TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
* Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_, and small caps
are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
* Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected.
* Original spelling was kept, but variant spellings were made
consistent when a predominant usage was found.
* To aid referencing places and names in present-day maps and
documents, outdated and current spellings of some proper names
follow:
Aguilar del Campo, now Aguilar de Campoo,
Albalete, now Albalat,
Albaracin, now Albarracín,
Albuquerque, now Alburquerque,
Alemtejo, now Alentejo,
Almanza, now Almansa,
Arroyo dos Molinos, now Arroyomolinos, Cáceres,
Arzobispo, now El Puente del Arzobispo,
Baccelar (Manuel), now Manuel Pinto de Morais Bacelar,
Ballasteros, now Ballesteros,
Barba del Puerco, now Puerto Seguro,
Bussaco, now Buçaco,
Caçeres, now Cáceres,
Calvarisa de Abaxo, now Calvarrasa de Abajo,
Calvarisa de Ariba, now Calvarrasa de Arriba,
Canizal, now Cañizal,
Cordova, now Córdoba,
Corunna, now La Coruña,
Douro, now Duero (in Spain),
Douro (in Portugal),
Ernani, now Hernani,
Estremadura, now Extremadura (in Spain),
Estremadura (in Portugal),
Estremos, now Estremoz,
Fascinas, now Facinas,
Gibalfaro, now Gibralfaro,
Guadalaviar (river), now Turia (río),
Guarena, now Guareña,
Junialcon, now Gimialcón,
La Baneza, now La Bañeza
La Bispal, now La Bisbal,
Las Rosas, now Las Rozas,
Majalahonda, now Majadahonda,
Majorca, now Mallorca,
Montanches, now Montánchez,
Mozencillo, now Mozoncillo,
Niza, now Nisa,
Pampeluna, now Pamplona,
Peniscola, now Peñíscola,
Puzzol, now Puçol,
Requeña, now Requena,
Ruvielos, now Rubielos de Mora,
Saguntum, now Sagunto,
Sanguessa, now Sangüesa,
Saragossa, now Zaragoza,
Senabria, now Sanabria,
Tagus (river), now Tajo (Spanish), Tejo (Portuguese),
Talarubia, now Talarrubias,
Truxillo, now Trujillo,
Vincente, now Vicente,
Villa Real, now Vila Real,
Villafanes, now Villafamés,
Vittoria, now Vitoria,
Xeres, now Jerez,
Xiloca, now Jiloca,
Zamorra, now Zamarra.
* Chapter headers and Table of contents have been made consistent.
* Footnotes have been renumbered into a single series. Each footnote
is placed at the end of the paragraph or the table that includes its
anchor.
[Illustration: _Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia_
_from the portrait by Girardet_]
A HISTORY OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR
BY
CHARLES OMAN
M.A. OXON., HON. LL.D. EDIN.
FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY
CHICHELE PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY
FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE
CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA
DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID, OF THE ACADEMY OF LISBON
AND OF THE ACADEMY OF SAN LUIS OF SARAGOSSA
VOL. V
OCT. 1811-AUG. 31, 1812
VALENCIA CIUDAD RODRIGO BADAJOZ
SALAMANCA MADRID
WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1914
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK
TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY
HUMPHREY MILFORD M.A.
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY
PREFACE
In this volume Wellington’s campaigning in 1812 is followed no further
than the day (August 31st) on which he set out from Madrid to drive
back Clausel from the Douro. Reasons of space make it impossible to
include the siege of Burgos and the retreat which followed. I had
written the narrative of them, but found it impossible to add six long
chapters to the 620 pages already in print. The fact is that, from
the point of view of Wellington’s army, the year 1812 was much more
tightly packed with military events than any which had gone before. In
1809 there was nothing important to chronicle after August: in 1810
the Anglo-Portuguese did not come into the forefront of the war till
July, when Masséna had crossed the frontier and laid siege to Almeida.
In 1811 the year opened with a deadlock, which was only ended by the
commencement of Masséna’s retreat on March 9th, and concluded with
a similar deadlock which endured from July to December--interrupted
only by the short campaign of El Bodon and Aldea da Ponte, and this
covered only a week [Sept. 22-9]. In 1812 the great strategical
operations began on the first day of the year with the concentration
for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and did not end till the last week of
November--which saw Wellington once more encamped under the walls of
that fortress. For eleven months on end he had been on the move, with
only a brief rest in cantonments between April 24th, the day when he
gave up his pursuit of Marmont in Northern Portugal, and the end of
May, when his divisions began to assemble again for the projected march
on Salamanca. But for this short break his operations were continuous,
and the narrative of them must of necessity be lengthy.
The campaign of 1812 cannot be called the greatest exhibition of
military genius in Wellington’s career: that distinction must be given
to the campaign of 1813. But it included the battle of Salamanca, the
most skilfully fought and the most decisive of all his victories,
‘the beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes.’ And its earlier
episodes, the two sudden strokes which ended in the storming of Ciudad
Rodrigo and of Badajoz, deserve the closest attention, as showing a
marvellous power of utilizing opportunities, and solving time-problems
of the most complicated sort. We shall see how Wellington, in face
of an enemy whose whole force was far superior to his own, so
conducted his operations that he had success in his hands before the
French armies could concentrate to overwhelm him. He would have been
victorious in 1812 even without the assistance that was given him
during the early months of the year by Napoleon’s misguided orders from
Paris, and in the summer by Soult’s repeated and deliberate refusal to
co-operate with King Joseph and Marmont for the general welfare of the
French cause in Spain. The limits of his success were largely extended
by those adventitious circumstances, but even without them he must
have achieved great things by force of the combinations which he had
prepared.
The reader will find that I have devoted a good deal of space to the
precise working out of the effect of Napoleon’s successive dispatches
to Marmont, with reference to the time at which each was received, and
the influence which it had on the Marshal’s movements. I am bound to
say that careful study has convinced me that Marmont’s justification
of his own actions from January to May, written in the fourth volume
of his _Mémoires_, is in the main fair and sensible, and that his
criticism of his master’s orders is as sound as it is lucid. Napier
held the reverse opinion, but his arguments in support of it are
unconvincing: he is set on proving his idol infallible at all costs, in
this as in so many other cases.
I find myself equally at variance with Napier’s estimate of the
relative share of responsibility that falls on Soult upon the one
side and King Joseph and Jourdan on the other, for the disasters
of the summer of 1812. Jourdan’s plan of campaign, set out in
his ‘May _Mémoire_’ [see pp. 303-11], is a most clear-headed and
practicable scheme; the adoption of it would have reduced the effect
of Wellington’s strategy, and have set a limit to his successes.
Soult wrecked the whole scheme by wilful disobedience, which sinned
as much against military discipline as against common sense. The
counter-projects which he kept sending to Jourdan and the King were
founded on his own personal desires, not on a consideration of the
general situation in the Peninsula. Soult had been kind and courteous
to Napier while the historian was working at the French archives, and
had placed his own private papers at his disposition. I think that the
obligation was repaid by the mildness of the censures passed on the
Marshal’s strange behaviour in the summer of 1812.
A smaller proportion of the pages of this volume than of its
predecessors is occupied by the tale of those campaigns in the
Peninsula in which the British took no part. The year 1812 commences
with the surrender of Blake and the occupation of Valencia by the
French. When that great city and the army that had been driven into
it succumbed before Suchet’s attack, there was no longer any large
Spanish force in the field, and the operations of Lacy, Ballasteros,
and the Galicians are of only secondary importance and require no
great attention. Indeed the most effective service done against the
French in 1812 was that of the guerrilleros of Aragon, Cantabria, and
Navarre, whose obstinate resistance immobilized such a large portion of
the 230,000 imperial troops that lay in Spain. It will be noted that I
have had to devote a considerable number of pages to a much-neglected
episode of the summer of 1812--the campaigns against Caffarelli of the
irregular bands of the North, assisted by the fleet of Sir Home Popham.
It cannot be too often repeated that by immobilizing the 35,000 men of
the French Army of the North, they co-operated in the most effective
way with Wellington, and had their share in making the Salamanca
campaign a success for the allies.
I trust that I may have succeeded in making the topographical details
clear at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and more especially Salamanca, all of
which I have visited. I spent many hours going over the ground at the
Arapiles, and found that no mere map could have enabled one to grasp
the situation in a satisfactory fashion.
I have once more to express my indebtedness to the owners of two
great files of Peninsular War documents, who were good enough to
place them at my disposition and to allow me to bring them to Oxford.
The D’Urban papers, lent to me by Mr. W. S. M. D’Urban, of Newport
House, near Exeter, the grandson of Sir Benjamin D’Urban, Beresford’s
Chief-of-the-Staff, continue to be of immense value all through 1812.
In the first half of the year Sir Benjamin was still at the Portuguese
head-quarters, and his diary and correspondence give the views of those
who had the best opportunity of knowing Wellington’s plans from the
inside. In June he was appointed to another post, that of commanding
the detached Portuguese cavalry brigade which covered Wellington’s left
flank in the Salamanca campaign; his notes as to his operations are
of extreme interest throughout June, July, and August; the narratives
which he drew up concerning his own fortunes at the battle of
Salamanca, and at the unfortunate combat of Majalahonda, have cleared
up several obscure problems, which no published material could have
enabled me to solve.
The papers of Sir George Scovell, lent me by his great-nephew, Mr. G.
Scovell, of Hove, had already begun to be of use to me in the chronicle
of 1811. But in 1812 they are of far greater importance, since it was
early in that year that Scovell was placed by Wellington in charge
of the toilsome duty of studying and decoding all French captured
dispatches written in cipher. The originals were left in his hands,
and only the interpretations, written out in full, were made over to
the Commander-in-Chief. These originals, often scraps of the smallest
dimensions made to be concealed in secret places about the person of
the bearer, are historical antiquities of the highest interest. Their
importance is so great that I have thought it necessary to give in
Appendix XV a detailed account of them, of the characteristics of the
‘Great Paris Cipher’--as Scovell called it--and of the contents of each
document.
I must mention, as in previous volumes, much kind help given to me
from abroad. The authorities of the Paris War Office have continued to
facilitate my researches among their bulky _cartons_. I have to notice
with sincere regret the death of my old friend, M. Martinien, who did
so much for me while I was compiling volumes III and IV of this work. I
much missed his guidance while working over the material of 1812 during
the last two autumns. Colonel Juan Arzadun, of the Madrid Artillery
Museum, has continued to send me occasional information, and I am
specially obliged to Don Rafael Farias for procuring for me, and making
me a present of, that very rare document the 1822 ‘Estados de los
ejércitos españoles durante la guerra contra Bonaparte,’ a collection
of morning-states and tables of organization on which I had in vain
tried to lay hands during three successive visits to Madrid. Another
gift of the highest value was the complete set of Beresford’s _Ordens
do Dia_ for the Portuguese army, ranging over the whole war. This most
useful series was presented to me by my friend Mr. Rafael Reynolds,
the companion of my last Portuguese tour, who found a copy of this
almost unprocurable file at Lisbon. I owe the two views of the field
of Salamanca to the camera of Mr. C. J. Armstrong, who sent them to me
along with many other interesting Peninsular photographs.
Three friends in England have continued to give me help of the most
invaluable kind. Mr. C. T. Atkinson, Fellow of Exeter College,
has looked through the whole of my proofs, and furnished me with
innumerable notes, which enabled me to add to the accuracy of my
narrative. He has also written me an appendix, No. XIV, concerning the
English troops which in 1812 operated on the East coast of Spain--and
the others which formed the garrisons of Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Tarifa.
The Hon. John Fortescue, the historian of the British army, has not
only answered at length my queries on many obscure problems, but has
lent me the file of his transcripts of French dispatches for 1812, a
good many of which, and those of high importance, were unknown to me.
They were especially valuable for Soult’s operations. Our narratives of
the campaigns of 1812 will appear almost simultaneously, and I think it
will be found that all our main opinions are in agreement. Major J. H.
Leslie, R.A., has once more contributed to this volume an ‘Artillery
Appendix’ on the same lines as those for 1810 and 1811 in vols. III and
IV. His researches have always proved exhaustive and invaluable for the
history of his old Corps.
Lastly, the compiler of the Index, a task executed this summer under
very trying conditions, must receive, for the fifth time, my heartfelt
thanks for her labour of love.
As in previous volumes, the critic may find some slight discrepancies
between the figures given with regard to strengths of regiments or
losses in action in the text and in the Appendices. This results from
the fact that many official documents contain incorrect arithmetic,
which was only discovered by the indefatigable proof-readers of the
Clarendon Press, who have tested all the figures, and found not
infrequent (if minute) errors. The text was printed off before the
Appendices were finally dealt with: where the numbers differ those
in the Appendices are, of course, to be preferred. But the worst
discrepancies do not get beyond units and tens.
C. OMAN.
OXFORD:
_July 27, 1914_.
NOTE.--When every page of the text, appendices, and index of this
volume has been printed off, and the final proofs of the preface are
passing through my hands, comes the news that Great Britain is most
unexpectedly involved in a war to which there can be no parallel named
save the struggle that ended just a hundred years ago. May her strength
be used as effectively against military despotism in the twentieth as
it was in the nineteenth century.
_Aug. 5, 1914._
CONTENTS
SECTION XXX
SUCHET’S CONQUEST OF VALENCIA, SEPTEMBER 1811-JANUARY 1812
CHAPTER PAGE
I. The Invasion of Valencia. Siege of Saguntum. September-October
1811 1
II. The Battle of Saguntum. October 25, 1811 26
III. The Capture of Valencia and of Blake’s Army. November
1811-January 1812 47
IV. Suchet’s Conquest of Valencia: Side-issues and Consequences.
January-March 1812 76