CHAPTER IV.

ANTAGONISM BETWEEN DARWINISM AND MORALITY.

§ 1. _Objections to Darwinism from an Ethical Standpoint._

From what we said at the beginning of the preceding preliminary view, it is

evident that we have to look for the advocates of an irreconcilableness

between morality and Darwinism, not in the camp of the followers of the

latter, but only in that of its adversaries. It is true, such advocates

were never wanting. In pamphlets and journals, it has been often enough

said that Darwinism cuts through the nerve of life, not only of religion,

but also of morality.

It was demonstrated that in making man a mere product of nature, and

degrading him to a being that is nothing else but a more highly developed

animal, Darwinism takes from human personality its value, from the realms

of morality its dignity, and from its demands their autonomy. In making the

struggle for existence the principle of all development and, by extending

it to the development and social relations of man, at the same time the

human social principle, it puts in place of self-denial and love the

principle of egoism and boorishness and the right of the stronger, gives

full course to the unchaining of all animal passions, and coquettes with

all the emotions which, flattering the animal part of man, {231} aims at

the subversion of all that exists and at the destruction of the ideal

acquisitions of mankind. In tracing everything which constitutes the higher

position and dignity of man back to his own work, and permitting it to be

worked out of physical, spiritual, and ethical brutishness, in slow

development and effort, closely related to the animal kingdom, it fosters

and nourishes haughtiness in an intolerable way. And finally, in breaking

off and denying the dependence of man upon God, and leading to mechanical

determinism, it destroys the deepest and most effective motive to moral

action--the tracing of the moral law to the authority of the divine

Law-giver, and the consciousness of an individual moral responsibility.

It cannot be denied that many of the most zealous Darwinians gave too much

cause for such a conception and representation of the ethical consequences

of their system. In view of the fact that they applied the selection

principle, with its most radical consequences, to the origin and

development of mankind, and that they elevated the same to the ethical and

social principle of mankind and did not permit the acceptance of any new

and higher agencies in mankind except those already active in the animal

and the organic world, and that they gladly treated this selection

principle also in the social and ethical realm as a struggle for existence,

it was simply an entirely logical conclusion that the advocates of the

moral nobility of mankind reproached such a reproduced Darwinism with

degrading the moral dignity of man and with replacing love by egoism.

Besides, in view of the fact that they declared materialistic monism, even

the most naked atheism, the only conclusion of {232} Darwinism, and

extended their mechanistic explanation of the world to a determinism in the

highest degree mechanistic, and, carried to its utmost limit, to a denial

of human freedom, it was not to be wondered at that those who recognize in

theism the basis of all life worthy of man, and in the freedom of man one

of the most precious pearls in the crown of his human dignity and of his

creation in the image of God, complained of Darwinism's taking from

morality its strongest motive and from moral action its responsibility.

And, finally, in view of the fact that those who thus express themselves in

their works showed but rarely, or not at all, some of the noblest fruits of

moral education, such as respectful treatment of adversaries, humbleness

and tact, they could not themselves reasonably complain that there was

ascribed to their doctrine an influence detrimental to moral education. All

this we find abundantly confirmed in the publications of Büchner and

Häckel, and in many articles of the "Ausland."

But the question is, whether those Darwinians who drew these conclusions

were by their scientific investigations obliged to draw them, or whether

they did not rather reach their religious and ethical view of the world by

quite other ways, and whether they did not in a wholly arbitrary and

irresponsible manner make extensive use of Darwinism in this anti-religious

and ethically objectional direction--a fact which we shall try to prove in

the last part of our investigation.

Of course the Darwinians who spoke thus, did not intend to injure the moral

principle, but only to purify and reform it; and therefore we shall have to

speak of them in the following section.

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The Theories of Darwin and Their Relation to Philosophy, Religion, and Morality · 第 4 / 8 章