CHAPTER XIV.

From the end of July to September 11.

The corps of Tekeli had meanwhile prosecuted its operations in Upper

Hungary. As he was approaching Tyrnau, the Duke of Lorraine reinforced

the citadel of Presburg with some regiments of cavalry, and put the

remainder of his army in motion across the March field. Learning

that the town of Presburg was already occupied, and the citadel

threatened by the adherents of Tekeli, and also that 20,000 Turks and

20,000 Hungarians were encamped in the neighbourhood, he pushed on

towards the city. He succeeded in flinging an additional force into

the fortress, and, after some resistance, drove the enemy out of the

suburbs and town. The citizens, excusing their defection on the ground

of compulsion, renewed their fealty to the Emperor. The advanced guard

of the Polish army, under Prince Lubomirski, had meanwhile arrived, and

with their assistance the Duke on the following day gained a victory

which cleared the left bank of the Danube, and re-established the

communication with Komorn and Raab. The hostile camp fell entirely into

the victors’ hands. The Turks and Tekeli threw mutual blame upon each

other. To whichever it was due, their united forces, after ravaging the

March field, were overtaken by Lorraine near Stammersdorf, and again

completely defeated. The Pacha of Erlau with 1200 men were left dead

on the field, many more perished in attempting to swim the Danube, 22

standards were taken, and a body of 600 Hungarians deserted to the

enemy. Meanwhile the troops of the Empire were flocking in from all

quarters. The Bavarians have been already mentioned. The Elector of

Saxony, John George III., marched out of Dresden on the 22nd July with

12,000 men and 18 guns, and reached Crems on the 28th August. Sobieski

writes to his wife in great admiration of the Saxon troops, as well

dressed, complete in numbers, and well disciplined. “We may say of the

Germans what has been said of the horse, they do not know their own

strength.” The King of Poland left Cracow early in August. The Emperor

had undergone the humiliation of imploring the personal presence of

a sovereign whose policy and interests he had always thwarted, even

should he arrive without his army. This homage to his military talents

was doubtless grateful, but John Sobieski needed no stimulus when the

Turk was in the field. While the French ambassador was exerting all

his influence to detain him, and writing to Louis XIV. that he was

too corpulent for active service, he took leave of his wife, and,

after making his will, set out, accompanied by his son, a boy sixteen

years of age, in advance of his army. His march lay through a country

exposed to the incursions of Tartars and Hungarians, but he performed

it on horseback with an escort of some 2000 cavalry, and reached the

head-quarters of Lorraine in safety. He found them at Tuln, on the

right bank of the river, the force weak in numbers, and still employed

in the construction of the bridge which the Emperor in his letters

had announced as finished. Many of the German troops had not yet

arrived. Lorraine spake with anxiety of the condition of affairs. “Be

of good cheer,” replied Sobieski; “which of us at the head of 200,000

men would have allowed this bridge to be constructed within five

leagues of his camp? The Vizier is a man of no capacity.” The Polish

army, under Field Marshal Jablonowski, reached the bank of the Danube

opposite Tuln early in September. It amounted to about 26,000 men of

all arms, but with a very small proportion of infantry. After passing

them in review, the leaders held a council of war, in which Lorraine

suggested that the march for the relief of the city should be directed

over the Kahlenberg. The King gave an immediate assent, observing,

that he had left his royal dignity at Warsaw, and was prepared to act

with the Duke as with a friend and brother. On the other hand, no

jealousies would seem to have interfered to prevent an immediate and

frank acknowledgment of the authority of Sobieski as Commander-in-chief

of the assembled forces. It is not to be forgotten that the Duke of

Lorraine had been competitor with Sobieski for the crown of Poland.

Sobieski’s letters contain some graphic details of their first meeting,

which seems to have passed off at table with more joviality than was

consistent with the ordinary habits of Lorraine, who was free from

the German vice of drinking, but who on this occasion, beginning with

the lighter vintage of Moselle, passed on to the stronger wines of

Hungary. Sobieski describes him as modest and taciturn, strongly marked

with the small-pox, _le nez trez aquilin, et presque en peroquet_;

stooping, plain, and negligent in his attire. _Avec tout ça, il n’a

pas la mine d’un marchand mais d’un homme comme il faut, et même

d’un homme de distinction. C’est un homme avec qui je m’accorderais

facilement._ It was further decided that the Poles should cross the

river at Tuln and the Germans at Crems, so as to effect their junction

at the former place on the 5th September. The junction did not however

take place till the 7th. Three thousand Poles were detached towards the

March field to keep the Hungarians in check. The Christian army now

consisted of 85,000 men, Austrians, Poles, Bavarians, Saxons, Swabians,

and Franconians, with 186 pieces of artillery. Of this number, some

7000 were detached for the occupation of various posts, leaving about

77,000 effectives for field operations against the Turks. This force,

small in numbers if we consider the greatness of the stake at issue,

counted among its leaders four sovereigns and twenty-two other princes

of sovereign houses. The electoral houses of Germany were worthily

represented by Saxony and Bavaria. John George III., Elector of Saxony,

had seen much service in the cause of Austria, and had been the first

of the German princes to give a frank adhesion to her cause. Sobieski

describes him as speaking neither Latin nor French, and little German;

not addicted to harangues or compliments, _étourdi_, drunken, simple,

and good-natured. The man thus satirically painted was however a

sturdy specimen of the German race, and could deal hard blows in the

field. Maximilian Emanuel, of Bavaria, conspicuous in after years for

the misfortunes entailed upon him by his alliance with France against

Austria, and the principal victim of Marlborough’s success at Blenheim,

came forward now at the age of twenty-one, to save from destruction the

sovereign who, after rewarding him with the hand of a daughter, lived

to expel him for awhile from his dominions. He had the good sense now

to consign the conduct of his troops to experienced hands, and served

himself as a volunteer. Among the others were the Dukes of Sachsen

Lauenburg, Eisenach, and Weissenfels, of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Wirtemberg

and Holstein, Pfalzneuburg and Croy, the Margrave of Baireuth and Louis

of Baden afterwards so famous; the Landgrave of Hesse, the Princes of

Waldeck, Hohenzollern, Anhalt, and Salm; last and youngest, Eugene of

Savoy. The Prince of Waldeck commanded the troops of the Circles.

The literature of modern Europe, rich as it is in the correspondence

of eminent persons of both sexes, perhaps contains no collection

of letters of such engrossing interest as those written at this

period by John Sobieski to his wife, which have lately found an

eminent translator and commentator in the Count Plater. The familiar

correspondence of such a man as Sobieski, even if devoted to ordinary

occurrences and insignificant events, would derive an interest from

the character and fame of the writer which few such collections could

claim. In the case of these, however, the circumstances of the time

combine with the character of the man to enhance that interest to the

highest degree. They are the letters of an absent lover, pledged to

punctual and familiar correspondence, and consequently rich in minute

details. They are the military dispatches of one of the greatest

soldiers who ever lived, penned in moments snatched from hard-earned

repose, often when the night-lamp of his tent was growing pale before

the twilight of morning, and dealing with the hourly progress of one of

the greatest military transactions in history. Some passages of these

documents escaped at the time, and have been quoted by all writers on

the subjects concerned, from Voltaire and Madame de Sévigné to the

gazette writers of the day; but these passages, principally relating

to the great and notorious result, are not of greater interest, and

are of less historical value, than the remainder more lately rescued

from the obscurity of the Polish language which was the medium of his

most familiar intercourse with his absent wife. It is a singular trait

of ability in this mischievous woman, especially when we consider

the habitual distaste of her countrymen and countrywomen for the

acquisition of foreign languages, that she should have so completely

mastered the difficulties of a Sclavonic dialect as to speak and write

it with fluency and correctness. It is embarrassing to quote from these

letters, because there is scarcely a passage in them which does not

present the temptation. The series commences from the 29th August, the

first evening after taking leave of his wife at Cracow. This and the

five following letters carry him through the fatigues of the march, the

tedious ceremonies of his reception at Olmutz and other halting-places;

and the seventh, of the 9th September, is written from Tuln, the great

rendezvous, and one of the points of passage for the collected forces

of Poland and Germany. At every step the interest thickens; fresh

intelligence is announced of the desperate condition of the city; the

figures of men then, or afterwards, famous in history, are briefly

and graphically introduced to our notice; observations on the busy

present, and speculations on the doubtful future, are interwoven with

lively sketches of character and costume. At Tuln commenced the main

difficulties of the great operation on which the eyes of Europe were

concentered, difficulties which nothing but the gross negligence of the

Turks could have enabled the allies to surmount. The Tartar cavalry,

properly directed, might alone have rendered impossible the three days’

march, by forest paths, through a country destitute of provisions,

and scarcely practicable for artillery or carriages, which intervened

between the banks of the river and the heights of the Kahlenberg.

Baggage and commissariat were of necessity left behind, in the

neighbourhood of Tuln. It was necessary to weaken the fighting strength

of the army by a strong guard to protect these depôts from the Tartars,

and by heavy escorts for the transport of provisions from this base of

operation.

It was hardly to be expected that the heights of the Kahlenberg

themselves would be found unguarded; and to explore the condition of

this crowning post, the key to the main operation, was in itself a

task of the utmost hazard and delicacy. It was performed on the night

of the 10th by the king and the other principal commanders in person,

and this service separated him so far and so long from his army then

struggling up the precipices and through the forests behind, that the

greatest alarm was excited for his safety. The crest of the Kahlenberg,

with its castle and chapel, were found unoccupied; but the Turks, too

late aware of its importance, were moving towards it in the course

of the 11th, when, by great exertion, the first troops which came to

hand, five Saxon battalions of the left wing, with three guns, were

brought up to the summit. The Turks, finding themselves anticipated,

retired without a serious struggle, and the Saxon guns opening upon

their rear, gave signal to the city of its approaching salvation. The

king and the other commanders rejoined their several corps about midday

of the 11th, and the principal difficulties of the march having been

now overcome, the army was enabled to arrange itself in nearly the

order which was preserved through the following day of battle.[14] This

operation was conducted without disturbance from the enemy, except on

the extreme left, where General Leslie experienced some opposition

in the establishment of a battery. The report of this skirmish

roused Sobieski, not from slumber, which, as he states, was rendered

unattainable by the thunder of the Turkish batteries against the city,

but from the occupation of writing a long and detailed letter to his

wife. Disturbed in this enjoyment, the indefatigable man, described by

the French ambassador as too corpulent to ride, was again in the saddle

at three A. M. He appears to have ridden along the whole position, from

his tent on the extreme right to the Leopoldsberg on the left. This

exertion had the advantage of bringing him once more into personal

communication with Lorraine before that final issue which took place

on the following day, contrary indeed to the expectation or intention

of either, for neither contemplated at this moment the possibility of

bringing so vast an operation as the relief of the city within the

compass of a single day.

Nothing seems to have given Sobieski so much annoyance at this period

as the non-appearance of some Cossack levies, which his agents had

been despatched to raise. He writes of them in their absence in a

strain which might have been used by a Russian commander of our own

day, and which shows that the admirable qualities of the real Cossack

for the duty of light troops, especially against the Turk, had fully

displayed themselves in the seventeenth century. It is certain that

down to the latest period, the Vizier had no belief, or even suspicion,

that Sobieski had taken the field in person, or that any strong Polish

force had joined the army. The reported appearance of Polish troops was

accounted for by the known arrival of Lubomirski’s partisan corps.

The muster-roll of the Turkish army found in the tent of the Vizier

gives in round numbers a total of 160,000 men, and historians have

been ready enough to adopt a cypher, which would give a difference of

80,000 men as against the victorious party. As this document, however,

includes all detachments and garrisons, and also many commanders and

men who were certainly no longer in existence, the Pacha of Erlau,

for instance, who, with most of his troops, had perished, as has been

related, in the affair of Stammersdorf, it is as needless to dwell upon

the fallacy of such an assumption of numbers, as it would be difficult

to arrive at anything like accuracy with any other. If we accept the

statement of Kantemir, that, on the night before the battle, nearly a

fourth of the Turkish army disbanded itself, we can hardly calculate

the force remaining in the camp at more than 100,000, for whom,

exhausted and dispirited as they were, 80,000 untouched regular troops

were more than an equal match.

When the advance of the Christian army became no longer doubtful, the

Vizier called his Pachas about him to deliberate upon the mode in

which to meet the impending attack. The aged Pacha of Pesth, who has

been mentioned as adverse from the first to the march upon Vienna,

advised the Vizier to raise the siege without delay, to collect the

whole army, and, cutting down the neighbouring forests, to palisade

and entrench themselves and abide the attack. On the repulse of the

first onset, to launch the cavalry on both flanks of the enemy, and

thus decide his defeat. The majority of the council was in favour of

this proposal. The Vizier was obstinate in rejecting it, alleging, not

unjustly, that if the siege were once raised, the city would instantly

avail itself of the opportunity to repair its defences, and put itself

into condition to defy a renewed attempt. It would be difficult, if

the Janissaries were once withdrawn from the trenches, to persuade

them to return to their toil, even after the achievement of a victory

in the field. His opinion then was that a sufficient force should

be left in the approaches to carry on the siege operations without

interruption, and that the remainder should advance against the enemy,

whose inferior numbers would be easily crushed. The Pachas made some

further remonstrances, but were forced to give way to the unlimited

authority of their chief. On the 11th September all the Turkish troops

in the Leopoldstadt were withdrawn, and the greater part of the cavalry

were moved forward towards the Kahlenberg, near the base of which,

and on the Wienerberg, they threw up entrenchments; and, disposing

themselves in the shape of a crescent, they awaited the appearance

of the Imperialists. Between Weinhaus and Gerstorf are still to be

seen the traces of a considerable work, which bears the name of the

Turkenschanz, the site of one of their principal batteries. So long

previous as the 9th September, the Vizier, in his first alarm at

the approach of the enemy, had determined to collect his force on

the Wienerberg, and a field-tent had been pitched for him near the

so-called Spinnerkreuz. On the following day, however, he changed his

intention and plan, and moving the main portion of his force towards

the Kahlenberg, drew it up upon the heights between Grinzing and

Heiligenstadt. On the evening of the same day, the 10th, the advanced

guard of the Christian army arrived on the Kahlenberg, and the first

sound of its guns, as above described, was heard in Vienna, as they

opened from the heights on the columns of the Turks. The effect was one

of mingled joy and anxiety. The issue of the struggle was evidently

at hand, but that issue was still uncertain, and the night was one of

agonising suspense. The population not immediately employed in military

duty, was divided through the day between the churches and the roofs of

towers and houses; the first engaged in earnest supplication to Heaven,

the latter in surveying the movements of the Turkish camp, and watching

for the first gleam of the Christian weapons as they issued from the

wooded heights. The commandant, as evening closed in, despatched a

messenger, who swam the Danube with a letter for the Duke of Lorraine.

Its words were few. “No time to be lost!—no time indeed to be lost!”

This message was acknowledged by a cluster of rockets from Hermansdorf.

Orders were now issued by Count Stahremberg to all the troops, regular

and irregular, to hold themselves in readiness for a sally during the

expected battle of the morrow, or for joining the Christian army, and

driving the Turks out of the approaches. The night of the 11th of

September closed in upon this troubled scene. The man whose doom is

sealed will often sleep till morning calls him to the scaffold. Such

heavy sleep as his, the offspring of nervous excitement and exhaustion,

perhaps, was granted to the citizen of Vienna; but even this may be

doubted, for the criminal is assured of his fate. The doom of Vienna

was yet uncertain.

FOOTNOTES:

[14] See Appendix.

The Sieges of Vienna by the Turks · 第 14 / 18 章