THE GREAT STRUGGLE
During the period which separates his two terms of office
Frontenac's life is almost a blank. His relations with
his wife seem to have been amicable, but they did not
live together. His great friend was the Marechal de
Bellefonds, from whom he received many favours of
hospitality. In 1685 the king gave him a pension of
thirty-five hundred livres, though without assigning him
any post of dignity. Already a veteran, his record could
hardly be called successful. His merits were known to
the people of Canada; they believed him to be a tower of
strength against the Iroquois. At Versailles the fact
stood out most plainly that through infirmities of temper
he had lost his post. His pension might save him from
penury. It was far too small to give him real independence.
Had either La Barre or Denonville proved equal to the
government of Canada, it is almost certain that Frontenac
would have ended his days ingloriously at Versailles,
ascending the stairs of others with all the grief which
is the portion of disappointed old age. Their failure
was his opportunity, and from the dreary antechambers of
a court he mounts to sudden glory as the saviour of New
France.
There is some doubt, as we have seen, concerning the
causes which gave Frontenac his appointment in 1672. At
that time court favour may have operated on his behalf,
or it may have seemed desirable that he should reside
for a season out of France. But in 1689 graver
considerations came into play. At the moment when the
Iroquois were preparing to ravage Canada, the expulsion
of James II from his throne had broken the peace between
France and England. The government of New France was now
no post for a court favourite. Louis XIV had expended
much money and effort on the colony. Through the
mismanagement of La Barre and Denonville everything
appeared to be on the verge of ruin. It is inconceivable
that Frontenac, then in his seventieth year, should have
been renominated for any other cause than merit. Times
and conditions had changed. The task now was not to work
peaceably with bishop and intendant, but to destroy the
foe. Father Goyer, the Recollet who delivered Frontenac's
funeral oration, states that the king said when renewing
his commission: 'I send you back to Canada, where I expect
you will serve me as well as you did before; I ask for
nothing more.' This is a bit of too gorgeous rhetoric,
which none the less conveys the truth. The king was not
reappointing Frontenac because he was, on the whole,
satisfied with what he had done before; he was reappointing
him because during his former term of office and throughout
his career he had displayed the qualities which were
called for at the present crisis.
Thus Frontenac returned to Quebec in the autumn of 1689,
just after the Iroquois massacred the people of Lachine
and just before they descended upon those of La Chesnaye.
The universal mood was one of terror and despair. If ever
Canada needed a Moses this was the hour.
It will be seen from the dates that Denonville's recall
was not due to the Lachine massacre and the other raids
of the Iroquois in 1689, for these only occurred after
Frontenac had been appointed. Denonville's dismissal was
justified by the general results of his administration
down to the close of 1688. Before Frontenac left France
a plan of campaign had been agreed upon which it was now
his duty to execute. The outlines of this plan were
suggested by Callieres, the governor of Montreal,
[Footnote: Louis Hector de Callieres-Bonnevue was a
captain of the French army who became governor of Montreal
in 1684, and succeeded Frontenac as governor of Canada
in 1698. He received the Cross of St Louis for distinguished
service against the Iroquois. Frontenac could not have
had a better lieutenant.] who had been sent home by
Denonville to expound the needs of the colony in person
and to ask for fresh aid. The idea was to wage vigorous
offensive warfare against the English from Albany to New
York. Success would depend upon swiftness and audacity,
both of which Frontenac possessed in full measure, despite
his years. Two French warships were to be sent direct to
New York in the autumn of 1689, while a raiding party
from Canada should set out for the Hudson as soon as
Frontenac could organize it.
In its original form this plan of campaign was never
carried out, for on account of head winds Frontenac
reached Quebec too late in the autumn. However, the
central idea remained in full view and suggested the
three war-parties which were sent out during the winter
of 1690 to attack the English colonies.
Louis XIV had given Denonville important reinforcements,
and with war clouds gathering in Europe he was unwilling
or unable to detach more troops for the defence of Canada.
Hence, in warring against the Iroquois and the English
Frontenac had no greater resources than those at the
disposal of Denonville when he attacked the Senecas. In
fact, since 1687 there had been some wastage in the number
of the regulars from disease. The result was that Frontenac
could not hope for any solid success unless he received
support from the Canadian militia.
In this crisis the habitants and their seigneurs accepted
with courage the duties laid upon them. In the narrower
sense they were fighting for their homes, but the spirit
which they displayed under Frontenac's leadership is not
merely that which one associates with a war of defence.
The French soldier, in all ages, loved to strike the
quick, sharp blow, and it was now necessary for the
salvation of Canada that it should be struck. The Iroquois
had come to believe that Onontio was losing his power.
The English colonies were far more populous than New
France. In short, the only hope lay in a swift, spectacular
campaign which would disorganize the English and regain
the respect of the Iroquois.
The issue depended on the courage and capacity of the
Canadians. It is to their honour and to the credit of
Frontenac that they rose to the demand of the hour. The
Canadians were a robust, prolific race, trained from
infancy to woodcraft and all the hardships of the
wilderness. Many families contained from eight to fourteen
sons who had used the musket and paddle from early boyhood,
and could endure the long tramps of winter like the
Indians themselves. The frontiersman is, and must be, a
fighter, but nowhere in the past can one find a braver
breed of warriors than mustered to the call of Frontenac.
Francois Hertel and Hertel de Rouville, Le Moyne d'Iberville
with his brothers Bienville and Sainte-Helene, D'Aillebout
de Mantet and Repentigny de Montesson, are but a few
representatives of the militiamen who sped forth at the
call of Frontenac to destroy the settlements of the
English.
What followed was war in its worst form, including the
massacre of women and children. The three bands organized
by Frontenac at the beginning of 1690 set out on snowshoes
from Montreal, Three Rivers, and Quebec. The largest
party contained a hundred and fourteen French and ninety-
six Indians. It marched from Montreal against Schenectady,
commanded by D'Aillebout de Mantet and Le Moyne de
Sainte-Helene. The second party, proceeding from Three
Rivers and numbering twenty-six French and twenty-nine
Indians under the command of Francois Hertel, aimed at
Dover, Pemaquid, and other settlements of Maine and New
Hampshire. The Quebec party, under Portneuf, comprised
fifty French and sixty Indians. Its objective was the
English colony on Casco Bay, where the city of Portland
now stands. All three were successful in accomplishing
what they aimed at, namely the destruction of English
settlements amid fire and carnage. All three employed
Indians, who were suffered, either willingly or unwillingly,
to commit barbarities.
It is much more the business of history to explain than
to condemn or to extenuate. How could a man like Francois
Hertel lead one of these raids without sinking to the
moral level of his Indian followers? Some such question
may, not unnaturally, rise to the lips of a modern reader
who for the first time comes upon the story of Dover and
Salmon Falls. But fuller knowledge breeds respect for
Francois Hertel. When eighteen years old he was captured
by the Mohawks and put to the torture. One of his fingers
they burned off in the bowl of a pipe. The thumb of the
other hand they cut off. In the letter which he wrote on
birch-bark to his mother after this dreadful experience
there is not a word of his sufferings. He simply sends
her his love and asks for her prayers, signing himself
by his childish nickname, 'Your poor Fanchon.' As he grew
up he won from an admiring community the name of 'The
Hero.' He was not only brave but religious. In his view
it was all legitimate warfare. If he slew others, he ran
a thousand risks and endured terrible privations for his
king and the home he was defending. His stand at the
bridge over the Wooster river, sword in hand, when pressed
on his retreat by an overwhelming force of English,
holding the pass till all his men are over, is worthy of
an epic. He was forty-seven years old at the time. The
three eldest of his nine sons were with him in that little
band of twenty-six Frenchmen, and two of his nephews.
'To the New England of old,' says Parkman 'Francois Hertel
was the abhorred chief of Popish malignants and murdering
savages. The New England of to-day will be more just to
the brave defender of his country and his faith.'
The atrocities committed by the French and Indians are
enough to make one shudder even at this distance of time.
As Frontenac adopted the plan and sent forth the
war-parties, the moral responsibility in large part rests
with him. There are, however, some facts to consider
before judgment is passed as to the degree of his
culpability. The modern distinction between combatants
and non-combatants had little meaning in the wilds of
America at this period. When France and England were at
open war, every settler was a soldier, and as such each
man's duty was to keep on his guard. If caught napping
he must take the consequences. Thus, to fall upon an
unsuspecting hamlet and slay its men-folk with the
tomahawk, while brutal, was hardly more brutal than under
such circumstances we could fairly expect war to be.
The massacre of women and children is another matter,
not to be excused on any grounds, even though Schenectady
and Salmon Falls are paralleled by recent acts of the
Germans in Belgium. Still, we should not forget that
European warfare in the age of Frontenac abounded with
just such atrocities as were committed at Schenectady,
Dover, Pemaquid, Salmon Falls, and Casco Bay. The sack
of Magdeburg, the wasting of the Palatinate, and, perhaps,
the storming of Drogheda will match whatever was done by
the Indian allies of Frontenac. These were unspeakable,
but the savage was little worse than his European
contemporary. Those killed were in almost all cases killed
outright, and the slaughter was not indiscriminate. At
Schenectady John Sander Glen, with his whole family and
all his relations, were spared because he and his wife
had shown kindness to French prisoners taken by the
Mohawks. Altogether sixty people were killed at Schenectady
(February 9, 1690), thirty-eight men, ten women, and
twelve children. Nearly ninety were carried captive to
Canada. Sixty old men, women, and children were left
unharmed. It is not worth while to take up the details
of the other raids. They were of much the same sort--no
better and no worse. Where a garrison surrendered under
promise that it would be spared, the promise was observed
so far as the Indians could be controlled; but English
and French alike when they used Indian allies knew well
that their excesses could not be prevented, though they
might be moderated. The captives as a rule were treated
with kindness and clemency when once the northward march
was at an end.
Meanwhile, Frontenac had little time to reflect upon the
probable attitude of posterity towards his political
morals. The three war-parties had accomplished their
purpose and in the spring of 1690 the colony was aglow
with fresh hope. But the English were not slow to retaliate.
That summer New York and Massachusetts decided on an
invasion of Canada. It was planned that a fleet from
Boston under Sir William Phips should attack Quebec,
while a force of militia from New York in command of John
Schuyler should advance through Lake Champlain against
Montreal. Thus by sea and land Canada soon found herself
on the defensive.
Of Schuyler's raid nothing need be said except that he
reached Laprairie, opposite Montreal, where he killed a
few men and destroyed the crops (August 23, 1690). It
was a small achievement and produced no result save the
disappointment of New York that an undertaking upon which
much money and effort had been expended should terminate
so ingloriously. But the siege of Quebec by Phips, though
it likewise ended in failure, is a much more famous event,
and deserves to be described in some detail.
The colony of Massachusetts mustered its forces for a
great and unusual exploit. Earlier in the same year a
raid upon the coasts of Acadia had yielded gratifying
results. The surrender of Port Royal without resistance
(May 11, 1690) kindled the Puritan hope that a single
summer might see the pestiferous Romanists of New France
driven from all their strongholds. Thus encouraged, Boston
put forth its best energies and did not shrink from
incurring a debt of 50,000 pounds, which in the
circumstances of Massachusetts was an enormous sum. Help
was expected from England, but none came, and the fleet
sailed without it, in full confidence that Quebec would
fall before the assault of the colonists alone.
The fleet, which sailed in August, numbered thirty-four
ships, carrying twenty-three hundred men and a considerable
equipment. Sir William Phips, the leader of the expedition,
was not an Englishman by birth, but a New Englander of
very humble origin who owed his advancement to a robust
physique and unlimited assurance. He was unfitted for
his command, both because he lacked experience in fighting
such foes as he was about to encounter, and because he
was completely ignorant of the technical difficulties
involved in conducting a large, miscellaneous fleet
through the tortuous channels of the lower St Lawrence.
This ignorance resulted in such loss of time that he
arrived before Quebec amid the tokens of approaching
winter. It was the 16th of October when he rounded the
island of Orleans and brought his ships to anchor under
the citadel. Victory could only be secured by sudden
success. The state of the season forbade siege operations
which contemplated starvation of the garrison.
Hopeful that the mere sight of his armada would compel
surrender, Phips first sent an envoy to Frontenac under
protection of the white flag. This messenger after being
blindfolded was led to the Chateau and brought before
the governor, who had staged for his reception one of
the impressive spectacles he loved to prepare. Surrounding
Frontenac, as Louis XIV might have been surrounded by
the grandees of France, were grouped the aristocracy of
New France--the officers of the French regulars and the
Canadian militia. Nothing had been omitted which could
create an impression of dignity and strength. Costume,
demeanour, and display were all employed to overwhelm
the envoy with the insulted majesty of the king of France.
Led into this high presence the messenger delivered his
letter, which, when duly interpreted, was found to convey
a summary ultimatum. Phips began by stating that the war
between France and England would have amply warranted
this expedition even 'without the destruction made by
the French and Indians, under your command and
encouragement, upon the persons and estates of their
Majesties' subjects of New England, without provocation
on their part.' Indeed, 'the cruelties and barbarities
used against them by the French and Indians might, upon
the present opportunity, prompt unto a severe revenge.'
But seeking to avoid all inhumane and unchristian-like
actions, Phips announces that he will be content with 'a
present surrender of your forts and castles, undemolished,
and the King's and other stores, unimbezzled, with a
seasonable delivery of all captives; together with a
surrender of all your persons and estates to my dispose;
upon the doing whereof, you may expect mercy from me, as
a Christian, according to what shall be found for their
Majesties' service and the subjects' security. Which, if
you refuse forthwith to do, I am come provided and am
resolved, by the help of God in whom I trust, by force
of arms to revenge all wrongs and injuries offered, and
bring you under subjection to the Crown of England, and,
when too late, make you wish you had accepted of the
favour tendered. Your answer positive in an hour, returned
by your own trumpet, with the return of mine, is required
upon the peril that will ensue.'
To this challenge Frontenac at once returned the answer
which comported with his character. When Phips's envoy
took out his watch to register the hour permitted by the
ultimatum, Frontenac rejoined that he required no time
for deliberation, but would return his answer by the
mouth of the cannon. The ground which he assigned for
the invasion of New England was that its people had
rebelled against their lawful prince, the ally of France.
Other more personal observations were directed towards
the manner in which Phips had behaved at Port Royal. No
word in writing would Frontenac send. The envoy (who was
only a subaltern) received his conge, was blindfolded
and led back to his boat.
Compliments having been thus exchanged, it remained for
Phips to make good his challenge. If we compare the four
English and American sieges of Quebec, the attack by
Phips will be seen to have little in common with those
of Kirke and Montgomery, but to resemble rather strikingly
the attack by Wolfe. Without fighting, Kirke swooped down
upon a garrison which was exhausted by starvation. Arnold
and Montgomery operated without a fleet. But while Phips's
attempt is unlike Wolfe's in that it ended in failure,
the presence of the fleet and the attempt to effect a
landing below the mouth of the St Charles present features
of real similarity. It is clear that Phips received
intelligence from prisoners of a possible landing above
the town, at the spot where Wolfe carried out his daring
and desperate coup de main. But, anticipating Wolfe in
another quarter, he chose to make his first attack on
the flats rather than on the heights.
The troops ordinarily stationed at Quebec were increased
just after Phips's arrival by a force of seven hundred
regulars and militiamen under Callieres, who had come
down from Montreal with all possible haste. So agile were
the French and so proficient in irregular warfare that
Phips found it difficult to land any considerable detachment
in good order. Thirteen hundred of the English did succeed
in forming on the Beauport Flats, after wading through
a long stretch of mud. There followed a preliminary
skirmish in which three hundred French were driven back
with no great loss, after inflicting considerable damage
on the invaders. But though the English reached the east
bank of the St Charles they could do no more. Phips wasted
his ammunition on a fruitless and ill-timed bombardment,
which was answered with much spirit from the cliffs.
Meanwhile the musketeers on the bank of the St Charles
were unable to advance alone and received no proper supply
of stores from the ships. Harassed by the Canadians, wet,
cold, and starving, they took to the boats, leaving behind
them five cannon. After this nothing happened, save
deliberations on the part of Phips and his officers as
to whether there remained anything that could be done
other than to sail for home, beaten and humiliated, with
a heavy burden of debt to hang round the neck of a too
ambitious Massachusetts. Thus ended the second siege of
Quebec (October 23, 1690).
Frontenac had lost two of his best soldiers--Sainte-Helene,
of the fighting Le Moynes, and the Chevalier de Clermont;
but, this notwithstanding, the victory was felt to be
complete. The most precious trophy was the flag of
Phips's ship, which a shot from the ramparts had knocked
into the river, whence it was rescued and brought ashore
in triumph. Best of all, the siege had been too short to
bring famine in its train. The loss of life was
inconsiderable, and in prestige the soldiery of New France
now stood on a pinnacle which they had never before
attained. When we consider the paucity of the forces
engaged, this repulse of the English from Quebec may not
seem an imposing military achievement. But Canada had
put forth her whole strength and had succeeded where
failure would have been fatal. In the shouts of rejoicing
which followed Phips's withdrawal we hear the cry of a
people reborn.
The siege of Quebec and Schuyler's raid on Laprairie open
up a subject of large and vital moment--the historical
antagonism of New France and New England. Whoever wishes
to understand the deeper problems of Canada in the age
of Frontenac should read John Fiske's volumes on the
English colonies. In the rise of Virginia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts
one sees the certain doom which was impending over New
France. It may be too much to say that Richelieu by
conquering Alsace threw away America. Even had the
population of Canada been increased to the extent called
for by the obligations of Richelieu's company in 1627,
the English might have nevertheless prevailed. But the
preoccupation of France with the war against Austria
prevented her from giving due attention to the colonial
question at the critical moment when colonists should
have been sent out in large numbers. And it is certain
that by nothing short of a great emigration could France
have saved Canada. As it was, the English were bound to
prevail by weight of population. When the conflict reached
its climax in the days of Montcalm and Wolfe, two and a
half million English Americans confronted sixty-five
thousand French Canadians. On such terms the result of
the contest could not be doubtful. Even in Frontenac's
time the French were protected chiefly by the intervening
wilderness and the need of the English colonists to
develop their own immediate resources. The English were
not yet ready for a serious offensive war. In fact they,
too, had their own Indian question.
It is a matter of some interest to observe how the conquest
of Canada was postponed by the lack of cohesion among
the English colonies. Selfishness and mutual jealousy
prevented them from combining against the common foe.
Save for this disunion and fancied conflict of interest,
New France must have succumbed long before the time of
Montcalm. But the vital significance of the conflict
between New England and New France lies in the contrast
of their spirit and institutions. The English race has
extended itself through the world because it possessed
the genius of emigration. The French colonist did his
work magnificently in the new home. But the conditions
in the old home were unfavourable to emigration. The
Huguenots, the one class of the population with a strong
motive for emigrating, were excluded from Canada in the
interest of orthodoxy. The dangers of the Atlantic and
the hardships of life in a wintry wilderness might well
deter the ordinary French peasant; moreover, it by no
means rested with him to say whether he would go or stay.
But, whatever their nature, the French race lost a
wonderful opportunity through the causes which prevented
a healthy, steady exodus to America.
England profited by having classes of people sufficiently
well educated to form independent opinions and strong
enough to carry out the programme dictated by these
opinions. While each of the English colonies sprang from
a different motive, all had in common the purpose to form
an effective settlement. The fur trade did France more
harm than good. It deflected her attention from the middle
to the northern latitudes and lured her colonists from
the land in search of quick profits. It was the enemy to
the home. On the other hand, the English came to America
primarily in search of a home. Profits they sought, like
other people, but they sought them chiefly from the soil.
Thus English ideas took root in America, gained new
vitality, and assumed an importance they had not possessed
in England for many centuries. And, while for the moment
the organization of the English colonies was not well
suited to offensive war, as we may judge from the abortive
efforts of Phips and Schuyler, this defect could be
corrected. Arising, as it did arise, from a lack of unity
among the colonies, it was even indicative of latent
strength. From one angle, localism seems selfishness and
weakness; from another, it shows the vigorous life of
separate communities, each self-centred and jealous of
its authority because the local instinct is so vitally
active. It only needed time to broaden the outlook and
give the English colonies a sense of their common interest.
Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts, by striking their
roots each year more deeply into the soil of America,
became more and more self-supporting states in everything
save name and political allegiance; while New France,
which with its austere climate would have developed more
slowly in any case, remained dependent on the king's
court.
Thus Frontenac's task was quite hopeless, if we define
it as the effort to overthrow English power in America.
But neither he nor any one of that age defined his duties
so widely. In 1689 Canada was in extremes, with the
Iroquois at Lachine and Dongan threatening an attack from
New York. Frontenac's policy was defensive. If he struck
first, it was because he considered audacity to be his
best safeguard. No one knew better than Frontenac that
a successful raid does not mean conquest.