Armed intervention--Conspiracy of Cienfuegos and Trinidad--General
Narciso Lopez--The author's views on the subject--Inducements to
revolt--Enormous taxation--Scheme of the patriots--Lopez's first
landing in 1850--Taking of Cardinas--Return of the invaders--Effect
upon the Cuban authorities--Roncali recalled--New
captain-general--Lopez's second expedition--Condition of the
Invaders--Vicissitudes--Col. Crittenden--Battle of Las
Pozas--Superiority of courage--Battle of Las Frias--Death of Gen.
Enna--The fearful finale of the expedition.
We have noticed in the preceding chapter, the anomaly of the political
condition of Cuba, increasing in prosperity and civilization, imbibing
liberal ideas from its geographical position, and yet denied
participation in the few shadowy rights which the peninsular subjects of
the enfeebled, distracted and despotic parent monarchy enjoyed. We have
seen that, in later years, the adoption of more liberal ideas by Spain
produced no amelioration of the condition of the colony; and that, on
the other hand, a conformity to the legal enactments of the mother
country was punished as treason. The result of the movement in the
western department, under Tacon, showed the Cubans that they had nothing
to hope from Spain, while the cruelties of General O'Donnell increased
the great discontent and despair of the people. They now became
satisfied that the hope of legal reform was but a chimera; and a portion
of the liberal party, seeing no issue from their insufferable position
but that of revolution, boldly advocated the intervention of arms.
In 1848 a conspiracy was formed, in Cienfuegos and Trinidad, with the
purpose of throwing off the Spanish yoke; but it was soon discovered,
and crushed by the imprisonment of various individuals in the central
department. The principal leader in this movement was General Narciso
Lopez, who succeeded in effecting his escape to the United States, where
he immediately placed himself in communication with several influential
and liberal Creoles, voluntary and involuntary exiles, and established a
correspondence with the remnant of the liberal party yet at liberty on
the island, at the same time being aided in his plans by American
sympathy. The result of the deliberations of himself, his correspondents
and associates, was to try by the chances of war for the liberation of
Cuba. The disastrous result of the expedition boldly undertaken for this
purpose is already well known.
Before sketching the principal features of this attempt, we may be
permitted to declare that, although we deplore the fate of those of our
countrymen who perished in the adventure, though we readily concede that
many of them were actuated by lofty motives, still we must condemn their
action, and approve of the vigorous measures adopted by the federal
government to suppress that species of reckless adventure in which the
_flibustiers_ engaged. No amount of sympathy with the sufferings of an
oppressed people, no combination of circumstances, no possible results,
can excuse the fitting out of a warlike expedition in the ports of a
nation against the possessions of a friendly power. The flag which has
waved unstained in peace and war over a free land for more than three
quarters of a century, must remain spotless to the last. The hopes of
every free heart in the world are centred on our banner, and we must see
to it that no speck dims the dazzling lustre of its stars. No degree of
pride at the daring gallantry displayed by the little handful of
invaders of Cuba,--a gallantry inherited from a brave ancestry who
displayed their valor in the holiest of causes,--must blind our eyes to
the character of the adventure which called it forth. We have tears for
the fallen, as brothers and men; but our conscience must condemn their
errors. While, individually, we should rejoice to see Cuba free, and an
integral portion of the Union, nothing will ever induce us to adopt the
atrocious doctrine that the ends justify the means. But let us pass to a
consideration of the recent events in the records of the island.
Many of the leading patriots of the island undoubtedly believed that the
government of the United States would second their efforts, if they
should decide to unite themselves to our republic, and boldly raise the
banner of annexation. A portion of the Cuban liberals adopted the motto,
"Legal Reform or Independence;" and these two factions of the patriots
did not henceforth act in perfect concert with each other--a most fatal
error to the interests of both. Time and circumstances favored the war
and annexation party; the people were more than ever discontented with a
government which so oppressed them by a military despotism, and by the
enormous weight of the unjust taxation levied upon them. We may here
remark that the increase of the public revenue, in the midst of so many
elements of destruction and ruin, can only be explained by the facility
with which the captain-general and royal stewards of the island invent
and arrange taxes, at their pleasure, and without a shadow of propriety,
or even precedent.
The _consuming_ population of Cuba amounts to about eight hundred
thousand souls, and the total amount of taxes and contributions of
various forms is more than twenty-three millions of dollars, in specie,
per annum! It is hardly conceivable that such a sum can be extorted from
a population whose wealth is precarious, and whose living is so costly.
With this revenue the government pays and supports an army of over
twenty thousand Peninsular troops in the island; a vast number of
employes, part of the clergy and half the entire navy of Spain; the
diplomatic corps in the United States and Mexico; many officials of rank
at home in Spain; and the surplus is remitted to Spain, and spent on the
Peninsula on matters entirely foreign to the interests of the island
itself. A precious state of affairs!
The colored population of the island, both slaves and free, hated the
Spaniards, for good reasons. The war party, moreover, reckoned on the
genius of a leader (Lopez) trained to arms,[8] equal in talents to any
of the Spanish generals, and beloved by the Spanish troops, as well as
by the Cuban population; and they relied, also, as we have said, on the
sympathy and ultimate aid of the United States government. It is
undoubtedly true that interested parties in this country, prompted by
mercenary motives, increased this latter delusion by false reports;
while the Cuban conspirators, in turn, buoyed up the hopes of their
friends in the United States, by glowing accounts of the patriotic
spirit of the Creoles, and the extent of the preparations they were
making for a successful revolt. General Lopez was actively arranging the
means for an invasion, when, in 1849, the United States government threw
terror into the ranks of the _flibustiers_, by announcing its
determination to enforce the sacredness of treaty stipulations. This,
for a time, frustrated the intended invasion.
In 1850 Lopez succeeded in effecting his first descent upon the island.
Having succeeded in baffling the vigilance of the United States
government, an expedition, consisting of six hundred and fifty-two men,
was embarked on board two sailing-vessels and the steamer Creole, which
conveyed the general and his staff. In the beginning of July the
sailing-vessels left New Orleans, with orders to anchor at Contoy, one
of the Mugeres Islands, on the coast of Yucatan; the general followed,
on the Creole, on the 7th. At the time when the troops were embarked on
the Creole at Contoy, fifty-two of the number, who had been deceived as
to the nature of the expedition, refused to follow the general, and were
left on the island, with the intention of returning to the United States
in the two schooners. General Lopez, after gaining some information from
a fisherman he encountered, resolved to land at Cardenas, on the
northern coast of the island, a hundred and twenty miles east of Havana.
He calculated that he could surprise and master the garrison before the
captain-general could possibly obtain intelligence of his departure from
New Orleans. His plan was, to master the town, secure the authorities,
intimidate the Spaniards, and then, sustained by the moral influence of
victory, proceed to Matanzas by railroad.
Roncali, the captain-general, having received intelligence of the
landing at Contoy, despatched several ships-of-war in that direction, to
seize upon the general and his followers. The latter, however, escaped
the snare, and effected his landing on the 19th. The garrison rushed to
arms, and, while a portion of the troops, after immaterial loss, retired
in good order to the suburbs, another, under the command of Governor
Ceruti, intrenched themselves in the government-house, and gave battle
to the invaders. After a sharp skirmish, the building being set on fire,
they surrendered; the governor and two or three officers were made
prisoners, and the soldiers consented to join the revolutionary colors!
Meanwhile, a body of one hundred invaders seized upon the railroad
station. The engines were fired up, and the trains made ready to
transport the invading column to Matanzas.
But now came a pause. General Lopez, seeing that the native population
did not respond to his appeal, knew that as soon as the news of the
taking of Cardenas should be circulated, he would be in a very critical
situation. In fact, the governor of Matanzas was soon on the march, at
the head of five hundred men. General Armero sailed from Havana in the
Pizarro, with a thousand infantry, while two thousand five hundred
picked troops, under the command of General Count de Mirasol, were sent
from Havana by the railroad. Lopez saw that it would be madness to wait
the attack of these formidable columns, unsupported save by his own
immediate followers, and accordingly issued his orders for the
reembarkation of his band, yet without relinquishing the idea of landing
on some more favorable point of the island.
That portion of the garrison which, in the beginning of the affair, had
retreated to the suburbs, finding itself reinforced by a detachment of
cavalry, attempted to cut off the retreat of the invading general; but
the deadly fire of the latter's reserve decimated the horse, and the
infantry, dismayed at their destruction, took to rapid flight. The
Creole accordingly left the port without molestation, and before the
arrival of the government steam-frigate Pizarro. The Spanish prisoners
were landed at Cayo de Piedras, and then Lopez, discovering the Pizarro
in the distance, made for the American continent, where the steamer was
abandoned. General Lopez was arrested by the authorities of Savannah,
but liberated again, in deference to the public clamor. The Creole was
seized, confiscated and sold. The invaders disbanded; and thus this
enterprise terminated.
A less enterprising and determined spirit than that of General Lopez
would have been completely broken by the failure of his first attempts,
the inactivity of the Cubans, the hostility of the American government,
and the formidable forces and preparations of the Spanish officials. He
believed, however, that the Cubans were ripe for revolt; that public
opinion in the United States would nullify the action of the federal
government; and that, if he could once gain a foothold in the island,
the Spanish troops would desert in such numbers to his banners that the
preponderance of power would soon be upon his side; and, with these
views, he once more busied himself, with unremitting industry, to form
another expedition.
Meanwhile, the daring attack upon Cardenas, while it demonstrated the
determination of the invading party, caused great anxiety in the mind of
General Roncali. True, he had at his disposal an army of more than
twenty thousand regular troops; but he was by no means sure of their
loyalty, and he therefore determined to raise a local militia; but, as
he suffered only Spaniards to enlist in it, he aroused the jealousy of
the Cuban-born inhabitants, and thus swelled the force of opposition
against the government. General Lopez was informed of this fact, and
based new hopes upon the circumstance.
The Spanish government, having recalled Roncali, appointed Don Jose de
la Concha captain-general of the island, and the severity of his sway
reminded the inhabitants of the iron rule of Tacon. It was during his
administration that Lopez effected his second landing at Playitas, sixty
miles west of Havana. Several partial insurrections, which had preceded
this event, easily suppressed, as it appears, by the Spanish government,
but exaggerated in the accounts despatched to the friends of Cuba in the
United States, inflamed the zeal of Lopez, and made him believe that the
time for a successful invasion had at length arrived.[9] He was so
confident, at one time, of the determination and ability of the Cubans
alone to secure their independence, that he wished to embark without any
force, and throw himself among them. It was this confidence that led him
to embark with only four hundred ill-armed men on board the little
steamer Pampero, on the 2d of August, 1851. This force consisted mostly
of Americans, but embraced forty-nine Cubans in its ranks, with several
German and Hungarian officers; among the latter, General Pragay, one of
the heroes of the Hungarian revolution, who was second in command to
General Lopez on this occasion.
Many of the foreign officers spoke little, if any, English, and mutual
jealousies and insubordinations soon manifested themselves in the little
band. They were composed of fierce spirits, and had come together
without any previous drilling or knowledge of each other. It was not the
intention of the commander-in-chief to sail direct for Cuba, but to go
to the neighborhood of St. John's river, Florida, and get a supply of
artillery, ammunition, extra arms, etc. He then proposed to land
somewhere in the central department, where he thought he could get a
footing, and rally a formidable force, before the government troops
could reach him. But, when five days out, Lopez discovered that the
Pampero was short of coal; as no time could be spared to remedy this
deficiency, he resolved to effect a landing at once, and send back the
Pampero for reinforcements and supplies. At Key West he obtained
favorable intelligence from Cuba, which confirmed his previous plans. He
learned that a large portion of the troops had been sent to the eastern
department; and he accordingly steered for Bahia Honda (deep bay). The
current of the gulf, acting while the machinery of the boat was
temporarily stopped for repairs, and the variation of the compass in the
neighborhood of so many arms, caused the steamer to run out of her
course on the night of the 10th; and when the morning broke, the
invaders found themselves heading for the narrow entrance of the harbor
of Havana!
The course of the steamer was instantly altered; but all on board
momentarily expected the apparition of a war steamer from the channel
between the Moro and the Punta. It appeared, afterwards, that the
Pampero was signalized as a strange steamer, but not reported as
suspicious until evening. The Pampero then made for the bay of Cabanas;
but, just as she was turning into the entrance, a Spanish frigate and
sloop-of-war were seen at anchor, the first of which immediately gave
chase, but, the wind failing, the frigate gave it up, and returned to
the bay to send intelligence of the expedition to Havana. The landing
was finally effected at midnight, between the 11th and 12th of August,
and the steamer was immediately sent off to the United States for
further reinforcements. As it was necessary to obtain transportation for
the baggage, General Lopez resolved to leave Col. Crittenden with one
hundred and twenty men to guard it, and with the remainder of the
expedition to push on to Las Pozas, a village about ten miles distant,
whence he could send back carts and horses to receive it. Among the
baggage were four barrels of powder, two of cartridges, the officers'
effects, including the arms of the general, and the flag of the
expedition. From the powder and arms they should not have separated,
but have divided that, against contingency.
In the mean time, seven picked companies of Spanish troops of the line
had been landed at Bahia Honda, which force was strengthened by
contingents drawn from the neighborhood. The march of the invading band
to Las Pozas was straggling and irregular. On reaching the village, they
found it deserted by the inhabitants. A few carts were procured and sent
back to Crittenden, that he might advance with the baggage. Lopez here
learned from a countryman of the preparations making to attack him. It
was no portion of his plan to bring the men into action with regular
troops, in their present undisciplined state; he proposed rather to take
a strong position in the mountains, and there plant his standard as a
rallying-point, and await the rising of the Cubans, and the return of
the Pampero with reinforcements for active operations.
As soon as Lopez learned the news from Bahia Honda, he despatched a
peremptory order to Crittenden to hasten up with the rear-guard,
abandoning the heavy baggage, but bringing off the cartridges and papers
of the expedition.
But the fatal delay of Crittenden separated him forever from the main
body, only a small detachment of his comrades (under Captain Kelly) ever
reaching it. The next day, while breakfast was being prepared for them,
the soldiers of the expedition were suddenly informed, by a volley from
one of the houses of the village, that the Spanish troops were upon
them. They flew to arms at once, and the Cuban company dislodged the
vanguard of the enemy, who had fired, at the point of the bayonet, their
captain, Oberto, receiving his death-wound in the spirited affair.
General Enna, a brave officer, in command of the Spanish troops, made
two charges in column on the centre of the invaders' line, but was
repulsed by that deadly fire which is the preeminent characteristic of
American troops. Four men alone escaped from the company heading the
first column, and seventeen from that forming the advance of the second
column of attack. The Spaniards were seized with a panic, and fled.
Lopez's force in this action amounted to about two hundred and eighty
men; the Spaniards had more than eight hundred. The total loss of the
former, in killed and wounded, was thirty-five; that of the latter,
about two hundred men killed, and a large number wounded! The invaders
landed with about eighty rounds of cartridges each; the Spanish dead
supplied them with about twelve thousand more; and a further supply was
subsequently obtained at Las Frias; the ammunition left with Crittenden
was never recovered. In the battle of Las Pozas, General Enna's horse
was shot under him, and his second in command killed. The invaders lost
Colonel Downman, a brave American officer; while General Pragay was
wounded, and afterwards died in consequence. Though the invaders fired
well and did terrible execution, they could not be prevailed upon to
charge the enemy, and gave great trouble to the officers by their
insubordination. The night after the battle, Captain Kelly came up with
forty men, and announced that the Spanish troops had succeeded in
dividing the rear-guard, and that the situation of Crittenden was
unknown. It was not until some days afterwards that it was ascertained
that Crittenden's party, attempting to leave the island in launches, had
been made prisoners by a Spanish man-of-war. They were taken to Havana,
and brutally shot at the castle of Atares.
About two o'clock on the 14th of August, the expedition resumed its
march for the interior, leaving behind their wounded, who were
afterwards killed and mutilated by the Spaniards. The second action with
the Spanish troops occurred at the coffee-plantation of Las Frias,
General Enna attacking with four howitzers, one hundred and twenty
cavalry, and twelve hundred infantry. The Spanish general attacked with
his cavalry, but they were met by a deadly fire, thrown into utter
confusion, and forced to retreat, carrying off the general mortally
wounded. The panic of the cavalry communicated itself to the infantry,
and the result was a complete rout. This was the work of about two
hundred muskets; for many of Lopez's men had thrown away their arms on
the long and toilsome march.
The expedition, however, was too weak to profit by their desperate
successes, and had no means of following up these victories. Plunging
into the mountains, they wandered about for days, drenched with rain,
destitute of food or proper clothing, until despair at last seized
them. They separated from each other, a few steadfast comrades remaining
by their leader. In the neighborhood of San Cristoval, Lopez finally
surrendered to a party of pursuers. He was treated with every indignity
by his captors, though he submitted to everything with courage and
serenity. He was taken in a steamer from Mariel to Havana.
Arrived here, he earnestly desired to obtain an interview with Concha,
who had been an old companion-in-arms with him in Spain; not that he
expected pardon at his hands, but hoping to obtain a change in the
manner of his death. His soul shrank from the infamous _garrotte_, and
he aspired to the indulgence of the _cuatro tiros_ (four shots). Both
the interview and the indulgence were refused, and he was executed on
the first of September, at seven o'clock in the morning, in the Punta,
by that mode of punishment which the Spaniards esteem the most infamous
of all. When he landed at Bahia Honda, he stooped and kissed the earth,
with the fond salutation, "_Querida Cuba_" (dear Cuba)! and his last
words, pronounced in a tone of deep tenderness, were, "_Muero por mi
amada Cuba_" (I die for my beloved Cuba).[10]
The remainder of the prisoners who fell into the hands of the
authorities were sent to the Moorish fortress of Ceuta; but Spain seems
to have been ashamed of the massacre of Atares, and has atoned for the
ferocity of her colonial officials by leniency towards the misguided men
of the expedition, granting them a pardon.
At present it may be said that "order reigns in Warsaw," and the island
is comparatively quiet in the presence of a vast armed force. To Concha
have succeeded Canedo and Pezuelas, but no change for the better has
taken place in the administration of the island. Rigorous to the native
population, insolent and overbearing to foreigners, respecting no flag
and regarding no law, the captains-general bear themselves as though
Spain was still a first-rate power as of yore, terrible on land, and
afloat still the mistress of the sea.
FOOTNOTES:
[8] His reputation as a cavalry officer was very distinguished, and he
was commonly recognized as _La primera Lanza de Espana_ (the first lance
of Spain).--_Louis Schlesinger's Narrative of the Expedition._
[9] "The general showed me much of his correspondence from the island.
It represented a pervading anxiety for his arrival, on the part of the
Creole population. His presence alone, to head the insurrection, which
would then become general, was all they called for; his presence and a
supply of arms, of which they were totally destitute. The risings
already made were highly colored in some of the communications addressed
to him from sources of unquestionable sincerity."--_Louis Schlesinger's
Narrative of the Expedition._
[10] General Lopez was born in Venezuela, South America, in 1798; and
hence, at the time of his execution, must have been about fifty-two
years of age. He early became an adopted citizen of Cuba, and espoused
one of its daughters.