ON THE APPLICATION OF LOGIC TO THE PROBLEM OF AN INTERNATIONAL
LANGUAGE
The problem of an international language has a theoretical as
well as a practical importance. I have no intention of discussing
the latter here and of explaining once more the necessity of an
auxiliary language for international relations of every sort, and
the practical possibility of making oneself understood by means
of an artificial language, a possibility which has been proved by
experience. But an international language is also, according to the
words of the celebrated philologist H. Schuchardt, a desideratum
of science, in which connection it raises at once problems of
philology and logic. That these problems are worthy of the study
of scientific men is proved by the discussions of Professors Diels
and Gomperz, the reports made to the Academy of Sciences of Leipzig
by Professors Brugmann and Leskien, and, finally, the labours and
decisions of the Committee of the _Délégation pour l'Adoption d'une
Langue Internationale_. The latter, composed of highly competent
scientists and linguists, has determined the principles necessary
for an auxiliary language, and has practically realised them.
My desire in what follows is to show briefly the connection of the
international language with logic, and its claims on the attention
and interest of philosophers. In the words of Leibnitz, "Languages
form the best mirror for the human spirit, and an exact analysis of
the meaning and relationship of words would be the best means of
disclosing the operations of the mind" (_N. Essais_, III., VII.,
end). But the majority of philosophers (with some distinguished
exceptions, _e.g._, Professor Wundt) and the majority of linguists
(also with some distinguished exceptions, _e.g._, M. Bréal) have
given little attention to the study of language from the point
of view of psychology and logic. Now this study is particularly
easy and interesting in the case of an artificial language, since
the latter presents a structure analogous to that of our existing
languages, but much simpler and more regular.
The words of the international language consist of invariable
elements (morphemes) of three sorts: stems, derivative affixes
(prefixes and suffixes), and grammatical inflections which, as in
the case of European languages, are always final letters or final
syllables. The stems themselves can be divided into two categories:
verb stems, which express a state, action, or relation, _e.g._,
_dorm_, _parol_, _frap_; and non-verbal or nominal stems, which
denote an object (living being or thing), or express an aspect of
it, _e.g._, _hom_, _dom_, _bel_, _blind_. The latter can produce
directly only names (substantives or adjectives): man, house,
beautiful, blind (in Ido, _homo_, _domo_, _bela_, _blinda_); the
former, on the contrary, produce directly verbs: to sleep, to
speak, to strike (in Ido, _dormar_, _parolar_, _frapar_), but
they can also give rise to nouns: sleep, word, blow (in Ido,
_dormo_, _parolo_, _frapo_). The proper _rôle_ of the grammatical
terminations is to determine the grammatical function of a stem
word and to indicate the category to which the word belongs,
whether verb, substantive, or adverb. Thus _parol-ar_ = to speak;
_parol-o_ = (spoken) word; _parol-a_ = oral; _parol-e_ = orally.
The _same_ idea, namely, that expressed by the stem word, always
runs through the various categories. This follows from a principle
which dominates the whole structure of the international language:
"Every word element" (morpheme) "represents an elementary idea,
which is always the same, so that a combination of elements has a
meaning determined by the combination of the corresponding ideas."
This principle is only a corollary to the general principle of
uniqueness so clearly enunciated by Ostwald: "There exists a
unique and reciprocal correspondence between the ideas and the
morphemes which express them." This principle represents evidently
the ideal of all language, for a language, being essentially a
system of symbols, is only theoretically perfect (and useful and
convenient in practice) when there exists a unique correspondence
between the symbol and the idea symbolised.
Now it follows from this principle that it is quite incorrect to
say, as is often done, "Being given a stem, it suffices to add
to it _-ar_ to form a verb, _-o_ to form a substantive, _-a_ to
form an adjective"; we require to define the sense possessed by
this verb, substantive, and adjective. In other words, to every
derivative of form there must correspond a derivative of sense
which is in no wise arbitrary, but determined by general rules.
If _dorm-ar_ = to sleep, _dorm-o_ cannot mean indifferently the
sleeper, the dormitory, or the desire to sleep; if _blind-a_ =
blind, _blind-o_ cannot signify at pleasure either blindness or the
act of blinding. The rule which must guide us here is the principle
enunciated above, namely, that a stem always preserves the same
sense and expresses the same idea; if one wishes to express another
idea related to the former in a definite way, it is necessary
to add to the stem a morpheme expressing this relationship. The
morphemes which denote the relations of our ideas are the affixes
of derivation, which permit us to express a whole family of ideas
by the aid and as the function of one fundamental idea, and to
form correspondingly a family of words all derived from the same
stem, as occurs, as a matter of fact, in natural languages. Certain
of these affixes are wrongly classed amongst the grammatical
inflections, such as, for example, the participial suffixes
which serve to derive an adjective or a substantive from a verb,
denoting him who performs the action, or is affected by (subject
to) the state or relationship expressed by the stem: _dorm-ant-a_
= _sleeping, arol-ant-a_ = _speaking_, whence, by simple change
of the final letter, _dorm-ant-o_ = _sleeper_, _parol-ant-o_
= _speaker_. One will perceive thereby the difference between
_direct_ derivation, which is effected by means of the grammatical
inflections, and _indirect_ derivation, which is effected by means
of the addition of affixes. There is nothing arbitrary about this
distinction, for it rests on the logical principles enunciated
above, which determine the theoretical and practical value of the
international language.
From these principles follow at once the rules of direct
derivation. If one starts from a verbal stem, what must be the
sense of the substantive directly derived from it? This sense can
be none other than the state or action expressed by the verb:
_dormar_ = _to sleep_, _dormo_ = _sleep_; _parolar_ = _to speak_,
_parolo_ = _a word_; _frapar_ = _to strike_, _frapo_ = _a blow_.
In these derived words we perceive the sense of the verb stem, and
the proof of that is that in our natural languages we often employ
the infinitive for this purpose: _le manger_, _le boire_, _le
dormir_, _le rire_; _das rennen_ (in English the verbal in _-ing_
is employed with the sense of the infinitive). Indeed, one might
completely identify the verbal substantive with the infinitive.
If one starts from a substantival stem, what must be the relation
between the adjective and substantive derived from it? They
must necessarily have the same sense, whichever of the two one
considers the primary word; if _avara_ = _avaricious_, _avaro_ =
_an avaricious person_; if _blinda_ = _blind_, _blindo_ = _a blind
person_. This rule is all the more necessary in practice as there
are a crowd of substantival stems concerning which one could not
say whether they produce at first a substantive or an adjective:
_vidva_ = _widowed_, _vidvo_ = _widower_; _nobela_ = _noble_,
_nobelo_ = _nobleman_; _santa_ = _holy_, _santo_ = _a saint_. This
is particularly true of the names of followers of this or that
doctrine: _katoliko_, _katolika_; _skeptiko_, _skeptika_, etc.
No one would think of using any suffix to derive one of these
words from the other. There is only a very slight difference of
meaning between a _katolika skeptiko_ and a _skeptika katoliko_,
the substantive indicating in each case the primary and fundamental
idea to which the other is superadded.
This brings us to the enunciation of the _principle of
reversibility_, which may be formulated as follows: "Every
derivation must be _reversible_; that is to say, if one passes from
one word to another of the same family in virtue of a certain rule,
one must be able to pass inversely from the second to the first in
virtue of a rule which is exactly the inverse of the preceding."
That is an evident corollary of the _principle of uniqueness_,
for otherwise one would be led to give two meanings to the same
word. Let us suppose, for example, that from the noun _krono_, =
_a crown_, one imagines it possible to derive directly (as is the
case in certain languages) the verb _kronar_ = _to crown_. From
this verb one could deduce inversely in virtue of the general rule
the substantive _krono_ = _coronation_, so that the same word
_krono_ would then mean both _crown_ and _coronation_. That would
be, however, a logical error inadmissible in the international
language, however numerous may be the examples of it which occur
in living languages. On the contrary, thanks to the principle of
reversibility, one can proceed from any word whatsoever of a family
and arrive at any other word of the same family, or return to the
initial word, in an absolutely unique manner, whereas if one did
not observe this principle one would inevitably obtain two meanings
for the same word.
The principle of reversibility fixes the rules of direct derivation
for the cases which are the converse of those we have studied.
Just as the substantive directly derived from a verb denotes the
state or action expressed by this verb (or, more strictly, by its
root), so a verb can be derived directly from a substantive only
if the latter expresses an action or a state. For example, _paco_
= _peace_; can one form the verb _pacar_, and if so what will be
its meaning? This verb can only signify one thing, _to be in the
state of peace_, and not _to pacify_ or _make peace_, for in that
case _paco_ would mean _pacification_ or _conclusion of peace_, and
not the _state of peace_. Similarly, if one can and must convert an
adjective into a noun by the simple substitution of _-o_ for _-a_,
the adjective immediately derived from a substantive can only mean
"what is --." If _homo_ = _a man_ (a human being), _homa_ can only
mean _human_ in the sense of _which is a man_ (human being); _homa
ento_ = _a human being_. But if one wishes to obtain an adjective
signifying "which belongs to --," "which relates to --," "which
depends on --," it is necessary to employ a suffix (_-al_): _homala
manuo_ = _a human hand_. One might equally well say _manuo di homo_
= _the hand of a man_ (human being). But just as the preposition
_di_ is indispensable for indicating the relationship between two
ideas which are not simply juxtaposed, but depend on each other,
so, if we wish to express one of the ideas in adjectival form, we
require a suffix which also expresses this relation or dependence.
Besides, a suffix of this nature exists under different forms
in all our languages: G. _-isch_; E. _-ic_, _-al_, _-ical_; F.
_-ique_, _-al_, _-el_; I. _-ico_; S. _-ico_. The choice of _-al_
rather than _-ik_ was determined by reasons of euphony and also
internationality, the derivative adjectives employed in science
(the most international of all) ending often in _-al_: _mental_,
_vocal_, _spatial_; _rationnel_, _universel_, _fonctionnel_, etc.
In this connection we shall make a general remark. The
international language borrows its _stems_ from the European
languages according to the principle of maximum internationality,
_i.e._, adopts for each idea the most international stem, namely,
that which is familiar to the greatest number of men. But it
cannot, and must not, borrow their derivatives from living
languages without losing all its theoretical and practical
advantages, because the natural derivatives are too irregular.
Sometimes the same affix has several different meanings; sometimes
the same relationship is expressed by different affixes. In virtue
of the principle of uniqueness, it is necessary to unify and
regularise the meaning and employment of the affixes, assigning
to each one a perfectly definite significance and function.
Undoubtedly one must endeavour to adopt for the affixes forms
which are international (as much as possible), or at least known
in some language (like the suffix _-in_ of the feminine, borrowed
from the German, _e.g._, _königin_, and the prefix _mal-_, denoting
"a contrary," borrowed from the French, _e.g._, _malheureux_), so
as to reproduce as much as possible international derivatives.
But it is chimerical to endeavour to reproduce them all, since
they are irregular and consequently incompatible with that
logical regularity of the language on which is based not only
its fertility, but also its simplicity in practical use and its
facility for _all nationalities_ (even for non-European peoples
who are not familiar with the anomalies and caprices of European
languages). The international language must be autonomous in its
formation of words; when the elements which it borrows from our
languages have been once chosen (in the best possible manner), it
must combine them freely according to its own rules, preserving
their form and sense rigorously invariable. It is by virtue of
this condition that it becomes a true language, richer in certain
respects than our own, since it can form all the useful derivatives
which are often wanting in one or the other, and not merely a
simple imitation or copy of our languages, which would be as
difficult as they, and which would require a previous knowledge of
them.
We shall not explain here all the forms of indirect derivation,
or enumerate the forty-seven affixes used for this purpose. We
shall quote only a few of them for the sake of example, in order
to show the application of the principles enunciated above. If
there is one suffix which is particularly useful to philosophers,
it is that which enables one to derive from an adjective the name
of the corresponding abstract quality; that is the Greek suffix
_-otet_ and the Latin suffix _-itat_ (_-itud_), whence have come
the French _-ité_, the English _-ity_, the Italian _-ita_, the
Spanish _-itad_; and the German suffix _-heit_ or _-keit_, etc.
We perceive here a logical relation well known and made use of
in all our languages. It must find a place in the international
language, but by what suffix ought it to be represented? Now, if
one analyses the idea involved in this suffix, one will find that
_beauty_, _health_, _blindness_, are simply the states or facts
of being beautiful, healthy, blind. The idea involved in this
suffix is then the idea of _being_, not the idea of existence, but
the idea _of being_ such and such, the idea of attribution which
is expressed by the copula _est_. It is natural, therefore, to
represent it by the Indo-European stem of the verb _to be_, namely,
_es_; _bel-es-o_ = _beauty_; _san-es-o_ = _health_; _blind-es-o_
= _blindness_. The fact that this suffix recalls a French suffix
(_richesse_), an Italian suffix (_bellezza_), and an English
suffix _-ness_ (_happiness_) employed in the same sense can only
serve as an accessory confirmation of the above choice, which
was dictated by logical motives. Moreover, this agrees perfectly
with our general rules; _to be well_ will be translated by _esar
sana_ or _san-esar_, and the fact of being well will be _saneso_ =
_health_. Conversely, if we start from _saneso_ = _health_, we can
form the verb _sanesar_ = _to be in (good) health_. Whatever may
be the point of departure, there is no fear of making a mistake or
"going off the rails" in forming these derivatives, if we observe
the principle of reversibility. It would, therefore, be not only
arbitrary, but absurd, to express _health_ by _sano_, which latter
can only mean a healthy being. For one must not imagine, as is
often stated, that an adjective expresses a quality; it expresses
precisely _he who, or that which, possesses the quality in
question_. That is why all our languages employ a suffix for the
purpose of deriving from an adjective the name of the corresponding
quality.
But our languages often require to express the inverse relation,
namely, that of the individual possessing a quality to that
quality. For just as there are names of qualities which are derived
from adjectives, as _beauté_, _gaieté_, _bellezza_, _tapferkeit_,
_gleichheit_, so there are others which are primary and from
which, therefore, the corresponding adjectives are derived:
_courage_, _courageux_; _joie_, _joyeux_; _beauty_, _beautiful_;
_glück_, _glücklich_; _freude_, _freudig_. And, as one sees, our
languages employ in these cases a series of analogous suffixes.
The international language must evidently imitate them, for it
cannot decree that all the names of qualities shall be derivative,
nor that they shall all be primary; that would amount to an
arbitrary uniformity contrary to the spirit of our languages and
probably also to our logical instincts. The international language
must, therefore, have a suffix which will serve to derive from
the name of a quality the name of the possessor of that quality.
That will be _-oz_, a Latin suffix (_formosus_, _generosus_,
etc.), occurring very frequently in the Romance and even Germanic
languages (_mysteriös_, _mysterious_, _mystérieux_, _misterioso_).
This suffix is the logical inverse of the preceding one (_-es_)
and is quite as indispensable as it. It is a curious fact that
our languages exhibit examples of the superposition of these two
suffixes considered in respect of their sense, if not their form:
_glück_, _glücklich_, _glücklichkeit_; _beauty_, _beautiful_,
_beautifulness_. Latin has derived _formosus_ from _forma_; Spanish
in its turn has derived _hermosura_ from _hermoso_, etc. Languages
also provide us with frequent examples of the reciprocity of these
suffixes.
On the one hand, On the other hand,
_gaie_ gives _gaieté_; _joie_ gives _joyeux_;
_gay_ " _gaiety_; _joy_ " _joyful_;
_allegro_ " _allegrezza_; _gioja_ " _giojoso_;
_fröhlich_ " _fröhlichkeit_; _freude_ " _freudig_.
The international language is, therefore, faithful not only to
logic, but to the spirit of our languages, in admitting at the
same time the two inverse derivations: _gaya_, _gayeso_; _joyo_,
_joyoza_. A language which contained the suffix -es, and not the
suffix _-oz_, would be lame or one-armed.
Besides, this lacuna would manifest itself very quickly in further
derivations, for the latter would violate the principle of
reversibility and therefore that of uniqueness. If from _joyo_ were
derived _joya_, from this adjective, analogous to _gaya_, one could
derive inversely _joyeso_ = _joyo_, thus producing two names for
the same quality (just as above _sano_ would have been synonymous
with _saneso_). If from _kurajo_ (_courage_) were derived _kuraja_
(_courageous_), one could derive from the latter _kurajeso_,
synonymous with _kurajo_. And, on the other hand, _kurajo_ being
the substantive of _kuraja_, this word would signify both _courage_
and _a courageous person_. From want of a single suffix the whole
series of derivations would become confused and illogical, just
as in a chain of reasoning a single error, or in an algebraical
calculation a single false equation, would lead to the most absurd
conclusions.
To sum up, one must take care not to derive a word directly from
another, except when they both express the same idea (apart from
the difference of their grammatical _rôle_ in the sentence).
Consequently, whenever the sense changes, a word element must be
added or disappear, in order to translate the modification of the
idea. It is by virtue of this condition that the language will
become the exact and faithful expression of our thoughts, and
will conform to that indwelling and instinctive logic which, in
spite of all sorts of irregularities and exceptions, animates our
languages. In its system of derivation as well as in the rest of
its structure, the international language is nothing but a purified
and idealised extract, a quintessence of the European languages.
The logic which holds sway there is not the Aristotelian logic of
genus and species, but rather that logic newly constituted under
the name of the _logic of relationships_, which is, however, as
old as the world, since it lies, though obscurely, at the basis
of the formative processes in our natural languages. That is the
reason why the international language offers to philosophers a
particularly instructive field of study. It is worthy of their
interest in other respects. Not only does it offer to them, as it
does to all men, a _medium of communication_ between all countries,
but it furnishes them also with an _instrument of precision_ for
the analysis and exact expression of the forms of thought, which is
very superior, from the point of view of logic, to our traditional
languages, encumbered as these are with confused and ambiguous
expressions. It is their duty to contribute to the development and
perfecting of a language which, without losing anything of its
practical qualities, can and must realise by degrees the ideal of
human language; if it is true that there _does_ exist an ideal
in our languages, though hidden and irremediably disfigured by
all sorts of anomalies. To quote a saying of Schuchardt, _Was die
Sprache gewollt haben die Sprachen zerstört_.[5]
L. COUTURAT.