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IMPRESSIONS
OF SOUTH AFRICA
BY
JAMES BRYCE
AUTHOR OF "THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE," "TRANSCAUCASIA AND ARARAT,"
"THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH," ETC.
_With Three Maps._
THIRD EDITION, REVISED THROUGHOUT
WITH A NEW PREFATORY CHAPTER, AND WITH THE
TRANSVAAL CONVENTIONS OF 1881 AND 1884
London
MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited
1899
_All rights reserved_
RICHARD CLAY AND SONS, LIMITED,
LONDON AND BUNGAY.
_First Edition, 8vo. November 1897_
_Reprinted, November 1897_
_Second Edition, January 1898_
_Third Edition, Crown 8vo. November 1899_
_Reprinted, December 1899_
TO
THE COMPANION OF MY JOURNEY
PREFATORY CHAPTER
This new edition has been carefully revised throughout, and, as far as
possible, brought up to date by noting, in their proper places, the
chief events of importance that have occurred since the book first
appeared. In the historical chapters, however, and in those which deal
with recent politics, no changes have been made save such as were needed
for the correction of one or two slight errors of fact, and for the
mention of new facts, later in date than the first edition. I have left
the statements of my own views exactly as they were first written, even
where I thought that the form of a statement might be verbally improved,
not only because I still adhere to those views, but also because I
desire it to be clearly understood that they were formed and expressed
before the events of the last few months, and without any reference to
the controversies of the moment.
When the first edition of the book was published (at the end of 1897)
there was strong reason to believe as well as to hope that a race
conflict in South Africa would be avoided, and that the political
problems it presents, acute as they had become early in 1896, would be
solved in a peaceable way. To this belief and hope I gave expression in
the concluding chapter of the book, indicating "tact, coolness and
patience, above all, patience," as the qualities needed to attain that
result which all friends of the country must unite in desiring.
Now, however, (October 1899), Britain and her South African Colonies and
territories find themselves at war with the South African Republic and
the Orange Free State. A new chapter is opened in the history of the
country which completely alters the situation, and must necessarily
leave things very different from what it found them. Readers of this new
edition may reasonably expect to find in it some account of the events
which have within the last two years led up to this catastrophe, or at
any rate some estimate of that conduct of affairs by the three
governments concerned which has brought about a result all three ought
to have sought to avert.
There are, however, conclusive reasons against attempting to continue
down to the outbreak of the war (October 11th) the historical sketch
given in Chapters II to XII. The materials for the historian are still
scanty and imperfect, leaving him with data scarcely sufficient for
judging the intention and motives with which some things were done.
Round the acts and words of the representatives of the three governments
concerned, there rages such a storm of controversy, that whoever places
a particular construction upon those acts and words must need support
his construction by citations from documents and arguments based on
those citations. To do this would need a space much larger than I can
command. The most serious difficulty, however, is that when events are
close to us and excite strong feelings, men distrust the impartiality of
a historian even when he does his best to be impartial. I shall not,
therefore, attempt to write a history of the last two fateful years, but
content myself first, with calling the reader's attention to a few
salient facts that have occurred since 1896, and to some aspects of the
case which have been little considered in England; and secondly, with
describing as clearly and estimating as cautiously as I can, the forces
that have worked during those years with such swift and deadly effect.
Some of these facts may be dismissed with a word or two, because they
lie outside the present crisis. One is the entrance of the Colony of
Natal into the South African Customs Union, an event which created one
uniform tariff system for the whole of British and Dutch South Africa
except the Transvaal. Another is the extension of the two great lines of
railway from the coast into the interior. This extension has given
Bulawayo and Matabililand a swift and easy communication with Cape Town,
thereby strengthening immensely the hold of Britain upon the interior,
and lessening any risk that might be feared of future native risings. It
has also opened up a new and quick route from the coast of the Indian
Ocean at Beira into the heart of Mashonaland, and brought the
construction of a railway from Mashonaland across the Zambesi to Lake
Tanganyika within the horizon of practicable enterprises. A scheme of
government has been settled for the territories of the British South
Africa Company south of the Zambesi (Southern Rhodesia), which is now
at work. The prospects of gold mining in that region are believed to
have improved, and the increase of gold production in the mines of the
Witwatersrand has proved even more rapid than was expected in 1896. An
agreement has been concluded between Britain and the German Empire
relating to their interests on the coast of the Indian Ocean, which,
though its terms have not been disclosed, is generally understood to
have removed an obstacle which might have been feared to the acquisition
by Britain of such rights at Delagoa Bay as she may be able to obtain
from Portugal, and to have withdrawn from the South African Republic any
hope that State might have cherished of support from Germany in the
event of a breach with Britain.
These events, however, great as is their bearing on the future, are of
less present moment than those which have sprung from Dr. Jameson's
expedition into the Transvaal in December, 1895, and the internal
troubles in that State which caused and accompanied his enterprise. It
rekindled race feeling all over South Africa, and has had the most
disastrous effects upon every part of the country. To understand these
effects it is necessary to understand the state of opinion in the
British Colonies and in the two Republics before it took place. Let us
examine these communities separately.
In Cape Colony and Natal there was before December, 1895, no hostility
at all between the British and the Dutch elements. Political parties in
Cape Colony were, in a broad sense, British and Dutch, but the
distinction was really based not so much on racial differences as on
economic interests. The rural element which desired a protective tariff
and laws regulating native labour, was mainly Dutch, the commercial
element almost wholly British. Mr. Rhodes, the embodiment of British
Imperialism, was Prime Minister through the support of the Dutch element
and the Africander Bond. Englishmen and Dutchmen were everywhere in the
best social relations. The old blood sympathy of the Dutch element for
the Transvaal Boers which had been so strongly manifested in 1881, when
the latter were struggling for their independence, had been superseded,
or at least thrown into the background, by displeasure at the
unneighbourly policy of the Transvaal Government in refusing public
employment to Cape Dutchmen as well as to Englishmen, and in throwing
obstacles in the way of trade in agricultural products. This displeasure
culminated when the Transvaal Government, in the summer of 1895, closed
the Drifts (fords) on the Vaal River, to the detriment of imports from
the Colony and the Orange Free State.
In the Orange Free State there was, as has been pointed out in Chapter
XIX., perfect good feeling and cordial co-operation in all public
matters between the Dutch and the English elements. There was also
perfect friendliness to Britain, the old grievances of the Diamond
Fields dispute (see page 144) and of the arrest of the Free State
conquest of Basutoland having been virtually forgotten. Towards the
Transvaal there was a political sympathy based partly on kinship, partly
on a similarity of republican institutions. But there was also some
annoyance at the policy which the Transvaal Government, and especially
its Hollander advisers, were pursuing; coupled with a desire to see
reforms effected in the Transvaal, and the franchise granted to
immigrants on more liberal terms.
Of the Transvaal itself I need say the less, because its condition is
fully described in Chapter XXV. There was of course much irritation
among the Uitlanders of English and Colonial stock, with an arrogant
refusal on the part of the ruling section and the more extreme
old-fashioned Boers to admit the claims of these new-comers. But there
was also a party among the burghers, important more by the character and
ability of its members than by its numbers, yet growing in influence,
which desired reform, perceived that the existing state of things could
not continue, and was ready to join the Uitlanders in agitating for
sweeping changes in the Constitution and in administration.
The events of December, 1895, changed the face of things swiftly and
decisively in all these communities.
In Cape Colony Dutch feeling, which as a political force was almost
expiring, revived at once. The unexpected attack on the Transvaal
evolved an outburst of sympathy for it, in which the faults of its
government were forgotten. Mr. Rhodes retired from office. The
reconstructed Ministry which succeeded fell in 1898, and a new Ministry
supported by the Africander Bond came into power after a general
election. Its majority was narrow, and was accused of not fairly
representing the country, owing to the nature of the electoral areas. A
Redistribution Bill was passed by a species of compromise, and in the
elections to the new constituencies which followed the Dutch party
slightly increased its majority, and kept its Cabinet (in which,
however, men of Dutch blood are a minority) in power. Party feeling,
both inside and outside the legislature, became, and has remained,
extremely strong on both sides. The English generally have rallied to
and acclaim Mr. Rhodes, whose connection with Dr. Jameson's expedition
has made him the special object of Dutch hostility. There is, according
to the reports which reach England, no longer any moderating third
party: all are violent partisans. Nevertheless--and this is a remarkable
and most encouraging fact--this violence did not diminish the warmth
with which the whole Assembly testified its loyalty and affection
towards the Queen on the occasion of the completion of the sixtieth year
of her reign in 1897. And the Bond Ministry of Mr. Schreiner proposed
and carried by a unanimous vote a grant of L30,000 per annum as a
contribution by the Colony to the naval defence of the Empire, leaving
the application of this sum to the unfettered discretion of the British
Admiralty.
In the Orange Free State the explosion of Dutch sentiment was still
stronger. Its first result was seen in the election of a President. In
November, 1895, two candidates for the vacant office had come forward,
and their chances were deemed to be nearly equal. When the news of the
Jameson expedition was received, the chance of the candidate of British
stock vanished. Since then, though there was not (so far as I gather)
down till the last few weeks any indication of hostility to Britain,
much less any social friction within the State, a disposition to draw
closer to the threatened sister Republic showed itself at once. This
led to the conclusion of a defensive alliance between the Free State and
the Transvaal, whereby either bound itself to defend the other, if
unjustly attacked. (The Transvaal is believed to have suggested, and the
Free State to have refused, a still closer union.) As the Orange Free
State had no reason to fear an attack, just or unjust, from any quarter,
this was a voluntary undertaking on its part, with no corresponding
advantage, of what might prove a dangerous liability, and it furnishes a
signal proof of the love of independence which animates this little
community.
We come now to the Transvaal itself. In that State the burgher party of
constitutional reform was at once silenced, and its prospect of
usefulness blighted. So, too, the Uitlander agitation was extinguished.
The Reform leaders were in prison or in exile. The passionate
anti-English feeling, and the dogged refusal to consider reforms, which
had characterized the extreme party among the Boers, were intensified.
The influence of President Kruger, more than once threatened in the
years immediately preceding, was immensely strengthened.
The President and his advisers had a golden opportunity before them of
using the credit and power which the failure of the Rising and the
Expedition of 1895 had given them. They ought to have seen that
magnanimity would also be wisdom. They ought to have set about a reform
of the administration and to have proposed a moderate enlargement of the
franchise such as would have admitted enough of the new settlers to give
them a voice, yet not enough to involve any sudden transfer of
legislative or executive power. Whether the sentiment of the Boers
generally would have enabled the President to extend the franchise may
be doubtful; but he could at any rate have tried to deal with the more
flagrant abuses of administration. However, he attempted neither. The
abuses remained, and though a Commission reported on some of them, and
suggested important reforms, no action was taken. The weak point of the
Constitution (as to which see p. 152) was the power which the
legislature apparently possessed of interfering with vested rights, and
even with pending suits, by a resolution having the force of law. This
was a defect due, not to any desire to do wrong, but to the inexperience
of those who had originally framed the Constitution, and to the want of
legal knowledge and skill among those who had worked it, and was
aggravated by the fact that the legislature consisted of one Chamber
only, which was naturally led to legislate by way of resolution
(besluit) because the process of passing laws in the stricter sense of
the term involved a tedious and cumbrous process of bringing them to the
knowledge of the people throughout the country. Upon this point there
arose a dispute with the Chief Justice which led to the dismissal of
that official and one of his colleagues, a dispute which could not be
explained here without entering upon technical details. There is no
reason to think that the President's action was prompted by any wish to
give the legislature the means of wronging individuals, nor has evidence
been produced to show that its powers have been in fact (at least to any
material extent) so used. The matter cannot be fairly judged without
considering the peculiar character of the Transvaal Constitution, for
which the President is nowise to blame, and the statements often made in
this country that the subjection of the judiciary to the legislature
destroys the security of property are much exaggerated, for property has
been, in fact, secure. It was, nevertheless, an error not to try to
retain a man so much respected as the Chief Justice, and not to fulfil
the promise given to Sir Henry de Villiers (who had been invoked as
mediator) that the judiciary should be placed in a more assured
position.
The idea which seems to have filled the President's mind was that force
was the only remedy. The Republic was, he thought, sure to be again
attacked from within or from without; and the essential thing was to
strengthen its military resources for defence, while retaining political
power in the hands of the burghers. Accordingly, the fortifications
already begun at Pretoria were pushed on, a strong fort was erected to
command Johannesburg, and munitions of war were imported in very large
quantities, while the Uitlanders were debarred from possessing arms.
Such precautions were natural. Any government which had been nearly
overthrown, and expected another attack, would have done the like. But
these measures of course incensed the Uitlanders, who saw that another
insurrection would have less chance of success than the last, and
resented the inferiority implied in disarmament, as Israel resented the
similar policy pursued by the Philistine princes. The capitalists also,
an important factor by their wealth and by their power of influencing
opinion in Europe, were angry and restless, because the prospect of
securing reforms which would reduce the cost of working the gold reefs
became more remote.
This was the condition of things in the two Republics and the British
Colonies when the diplomatic controversy between the Imperial Government
and the South African Republic, which had been going on ever since 1895,
passed in the early summer of 1899 into a more acute phase. The
beginning of that phase coincided, as it so happened, with the expiry of
the period during which the leaders of the Johannesburg rising of 1895
had promised to abstain from interference in politics, and the incident
out of which it grew was the presentation to the Queen (in March 1899),
through the High Commissioner, of a petition from a large number of
British residents on the Witwatersrand complaining of the position in
which they found themselves. The situation soon became one of great
tension, owing to the growing passion of the English in South Africa and
the growing suspicion on the part of the Transvaal Boers. But before we
speak of the negotiations, let us consider for a moment what was the
position of the two parties to the controversy.
The position of the Transvaal Government, although (as will presently
appear) it had some measure of legal strength, was, if regarded from the
point of view of actual facts, logically indefensible and materially
dangerous. It was not, indeed, the fault of that Government that the
richest goldfield in the world had been discovered in its territory, nor
would it have been possible for the Boers, whatever they might have
wished, to prevent the mines from being worked and the miners from
streaming in. But the course they took was condemned from the first to
failure. They desired to have the benefit of the gold-mines while yet
retaining their old ways of life, not seeing that the two things were
incompatible. Moreover, they--or rather the President and his
advisers--committed the fatal mistake of trying to maintain a government
which was at the same time undemocratic and incompetent. If it had been
representative of the whole mass of the inhabitants it might have
ventured, like the governments of some great American cities, to
disregard both purity and efficiency. If, on the other hand, it had been
a vigorous and skilful government, giving to the inhabitants the
comforts and conveniences of municipal and industrial life at a
reasonable charge, the narrow electoral basis on which it rested would
have remained little more than a theoretic grievance, and the bulk of
the people would have cared nothing for political rights. An exclusive
government may be pardoned if it is efficient, an inefficient government
if it rests upon the people. But a government which is both inefficient
and exclusive incurs a weight of odium under which it must ultimately
sink; and this was the kind of government which the Transvaal attempted
to maintain. They ought, therefore, to have either extended their
franchise or reformed their administration. They would not do the
former, lest the new burghers should swamp the old ones, and take the
control out of Boer hands. They were unfit to do the latter, because
they had neither knowledge nor skill, so that even had private interests
not stood in the way, they would have failed to create a proper
administration. It was the ignorance, as well as the exclusive spirit
of the Transvaal authorities, which made them unwilling to yield any
more than they might be forced to yield to the demand for reform.
The position in which Britain stood needs to be examined from two sides,
its legal right of interference, and the practical considerations which
justified interference in this particular case.
Her legal right rested on three grounds. The first was the Convention of
1884 (printed in the Appendix to this volume), which entitled her to
complain of any infraction of the privileges thereby guaranteed to her
subjects.
The second was the ordinary right, which every State possesses, to
complain, and (if necessary) intervene when its subjects are wronged,
and especially when they suffer any disabilities not imposed upon the
subjects of other States.
The third right was more difficult to formulate. It rested on the fact
that as Britain was the greatest power in South Africa, owning the whole
country south of the Zambesi except the two Dutch Republics (for the
deserts of German Damaraland and the Portuguese East-coast territories
may be practically left out of account), she was interested in
preventing any causes of disturbance within the Transvaal which might
spread beyond its borders, and become sources of trouble either among
natives or among white men. This right was of a vague and indeterminate
nature, and could be legitimately used only when it was plain that the
sources of trouble did really exist and were becoming dangerous.
Was there not also, it may be asked, the suzerainty of Britain, and if
so, did it not justify intervention? I will not discuss the question,
much debated by English lawyers, whether the suzerainty over the
"Transvaal State," mentioned in the preamble to the Convention of 1881,
was preserved over the "South African Republic" by the Convention of
1884, not because I have been unable to reach a conclusion on the
subject, but because the point seems to be one of no practical
importance. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is a
suzerainty, it is perfectly clear from an examination of the Conventions
and of the negotiations of 1884 that this suzerainty relates solely to
foreign relations, and has nothing whatever to do with the internal
constitution or government of the Transvaal. The significance of the
term--if it be carried over and read into the Convention of 1884--is
exhausted by the provision in Article IV of that instrument for the
submission of treaties to the British Government. No argument,
accordingly, for any right of interference as regards either the
political arrangements of the Transvaal or the treatment of foreigners
within its borders, can be founded on this real or supposed suzerainty.
This view had been too frequently and too clearly expressed by the
British Government before 1896, to make it possible for any British
official to attempt to put any such construction upon the term; and the
matter might therefore have been suffered to drop, since the right to
veto treaties was explicit, and did not need to be supported by an
appeal to the preamble of 1881. The term, however, though useless to
Britain, was galling to the Transvaal, which suspected that it would be
made a pretext for infringements upon their independence in internal
affairs; and these suspicions were confirmed by the talk of the
Uitlander spokesmen in Johannesburg, who were in the habit of appealing
to Britain as the Suzerain Power. It has played a most unfortunate part
in the whole controversy.
Suzerainty, which is a purely legal, though somewhat vague, conception,
has in many minds become confused with the practical supremacy, or
rather predominance, of Britain in South Africa, which is a totally
different matter. That predominance rests on the fact that Britain
commands the resources of a great empire, while the Dutch republics are
petty communities of ranchmen. But it does not carry any legal rights of
interference, any more than a preponderance of force gives Germany
rights against Holland.
As I have referred to the Convention of 1884, it may be well to observe
that while continuing to believe that, on a review of the facts as they
then stood, the British Government were justified in restoring
self-government to the Transvaal in 1881, they seem to me to have erred
in conceding the Convention of 1884. Though the Rand goldfields had not
then been discovered, Lord Derby ought to have seen that the relations
of the Transvaal to the adjoining British territories would be so close
that a certain measure of British control over its internal
administration might come to be needful. This control, which was indeed
but slight, he surrendered in 1884. But the improvidence of the act does
not in the least diminish the duty of the country which made the
Convention to abide by its terms, or relieve it from the obligation of
making out for any subsequent interference a basis of law and fact which
the opinion of the world might accept as sufficient.
It has not been sufficiently realised in England that although the
Transvaal may properly, in respect of British control over its foreign
relations, be described as a semi-dependent State, Britain was under the
same obligation to treat it with a strict regard to the recognised
principles of international law as if it had been a great power. She had
made treaties with it, and those treaties it was her duty to observe.
Apart from all moral or sentimental considerations, apart from the fact
that Britain had at the Hague Conference been the warm and effective
advocate of peaceful methods of settling disputes between nations, it is
her truest interest to set an example of fairness, legality and
sincerity. No country, not even the greatest, can afford to neglect that
reasonable and enlightened opinion of thoughtful men in other
countries--not to be confounded with the invective and misrepresentation
employed by the press of each nation against the others--which
determines the ultimate judgment of the world, and passes into the
verdict of history.
Did then the grievances of which the British residents in the Transvaal
complained furnish such a basis? These grievances are well known, and
will be found mentioned in chapter XXV. They were real and vexatious. It
is true that some of them affected not so much British residents as the
European shareholders in the great mining companies; true also that the
mining industry (as will be seen from the figures on p. 301) was
expanding and prospering in spite of them. Furthermore, they were
grievances under which, it might be argued, the immigrants had placed
themselves by coming with notice of their existence, and from which they
might escape by taking a train into the Free State or Natal. And they
were grievances which, however annoying, did not render either life or
property unsafe,[1] and did not prevent the Johannesburgers from
enjoying life and acquiring wealth. Nevertheless, they were such as the
British Government was entitled to endeavour to have redressed. Nor
could it be denied that the state of irritation and unrest which
prevailed on the Witwatersrand, the probability that another rising
would take place whenever a chance of success offered, furnished to
Britain, interested as she was in the general peace of the country, a
ground for firm remonstrance and for urging the removal of all
legitimate sources of disaffection, especially as these re-acted on the
whole of South Africa. The British authorities at the Cape seem indeed
to have thought that the unyielding attitude of the Transvaal Government
worked much mischief in the Colony, being taken by the English there as
a defiance to the power and influence of Britain, and so embittering
their minds.
Among the grievances most in men's mouths was the exclusion of the
new-comers from the electoral franchise. It must be clearly
distinguished from the other grievances. It was a purely internal
affair, in which Britain had no right to intermeddle, either under the
Convention of 1884 or under the general right of a state to protect its
subjects. Nothing is clearer than that every state may extend or limit
the suffrage as it pleases. If a British self-governing colony were to
restrict the suffrage to those who had lived fourteen years in the
colony, or a state of the American Union were to do the like, neither
the Home Government in the one case, nor the Federal Government in the
other would have any right to interfere. All therefore that Britain
could do was to call the attention of the South African Republic in a
friendly way to the harm which the restriction of the franchise was
causing, and point out that to enlarge it might remove the risk of a
collision over other matters which did fall within the scope of British
intervention.
We are therefore, on a review of the whole position, led to conclude
that Britain was justified in requiring the Transvaal Government to
redress the grievances (other than the limited suffrage) which were
complained of. Whether she would be justified in proceeding to enforce
by arms compliance with her demand, would of course depend upon several
things, upon the extent to which the existence of the grievances could
be disproved, upon the spirit in which the Transvaal met the demand,
upon the amount of concessions offered or amendment promised. But before
the British Government entered on a course which might end in war, if
the Transvaal should prove intractable, there were some considerations
which it was bound seriously to weigh.
One of these was the time for entering on a controversy. The Jameson
invasion was only three years old; and the passions it evoked had not
subsided. In it British officers, and troops flying the British flag, if
not Britain herself, had been wrongdoers. Suspicions of British good
faith were known to pervade the Boer mind, and would give an ominous
colour to every demand coming from Britain. The lapse of time might
diminish these suspicions, and give to negotiations a better prospect of
success. Time, moreover, was likely to work against the existing system
of the Transvaal. Bad governments carry the seeds of their own
dissolution. The reforming party among the Transvaal burghers would gain
strength, and try to throw off the existing _regime_. The President was
an old man, whose retirement from power could not be long delayed; and
no successor would be able to hold together as he had done the party of
resistance to reform. In the strife of factions that would follow his
retirement reform was certain to have a far better chance than it could
have had since 1895. In fact, to put it shortly, all the natural forces
were working for the Uitlanders, and would either open the way for their
admission to a share in power, or else make the task of Britain easier
by giving her less united and therefore less formidable antagonists.
These considerations counselled a postponement of the attempt to bring
matters to a crisis.
In the second place the British Government had to remember the
importance of carrying the opinion of the Dutch in Cape Colony, and, as
far as possible, even of the Orange Free State, with them in any action
they might take. It has been pointed out how before December, 1895, that
opinion blamed the Transvaal Government for its unfriendly treatment of
the immigrants. The Dutch of both communities had nothing to gain and
something to lose by the maladministration of the Transvaal, so that
they were nowise disposed to support it in refusing reforms. The only
thing that would make them rally to it would be a menace to its
independence, regarding which they, and especially the Free State
people, were extremely sensitive. Plainly, therefore, unless the
colonial Dutch were to be incensed and the Free State men turned to
enemies, such a menace was to be avoided.
Finally, the British authorities were bound to make sure, not only that
they had an adequate _casus belli_ which they could present to their own
people and to the world, but also that the gain to be expected from
immediately redressing the grievances of the Uitlander outweighed the
permanent evils war would entail. Even where, according to the usage of
nations, a just cause for war exists, even where victory in the war may
be reckoned on, the harm to be expected may be greater than the fruits
of victory. Here the harm was evident. The cost of equipping a large
force and transporting it across many thousand miles of sea was the
smallest part of the harm. The alienation of more than half the
population of Cape Colony, the destruction of a peaceful and prosperous
Republic with which Britain had no quarrel, the responsibility for
governing the Transvaal when conquered, with its old inhabitants
bitterly hostile, these were evils so grave, that the benefits to be
secured to the Uitlanders might well seem small in comparison. A nation
is, no doubt, bound to protect its subjects. But it could hardly be said
that the hardships of this group of subjects, which did not prevent
others from flocking into the country, and which were no worse than they
had been for some time previously, were such as to forbid the exercise
of a little more patience. It was said by the war party among the
English in South Africa that patience was being mistaken for weakness,
and that the credit of Britain was being lowered all over the world, and
even among the peoples of India, by her forbearance towards the
Transvaal. Absurd as this notion may appear, it was believed by heated
partizans on the spot. But outside Africa, and especially in Europe, the
forbearance of one of the four greatest Powers in the world towards a
community of seventy thousand people was in no danger of being
misunderstood.
Whether the force of these considerations, obvious to every unbiased
mind which had some knowledge of South Africa, was fully realized by
those who directed British policy, or whether, having realized their
force, they nevertheless judged war the better alternative, is a
question on which we are still in the dark. It is possible--and some of
the language used by the British authorities may appear to suggest this
explanation--that they entered on the negotiations which ended in war in
the belief that an attitude of menace would suffice to extort
submission, and being unable to recede from that attitude, found
themselves drawn on to a result which they had neither desired nor
contemplated. Be this as it may, the considerations above stated
prescribed the use of prudent and (as far as possible) conciliatory
methods in their diplomacy, as well as care in selecting a position
which would supply a legal justification for war, should war be found
the only issue.
This was the more necessary because the Boers were known to be intensely
suspicious. Every weak power trying to resist a stronger one must needs
take refuge in evasive and dilatory tactics. Such had been, such were
sure to be, the tactics of the Boers. But the Boers were also very
distrustful of the English Government, believing it to aim at nothing
less than the annexation of their country. It may seem strange to
Englishmen that the purity of their motives and the disinterestedness of
their efforts to spread good government and raise others to their own
level should be doubted. But the fact is--and this goes to the root of
the matter--that the Boers have regarded the policy of Britain towards
them as a policy of violence and duplicity. They recall how Natal was
conquered from them in 1842, after they had conquered it from the Zulus;
how their country was annexed in 1877, how the promises made at the time
of that annexation were broken. They were not appeased by the
retrocession of 1881, which they ascribed solely to British fear of a
civil war in South Africa. It should moreover be remembered,--and this
is a point which few people in England do remember--that they hold the
annexation to have been an act of high-handed lawlessness done in time
of peace, and have deemed themselves entitled to be replaced in the
position their republic held before 1877, under the Sand River
Convention of 1852. Since the invasion of December 1895, they have been
more suspicious than ever, for they believe the British Government to
have had a hand in that attempt, and they think that influential
capitalists have been sedulously scheming against them. Their passion
for independence is something which we in modern Europe find it hard to
realise. It recalls the long struggle of the Swiss for freedom in the
fourteenth century, or the fierce tenacity which the Scotch showed in
the same age in their resistance to the claim of England to be their
"Suzerain Power." This passion was backed by two other sentiments, an
exaggerated estimate of their own strength and a reliance on the
protecting hand of Providence, fitter for the days of the Maccabees or
of Cromwell than for our own time, but which will appear less strange if
the perils through which their nation had passed be remembered.
These were the rocks among which the bark of British diplomacy had to be
steered. They were, however, rocks above water, so it might be hoped
that war could be avoided and some valuable concession secured. To be
landed in war would obviously be as great a failure as to secure no
concession.
Instead of demanding the removal of the specific grievances whereof the
Uitlanders complained, the British Government resolved to endeavour to
obtain for them an easier acquisition of the electoral franchise and an
ampler representation in the legislature. There was much to be said for
this course. It would avoid the tedious and vexatious controversies that
must have arisen over the details of the grievances. It would (in the
long run) secure reform in the best way, viz., by the action of public
spirit and enlightenment within the legislature. It would furnish a
basis for union between the immigrants and the friends of good
government among the burghers themselves, and so conduce to the future
peace of the community. There was, however, one material condition, a
condition which might prove to be an objection, affecting the resort to
it. Since the electoral franchise was a matter entirely within the
competence of the South African Republic, Britain must, if she desired
to abide by the principles of international law, confine herself to
recommendation and advice. She had no right to demand, no right to
insist that her advice should be followed. She could not compel
compliance by force, nor even by the threat of using force. In other
words, a refusal to enlarge the franchise would not furnish any _casus
belli_.
This course having been adopted, the negotiations entered on a new phase
with the Conference at Bloemfontein, where President Kruger met the
British High Commissioner. Such a direct interchange of views between
the leading representatives of two Powers may often be expedient,
because it helps the parties to get sooner to close quarters with the
substantial points of difference, and so facilitates a compromise. But
its utility depends on two conditions. Either the basis of discussion
should be arranged beforehand, leaving only minor matters to be
adjusted, or else the proceedings should be informal and private. At
Bloemfontein neither condition existed. No basis had been previously
arranged. The Conference was formal and (although the press were not
admitted) virtually public, each party speaking before the world, each
watched and acclaimed by its supporters over the country. The eyes of
South Africa were fixed on Bloemfontein, so that when the Conference
came to its unfruitful end, the two parties were practically further off
than before, and their failure to agree accentuated the bitterness both
of the Transvaal Boers and of the English party in the Colonies. To the
more extreme men among the latter this result was welcome. There was
already a war party in the Colony, and voices clamorous for war were
heard in the English press. Both then and afterwards every check to the
negotiations evoked a burst of joy from organs of opinion at home and in
the Cape, whose articles were unfortunately telegraphed to Pretoria.
Worse still, the cry of "Avenge Majuba" was frequently heard in the
Colonies, and sometimes even in England.
The story of the negotiations which followed during the months of July,
August and September, cannot be told fully here, because it is long and
intricate, nor summarized, because the fairness of any summary not
supported by citations would be disputed. There are, however, some
phenomena in the process of drifting towards war which may be concisely
noticed.
One of these is that the contending parties were at one moment all but
agreed. The Transvaal Government offered to give the suffrage after five
years residence (which was what had been asked by the High Commissioner
at Bloemfontein) coupled with certain conditions, which had little
importance, and were afterwards so explained as to have even less. This
was, from their point of view, a great concession, one to which they
expected opposition from the more conservative section of their own
burghers. The British negotiators, though they have since stated that
they meant substantially to accept this proposal, sent a reply whose
treatment of the conditions was understood as a refusal, and which
appeared to raise further questions; and when the Transvaal went back to
a previous offer, which had previously been held to furnish a basis for
agreement, the British Government declined to recur to that basis, as
being no longer tenable after the later offer. The Boers, who had
expected (from informal communications) that the five years offer would
be readily accepted, seem to have thought that there was no longer any
chance of a settlement, because fresh demands would follow each
concession. They ought, however, to have persevered with their five
years offer, which they could the more easily have done because they had
tacitly dropped the unsustainable claim to be a "sovereign and
independent state," and expressed themselves ready to abide by the
Convention of 1884. The British Government, on its part, would seem to
have thought, when the five years offer was withdrawn because the
conditions attached to it were not accepted, that the Boers had been
trifling with them, and resolved to exact all they demanded, even though
less than all would have represented a diplomatic victory. Thus a
conflict was precipitated which a more cautious and tactful policy might
have avoided.
The controversy continued through three months to turn on the question
of the franchise, nor were any demands for the redress of Uitlander
grievances ever formulated and addressed to the Transvaal either under
the Convention of 1884 or in respect of the general rights at
international law which Britain possessed. When the franchise
negotiations came to an _impasse_, the British Government announced
(September 22nd) that their demands and scheme for a "final settlement
of the issues created by the policy of the Republic"--a phrase which
pointed to something more than the redress of grievances--would be
presented to the Republic. These demands, however, never were presented
at all. After an interval of seventeen days from the announcement just
mentioned, the Transvaal declared war (October 9th and 11th). The terms
of their ultimatum were offensive and peremptory, such as no Government
could have been expected to listen to. Apart, however, from the language
of the ultimatum, a declaration of war must have been looked for. From
the middle of July the British Government had been strengthening its
garrison in South Africa, and the despatch of one body of troops after
another had been proclaimed with much emphasis in the English
newspapers. Early in October it was announced that the Reserves would be
called out and a powerful force despatched. The Transvaal had meantime
been also preparing for war, so that the sending of British troops might
well, after the beginning of September, be justified as a necessary
precaution, since the forces then in South Africa were inferior in
numbers to those the Boers could muster. But when the latter knew that
an overwhelming force would soon confront them, and draw round them a
net of steel, whence they could not escape, they resolved to seize the
only advantage they possessed, the advantage of time, and to smite
before their enemy was ready. It was therefore, only in a technical or
formal sense that they can be said to have begun the war; for a weak
State, which sees its enemy approach with a power that will soon be
irresistible, has only two alternatives, to submit or to attack at once.
In such a quarrel the responsibility does not necessarily rest with
those who strike first. It rests with those whose action has made
bloodshed inevitable.
A singular result of the course things took was that war broke out
before any legitimate _casus belli_ had arisen. Some one has observed
that whereas many wars have been waged to gain subjects, none was ever
waged before to get rid of subjects by making it easier for them to pass
under another allegiance. The franchise, however, did not constitute a
legitimate cause of war, for the British Government always admitted they
had no right to demand it. The real cause of war was the menacing
language of Britain, coupled with her preparations for war. These led
the Boers also to arm, and, as happened with the arming and
counter-arming of Prussia and Austria in 1866, when each expected an
attack from the other, war inevitably followed. To brandish the sword
before a cause for war has been shown not only impairs the prospect of a
peaceful settlement, but may give the world ground for believing that
war is intended.
By making the concession of the franchise the aim of their efforts, and
supporting it by demonstrations which drove their antagonist to arms,
the British Government placed themselves before the world in the
position of having caused a war without ever formulating a _casus
belli_, and thereby exposed their country to unfavourable comment from
other nations. The British negotiators were, it may be said, placed in a
dilemma by the distance which separated their army from South Africa,
and which obliged them to move troops earlier than they need otherwise
have done, even at the risk (which, however, they do not seem to have
fully grasped) of precipitating war. But this difficulty might have been
avoided in one of two ways. They might have pressed their suggestion for
an extension of the franchise in an amicable way, without threats and
without moving troops, and have thereby kept matters from coming to a
crisis. Or, on the other hand, if they thought that the doggedness of
the Transvaal would yield to nothing but threats, they might have
formulated demands, not for the franchise, but for the redress of
grievances, demands the refusal or evasion of which would constitute a
proper cause of war, and have, simultaneously with the presentation of
those demands, sent to South Africa a force sufficient at least for the
defence of their own territory. The course actually taken missed the
advantages of either of these courses. It brought on war before the
Colonies were in a due state of defence, and it failed to justify war by
showing any cause for it such as the usage of civilized States
recognizes.
As Cavour said that any one can govern with a state of siege, so strong
Powers dealing with weak ones are prone to think that any kind of
diplomacy will do. The British Government, confident in its strength,
seems to have overlooked not only the need for taking up a sound legal
position, but the importance of retaining the good will of the Colonial
Dutch, and of preventing the Orange Free State from taking sides with
the Transvaal. This was sure to happen if Britain was, or seemed to be,
the aggressor. Now the British Government by the attitude of menace it
adopted while discussing the franchise question, which furnished no
cause for war, by the importance it seemed to attach to the utterances
of the body calling itself the Uitlander Council in Johannesburg (a body
which was in the strongest opposition to the Transvaal authorities), as
well as by other methods scarcely consistent with diplomatic usage, led
both the Transvaal and the Free State to believe that they meant to
press matters to extremities, and that much more than the franchise or
the removal of certain grievances was involved; in fact, that the
independence of the Republic itself was at stake.[2]
They cannot have intended this, and indeed they expressly disclaimed
designs on the independence of the Transvaal. Nevertheless the Free
State, when it saw negotiations stopped after September 22nd, and an
overwhelming British force ordered to South Africa while the proposals
foreshadowed in the despatch of September 22nd remained undisclosed,
became convinced that Britain meant to crush the Transvaal. Being bound
by treaty to support the Transvaal if the latter was unjustly attacked,
and holding the conduct of Britain in refusing arbitration and resorting
to force without a _casus belli_ to constitute an unjust attack, the
Free State Volksraad and burghers, who had done their utmost to avert
war, unhesitatingly threw in their lot with the sister Republic. The act
was desperate, but it was chivalric. The Free State, hitherto happy,
prosperous and peaceful, had nothing to gain and everything to lose. Few
of her statesmen can have doubted that Britain must prevail and that
their Republic would share the ruin which awaited the Transvaal Dutch.
Nevertheless honour and the sense of kinship prevailed. It is to be
hoped that the excited language in which the passionate feelings of the
Free State have found expression will not prevent Englishmen from
recognizing in the conduct of this little community a heroic quality
which they would admire if they met it in the annals of ancient Greece.
It has been suggested that the question of responsibility for the war is
really a trivial one, because the negotiations were all along, on one
side or on both, unreal and delusive, masking the conviction of both
parties that they must come to blows at last. It is said that a conflict
for supremacy between the English and Dutch races in South Africa was
inevitable, and it is even alleged that there was a long-standing
conspiracy among the Dutch, as well in the Colonies as in the Republics,
to overmaster the British element and oust Britain from the country.
On this hypothesis several observations may be made.
One is that it seems to be an afterthought, intended to excuse the
failure of diplomacy to untie the knot. No one who studies the
despatches can think that either the Transvaal Government or the British
Government regarded war as inevitable when the one made, and the other
sent a reply intended to accept, the proposals of August 19th. Nothing
is easier than to bring charges of bad faith, but he who peruses these
despatches with an impartial mind will find little or nothing to justify
any such imputation on either party. Another is, that the allegation
that a calamity was inevitable is one so easy to make and so hard to
refute that it is constantly employed to close an embarrassing
discussion. You cannot argue with a fatalist, any more than with a
prophet. Nations whose conscience is clear, statesmen who have foresight
and insight, do not throw the blame for their failures upon Destiny. The
chieftain in Homer, whose folly has brought disaster, says, "It is not I
who am the cause of this: it is Zeus, and Fate, and the Fury that
walketh in darkness." "It could not have been helped anyhow," "It was
bound to come"--phrases such as these are the last refuge of despairing
incompetence.
The hypothesis that the Dutch all over South Africa were leagued for the
overthrow of British power is so startling that it needs to be supported
by wide and weighty evidence. Is such evidence forthcoming? It has not
been produced. One who has not been in South Africa since 1895 dare not
rely on his own observation to deny the allegation. But neither can
Englishmen at home accept the assertions of partisans in South Africa,
the extravagance of whose language shows that they have been carried
away by party passion.
The probabilities of the case are altogether against the hypothesis, and
support the view of a temperate writer in the _Edinburgh Review_ for
October, who describes it as "a nightmare." What are these
probabilities?
The Dutch in the Cape had been loyal till December 1895, and had indeed
been growing more and more loyal during the last fifteen years. The
Africander Bond had shaken itself free from the suspicions once
entertained of its designs. Its leader, Mr. Hofmeyr, was conspicuously
attached to the Imperial connection, and was, indeed, the author of a
well-known scheme for an Imperial Customs Union. Even after December,
1895, its indignation at the attack on the Transvaal had not affected
the veneration of the Dutch party for the British Crown, so warmly
expressed in 1897. In 1898 the Cape Assembly, in which there was a Dutch
majority led by a Ministry supported by the Bond, voted unanimously a
large annual contribution to Imperial naval defence. Every effort was
made by Mr. Hofmeyr and by the Prime Minister of the Cape to induce the
Transvaal to make concessions which might avert war. As regards the Free
State, its Dutch burghers had been for many years on the best terms with
their English fellow-burghers and with the British Government. They had
nothing to gain by a racial conflict, and their President, who is
understood to have suggested the Bloemfontein Conference, as well as Mr.
Fischer, one of their leading statesmen, strove hard to secure peace
till immediately before war broke out.
There was, moreover, no prospect of success for an effort to overthrow
the power of Britain. The Dutch in the Colony were not fighting men
like their Transvaal brethren, and were, except for voting purposes,
quite unorganized. Those of the Free State were a mere militia, with no
experience of war, and had possessed, at least down to 1895, when I
remember to have seen their tiny arsenal, very little in the way of war
munitions. The Transvaal Boers were no doubt well armed and good
fighters, but there were after all only some twenty or twenty-five
thousand of them, a handful to contend against the British Empire. The
Transvaal Government was, moreover, from its structure and the capacity
of the men who composed it, if not indisposed to indulge in day-dreams,
at any rate unfit to prosecute so vast an enterprise.
There seems therefore to be no foundation in any facts which have so far
been made public for the belief in this "conspiracy of the Dutch race,"
or for the inevitableness of the imagined conflict.
The truth would appear to be that the Transvaal people did at one time
cherish the hope of extending their Republic over the wide interior.
They were stopped on the west in 1884. They were stopped on the north in
1890. They were stopped in their effort to reach the sea in 1894. After
that year British territory surrounded them on all sides except where
they bordered the Portuguese on the north-east. Many of them, including
the President, doubtless cherished the hope of some time regaining a
complete independence such as that of the Free State. Some ardent
spirits dreamt of a Dutch South African Republic with Pretoria for its
future capital; and there were probably a few men of the same visionary
type in the Colony and the Free State who talked in the same wild way,
especially after the Jameson invasion had stirred Dutch feeling to its
depths. But from such dreams and such talk it is a long step to a
"conspiracy of the Dutch over all South Africa." The possibility that
the Dutch element would some day or other prevail, a possibility to
which the slowness of British immigration and the natural growth of the
Dutch population gave a certain substance in it down to 1885, was in
that year destroyed by the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand, which
brought a new host of English-speaking settlers into South Africa, and
assured the numerical and economic preponderance of the English in the
progressive and expanding regions of the country. It is also true that
the Transvaal Government made military preparations and imported arms on
a large scale. They expected a rising even before 1895; and after 1895
they also expected a fresh invasion. But there is not, so far as the
public know, any shred of evidence that they contemplated an attack upon
Britain. The needs of defence, a defence in which they doubtless counted
on the aid of the Free State and of a section of their own Uitlanders,
sufficiently explain the accumulation of warlike munitions on which so
much stress has been laid.
The conclusion to which an examination of the matter leads is that no
evidence whatever has been produced either that there was any such
conspiracy as alleged, or that a conflict between Dutch and English was
inevitable. Such a conflict might, no doubt, have possibly some day
arisen. But it is at least equally probable that it might have been
avoided. The Transvaal people were not likely to provoke it, and every
year made it less likely that they could do so with any chance of
success. The British element was increasing, not only around their
State, but within it. The prospect of support from a great European
Power had vanished. When their aged President retired from the scene,
their old dissensions, held in check only by the fear of Britain, would
have reappeared, and their vicious system of government would have
fallen to pieces. So far as Britain was concerned, the way to avert a
conflict was to have patience. Haste had been her bane in South Africa.
It was haste which annexed the Transvaal in 1877, when a few months'
delay might have given her the country. It was haste which in 1880
wrecked the plan of South African Confederation. It was haste which
brought about that main source of recent troubles, the invasion by the
South Africa Company's police in 1895.
In these reflections upon recent events nothing has been said, because
nothing could now be profitably said, upon two aspects of the
matter--the character and conduct of the persons chiefly concerned, and
the subterranean forces which are supposed to have been at work on both
sides. These must be left to some future historian, and they will form
an interesting chapter in his book. He will have proof positive of many
things which can now only be conjectured, and of some things which,
though they may be known to a few, ought not to be stated until proof of
them can be produced.
It is right, however, even while war is raging, to consider the
circumstances that have led to war, so far as these can be discussed
from the information which we all possess, because a fair consideration
of those circumstances ought to influence the view which Englishmen take
of their antagonists, and ought to affect their judgment of the measures
proper to be taken when war comes to its end, and arrangements have to
be made for the resettlement of the country. Those who have read the
historical chapters of this book, and have reflected on the history of
other British colonies, and particularly of Canada, will have drawn the
moral, which I have sought to enforce in the concluding chapter, that
what South Africa most needs is the reconcilement and ultimate fusion of
the two white races. Reconcilement and fusion have now, to all
appearances, been thrown back into a dim and distant future. That man
must be sanguine indeed who expects, as some persons say they do expect,
to see the relations of the two races placed on a better footing by a
bitter war between them, a war which has many of the incidents of a
civil war, and is waged on one side by citizen soldiers. To most
observers it seems more likely to sow a crop of dragon's teeth which
will produce a harvest, if not of armed men, yet of permanent hatred and
disaffection. Nevertheless, even at the darkest moment, men must work
with hope for the future, and strive to apply the principles of policy
which experience has approved. The first principle which governs the
relation of Britain to her self-governing colonies is that she must do
all she can to keep them contented and loyal. She cannot hope
permanently to retain any which have become disloyal, and the defection
of one may be the signal for the loosening of the tie which binds the
others. The gift of self-government practically makes the maintenance of
the Imperial connection dependent on the will of the colony; and where
self-government exists, voting is more powerful than arms. The Transvaal
Republic has been often troublesome, but an unfriendly neighbour is less
dangerous than a disaffected colony. A wise policy will therefore use
with moderation the opportunities which the conclusion of the present
war will afford for resettling the political arrangements of the
country, remembering that the Dutch and British races have got to live
together, looking forward to a time, probably less than a century
distant, when the exhaustion of mineral wealth will have made South
Africa again a pastoral and agricultural country, and thereby increased
the importance, relatively to the town-dwelling English, of that Dutch
element which is so deeply rooted in the soil. To reconcile the races by
employing all the natural and human forces which make for peace and
render the prosperity of each the prosperity of both, and so to pave the
way for the ultimate fusion of Dutchman and Englishman in a common
Imperial as well as a common Africander patriotism--this should be the
aim of every government that seeks to base the world-wide greatness of
Britain on the deepest and surest foundations.
_October 23rd, 1899._
[Footnote 1: Whatever may be thought as to the much controverted Edgar
case, the fact that such special stress has been laid on it, and that
few, if any, other cases have been instanced in which crimes against
Uitlanders went unpunished, goes to show that life was exposed only to
those dangers which threaten it in all new mining communities.]
[Footnote 2: The language of the English newspapers in Cape Colony, and
of some in London, did as much to strengthen this belief as the language
of the Transvaal papers did to inflame minds there. Seldom has the press
done more to destroy the prospects of peace.]
NOTE
I have to thank Sir Donald Currie and Messrs. A.S. and G.G. Brown for
the permission kindly given me to use the maps in the excellent "Guide
to South Africa" (published by the Castle Mail Packets Company) in the
preparation of the three maps contained in this volume; and I trust that
these maps will prove helpful to the reader, for a comprehension of the
physical geography of the country is essential to a comprehension of its
history.
The friends in South Africa to whom I am indebted for many of the facts
I have stated and views I have expressed are too numerous to mention:
but I cannot deny myself the pleasure of returning thanks for the genial
hospitality and unfailing kindness which I received in every part of the
country.
_September 13th, 1897._
MAPS AT END OF VOLUME
POLITICAL MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA.
OROGRAPHICAL MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA.
RAINFALL MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA.
CONTENTS
Page
PREFATORY CHAPTER vii
NOTE (1897) xlv
AREA AND POPULATION OF THE SEVERAL COLONIES, REPUBLICS AND TERRITORIES
IN SOUTH AFRICA lv
DATES OF SOME IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA lvii
INTRODUCTION lix
PART I
_NATURE_
CHAPTER I
PHYSICAL FEATURES
THE COAST STRIP AND THE GREAT PLATEAU 4
MOUNTAIN-RANGES 6
CLIMATE 8
THE ABSENCE OF RIVERS 9
CHAPTER II
HEALTH
TEMPERATURE 12
DRYNESS OF THE AIR 13
MALARIAL FEVERS 13
CHAPTER III
WILD ANIMALS AND THEIR FATE
ORIGINAL ABUNDANCE OF WILD CREATURES 17
THEIR EXTINCTION: THE LION, ELEPHANT, AND RHINOCEROS 18
RECENT ATTEMPTS AT PROTECTION 22
CHAPTER IV
VEGETATION
CHARACTER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FLORA 24
NATIVE AND IMPORTED TREES 26
CHANGES MADE BY MAN IN THE LANDSCAPE 32
CHAPTER V
PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF THE VARIOUS POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF THE COUNTRY
CAPE COLONY 33
NATAL 35
GERMAN AND PORTUGUESE AFRICA 36
THE ORANGE FREE STATE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC 38
BECHUANALAND AND THE TERRITORIES OF THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY 40
CHAPTER VI
NATURE AND HISTORY
INFLUENCE OF PHYSICAL CONDITIONS ON THE SAVAGE RACES 44
SLOW PROGRESS OF EARLY EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT 45
LATER EXPLORATIONS ALONG THE INTERIOR PLATEAU 47
CHAPTER VII
ASPECTS OF SCENERY
DRYNESS AND MONOTONY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LANDSCAPE 50
STRIKING PIECES OF SCENERY: BASUTOLAND, MANICALAND 51
PECULIAR CHARM OF SOUTH AFRICA: COLOUR AND SOLITUDE 53
INFLUENCE OF SCENERY ON CHARACTER 57
PART II
_HISTORY_
CHAPTER VIII
THE NATIVES: HOTTENTOTS, BUSHMEN, AND KAFIRS
THE ABORIGINES: BUSHMEN AND HOTTENTOTS 63
THE BANTU OR KAFIR TRIBES 67
CHAPTER IX
OUT OF THE DARKNESS--ZIMBABWYE
ANCIENT WALLS IN MATABILILAND AND MASHONALAND 70
DHLODHLO: CHIPADZI'S GRAVE 71
THE GREAT ZIMBABWYE 75
THEORIES AS TO THE BUILDERS OF THE ANCIENT WALLS 78
CHAPTER X
THE KAFIRS: HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONS
THE KAFIRS BEFORE THEIR STRUGGLES WITH THE EUROPEANS 83
CAREERS OF DINGISWAYO AND TSHAKA 84
RESULTS OF THE ZULU CONQUESTS 85
KAFIR INSTITUTIONS 87
WAR, RELIGION, SORCERY 89
STAGNATION AND CRUELTY OF PRIMITIVE KAFIR LIFE 93
CHAPTER XI
THE EUROPEANS IN SOUTH AFRICA TILL 1854
THE PORTUGUESE AT SOFALA 99
THE DUTCH AT THE CAPE: THE FRENCH HUGUENOTS 102
THE AFRICANDER TYPE OF LIFE AND CHARACTER 104
DISAFFECTION OF THE DUTCH SETTLERS 108
BRITISH OCCUPATION OF THE CAPE 109
FEATURES OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION 110
BOER DISCONTENT AND ITS CAUSES 112
THE GREAT TREK OF 1836 115
ADVENTURES OF THE EMIGRANT BOERS 117
THE BOERS AND THE BRITISH IN NATAL 119
THE BOERS IN THE INTERIOR: BEGINNINGS OF THE TWO DUTCH REPUBLICS 122
BRITISH ADVANCE: THE ORANGE RIVER SOVEREIGNTY 129
THE SAND RIVER CONVENTION OF 1852: INDEPENDENCE OF THE TRANSVAAL
BOERS 130
THE BLOEMFONTEIN CONVENTION OF 1854: INDEPENDENCE OF THE ORANGE FREE
STATE 132
CHAPTER XII
THE EUROPEANS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1854-95
PROGRESS OF CAPE COLONY: MATERIAL AND POLITICAL 134
GRANT OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN 1872 139
KAFIR WARS: CAUSES OF THEIR FREQUENT RECURRENCE 139
RENEWED BRITISH ADVANCE: BASUTOLAND 140
THE DELAGOA BAY ARBITRATION 146
FIRST SCHEME OF SOUTH AFRICAN CONFEDERATION 148
THE ZULU WAR OF 1879 149
FORMATION OF THE TRANSVAAL REPUBLIC 151
ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL 154
REVOLT OF THE TRANSVAAL: ITS INDEPENDENCE RESTORED 160
BOERS AND BRITISH IN BECHUANALAND 165
THE CONVENTIONS OF 1884 AND 1894: SWAZILAND 168
GERMAN OCCUPATION OF DAMARALAND 169
THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY; ACQUISITION OF MASHONALAND AND
MATABILILAND 170
RECENT HISTORY OF THE TRANSVAAL: THE RISING OF 1895 174
PART III
_A JOURNEY THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA_