483] See Vere’s _Marches and Movements of the 4th Division_, p.
28. Napier’s statement that the Light Division was more exposed
than the 4th or 5th during the retreat, seems to be discounted
by the fact that it had not one man killed or wounded--the 5th
Division had only two (in the 3rd Royal Scots), the 4th Division
over 200; and though most of them fell in the last charge, a good
number were hit in the retreat.
Wellington allowed all the three retreating divisions to halt for a
moment on the farther side of the stream, at the bottom of the trough
in which it runs. ‘The halt near the water, short as it was, gave
refreshment and rest to the troops, after a rapid march over an arid
country in extremely hot weather[484].’ But it could not be allowed
to last for more than a very few minutes, for the pursuing enemy soon
appeared in force at several points on the heights above the eastern
bank of the Guarena, and many batteries opened successively on the
three divisions, who were of necessity compelled to resume their march
up the slope to the crest, on their own side of the water. Here they
fell into position on Wellington’s chosen defensive fighting-ground,
the 4th Division forming the extreme northern section of the battle
array, by the village of Castrillo, the Light and 5th Divisions falling
in to the line of troops already drawn up in front of Canizal, while
the 1st and 7th Divisions were extended to the south, to form the new
right wing, and took their place on the heights of Vallesa, above the
village and ford of El Olmo.
[484] Vere’s _Marches and Movements of the 4th Division_, p. 28.
Some anxious hours had been spent while the retreat was in progress,
but Wellington was now safe, with every man concentrated on an
excellent position, where he was prepared to accept the defensive
battle for which he had been waiting for the last month. It seemed
likely at first that his wish might be granted, for the French made a
vigorous attack upon his left wing, almost before it had got settled
down into its appointed ground. It would appear that General Clausel,
who commanded the more northerly of the two great columns in which the
French army was advancing (while Marmont himself was with the other),
thought that he saw his chance of carrying the heights above Castrillo
and turning the allied left, if he attacked at once, before the 4th
Division had been granted time to array itself at leisure. Accordingly,
without wasting time by sending to ask permission from his chief, he
directed a brigade of dragoons to outflank Cole’s left by crossing the
Guarena down-stream, while Brennier’s division passed it at Castrillo
and assailed the front of the 4th Division. Clausel’s own division
advanced in support of Brennier’s.
This move brought on very sharp fighting: the turning movement of the
French dragoons was promptly met by Victor Alten’s brigade [14th Light
Dragoons, 1st Hussars K.G.L.], whose squadrons had been watching the
lower fords of the Guarena all day. Alten allowed the hostile cavalry
to cross the river and come up the slope, and then charged suddenly,
in échelon of squadrons, the left squadron of the 1st Hussars K.G.L.
leading[485]. The enemy had only begun to deploy when he was attacked,
Alten’s advance having been too rapid for him. The two French regiments
(15th and 25th Dragoons) were, after a stiff fight, completely routed
and driven downhill with great loss, till they finally found refuge
behind a half-battery and an infantry battalion which formed their
supports. General Carrié, commanding the two regiments, was taken
prisoner by a German hussar, having got cut off from his men in the
flight. The French lost in all 8 officers and more than 150 men, of
whom 94 were prisoners--mostly wounded. How sharp the clash was may be
seen from the fact that Alten’s victorious brigade had not much fewer
casualties--the 14th Light Dragoons lost 75 killed and wounded, the
German hussars 60[486]. But no doubt some of these losses were suffered
not in the cavalry combat, but a little later in the day, when Alten
charged the French infantry[487].
[485] Brotherton of the 14th L.D. says with the _right_ échelon
advanced (Hamilton’s _History of the 14th_, p. 107), but I fancy
that the German Hussars’ version that the _left_ échelon led is
correct, as the right squadron of their regiment would have been
in the middle of the brigade, not on a flank. See narrative in
Schwertfeger, i. pp. 368-9.
[486] These are the official returns. The regimental histories
give only 45 and 56 respectively.
Martinien’s lists show six casualties in officers in the two
French regiments, and two more were taken prisoners, General
Carrié and a lieutenant of the 25th Dragoons.
[487] Brotherton says that the first two squadrons which charged
the French dragoons made no impression, and that it was the
impact of the third, led by himself, which broke them.
While this lively fight was in progress on the flank, Brennier’s
division had crossed the Guarena in a mass, and on a very short front,
apparently in three columns of regiments, battalion behind battalion.
They were ascending the lower slopes below Cole’s position, when
Wellington, who was present here in person, suddenly took the offensive
against them, sending W. Anson’s brigade (3/27th and 1/40th) against
them in line, with Stubbs’s Portuguese (11th and 23rd regiments)
supporting, in columns of quarter distance. The French division halted,
apparently with the intention of deploying--but there was no time for
this. The line of Anson’s brigade enveloped both the hostile flanks
with its superior frontage, and opened fire: after a short resistance
the French gave way in great disorder, and streamed down to the
Guarena. As they fled Alten let loose part of his brigade against their
flank: the horsemen rode in deep among the fugitives, and cut off 6
officers and 240 men as prisoners. Clausel had to bring up a regiment
of his own division to cover the broken troops as they repassed the
river; it suffered severely from Cole’s artillery, losing 6 officers
killed and wounded, and many men[488].
[488] This was the 25th Léger.
The attempt to take liberties with Wellington’s army, when it had
assumed the defensive on favourable ground, had thus failed in the
most lamentable style, and with very heavy loss--at least 700 men
had been killed, wounded, or taken in Marmont’s army that day, and
all but a few scores belonged to the four infantry and two cavalry
regiments which Clausel sent to attack the heights by Castrillo[489].
The corresponding British loss that day was 525, including about 50
stragglers taken prisoners during the retreat from the Trabancos to
the Guarena, because they had fallen behind their regiments--foot-sore
infantry, or troopers whose horses had been shot. The cavalry, which
had so successfully covered the long march across the open, had a
certain amount of casualties, but the only units that had suffered
heavily were the four regiments--horse and foot--that dealt with
Clausel’s attack, who lost 276 men between them.
[489] The exact figures, save for officers, are as usual missing.
But Martinien’s invaluable lists show that of 41 French officers
killed, wounded, or taken that day, 35 belonged to the four
infantry regiments (17th and 25th Léger, 22nd and 65th Line) and
the two cavalry regiments (15th and 25th Dragoons) which fought
at Castrillo.
Wellington must have felt much disappointment at seeing Clausel’s
offensive move at Castrillo unsupported by the rest of the French
divisions, who were lining the farther bank of the Guarena parallel
with the whole of his front. But Marmont, unlike his venturesome
subordinate, nourished no illusions about the advisability of attacking
a British army in position. He made no move in the afternoon; in his
memoirs he points out that the infantry was absolutely exhausted,
having been continuously on the march for three days and one night.
This day had been a disappointing one for the French marshal also. He
had failed to cut off Wellington’s two detached divisions, so that all
the advantage which he had obtained by his marches and countermarches
between Toro and Tordesillas was now exhausted. The allied army
had succeeded in concentrating, and was now drawn up in his front,
covering Salamanca and its own line of communications in a very tenable
position. Napier truly remarks that, since the attempt to isolate and
destroy Cotton’s detachment had miscarried, Marmont had gained no more
by his elaborate feint and forced marches than he would have obtained
by continuing his original advance across Toro bridge on the 16th. He
had got the whole Anglo-Portuguese army arrayed in a defensive position
in front of him, on the line of the Guarena, instead of somewhere in
the neighbourhood of Fuente Sauco, a few miles farther east.
On the morning of the 19th July it seemed as if a new deadlock was
to bring the campaign to a standstill, for the two armies continued
to face each other across the Guarena, Wellington hoping rather than
expecting to be attacked, Marmont looking in vain for a weak point
between Castrillo and Vallesa, where it would be worth while to try a
forward thrust. While he was reconnoitring, his weary infantry got a
much-needed rest. At about four o’clock in the afternoon, however, the
whole French army was seen falling into column, and presently edged off
southward till it lay between Tarazona and Cantalapiedra. Wellington
thereupon made a corresponding movement, evacuating Castrillo to
the north, and extending his line of battle beyond Vallesa to the
south. There was a little distant cannonading across the valley of
the Guarena, and some of the shells set fire to the vast fields of
ripe wheat which covered the whole country-side in this region. The
conflagration went rolling on for a long way across the plain, leaving
a trail of smoke behind.
The situation on this evening had nothing decisive about it. It was
clear that neither side intended to fight save at an advantage. Marmont
had shown himself more cautious than had been expected. Wellington
had at this moment every motive for risking nothing, unless the
enemy proved more obliging than he had shown himself hitherto. He
had reasons for self-restraint at this moment of which his adversary
knew nothing. The first was that he was aware (from intercepted
dispatches) of King Joseph’s intention to march from Madrid to join
the Army of Portugal: with a possible 15,000 men about to appear on
his flank, he must look to the future with care. The second was that
he had received a few days before the untoward news that Lord William
Bentinck’s long-promised expedition to Catalonia might not ever take
place. The Commander-in-Chief in Sicily wrote that he had found new
opportunities in Italy, which it might be his duty to seize. His troops
had been embarked, but they were not to be expected for the present off
the coast of Spain. This was a disheartening piece of intelligence:
Wellington had been told to count upon this support both by Bentinck
himself and by the Home Government. If it should fail, Marshal
Suchet, left undisturbed by this diversion, might send considerable
reinforcements to Madrid[490].
[490] For dismay expressed by Wellington at this news see
dispatches to Henry Wellesley dated Rueda, July 15, and to Lord
Bathurst (_Dispatches_, ix. pp. 285 and 287).
As a matter of fact he did not--being, like Soult, a general of much
too self-centred a type of mind to help a neighbour if he could avoid
it. Only one regiment of the Valencian army ever got to Madrid, and
that came too late for King Joseph’s purpose. But so far as Wellington
could guess on July 19, it was quite possible that Suchet might find
10,000 men, to add to the disposable 15,000 of the Army of the Centre.
There was also the possibility that D’Erlon, obeying the orders which
King Joseph kept sending to him, might make up his mind to cross the
Guadiana and Tagus, and come north by Arzobispo and Madrid. If so, Hill
was to make a parallel march by Alcantara, and would certainly arrive
many days before D’Erlon. This was a mere possibility; there were good
reasons for holding that Soult might forbid any such move; and till
D’Erlon started northward, Hill must remain behind to contain him. The
problem was not pressing: it could not develop for many days[491].
[491] See Wellington to Hill, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 290.
On the other hand there was news that the Galicians were at last on
the move. Santocildes had been prevailed upon to leave a smaller force
to besiege Astorga, and had come down with a second division to join
Cabrera at Benavente. This force, advancing up the Douro valley, would
find absolutely no enemy in front of it, and must obviously disturb
Marmont’s operations, since it might be at the gates of Valladolid,
his base and storehouse, in a few days. He would then be forced to
detach a division or so to save his dépôts, and he could not spare
even a brigade if he wished to continue on the offensive. Certain
intelligence that there was not a Frenchman left behind on the Douro,
save the trifling garrisons of Toro, Zamora, and Tordesillas, had been
brought in by General D’Urban. That officer, after conducting a very
daring exploration round the rear of Marmont’s army, almost to the
gates of Valladolid, had recrossed the Douro by Wellington’s orders
at the ford of Fresno de Ribera, and fell in upon the left flank of
the allied army near Fuente Sauco on July 18th[492]. For the rest of
the campaign his 700 sabres were at Wellington’s disposal[493]. His
report showed that Marmont’s rear was absolutely undefended, and that
the Galicians could march up the Douro, if desired, without finding any
opponents: it would be perfectly possible for them to cut all Marmont’s
communications with Valladolid and Burgos, without being in any danger
unless the Marshal detached men against them.
[492] Not July 17th, as Napier says. D’Urban’s diary proves that
he recrossed the Douro on the 18th.
[493] He left one squadron near Zamora, to serve as covering
cavalry for Silveira’s militia, who remained waiting for
Santocildes’s advance, which they were to observe and support.
His force was therefore reduced to 700 men.
The 20th of July proved to be a most interesting day of manœuvring,
but still brought no decisive results. Early in the morning the whole
French army was seen in march, with its head pointing southward,
continuing the movement that it had begun on the previous day. Marmont
had made up his mind to proceed with the hitherto unsuccessful scheme
for turning his adversary’s right wing[494], in the hope of either
cutting him off from his communication with Salamanca, or of catching
him with his army strung out on too long a line from continuous and
rapid movement. The character of this day’s march differed from that
of the 19th, because the single well-marked Guarena valley ceased
after a time to separate the two hostile armies. That little river is
formed by three tributaries which meet at and above the village of
El Olmo: each of them is a paltry brook, and their courses lie along
trifling irregularities of the broad tableland from which they descend.
It is only after their junction that they flow in a deep well-marked
valley, and form a real military obstacle. Of the three brooks, that
which keeps the name of Guarena lies most to the east: up its right
bank and towards its source Marmont’s march was directed. Wellington’s
parallel movement southward, on the other hand, was directed along the
left bank of the Poreda, the middle brook of the three. Between them
there was at first a narrow triangular plateau, on which neither party
trespassed save with cavalry scouts.
[494] He adds in his _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 251-2, that if he had
not succeeded in getting ahead of Wellington’s van, he had a
counter-project of trying to get round his rear, but the British
marched so exactly parallel with him that he got no chance of
this.
After a few miles of marching Marmont ordered his advanced guard to
cross the Guarena, which they could do with ease, no British being
near, save a few cavalry vedettes. He then turned the head of his
column south-westward, instead of keeping to his original direction
due south. Having crossed the Guarena he came in sight of the British
column marching on the other side of the Poreda brook from Vallesa. The
movements of the two armies tended to converge, the point on which both
were moving being the village of Cantalpino. It seemed likely that the
heads of the marching columns must collide, and that a combat, if not
a general action, would ensue. Each army was marching in an order that
could be converted into a battle line by simply facing the men to right
or to left respectively. Wellington had his troops in three parallel
columns, the first one, that nearest to the French, being composed
of the 1st, 4th, 5th, and Light Divisions, the second, which would
have formed the supporting line if the army had fronted and gone into
action, contained the 6th and 7th and Pack’s and Bradford’s brigades:
the 3rd Division and España’s Spaniards formed a reserve, moving
farthest from the enemy. The light cavalry were marching ahead of the
column, the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese brought up their
rear. Marmont was clearly seen to be moving in a similar formation,
of two columns each composed of four infantry divisions, with Curto’s
_chasseurs_ ahead, and Boyer’s dragoons at the tail of the line of
march[495].
[495] Marmont describes the formation (_Mémoires_, iv. p. 252) as
‘gauche en tête, par peloton, à distance entière: les deux lignes
pouvaient être formées en un instant par _à droite en bataille_.’
The day was warm but clouded, so that the sun did not shine with full
July strength, or the long march which both armies carried out would
have been brought to an end by exhaustion at a much earlier hour than
was actually the case. As the long morning wore on, the two hostile
forces gradually grew closer to each other, owing to the new westward
turn which Marmont had given to his van. At last they were within
long artillery range; but for some time no shot was fired, neither
party being willing to take the responsibility of attacking an enemy
in perfect order and well closed up for battle. Either general could
have brought on a fight, by simply fronting to flank, in ten minutes;
but neither did so. Marmont remarks in his _Mémoires_ that in his long
military service he never, before or after, saw such a magnificent
spectacle as this parallel march of two bodies of over 40,000 men each,
at such close quarters. Both sides kept the most admirable order, no
gaps occurred in either line, nor was the country one that offered
advantage to either: it was very nearly flat, and the depression of the
Poreda brook became at last so slight and invisible that it was crossed
without being noticed. The ground, however, on which the French were
moving was a little higher than that on which the allies marched[496].
[496] There is an excellent description of the parallel march in
Leith Hay, ii. pp. 38-40, as well as in Napier.
The converging lines of advance at last almost touched each other at
the village of Cantalpino: the light cavalry and the 1st Division, at
the head of Wellington’s front (or eastern) column of march had just
passed through it, when Marmont halted several batteries on a roll of
the ground a few hundred yards off, and began to shell the leading
battalions of the 4th Division, which was following closely behind the
1st. Wellington ordered Cole not to halt and reply, nor to attack, but
to avoid the village and the French fire by a slight westerly turn, to
which the other divisions conformed, both those in the first and those
in the second line[497]. This amounted to the refusing of battle, and
many officers wondered that the challenge of Marmont had been refused:
for the army was in perfect order for fighting, and in excellent
spirits. But Wellington was taking no risks that day.
[497] This swerve and its consequence are best stated in Vere’s
_Marches of the 4th Division_, p. 30.
The slight swerve from the direct southerly direction at Cantalpino
made by the allied army, distinctly helped Marmont’s plan for turning
its right, since by drawing back from its original line of movement it
allowed the enemy to push still farther westward than his original
line of march had indicated. This meant that he was gradually getting
south of Wellington’s vanguard, and would, if not checked, ultimately
arrive at the Tormes river, near the fords of Huerta, from which he
would have been edged off, if both armies had continued in their
original direction. During the early afternoon the parallel move
continued, with a little skirmishing between cavalry vedettes, and an
occasional outbreak of artillery fire, but no further developments. The
baggage in the English rear began to trail behind somewhat, owing to
the long continuance of the forced marching, and D’Urban’s Portuguese,
who shepherded the stragglers, had great difficulty in keeping them
on the move. A few score sick and foot-sore men, and some exhausted
sumpter-beasts, fell behind altogether, and were abandoned to the
French[498].
[498] Marmont says that if he had possessed a superior cavalry
he could have made great captures, but he dared attempt nothing
for want of sufficient numbers: he alleges that he took 300
stragglers--certainly an exaggeration as the British returns show
very few ‘missing.’ _Mémoires_, iv. p. 233.
Late in the afternoon the armies fell further apart, and all save the
outlying vedettes lost sight of each other. This was due to the fact
that Wellington had made up his mind to settle down for the night
on the heights of Cabeza Vellosa and Aldea Rubia, where Marmont had
taken up his position a month before, when he retired from before San
Cristobal. This was good fighting-ground, on which it was improbable
that the French would dare to deliver an attack. The 6th Division and
Alten’s cavalry brigade were detached to the rear, and occupied Aldea
Lengua and its fords.
This had been a most fatiguing day--the British army had marched,
practically in battle formation, not less than four Spanish leagues,
the French, by an extraordinary effort, more than five. When the
camp-fires were lighted up at night, it was seen that the leading
divisions of the enemy were as far south as Babila Fuente, quite
close to the Tormes and the fords of Huerta: the main body lay about
Villaruela, opposite the British bivouacs at Aldea Rubia and Cabeza
Vellosa. An untoward incident terminated an unsatisfactory day:
D’Urban’s Portuguese horse coming in very late from their duty of
covering the baggage-train, were mistaken for prowling French cavalry
by the 3rd Division, and shelled by its battery, with some little loss
of men and horses. The mistake was caused by a certain similarity in
their uniform to that of French dragoons--the tall helmets with crests
being worn by no other allied troops[499].
[499] The heavy cavalry in the British army were still wearing
the old cocked hat, the new-pattern helmet with crest was not
served out till 1813. The light dragoons were still wearing the
black-japanned leather headdress with the low fur crest: in 1813
they got shakos, much too like those of French _chasseurs_.
The net result of the long parallel march of July 20th was that
Marmont had practically turned Wellington’s extreme right, and was
in a position to cross the Upper Tormes, if he should choose, in
prolongation of his previous movement. The allied army was still
covering Salamanca, and could do so for one day more, if the marching
continued: but after that limit of time it would be forced either to
fight or to abandon Salamanca, the main trophy of its earlier campaign.
There remained the chance of falling upon Marmont’s rear, when his army
should be occupied in crossing the Tormes, and forcing him to fight
with his forces divided by the river. If this offensive move were not
taken, and the parallel march were allowed to continue, the next day
would see the armies both across the Tormes, in the position where
Graham and Marmont had demonstrated against each other on June 24th.
Wellington could not, however, begin his southward move till he was
certain that the enemy was about to continue his manœuvre on the same
plan as that of the last two days. If he started too early, Marmont
might attack the San Cristobal position when it was only held by a
rearguard, and capture Salamanca. Till an appreciable fraction of the
French were seen passing the Tormes it was necessary to wait.
It appeared to Wellington that his adversary’s most probable move would
be the passage of the Tormes by the fords at and just above Huerta.
That he would abandon his previous tactics, and attack the British
army, was inconsistent with the caution that he had hitherto displayed.
That he would continue his march southward, and cross the river
higher up, was unlikely; for the obvious passage in this direction,
by the bridge of Alba de Tormes, was commanded by the castle of that
town, which had been for some time occupied by a battalion detached
from Carlos de España’s division. Wellington looked upon this route
as completely barred to the French: he was unaware that the Spanish
general had withdrawn his detachment without orders on the preceding
afternoon. This astonishing move of his subordinate was made all the
worse by the fact that he never informed his chief that he had taken
upon himself to remove the battalion. Indeed Wellington only heard
of its disappearance on the 23rd, when it was too late to remedy the
fault. He acted on the 21st and 22nd as if Alba de Tormes were securely
held. It would appear that Carlos de España thought the castle too weak
to be held by a small force, and moved his men, in order to secure
them from being cut off from the main army, as they clearly might be
when the French had reached Babila Fuente. But the importance of his
misplaced act was not to emerge till after the battle of Salamanca had
been fought.
At dawn on the 21st Wellington withdrew his whole army on to the San
Cristobal position[500], and waited for further developments, having
the fords of Aldea Lengua and Santa Marta conveniently close if Marmont
should be seen crossing the Tormes. This indeed was the move to which
the Marshal committed himself. Having discovered at an early hour that
Alba de Tormes was empty, and that there was no allied force observing
the river bank below it, he began to cross in two columns, one at the
fords of Huerta, the other three miles higher up-stream at the ford of
La Encina. Lest Wellington should sally out upon his rear, when the
greater part of his army had got beyond the Tormes, he left a covering
force of two divisions in position between Babila Fuente and Huerta.
This, as the day wore on, he finally reduced to one division[501] and
some artillery. As long as this detachment remained opposite him,
Wellington could not be sure that the French might not attack him on
both sides of the Tormes.
[500] Napier says that this move was made on the night of the
20th, under cover of the smoke of the already-lighted camp-fires
of the army. This is contradicted by Vere’s journal of march of
the 4th Division, by Leith Hay’s Journal [’at daylight we marched
to the Heights of San Cristoval’], by Tomkinson’s diary, and
D’Urban, Geo. Simonds, and many others who speak of the move as
being early on the 21st.
[501] This was the division of Sarrut.
The defile of the French army across the fords naturally took a long
time, and Wellington was able to allow his weary infantry some hours
of much-needed rest in the morning. Only cavalry was sent forward at
once, to form a screen in front of the hostile force that was gradually
accumulating on the near side of the fords. In the afternoon, however,
when the greater part of the French were over the water, nearly the
whole allied army received orders to cross the Tormes, and occupy the
heights to the south of it. It moved practically in battle order,
in two lines, of which the front passed by the ford of Cabrerizos,
the second by that of Santa Marta. Only a reserve, now consisting
of the 3rd Division and D’Urban’s Portuguese horse, remained on the
north side of the river near Cabrerizos, to contain the French force
which was still visible at dusk on the slopes by Babila Fuente. Till
this detachment had disappeared, Wellington was obliged to leave a
corresponding proportion of his men to contain it, lest the enemy
might try a dash at Salamanca by the north bank. Marmont made no such
attempt, and in the morning it was obvious that this rearguard was
following the rest of his army across the Tormes.
During the night the French advanced cavalry were holding Calvarisa
de Ariba on their left and Machacon on their right: the infantry
were bivouacked in a concentrated position in the wooded country
south of those villages. The British cavalry screen held Calvarisa de
Abaxo[502], Pelabravo, and the height of Nuestra Señora de la Peña,
close in to the corresponding front line of the enemy’s vedettes. The
infantry were encamped in two lines behind the Ribera de Pelagarcia,
the ravine, which runs north from Nuestra Señora de la Peña to the
Tormes, between Santa Marta and Cabrerizos. This was Graham’s old
position of June 24th, and excellent for defence. The right was on
well-marked high ground, the centre was covered by woods. Only the
left, near Santa Marta, was on lower slopes.
[502] That the British cavalry were still at dawn so far forward
as Calvarisa de Abaxo is shown by Tomkinson’s diary (p. 185),
the best possible authority for light cavalry matters. The 4th
Division camped in the wood just west of Nuestra Señora de la
Peña (Vere, p. 31), the 5th on high ground in rear of Calvarisa
de Ariba (Leith Hay, p. 45), the 7th a little farther south, also
in woody ground (diary of Wheeler of the 51st).