There remains the need of preventing Chi_India and Tibet A history of the relations which have subsisted between the two countries from the time of Warren Hastings to 1910; with a particular account of the mission to Lhasa of 1904

in such a fashion as to cause disorder. Chinese influence in Tibet, as

long as it is neighbourly to us and not irritating to the Tibetans, we

have no cause to mind; it is, indeed, what for years we tried to believe

existed. So we never questioned China’s suzerainty over Tibet, and in

any dealings with the Tibetans their suzerainty always has been and

would be recognized. It is of many hundred years’ standing, and as long

as it is not used inimically to us, or in such a tactless way as to

cause disorder on our frontiers, we may be very well satisfied that it

exists. The Chinese are good neighbours, and in the sense of any

invasion of India by way of Tibet, we have no need to fear a Yellow

Peril. We have nothing to complain of, therefore, if the Chinese were

established as effective suzerains in Tibet, able to preserve order

there, and co-operating with us in a friendly manner. A reference to the

account of our negotiations at Lhasa will show that throughout I worked

with the Chinese Resident, and never directly with the Tibetans, to the

exclusion of the Chinese, and when I suspected an inclination of the

Tibetans thus to exclude them, I addressed both Chinese and Tibetans

together. Further, on leaving Lhasa I presented the Resident with the

eight or ten repeating-rifles I had among my articles for presentation,

and I gave no rifles to the Tibetans. My estimate of the situation was

that any influence we had should be exerted to sustain the authority and

position of the Resident. Our presence in Chumbi would give us the means

of exercising physical pressure more readily than the Chinese ever

could; the presence of the Chinese at Lhasa itself would enable them to

exert personal and moral pressure more readily than we could. By working

together we could keep the Tibetans in order. They are exceedingly

childish and foolish, besides being excessively obstinate in practical

affairs. And if we and the Chinese worked together, as the Amban and I

had done at Lhasa in 1904, we should, I thought, be able to preserve

harmonious relations between all three of us—Tibetans, Chinese, and

British alike.

But when Chinese action is such as to create unrest instead of

preserving order, when it upsets all the border people and necessitates

our assembling troops to keep the frontier steady, then we have a need

to intervene. And this has been the nature of Chinese action lately.

Except the Afghans, I have not known any people quite so tactless and

provocative as the Chinese in dealing with a subject race. Their

haughtiness and the hatred they inspired were remarked on a century ago

by Manning. Long years of slackness, indifference, and supercilious

disdain of the people, for whom no attempt is made to do anything, are

every now and then broken by some sudden and violent effort. Chao

Erh-feng’s methods have formed the subject of an impeachment by his own

countrymen, and apart from the question whether he used treachery or

beheaded prisoners, his regulations to the Tibetans of Batang to adopt

the queue and to wear trousers, the measures he ordered for the breaking

down of Lamaism, and his annexation of Derge, were all calculated to

rouse the whole Lamaist world. No one is more fully aware than myself

that the priestly power required to be broken, for it had become a curse

and drag to the people. What I doubt is whether the Chinese have gone

the right way about it. To me it seems they are more likely to have

roused rumblings among the Tibetans and Mongolians for many years to

come rather than have secured peace. Our own victories had reduced the

Tibetans of Tibet proper to order. The recalcitrant Dalai Lama had been

obliged to fly, and the Chinese were masters of the situation; and,

especially after we had withdrawn from Chumbi, they had nothing to fear

from us. That, even with these advantages, they should have pursued this

active policy in Tibet, driven the Dalai Lama from Lhasa, turned the

suzerainty into sovereignty, and practically transformed Tibet from a

native State into a Chinese province, indicates to me that they are

wanting in political sagacity, however much diplomatic acumen they may

possess, and that their action is much more likely to cause disorder

than order on our frontier.

The problem reduces itself to this, then—that we have to find some means

of preventing Chinese action causing disorder. Now, though I disagree

with our policy of the last few years, I recognize that it does now give

us a strong position. We have been most accommodating to the Chinese,

and especially in regard to the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley, when

the conditions under which they might claim evacuation had not been

fulfilled. If we erred, it was in the direction in which we always

should err—in the direction of conciliation and broad reasonableness. We

have, therefore, some ground to stand on. So standing, we have to work

back to the situation there was at Lhasa in 1904, when Yutai was

Resident, and before Tang and Chang and Chao ever appeared upon the

scene.

It is conceivable that this present burst of the Chinese will not last

long. It is expensive, and the Chinese cannot afford unnecessary

expenditure. What they want, we may conjecture, is, above everything, to

“save their face.” The Tibetans had been flouting them for years, and

the Chinese wanted to kick them. They now have kicked them, and their

faces are saved. What we have to do is to make them realize that to

proceed any farther will obviously bring them to unpleasant contact with

us. It might conceivably drive us into going to Lhasa again. We have

been there once, and could go there again. We ought, therefore, to be

able to make the Central Government see that their best chance of quiet

on their frontier—which is, after all, even more essential to them than

to us—is to send to Lhasa a Resident of the Yutai type rather than of

the Chang and Chao description. As long as the Chinese showed themselves

willing to co-operate with us, we have for a long series of years shown

ourselves ready to co-operate with them, and we are just as interested

in their faces being properly saved as they are. And if they would send

a Resident with the general hint to “get on” with us, there would be

quiet in Tibet without their dignity being interfered with. On our side,

to insure smooth working, we might send one or other of the officers on

the frontier to Peking or to Chengtu to talk matters over with our

representatives in China, find out where the shoe is pinching, and

acquire hints as to the methods of dealing with the Chinese to avoid

friction. Or a Consular officer from China might visit our trade-marts

and give the Indian Government suggestions. Anyhow, in these or similar

ways we might do what we can to remove any unnecessary local causes of

friction while we are pressing the Central Government for a more

conciliatory manner to be observed in the Chinese officials sent to

Tibet.

* * * * *

As regards the Tibetans, our difficulty will always be to keep up direct

relations with them without interfering with the legitimate and

desirable authority which the Chinese should always possess. The Chinese

forfeited their right to be the _sole_ medium of communication with the

Tibetans by their total inability to get them to withdraw from Sikkim in

1886, and to induce them to observe the Treaty which they asked us to

make with them on behalf of the Tibetans in 1890; and we acquired the

right to deal directly with the Tibetans by the expenditure we were put

to in 1888 and in 1904.

These direct relations, within the assigned limits, we should studiously

maintain. The touch and contact may be light, but it should never be

allowed to drop, for we have many instances of bad blood and

estrangement arising through dropping a people and letting them lapse

back into isolation once we have been forced into relationship with

them. The Tibetans want to preserve what they themselves call the right

of direct relations with us, and it is to our interest to preserve it.

How far the Tibetans are entitled to our support is a more delicate

question. We who fought against them would probably like to go farther

in this direction than those who have had no personal contact with them.

We had a square stand-up fight, and we made friends afterwards. We

should always, therefore, like to see a guiding and protecting hand

extended to them. And what especially rankles with us is that, when _we_

had knocked them over, and while they were still down, the Chinese

should have proceeded to kick them. While the Tibetans were strong the

Chinese did nothing. Even after they were down the Chinese did not touch

them while we were about; only after we had left Chumbi did the kicking

commence. And I do not myself see why we should have regarded the

process so placidly.

One thing, however, we can stand up for is that an effective Tibetan

Government should Still be maintained—a Government with whom we could,

when necessary, treat in the manner provided for in the Treaties with

the Tibetans and Chinese. This, on Lord Morley’s suggestion, was what

Sir Edward Grey pressed on the Chinese Government in February, 1910,

reminding them, at the same time, that the Lhasa Treaty made with the

Tibetans was confirmed by them, and that, in consequence, we had a right

to expect that the Tibetan Government should be maintained. The Chinese

Central Government have themselves assured us that they have no desire

to interfere with local autonomy in Tibet, and for the preservation of

order upon our frontier it is highly desirable that we should see that

these intentions are carried out. As I have admitted, the Tibetans do

require being kept in control up to a certain limit. They have been very

recalcitrant, and must expect to be brought to book. But when the

Chinese go beyond merely keeping order, when they drive the Dalai Lama

from his capital, depose him, seize his Government, garrison the whole

country, and direct the administration themselves, then they simply

cause a general discontent and uneasiness upon our frontier, and, from

the point of view of expediency alone, we are then justified in

intervening, as we intervened in Egypt when the Turks tried to increase

their degree of suzerainty beyond its normal limits.

As to the method of intervention, my own view is decidedly in favour of

sending a British officer to Lhasa itself. The Tibetans have actually

asked for this to be done, so there is no difficulty on that score, and

it is within the Chinese Empire, so the Chinese, if they wish to be

considered in any way a civilized Power, should have no objection on

their side. It is at Lhasa that a British officer could most effectively

explain to the Chinese the limits beyond which it is impossible for us

to countenance their proceeding, and it is there also that he could best

impress the Tibetans of the bounds within which alone we can have

relationship with them, or render them support. If such an officer could

find it feasible to visit Peking and London before proceeding to Lhasa,

he ought to be able to put Tibetan affairs upon a footing adapted to all

the interests concerned. And as to risk, if we keep an officer at

Gyantse we might as well send one to Lhasa.

Whether this is done or no we ought, in my view, to alter our whole

attitude to the Tibetan question. Instead of expecting to secure peace

by shrinking from having anything to do with the people, we should

rather put ourselves forward to acquire increased intimacy. We should

seek to secure quiet by the more effective and certain method of

deliberately making use of every means we have of keeping up and

increasing contact with the Tibetans. We have given the one line three

great trials, and it has failed. We have given the other line three

trials, and on each occasion it has succeeded. All the forbearance and

patience which we showed in countermanding the despatch of Macaulay’s

Mission, and in trusting to the consideration of the Chinese and

Tibetans, only led to the Sikkim campaign. Similar forbearance after

1888 merely led to the armed Mission of 1904. And the desire to have as

little as possible to do with Tibet since 1904 has, after all, resulted

in the reassembling of troops upon our frontier and protests to Peking.

I am not contending that no forbearance, moderation, and patience should

be shown. My own proceedings are good enough testimony of my belief in

the efficacy of these qualities. My contention is that there must be

moderation even in moderation, and forbearance even in forbearing, and

that the obstinate determination to have nothing, or as little as

possible, to do with Tibet has brought on exactly what we wanted to

avoid. On the other hand, when we have gone forward and made efforts to

get in touch with the Tibetans, to understand them and explain ourselves

to them, a more settled state has always resulted. After Bogle’s and

Turner’s Missions in the eighteenth century, and after the Mission of

1904, there was a perceptibly better feeling between us and the

Tibetans, all tending to that orderliness on our frontier which is what

we most desire. The closer contact and more intimate touch, besides

being the more humane method, diminishes rather than increases the risk

of trouble. As a case in point, I consider that if we had had a

representative at Lhasa this year, or even if our agent at Gyantse had

been able to proceed to Lhasa, the present trouble need not have arisen.

Knowing what British officers are by their personal influence able to

accomplish, I believe that if Major O’Connor, or Major Gurdon, or Major

Dew, or one or other of a dozen similar officers who are to be found in

India, had been at Lhasa last winter, he would have been able to nip

this trouble in the bud. And this not by giving the Tibetans out-and-out

support against their legitimate suzerain, but by telling them frankly

what the limits were beyond which it was quite impossible for them to

expect support from us, the Russians, or anyone else; and by similarly

impressing upon the Chinese that there is a point at which we should be

bound to protest if they attempted to go beyond it. He would have been

the friend of the Tibetans, and he would have been the friend of the

Chinese; and as friends of both he would have made them friends with one

another.

* * * * *

I am, then, for a forward policy in Tibet as elsewhere, though by

forward I do not mean an aggressive and meddlesome policy. I mean rather

one which looks forward into the future, and shows both foresight and

forethought—a policy which is active, mobile, adaptive, and initiative.

I imply a policy which recognizes that great civilized Powers cannot by

any possibility permanently ignore and disregard semi-civilized peoples

on their borders, but must inevitably establish, and in time regularize,

intercourse with them, and should therefore seize opportunities of

humanizing that intercourse, and, by promoting neighbourly association,

minimize that risk of war which isolation, aloofness, and estrangement,

invariably bring about. It is because we are islanders that we are such

inveterate upholders of isolation. But by so doing we are working

against the grain of the world, and must indubitably suffer in the

long-run.

If I might personify the spirit of such a forward policy, I would choose

the personality of the late King Edward. As he drew England out of her

“splendid isolation,” so, would I urge, should we be brought out of our

Indian isolation. And the means he employed in Europe are equally

applicable to Asia. At the bottom of all would be the same broad,

generous humanity, great-heartedness, and wealth of sympathy; there

would be the same tactful vigilance and the unceasing efforts to know

our neighbours and to give them opportunities of knowing us. There would

be the same staunch loyalty to friends, and, above all, there would be

that same courage and initiative which prompted King Edward, in his

first State visit to Paris, to go in among the French people, to dispel

the hostility which existed, and to win his way to their hearts by the

sheer grace of his personality.

This is the forward policy I would urge for Tibet, as for the frontier

generally—far-seeing initiative to control events, instead of the

passivity which lets events control us; the use of personality in place

of pen and paper; and the substitution of intimacy for isolation.

------------------

CHAPTER XXV

A FINAL REFLECTION

“That strange force which has so often driven the English forward

against their will appears to be in operation once more,” wrote the

_Spectator_ in May, 1904; “it is certain that neither the British

Government nor the British people wished to go to Lhasa.”

This reflection was criticized by other journals at the time as

savouring of hypocrisy. One paper said that no mention was made of the

Viceroy, and that it was obvious that “the advance was a perfectly

gratuitous move on the part of Lord Curzon.” Another leading London

paper attributed the whole movement to “the designs of the little group

of intriguing officials”; it said that “the raid was conceived and

engineered as a part of the forward policy which has always been the

peril of India and of the Empire,” and added that it had been “based

upon the most trivial and factitious excuses ever invented by designing

bureaucrats.”

This matter is worth going into. Bureaucrats, of whom presumably I was

one, are only too painfully aware that they have not a tithe of the

power which is attributed to them. They certainly have not the means of

making the whole British Government and British people act against their

will. I sometimes wish they had. To attribute to them such miraculous

power is as shallow as to believe that the Lamas exercise their hold

over Tibetans and Mongols only by trickery and chicanery. Bureaucrats

and priests must have something far more powerful behind them than

intrigues and trickery. The question is, What is it? What does impel us?

Is there really, as the _Spectator_ suggested, some strange force

driving us forward? and if so, whither is it driving us?

These questions are not applicable to the Tibetan affair alone, but to

the British Empire generally; and not only to the British Empire, but to

the Russian Empire, the Chinese Empire, the Japanese Empire; to the

French in Tongking and Annam, Algeria and Tunis; to the Americans in the

Philippines, the Germans in Asia Minor, the Austrians in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. They are of fundamental importance, and go to the very root

of things. They are therefore worth examination by so practical a people

as ourselves.

In all these cases where one country advanced into the territory of

another the forward movement has been attributed to the intrigues of

bureaucrats or the crafty designs of scheming politicians. If the

Germans advance to Paris, the action is attributed to the Machiavellian

designs of Bismarck; if the Austrians openly declare what is already the

accomplished fact of their sovereignty over Bosnia, Baron von Ahrenthal

is believed to have deliberately schemed some devilment; if the French

attempt to assert a predominance in Morocco, Delcassé is accused of

plotting against Germany; if the British laboriously straighten out the

affairs of Egypt, Lord Cromer is said to be designing to establish a

permanent occupation of the country; and if we advance to Lhasa, Lord

Curzon is accused of bureaucratic designs upon Tibet.

To take one very noteworthy case, the German invasion of France in 1870.

To this day the action is ascribed to the deliberate designs of Prince

Bismarck, and the story of his alteration of the Ems telegram is

regarded as a proof positive of his set design heartlessly to make war

on France. Yet quite recently there has appeared in the “Reminiscences

of Carl Schurz,” the American statesman, who was originally a German

subject and revolutionist of 1848, the account of a very remarkable

interview[65] he had with Bismarck _before_ the Franco-German War. In a

tone quite serious, grave, and almost solemn, Bismarck said to Schurz:

"Do not believe that I love war. I have seen enough of war to abhor it.

The terrible scenes I have witnessed harass my mind. I shall never

consent to a war which is avoidable, much less seek it. But this war

with France will surely come. It will be forced upon us by the French

Emperor." The Ems telegram was “edited,” but no mere editing of a

telegram by a bureaucrat could by itself have produced a war, much less

a victorious war. We read that when King William returned from Ems to

Berlin, he was quite stupefied by the outburst of popular enthusiasm

which greeted him from every side, and gradually came to see that it was

in truth a national war which the people needed and craved for. What

Bismarck did was simply to express and personify the feelings of the

people. And in a recent work by a French writer a letter by Napoleon

III. is mentioned, in which he admitted that the French Government had

been the aggressor in 1870.

So far as the British are concerned, it is an undeniable fact that we

have over and over again been forced forward against our deliberate wish

and intention. Our presence in India is the best possible example. There

could not by any means have been a deliberate intention on the part of

the inhabitants of an island in the North Sea to establish an Empire

over 200,000,000 people at the other end of the world, at a time when

they could only be reached by a six months’ voyage round the Cape, and

when the islanders were engaged in a life-and-death struggle with their

powerful neighbours across the Channel. “International considerations,”

the “wider purview,” the “interests of the Empire as a whole,” should in

all conscience have prevented the English from establishing their rule

in India. And yet, in spite of all these considerations, in spite of

peremptory orders from England, in spite of Governor after Governor

being sent out to stop any further aggressions, English rule did extend

over India. The British Government and the British people never

intended, never even wanted, to supplant the Moghul Emperors. They tried

their very best, from motives of clean, sheer self-interest, to leave

the Sikhs in the Punjab alone, just as they are now trying desperately

to leave the Afghans and frontier tribes alone. But yet they supplanted

the Moghuls at Delhi and annexed the Punjab.

It is absurd to put all this down to scheming bureaucrats. There must

have been something bigger than bureaucrats behind it all. And in the

case of Tibet, though the advance to Lhasa was undoubtedly due to a very

large extent to Lord Curzon’s strenuous advocacy, and without that would

not have taken place for some years later, yet it is a clear absurdity

to suppose that his words alone, or his words, supported only by the

opinion of Mr. White, myself, and a few other bureaucrats, would have

been able to prevail against the deliberate wish and intention of the

Cabinet in England, then faced by an opposition which the subsequent

General Election showed had the great bulk of public opinion behind it.

Lord Curzon is a man of great force and ability, and a most strenuous

advocate of any cause he takes up, but even he could not make a British

Cabinet reverse their opinion unless he had some strong compelling force

behind him.

Or, again, take the case of Lord Morley and Sir Edward Grey in this

matter of Tibet. No one could have desired less than they did to

intervene in Tibet. They had come into office supported by an enormous

majority in the country—a majority which had had the very question of

Tibet before them. They had to fear nothing from opposition in

Parliament or in the country. They had shown themselves most amenable

and compliant to Chinese wishes and Chinese methods. We had a right to

say that the Tibetans should pay the indemnity, but we forebore to press

this point, as the Chinese undertook to pay it on their behalf. We had a

right to occupy the Chumbi Valley till the trade-marts had been

effectively opened for three years. The trade-marts were not effectively

opened—our Agent reported, indeed, that they were effectively closed—but

again we did not want to press the point, and the Chumbi Valley, our

sole material guarantee for the observance of the Treaty, was evacuated.

We also engaged in a definite Treaty "not to annex Tibetan territory or

to interfere in the administration of Tibet." Even travellers such as

Sven Hedin we refused to allow across our border into Tibet. Everything

we could do to avoid interference and irritation we did. And every sign

of intriguing official had disappeared from India. Lord Curzon had left,

Mr. White and I had retired, Captain O’Connor was in Persia, and there

was a new Foreign Secretary. Yet just as many troops as accompanied the

Mission at the start were moved to the frontier ready to advance into

Tibet at any time. If men like Lord Morley and Sir Edward Grey so act,

may it not be inferred that bureaucrats also are carried along against

their will by some strange force?

To attribute these forward movements merely to the designs of

bureaucrats is, then, to take but a shallow view. Single men of great

force and ability and little knots of men can do a great deal, but to

accomplish anything big they must have a solid backing of some kind

behind them. They may, as it were, accentuate an impulse and carry it

forward a stage or two farther than without them it would have gone. But

unless they have this propulsion from behind they can accomplish

nothing. That great men are not only the creators, but the creatures, of

their time is now a truism. Born at any other period than the French

Revolution, Napoleon might have been no greater than Lord Roberts or

Lord Kitchener. Born in the Revolution, Cecil Rhodes might have been a

Napoleon.

The overwhelming probability is that there _is_ some strange force

working in the affairs of men, and when British Governments and the

British people are driven along against their will it is more reasonable

to attribute this phenomenon, not to the designs and intrigues of a few

officials, but to some inward compulsion from the very core of things.

The paragraph in the _Spectator_ must have been either written or

inspired by Mr. Meredith Townsend, then its co-editor and author of

“Asia and Europe,” a man who had lived in India, who had made a

life-long study of Asiatic politics, and who honestly did not like the

idea of advancing to Lhasa. When such a man wrote of the action of a

strange force the matter is worth close examination.

Intrinsically, there is nothing improbable or unnatural in the idea.

Individually, we all feel ourselves at times in the possession of some

unknown power. We are often carried along by an irresistible impulse in

spite of ourselves. Each of us must at some time or other in his life

have felt that within him which will not let him rest, but impels to

expression. Everyone must have experienced deep within him a great

source of power which ever and anon comes welling up in forceful

spiritual fountains. Some inner necessity compels us onward—longings,

dreams, aspirations, greater than can ever be satisfied coming surging

up from the inmost depths of our beings.

This internal force which probably most of us individually feel to be

within ourselves we also feel must be working in others around us. And

we have the further feeling that we are not each of us separate and

isolated geysers, but are connected together and impelled by some common

interior, hidden, urge and impulse. Each of us is a living centre of

action, but we all draw from some one original source and spring of

being. Deep in the heart of things, inherent in the very life itself, we

feel there is an indwelling eternal energy or vital impulse—the

“life-force” of Bernard Shaw; the “potent, felt, interior command” of

Whitman; the “élan vital” of Bergson; the “impulse from the distance of

our deepest, best existence” of Matthew Arnold; surging ever upward and

outward, and straining to express itself through our personalities.

To many of the deepest thinkers this is of all things the most real—to

some it is the only thing that is real. The solid mountains may be

merely an aspect or appearance of the true reality behind. But to many

this “great world-force, energizing through Nature”; this “creative and

urging principle of the world”; this unseen cosmic impulse; this

indwelling spirit pervading every human being, and ever striving to

unfold itself; this pulse and motive, “the fibre and the breath,” is the

one certainty, the one genuine reality.

We may, then, very safely assume that there actually is a strange force

driving us on. The highest intelligence affirms that it is so, and

intuition, a still higher guide, confirms the view. The practical

question is: What is the direction in which it is driving us?

It has been expressed in various ways—as harmony, as freedom, as the

union of all with all, as unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in

unity. The direction in which this impulse is believed to press is

towards fuller individualization and completer association. Each is

driven to express his own individuality more completely, but he equally

feels impelled to associate others more closely with him. There is a

tendency towards the balancing between individualization and

association, till the individuals become more and more free and perfect

individuals, but only as they become more and more closely united in

harmonious association. And, according to McTaggart, the closer the

unity of the whole, the greater will be the individuality of the parts,

and at the same time the more developed the individuality the closer the

unity; the impulse may be towards greater differentiation, but it is not

to separation or opposition, and our harmony with our fellow-beings will

always be more fundamentally real than our opposition to them. Towards

isolation, unsociability, or dissociation, there are no signs of the

impulse tending. It seems to be all in the opposite direction.

And perhaps it is here that we may find the true reason why, as the

_Spectator_ observed, we English have so often been driven forward

against our own will. It is when we have found ourselves in contact with

disorder or repugnance to association that we have been so often

compelled to intervene. We find by practical experience that the affairs

of the world will not work while there is disorder about. We find that

except on ocean islands there can in practice be no such thing as real

isolation. And experience proves to us in the everyday working of human

affairs that in one way or another order has to be preserved. It was the

existence of disorder that drew us into both India and Egypt, and it is

fear of disorder recurring if we leave that keeps us there. It was the

anticipation of disorder which Russian influence might cause which drew

us into Tibet in 1904. It is a similar anticipation of the disorder

which Chinese action may bring about that is causing even the pacific

Lord Morley to sanction the assembly of troops on the Tibet frontier in

1910. In none of these cases have we ever really _wanted_ to intervene.

We have intended, and we have publicly and solemnly declared our

intention, not to intervene, or, if we have to intervene, to withdraw

immediately. But yet the impulse comes. Somehow we have to intervene;

somehow we have to stay. And not only we find this, but other great

nations find the same. Practical statesmen find nothing so disturbing to

their wishes and intentions as contact with a weak, unorderly people.

They try for years to disregard their existence, but in the end, from

one cause or another, they find they have to intervene to establish

order and set up regular relations—they are, in fact, driven to

establish eventual harmony, even if it may be by the use of force at the

moment.

Yet all the time they feel that there is a delicate mean to be observed

in these matters. If they think only of order and nothing of

individualization they will find those among whom they are preserving

order impelled against them. This balancing of order and freedom, of

association and individualization, is always the difficult task. It is

our trouble now in India, though it may be parenthetically noted that in

isolated and secluded Tibet there is far less freedom for the individual

than in Bengal under our alien rule, and that there is less freedom in a

native State than in a British province in India, for we try in India as

in Egypt to give the individual all the play we can within the limits of

order.

* * * * *

That there is a strange force driving us on, and that it is impelling us

in the direction of freedom with union, or of the one through the other,

is, then, a reasonable assumption to make. And if this is so, we are not

merely drifting along on a mere tendency—we are being driven onward by a

forceful impulse. If, then, we find that the direction in which we are

thus being impelled is towards what is, in itself, obviously good and

desirable, should we not be wiser, instead of standing stubbornly

athwart the impulse, to throw our whole selves in with it, to immerse

ourselves in it, to let it permeate us through and through and to

utilize our intellects to give this general impetus practical, definite

effect?

Instead of fostering isolation, acquiescing in seclusion, and

encouraging unneighbourliness in Tibet, in Afghanistan, and all along

our frontier, would it not be better to work whole-heartedly with the

great World-Impulse towards more and more intimate union combined with

ever-increasing freedom? Independence, indeed, we may respect, but

surely not isolation. To individuality we may allow the fullest play,

but hardly to unsociality.

Further, recognizing that forceful impulses mean flux and movement, and

that therefore we can never expect finality, should we not place less

and less faith in settlements and treaties, and repose increasing trust

in personal contact, flexible and adaptable, ever ready for change in

details, but ever deepening and tightening the essential attachment of

man for man? It is through personalities that individuality is brought

out, association fostered, and harmony attained. It is through living

human beings that suspicions are dispelled, jealousies melted,

prejudices dissolved, and peoples united. The Tibet Treaty was good;

would not an agent at Lhasa have been better?

-----

Footnote 65:

“Reminiscences of Carl Schurz,” vol. iii., p. 272.

-----

------------------

APPENDIX

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RELATING

TO SIKKIM AND TIBET.

WHEREAS her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, are

sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of

friendship and good understanding which now exist between their

respective Empires; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a

disturbance of the said relations, and it is desirable to clearly define

and permanently settle certain matters connected with the boundary

between Sikkim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the

Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject

and have, for this purpose, named, Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, His Excellency the

Most Honourable Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, G.M.S.I.,

G.C.M.G., G.M.I.E., Marquess of Lansdowne, Viceroy and Governor-General

of India,

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, His Excellency Sheng Tai, Imperial

Associate Resident in Tibet, Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor.

Who having met and communicated to each other their full powers, and

finding these to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following

Convention in eight Articles:

ARTICLE I.—The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the

mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and

its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and

northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount

Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier and follows the above-mentioned

waterparting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.

II.—It is admitted that the British Government, whose protectorate over

the Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control

over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State,

and except through and with the permission of the British Government,

neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have

official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any other

country.

III.—The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of

China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article

I., and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the

frontier.

IV.—The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the

Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a

mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.

V.—The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is

reserved for further examination and future adjustment.

VI.—The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement

the method in which official communications between the British

authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.

VII.—Two Joint-Commissioners shall, within six months from the

ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British

Government in India, the Excellency Tong Shao-yi, His said Majesty’s

High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary, and a Vice-President of the Board

of Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, and

finding them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded

the following Convention in six Articles:

_Article I._—The Convention concluded on the 7th September, 1904, by

Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are

attached to the present Convention as an annex, is hereby confirmed,

subject to the modification stated in the Declaration appended thereto,

and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times

such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms

specified therein.

ARTICLE II.—The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan

territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government

of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to

interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

ARTICLE III.—The concessions which are mentioned in Article IX. (_d_) of

the Convention concluded on the 7th September, 1904, by Great Britain

and Tibet are denied to any State or to the subject of any State other

than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade-marts

specified in Article II. of the aforesaid Convention Great Britain shall

be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.

ARTICLE IV.—The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and

Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present

Convention and annex thereto, remain in full force.

ARTICLE V.—The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have

been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of

there being any difference of meaning between them the English text

shall be authoritative.

ARTICLE VI.—This Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both

countries, and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three

months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both

Powers.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, 1907.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland

and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His

Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire

to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the

interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to

conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding

between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to,

and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries,

to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland

and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the

Right Honourable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty’s Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the

Russias;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court

Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good

and due form, have agreed on the following:

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING TIBET.

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the suzerain

rights of China in Tibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain,

by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the

maintenance of the _status quo_ in the external relations of Tibet, have

made the following Arrangement:

Despatches from the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet to the Government

of India will be handed over by the Chinese frontier officer to the

Political Officer for Sikkim, who will forward them as quickly as

possible.

VIII.—Despatches between the Chinese and Indian officials must be

treated with due respect, and couriers will be assisted in passing to

and fro by the officers of each Government.

IX.—After the expiration of one year from the date of the opening of

Yatung, such Tibetans as continue to graze their cattle in Sikkim will

be subject to such Regulations as the British Government may from time

to time enact for the general conduct of grazing in Sikkim. Due notice

will be given of such Regulations.

GENERAL ARTICLES.

I.—In the event of disagreement between the Political Officer for Sikkim

and the Chinese frontier officer, each official shall report the matter

to his immediate superior, who in turn, if a settlement is not arrived

at between them, shall refer such matter to their respective Governments

for disposal.

II.—After the lapse of five years from the date on which these

Regulations shall come into force, and on six months’ notice given by

either party, these Regulations shall be subject to revision by

Commissioners appointed on both sides for this purpose, who shall be

empowered to decide on and adopt such amendments and extensions as

experience shall prove to be desirable.

III.—It having been stipulated that Joint Commissioners should be

appointed by the British and Chinese Governments under the 7th Article

of the Sikkim-Tibet Convention to meet and discuss, with a view to the

final settlement of the questions reserved under Articles 4, 5, and 6 of

the said Convention; and the Commissioners thus appointed having met and

discussed the questions referred to, namely: Trade, Communication and

Pasturage, have been further appointed to sign the agreement in nine

Regulations and three General Articles now arrived at, and to declare

that the said nine Regulations and the three General Articles form part

of the Convention itself.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND TIBET, SIGNED AT

LHASA ON THE 7TH SEPTEMBER, 1904.

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and

validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade

Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government

under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended

towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good

understanding which have existed between the British Government and the

Government of Tibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and

amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and

difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to

conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following articles

have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue

of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty’s Government and

on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den

Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three

monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and

lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of

Tibet.

I.—The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese

Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and

Tibet, as defined in Article I. of the said Convention, and to erect

boundary pillars accordingly.

II.—The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade-marts, to

which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access

at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade-mart at Yatung, under the

Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as

may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and

Tibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade-marts at the places mentioned, the

Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by

existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh

trade-marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires

it.

III.—The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is

reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government

undertakes to appoint fully authorized delegates to negotiate with

representatives of the British Government as to the details of the

amendments required.

IV.—The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other

than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.—The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyantse and

Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of

repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung,

Gyantse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade-marts that may

hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent, who shall receive from the

British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in

question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan

or to the Chinese authorities. The Tibetan Agent shall also be

responsible for the due delivery of such communications, and for the

transmission of replies.

VI.—As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred

in the despatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for

breaches of treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and

attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the

Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of pounds five hundred

thousand—equivalent to rupees seventy-five lakhs—to the British

Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government

may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Tibet or

in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five

annual instalments of rupees one lakh each on the 1st January in each

year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

VII.—As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and

for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade-marts specified

in Articles II., III., IV., and V., the British Government shall

continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid,

and until the trade-marts have been effectively opened for three years,

whichever date may be the later.

VIII.—The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications

and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free

communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and

Lhasa.

IX.—The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent

of the British Government,—

(_a_) No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold,

leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any

Foreign Power;

(_b_) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan

affairs;

(_c_) No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be

admitted to Tibet;

(_d_) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or

other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or to the

subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such

concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions

shall be granted to the British Government;

(_e_) No Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be

pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of

any Foreign Power.

X.—In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed

thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa this 7th day of September in the year of

our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the

Tibetan date, the 27th day of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon year.

DECLARATION SIGNED BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF

INDIA, AND APPENDED TO THE RATIFIED CONVENTION OF 7TH SEPTEMBER, 1904.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, having

ratified the Convention which was concluded at Lhasa on 7th September,

1904, by Colonel Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet

Frontier Matters, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty’s Government; and

by Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of

the Council, of the three monasteries Sera, Dre-pung and Ga-den, and of

the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly, on behalf

of the Government of Tibet, is pleased to direct as an act of grace that

the sum of money which the Tibetan Government have bound themselves

under the terms of Article VI. of the said Convention to pay to His

Majesty’s Government as an indemnity for the expenses incurred by the

latter in connection with the despatch of armed forces to Lhasa, be

reduced from Rs. 75,00,000 to Rs. 25,00,000; and to declare that the

British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall cease after the due

payment of three annual instalments of the said indemnity as fixed by

the said Article, provided, however, that the trade-marts as stipulated

in Article II. of the Convention shall have been effectively opened for

three years as provided in Article VI. of the Convention; and that, in

the meantime, the Tibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms

of the said Convention in all other respects.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA, DATED

27TH APRIL, 1906. (RECEIVED IN LONDON, 18TH JUNE, 1906.)

(_Ratifications exchanged at London, July 23, 1906._)

Whereas His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the

British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the

Emperor of China are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the

relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between

their respective Empires;

And whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognize the validity of or to

carry into full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of

the 17th March, 1890, and Regulations of the 5th December, 1893, place

the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure

their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regulations;

And whereas a Convention of ten Articles was signed at Lhasa on the 7th

September, 1904, on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified

by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on behalf of Great Britain

on the 11th November, 1904, a Declaration on behalf of Great Britain

modifying its terms under certain conditions being appended thereto;

His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved

to conclude a Convention on this subject, and have for this purpose

named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, Sir Ernest Mason

Satow, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order, St. Michael

and St. George, His said Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China; and His Majesty the

Emperor of China; His Excellency Tong Shao-yi, His said Majesty’s High

Commissioner and Plenipotentiary, and a Vice-President of the Board of

Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, and

finding them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded

the following Convention in six Articles:

ARTICLE I.—The Convention concluded on the 7th September, 1904, by Great

Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are