"Having been informed that, notwithstanding what has been ordained

by us, as well by sea as by land, particularly for the kingdom of

Granada, for the purpose of insuring the defence and security of our

kingdoms, the Turks, Moors, and corsairs have already committed, and

still commit, in the ports of this kingdom, on the coasts, in maritime

places, and those bordering on the sea, robberies, misdeeds, injuries,

and seizures of Christians; evils which are notorious, and which, it

is said, have been, and are, committed with ease and security, by

favor of the intercourse and understanding which the ravishers have

had, and still have, with some of the inhabitants of the country, who

give them intelligence, guide them, receive them, hide them, and lend

them favor and assistance; some of them even going away with the Moors

and Turks, leading away and carrying with them their wives, their

children, their goods, Christian captives, and the things which they

were able to ravish from the Christians; while other inhabitants of the

same kingdom, who have participated in these projects, or have been

acquainted with them, remain in the country, without having been or

being punished; for it appears that measures are not executed with due

severity, nor as completely, or with as much care as they ought to be:

as, moreover, it seems very difficult to get accurate information, as

it appears that even the justices and the judges, to whom it belongs to

make inquiries and to punish, have displayed remissness and negligence

in their employment;--this having been agitated and discussed in our

Council, with the view of providing, as is proper in a thing of such

great importance, for the service of God our Master, for our own and

the public good; the thing having been consulted upon by us, it has

been agreed that we ought to publish this present letter," &c.

Years passed away; the hatred between the two nations still endured; in

spite of the numerous checks which the Mahometan race had received, the

Christians were not satisfied. It was very probable that a nation who

had suffered, and might still suffer, such great humiliations, would

attempt to avenge them. It is also by no means difficult to believe in

the reality of the conspiracies which were charged against the Moors.

However this may be, the report of these conspiracies was general, and

the government was seriously alarmed by them. Those who desire a proof

of this, may read what Philip III. said, in 1609, in the law which

expelled the Moriscoes.

"Book viii. chap. 2, of the new _Recopilacion_.

"Law XXV. By virtue of which the Moriscoes were banished from the

kingdom: causes of this expulsion--means which were adopted for the

execution of the measure.

"D. Philip III., Madrid, 9 December, 1609.

"For a long time it has been endeavored to save the Moriscoes in these

kingdoms: the holy office of the Inquisition has inflicted divers

punishments; numerous edicts of mercy have been granted; neither means

nor diligence have been spared to instruct them in our holy faith,

without being able to obtain the desired result, for none of them have

been converted. On the contrary, their obstinacy has increased; the

peril which threatens our kingdoms, if we keep the Moriscoes, has been

represented to us by persons very well informed and full of the fear of

God, who, thinking it proper that a prompt remedy should be applied to

this evil, have represented to us that the delay might be charged upon

our royal conscience, considering the grave offences which our Lord

receives from that people. We have been assured that we might, without

scruple, punish them in their lives and properties, since they were

convicted by their continued offences of being heretics, apostates,

and traitors of _lèse-majesté_ divine and human. Although it would

have been allowable to proceed against them with the rigor which their

offences deserve, nevertheless, desiring to bring them back by means of

mildness and mercy, I ordained, in the city and kingdom of Valencia,

an assembly of the patriarchs, and other prelates and wise men, in

order to ascertain what could be resolved upon and settled; but having

learned that, at the very time they were engaged in remedying the

evil, the Moriscoes of the said kingdom of Valencia, and of our other

domains, continued to urge forward their pernicious projects; knowing,

moreover, from correct and certain intelligence, that they had sent to

treat at Constantinople with the Turks, and at Morocco with the king,

Muley Fidon, in order that there might be sent into the kingdom of

Spain the greatest number of forces possible to aid and assist them;

being sure that there would be found in our kingdom more than 150,000

men, as good Moors as those from the coasts of Barbary, all ready to

assist them with their lives and fortunes, whereby they were persuaded

of the facility of the enterprise; knowing that the same treaties have

been attempted with heretics and other princes our enemies: considering

all that we have just said, and to fulfill the obligation which we are

under of preserving and maintaining the holy Roman Catholic faith in

our kingdoms, as well as the security, peace, and repose of the said

kingdoms, with the counsel and advice of learned men, and others, very

zealous for the service of God and for our own, we ordain that all the

Moriscoes, inhabitants of these kingdoms, men, women, and children, of

all conditions," &c.

I have said that the Popes labored, from the commencement, to soften

the rigors of the Spanish Inquisition, sometimes by admonishing the

kings and inquisitors, sometimes by giving the accused and condemned a

right of appeal. The kings feared that the religious innovations would

produce a public disturbance; I add, that their policy embarrassed

the Popes, and prevented them from carrying as far as they would have

wished their measures of mildness and indulgence. Among the other

documents which support this assertion, I will cite one which proves

the irritation of the Spanish kings at the assistance which the accused

found at Rome.

"Book viii. chap. 3, law 2, of the new _Recopilacion_, enjoining

persons condemned by the Inquisition, and absent from these kingdoms,

not to return there under pain of death and losing their goods.

"D. Ferdinand and D. Isabella, at Saragossa, 2d August, 1498. Pragmatic

Sanction.

"Some persons condemned as heretics by the Inquisition have absented

themselves from our kingdoms, and have gone to other countries,

where, by means of false reports and undue formalities, they have

surreptitiously obtained exemptions, absolutions, mandates, securities,

and other privileges, in order to be exempt from the condemnations and

punishments which they had incurred, and to remain in their errors,

which, nevertheless, does not prevent their attempting to return to

these kingdoms, wherefore, wishing to extirpate so great an evil, we

command these condemned persons not to be so bold as to return. Let

them not return into our kingdoms and lordships, by any way, in any

manner, for any cause or reason whatsoever, under pain of death and

the loss of their goods; which punishment we will and ordain to be

incurred by the act itself. One-third of the property shall be for the

persons who shall have denounced, another for the courts, and the third

for our exchequer. Whenever the said justices, in their own places

and jurisdiction, shall know that any of the said persons are in any

part of their jurisdiction, we order all and each of them, without

exception, to go to the place where such persons are, without being

otherwise called upon, to apprehend them forcibly and immediately,

and without delay to execute, and cause to be executed, on them and

their properties the punishments which we have appointed; and this

notwithstanding all exemption, reconciliation, securities, and other

privileges which they may have, these privileges, in the present case,

and with respect to the said penalties, not availing them. We order

them to do and accomplish this under pain of the loss and confiscation

of all their property. The same penalty shall be incurred by all other

persons who shall have hidden or received the said condemned persons,

and who knowing that they were so, shall not have given information

to our courts. We order all great men and councillors, and other

persons of our kingdoms, to give favor and assistance to our courts,

whenever it shall be demanded and required from them, to accomplish and

execute what has been said above, under the penalties which the courts

themselves shall appoint on this subject."

We see from this document, that, after the year 1498, things had

reached such a point, that the kings attempted to maintain against

every one all the rigor of the Inquisition, and that they were offended

that the Popes interfered to soften it. It will be understood thereby

whence proceeded the harshness with which the guilty were treated; and

this shows us one of the causes which made the Inquisition sometimes

use its power with excessive severity. Although it was not a mere

instrument of the policy of kings, as some have said, the Inquisition

felt more or less the influence of that policy; and we know that

policy, when about to defeat an adversary, does not commonly display an

excess of compassion. If the Spanish Inquisition had been at that time

under the exclusive authority and direction of the Popes, it would have

been infinitely milder and more moderate in its method of acting.

At that time the object ardently desired by the kings of Spain was, to

obtain that the judgments of the Inquisition should be definitive in

Spain, without appeal to Rome; Queen Isabella had expressly demanded

this of the Pope. The Sovereign Pontiffs would not accede to these

solicitations, no doubt fearing the abuse which might be made of so

fearful an arm when the restraint of the moderating power should become

wanting.

It will be understood from the facts which I have just quoted, how much

reason I had to say that, if you excuse the conduct of Ferdinand and

Isabella with respect to the Inquisition, you must not condemn that

of Philip II., since the Catholic sovereigns showed themselves still

more harsh and severe than the latter monarch. I have already pointed

out the reason why the conduct of Philip II. has been so rigorously

condemned; but it is also necessary to show why there has been a sort

of obstinacy in excusing that of Ferdinand and Isabella.

When it is wished to falsify an historical fact by calumniating a

person or an institution, it is necessary to begin with an affectation

of impartiality and good faith; great success is obtained in this

by manifesting indulgence for the same thing which it is desired

to condemn, but taking care that this indulgence has strongly the

appearance of being a concession gratuitously made to our adversaries,

or of a sacrifice of our opinions, of our feelings, on the altars

of reason and justice, which are our guide and our idol. We thus

predispose our hearers or readers to regard the condemnation which

we are about to pronounce as a judgment dictated by the strictest

justice; a judgment in which neither passion, nor partiality, nor

perverse views, have any part. How can we doubt the good faith, the

love of truth, the impartiality of the man who begins by excusing what,

according to all appearances, and considering his opinions, ought to

be the object of his anathemas? Such is the situation of the men of

whom we speak. They intended to attack the Inquisition; now it happened

that the protectress, and, in some sort, the foundress of that tribunal

was Queen Isabella,--that distinguished name which Spaniards have

always pronounced with respect, that immortal queen, one of the noblest

ornaments of our history. What was to be done in this difficulty? The

means were simple. Although the Jews and heretics had been treated

with the greatest severity in the time of the Catholic sovereigns, and

although they had carried severity further than all those who have

succeeded them, it was necessary to close the eye to these facts, to

excuse the conduct of these sovereigns, and to point out the important

matters which urged them to employ the rigors of justice. They thus

avoided the difficulty,--for it was one to cast a stigma on the memory

of a great queen cherished and respected by all Spaniards,--and they

thus prepared the way for merciless accusations against Philip II. That

monarch had the unanimous cry of all Protestants against him, for the

simple reason that he had been their most powerful adversary; it would

therefore cost nothing to make all the weight of execration fall upon

him. The enigma is thus explained. Such is the cause of a partiality so

unjust,--such is the hypocrisy of that opinion which, while excusing

the Catholic sovereigns, condemns Philip II. without appeal.

I have not attempted to justify the policy of this monarch in all

respects; but I have presented a few considerations which may serve to

mitigate the violent attacks made upon him by his adversaries: it only

remains for me to transcribe here the documents to which I alluded when

I said that the Inquisition was not a mere instrument of the policy of

Philip II., and that this prince did not intend to establish a system

of _obscurantisme_ in Spain.

Don Antonio Perez, in his _Relations_, gives a letter of the confessor

of the king, Fray Diego de Chaves, in which letter the latter affirms

that the secular prince has power over the lives of his subjects and

vassals, and adds in a note: "I shall not undertake to relate all that

I have heard said on the subject of the condemnation of some of these

propositions; this is not within my province. Those who are concerned

in this will at once understand the import of my words. I shall

content myself with saying that, at the time when I was at Madrid, the

Inquisition condemned the following proposition: a preacher--it matters

not that I should mention his name--maintained in a sermon, at St.

Jerome's, in Madrid, in presence of the Catholic king, _that kings have

an absolute power over the persons of their subjects, as well as over

their properties_. Besides some other separate matters, the preacher

was condemned to retract this publicly, in the same place, with all

the ceremonies of a juridical act, which he did in the same pulpit,

saying that he had advanced such a proposition on such a day, and that

he retracted it as erroneous. 'For, messieurs,' said he, reading

literally from a paper, '_kings have no other power over their subjects

than what is given them by the divine and human law; they have none

proceeding from their own free and absolute will_.' I even know who

condemned the proposition, and appointed the words which the accused,

to the great gratification of the former, was obliged to pronounce;

indeed, he rejoiced to see torn up so poisonous a weed, which he felt

was increasing, as the event proved. Master Fray Hernando del Castillo

(I will mention his name) was the one who prescribed what the accused

was to say; he was consultee of the holy office, and preacher to the

king; he was a man of singular learning and eloquence, very well known

and esteemed by his own nation, and especially by the Italians. Dr.

Velasco, an important personage of that time, said of him, that the

guitar in the hands of Fabricio Dentici was not so sweet as the tongue

of Master Fray Hernandez del Castillo to the ears of those who heard

him." And at page 47 in the text: "I know," says Don Antonio Perez,

"that they were denominated very scandalous by persons very important

by their rank, their learning, and their Christian purity of heart;

there was one among them who had held supreme rank in the spiritual

order in Spain, and had previously filled an office in the tribunal

of the Inquisition." Perez afterwards says, that this person was the

nuncio of his Holiness. (_Relaciones de Anton. Perez._ Paris, 1624.)

The letter of Philip II. to Doctor D. Benito Arias Montano contains the

following, in addition to the remarkable passage which we have quoted.

"Concerning what you, Dr. &c., my chaplain, will have to do at Antwerp,

whither we send you. Dated at Madrid, 25th March, 1568.

"Besides that you will render this good office and service to the said

Plantinus, know that, from this time, in proportion as the six thousand

crowns are recovered from his hands, I apply them to buy books for the

monastery of St. Laurent-le-Royal, of the order of St. Jerome, which

I am building near the Escurial, as you know. Thus you are admonished

that such is my intention; you will comply with this, and will be

diligent in collecting all the choice books, printed and MS., that your

excellent discernment shall think proper, in order to bring them and

place them in the library of the said monastery. Indeed, it is one of

the chief possessions which I would wish to leave to the religious who

are intended to dwell there, for it is the most useful and necessary.

Wherefore I have also commanded my ambassador in France, D. Francis

de Alaba, to collect the best books which he shall be able in that

kingdom: you will communicate with him on that subject. I will direct

him to communicate in writing also with you, to send you a list of the

books which are to be had, as well as their price, before buying them;

you will advise him as to which he had better take or leave, and what

he may give for such. He will send to you at Antwerp those which he has

thus bought; you will acknowledge them, and forward them here, all at

once, at the proper time."

During the reign of Philip II.,--of that prince who is represented

to us as one of the principal authors of _obscurantisme_,--choice

works, both printed and MS., were sought in foreign countries, in order

to enrich the Spanish libraries; in our age, which we call that of

enlightenment, the libraries of Spain have been plundered, and their

treasures have gone to add to those of foreigners. Who is ignorant

of the collections which have been made of our books and MS., in

England? Consult the catalogues of the British Museum and other private

libraries. The author of these lines states only what he has seen with

his own eyes--what he has heard lamented by persons worthy of respect.

While we show so much negligence in preserving our treasures, let us

not be so unjust and so puerile as to lose our time in vain declamation

against those who have bequeathed them to us.

APPENDIX.

_A few words on Puigblanch, Villeneuve, and Llorente._

Here, in the Spanish edition, the notes relating to the Inquisition

terminate; but I think it may not be useless in the French edition

to add a few words, to explain the matter to my foreign readers:

little versed as they are in the knowledge of our affairs, they might

often happen to drink at corrupted sources, which they imagine to be

pure and salutary. Le Compte de Maistre, with respect to the Spanish

Inquisition, cites _L'Inquisition dévoilée de Natanaël Jomtob_: I will

say a few words, lest the authority of the author who quotes should

give too much importance to him who is quoted. This Natanaël Jomtob

is no other than Dr. D. Antonio Puigblanch, a Spaniard, who died not

long ago in London. This author, in the prologue to his works published

in London, himself explains the reason which made him adopt a strange

name. "These Hebrew words," he says, "are two proper significative

names, which, together, form the inscription, _Dedit Deus diem bonum_.

I wished thus to express the happiness of being able to speak and write

freely against the tribunal of the Inquisition, and the happiness of

seeing it abolished." (_Prolog._ p. cxv.)

In order that the reader may judge of the value that belongs to this

work, I will observe, that the first qualification in an historian,

especially on a matter so delicate, is complete impartiality united

to a great fund of moderation: these two qualifications were wanting

in M. Puigblanch, who was lamentably infected with the contrary

faults. It is impossible to be more violent than he is against all

that he meets with; his ill-humor and anger blind him; he attacks

institutions and men with perfect fury; he respects nothing: add

to this a pitiable vanity. It would be easy for me to produce here

various proofs of the impiety of Puigblanch; but I should fear to soil

my paper by transcribing the impious satires of this man. This is

enough to give an idea of the point of view in which he could regard

things relating to religious affairs and to the clergy. He misses no

opportunity of ridiculing the ministers of religion, of indulging in

invectives against them, and of giving vent to the incomprehensible

rage which he has against them. The unbecoming manner in which he

treats his adversaries, real or imaginary, even when they have more

or less sympathy with his opinions, is a good apology for the things

which he combats on the other hand. I cannot repeat his words here, so

coarse are they; besides, they attack persons who are still living;

suffice it to say, that not content with insulting them in the most

disgusting way, Puigblanch descends so low as to reproach them with

their physical defects, after the manner of a market-woman. What was

to be hoped from such a mind in a matter so important and delicate?

Were such dispositions suitable for an historian of the Inquisition,

who published his work precisely in the year 1811, that is to say,

at a time of reaction and effervescence? With respect to talent and

knowledge, I will not refuse to M. Puigblanch either reading or

erudition, or a certain aptitude for criticism, yet it must not be

forgotten that his mind was far from being so cultivated as it ought

to have been, in order to keep pace with our age. A work like his

required that he should have followed the march of the times, that he

should not have been altogether devoid of the philosophy of history,

that he should not have relied exclusively upon certain books, while

accumulating crude erudition, and incessantly perusing etymologies and

grammatical questions: this is what was wanting in M. Puigblanch. To

sum up all in one sentence, I have found the following description,

which I heard in London, from the mouth of a distinguished man who had

intercourse with Puigblanch for a long time, to be perfectly correct:

"Puigblanch," he told me, "knew what a learned man of the seventeenth

century in Spain might have known." The Christian reader may imagine

what was the result of the amalgamation of this kind of instruction

with all the bile of Voltairian passion.

D. Joaquin Lorenzo Villanueva is another of those Spaniards who have

distinguished themselves by declaiming against the Inquisition; in

his Literary Life (_Vida Literaria_) he had asserted that the public

information on this question, and the abolition of that famous

tribunal, were in great part owing to him. Puigblanch strongly

recriminates against Villanueva, who attempted to usurp his glory

by availing himself of his work without acknowledging it, and other

similar things, which do as little honor to the one as to the other.

Villanueva has been already judged in Spain by all sensible men;

foreigners who desire to understand this question will be under the

unpleasant obligation of reading the two large volumes in 8vo, in

which he has written his literary life. The bile of Villanueva against

all the clergy who are not of his coterie, and, above all, his hatred

against Rome, show themselves at every page of his book, and from time

to time produce explosions which are much too violent to accord with

the extreme mildness which he is pleased to affect. Moreover, let the

reader prepare and arm himself with patience, if he undertake to get

through these two large volumes, which contain, written by the man

himself, who so well deserved it, the most complete panegyric of his

profound knowledge, his vast erudition, his great humility, and his

virtues of all kinds. It certainly would have been very well, if the

author, with a slight recollection of modesty, had not candidly told

us, that they went so far as to call him the _father of the poor_,

that his poetic fire was not cooled by age, that his activity in labor

did not allow him to remain idle, even in the midst of the greatest

persecutions; in fine, if he had not undertaken to make us believe

that all his life was a continual sacrifice on the altars of knowledge

and virtue. To those who desire to derive their information from

Villanueva, we have a right to say: Do not forget that you must beware

of believing all--that the tree is known by its fruits--that the wolf

often assumes sheep's clothing.

Among those who have made the most noise with respect to the

Inquisition, is Llorente, the author of a history of that famous

institution. The impartiality which may be expected from this writer

shows itself every moment in his book, which has evidently been written

for the purpose of blackening, as much as possible, the Catholic clergy

and the Holy See. Happily the author has made himself too well known

by his other works, for any Catholic to allow himself to be deceived

by his insidious writings. No one, especially in Spain, is ignorant

of the project of the religious constitution with which Llorente

attempted to disturb consciences, and introduce schism and heresy into

our country. Does he who attempts to destroy the universal discipline

established from the earliest ages, who expresses doubts on the most

sacred mysteries of our holy religion, who contests the infallible

authority of the Church, and does not hold the first four Œcumenical

Councils to be legitimate, deserve the least credit when writing

the history of the Inquisition,--that history which affords so many

opportunities of declaiming against the clergy and against Rome? Here

is a proof of his impartiality. In his history of the Inquisition, he

could not avoid relating the conduct of the Apostolic See in the early

times of the Inquisition in Spain, and the efforts made by the Holy See

for the purpose of softening the rigors of that tribunal, the appeals

which were made, and the merciful judgments which were almost always

obtained at Rome; all these facts clearly showed that Rome, far from

being, as he pretended, a monster of cruelty, was rather a model of

mildness and prudence. How do you think he gets out of this difficulty?

By saying, that what the Court of Rome wanted was, to extort money from

us. An explanation as unworthy as it is impudent--an odious means of

depriving the most beneficent and generous actions of their lustre, and

which shows a fixed design to find evil every where, even to the extent

of assigning evil motives for benefits which are the most worthy of

gratitude.

With respect to Llorente, I am unwilling to pass over in silence a

remarkable fact which he has had the kindness to communicate to the

public in the same work. King Joseph, the intruder, intrusted Llorente,

by express orders, with the archives of the Supreme Council and the

Tribunal of the Inquisition of the capital. This excellent man was so

perfect an archivist, that he burnt all the reports of proceedings,

with the approbation of his master (as he himself tells us), with the

exception of those which could appertain to history, by the celebrity

or the renown of the persons who figured in them, such as those of

Caranza, of Macanaz, and a few others; although he preserved entire,

he adds, the registers of the decisions of the Council, the royal

ordinances, and the bulls and briefs from Rome. (Edition Française,

1818, t. 4, p. 145.) After having heard this remarkable confession, we

will ask every impartial man, whether there is not room for greatly

mistrusting an historian who claims to be sole and _unique_, because he

has had the opportunity of consulting the original documents whereon

he founds his history, and who, nevertheless, burns and destroys these

same documents? Was there no place to be found in Madrid to place them,

where they could be examined by those who, after Llorente, might wish

to write the history of the Inquisition from the original documents?

Llorente has preserved, he tells us, those which belonged to history;

but the history of the Inquisition had equally need of others, even the

most obscure--even the most apparently insignificant; for it not seldom

happens that a fact, a circumstance, a word, shows us an institution,

and paints for us an age. And observe, that this destruction took

place at a critical moment of public disturbance, when the whole

nation, devoted to an immortal struggle in defence of her independence,

could not fix her attention on such matters. The most remarkable

men, scattered on all sides, then led their fellow-citizens in arms,

or were engaged in the most important interests of the country;

consequently they could not watch over the conduct of an archivist,

who, after having left his brethren, whose blood was flowing upon the

battle-field, accepted employment under a foreign intruder, and burned

the documents of an institution whereof he undertook to write the

history.

NOTE 27, p. 281.

The plan of my work required that questions relating to the religious

communities should be examined at some length but it did not allow me

to give to this matter all the development of which it is susceptible.

Indeed, it would be possible, in my opinion, in writing the history of

religious communities, to give side by side that of the nations among

whom these communities arose, so as to show in detail a truth we have

now proved, viz. that the establishment of religious institutions,

besides the superior and divine object which they have had in view,

has been at all times the fulfilment of a social and religious

necessity. Although my strength does not enable me to aspire to such

an enterprise, by which the courage may well be daunted, even by

contemplating the immense extent of such a work, I wish to suggest the

idea of it here; perhaps a man may be found with sufficient capacity,

learning, and leisure, to undertake it, and enrich our age with this

new monument of history and philosophy. By conceiving the plan in this

point of view, and making it subordinate to this unity of object,

whereof the foundation, which shows itself in well-known facts, is

discovered in obscure and conjectured in hidden ones, there would be no

difficulty in giving all desirable variety to this work. The subject

itself leads to variety; for it invites the writer to descend to

extremely interesting particulars, which will be like the episodes of

a grand and unique poem. The disposition of men's minds, now become

favorable to religious institutions, thanks to the deceptions which are

the consequence of vain theories, and to the lessons of experience,

which destroy the calumnies invented by philosophy, render the road

every day more easy. The path is already sufficiently beaten; it is

only required to enlarge and extend it, in order to conduct a greater

number of men towards the region of truth.

Having pointed out this, it only remains for me to state here, in

conclusion, divers facts which could not be given in the text, and

which I have preferred to collect in a note. As these facts belonged to

the same subject, it appeared to me proper to collect them apart, while

leaving the reader to pay full attention to the observations which form

the body of my work.

There were known among the pagans, under the name of ascetics, persons

who devoted themselves to abstinence and the practice of the austere

virtues; so that, even before Christianity, there already existed the

idea of those virtues which have been since exercised in Christianity.

The lives of the philosophers are full of examples which prove the

truth of my assertion. Yet it will be understood that, deprived of the

light of faith and the aid of grace, the pagan philosophers afforded

but a very faint shadow of what was afterwards realized in the lives

of the Christian ascetics. We have stated that the monastic life is

founded on the Gospel, inasmuch as the Gospel contains asceticism. From

the foundation of the Church we see the monastic life established under

one form or another. Origen tells us of certain men, who, in order to

reduce their bodies into subjection, abstained from eating meat and

from all that had life. (Origen, _Contr. Celsum_, lib. v.) Tertullian

makes mention of some Christians who abstained from marriage, not

because they condemned it, but in order to gain the kingdom of heaven.

(Tertul. _De Cult. Femin._ lib. ii.)

It is remarkable, that the weaker sex participated in a singular manner

in that strength of mind which Christianity communicated for the

exercise of the heroic virtues. In the early ages of the Church there

were already reckoned, in great numbers, virgins and widows consecrated

to the Lord, bound by a vow of perpetual chastity; and we see that

special care was taken in the ancient Councils of the Church of that

chosen portion of her flock. It is one of the objects of the solicitude

of the Fathers to regulate discipline on this point in a proper manner.

The virgins made their public profession in the church; they received

the veil from the hands of the bishop, and, for greater solemnity, they

were distinguished by a kind of consecration. This ceremony required a

certain age in the person who was consecrated to God; we also observe

that discipline has been very different on this point. In the East

they received persons seventeen years old, and even sixteen, as we

learn from St. Basil (_Epist._ can. 18); in Africa at twenty-five,

as we see from the fourth canon of the third Council of Carthage; in

France at forty, as appears from the nineteenth canon of the Council

of Agde. Even when the virgins and widows dwelt in the houses of

their fathers, they did not cease to be reckoned among ecclesiastical

persons; they received the support of the Church by this title, in

cases of necessity. If they violated their vow of chastity, they were

excommunicated, and could not return to the communion of the faithful,

except by submitting to public penance. (For these details, see the

thirty-third canon of the third Council of Carthage, the nineteenth

canon of the Council of Ancyra, and the sixteenth canon of that of

Chalcedon.)

In the first three centuries, the state of the Church, subject to an

almost continual persecution, must naturally have hindered persons who

loved the ascetic life, men or women, from assembling in the towns to

observe it in common. Some think that the propagation of the ascetic

life in the desert is in great part due to the persecution of Decius,

which was very cruel in Egypt, and made a great number of Christians

retire into the deserts of the Thebais, or other solitudes in the

neighbourhood. Thus commenced the establishment of that method of life

which, in the end, was to gain so prodigious an extension. St. Paul, if

we are to believe St. Jerome, was the founder of the solitary life.

It appears that some abuses were introduced into the monastic life from

the earliest ages, as we see certain monks detested at Rome in the time

of Jerome. _Quousque genus detestabile monacorum urbe non pellitur_,

says the saint by the mouth of the Romans in a letter to Paula; but

the reputation of the monks, which had perhaps been compromised by the

Sarabaïtes and the Gyrovagues, a kind of vagabonds whose last care

was the practice of the virtues of their state, and who indulged in

gluttony and other pleasures with shameful licentiousness, was soon

restored. St. Athanasius, St. Jerome himself, St. Martin, and other

celebrated men, among whom St. Bennet distinguished himself in a

particular manner, renewed the splendor of the monastic life by the

most eloquent apology, that which consisted in giving, as they did, the

most sublime example of the most austere virtues.

It is remarkable that, in spite of the multiplication of monks in

the east and west, they were not divided into different orders, so

that, during the first six centuries, all, as Mabillon observes,

were considered as forming one institute. There was something noble

in this unity, which, as it were, formed all the monasteries into

one family; but it must be acknowledged that the diversity of orders

afterwards introduced was essentially calculated to attain the various

and numerous objects which successively attracted the attention of

religious institutions.

The discipline, by virtue whereof no new order could be instituted

without the previous approbation of the sovereign Pontiff, it may be

said, was very necessary, considering the ardor which afterwards urged

many persons to establish new institutions; so that, without this

prudent check, disorder would have been introduced in consequence of

the exaggerated transports which urged some imaginations to exceed all

bounds.

Some people take delight in relating the excesses into which some

individuals of the mendicant orders fell; and they borrow the

narratives of Matthew Paris, without forgetting the lamentations of

St. Bonaventura himself. I wish not to excuse evil, wherever it is

found; but I will observe, that the circumstances of the times when

the mendicant orders were established, and the kind of life they were

obliged to embrace, in order to fulfill the purpose for which they were

intended, as I have pointed out in the text, rendered almost inevitable

those evils which pious men sincerely deplored, and which the enemies

of the Church lament with no less affectation than exaggeration.

NOTE 28, p. 305.

I have already shown, by numerous testimonies of scholastic

theologians, how the divine origin of the civil power is to be

understood; and it is evident that it contains nothing but what is

perfectly conformable to sound reason, and adapted, at the same

time, to the high aims of society. It would have been easy for me to

accumulate testimonies; but I think I have adduced a sufficient number

to throw light on the subject, and to satisfy every reader who, free

from unjust prejudices, is sincerely desirous of listening to truth. In

order, however, to view this subject under every aspect, I will add a

few explanations on that celebrated passage of St. Paul to the Romans,

chap. xiii., in which the Apostle speaks of the origin of powers, and

of the submission and obedience due to them. Let it not be thought,

however, that I purpose attaining this end by any reasoning more or

less specious. Whenever a passage of Scripture is to be expounded in

its true sense, we should not rely principally upon what our wavering

reason suggests to us, but rather upon the interpretation of the

Catholic Church; for this reason we should consult those writers whose

high authority, founded on their wisdom and their virtue, leads us to

hope that they have not deviated from the maxim, _Quod semper, quod

ubique, quod ab omnibus traditum est_.

We have already seen a remarkable passage of St. John Chrysostom,

explaining this point with as much clearness as solidity; we have

also learned, from the testimony of the Fathers, what motives induced

the Apostles to inculcate so pressingly the obligation of obedience

to the lawful authorities. It only remains for us to insert here the

commentaries of some illustrious writers on the text of the Apostle. In

them we shall find, as it were, a code of doctrine; and when we come to

appreciate the reasons on which the precepts inculcated in the sacred

text are founded, we shall more easily discover their true meaning.

Observe, in the first place, with what wisdom, prudence, and piety this

important subject is expounded by a writer who was not of the golden

era, but, on the contrary, who lived in what is generally termed the

barbarous age--St. Anselm. In his commentaries on the 13th chapter of

the Epistle to the Romans, this doctor thus expresses himself:

"_Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. Non est enim

potestas nisi a Deo. Quæ autem sunt, a Deo ordinatæ sunt. Itaque qui

resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit. Qui autem resistunt, ipsi

sibi damnationem acquirunt._

"Sicut superius reprehendit illos, qui gloriabantur de meritis, ita

nunc ingreditur illos redarguere, qui postquam erant ad fidem conversi

nolebant subjici alicui potestati. Videbatur enim quod infideles, Dei

fidelibus non deberent dominari, etsi fideles deberent esse pares. Quam

superbiam removet, dicens: _Omnis anima_, id est, _omnis_ homo, _sit_

humiliter _subdita potestatibus_ vel secularibus, vel ecclesiasticis,

sublimioribus se: hoc est, omnis homo sit subjectus superpositis sibi

potestatibus. A parte enim majore significat totum hominem, sicut

rursum a parte inferiore totus homo significatur ubi Propheta dicit:

_Quia videbit omnis caro salutare Dei_. Et recte admonet, ne quis ex

eo quod in libertatem vocatus est, factusque Christianus, extollatur

in superbiam, et non arbitretur in hujus vitæ itinere servandum esse

ordinem suum, et _potestatibus_, quibus pro tempore rerum temporalium

gubernatio tradita est, non se putet esse subdendum. Cum enim constemus

ex anima et corpore, et quamdiu in hac vita temporali sumus, etiam

rebus temporalibus ad subsidium ejusdem vitæ utamur, oportet nos ex

ea parte, quæ ad hanc vitam pertinet, subditos esse _potestatibus_,

id est, res humanas cum aliquo honore administrantibus: ex illa vero

parte, qua Deo credimus, et in regnum ejus vocamur, non debemus

subditi esse cuiquam homini, id ipsum in nobis evertere cupienti,

quod Deus ad vitam æternam donare dignatus est. Si quis ergo putat

quoniam Christianus est, non sibi esse vectigal reddendum, sive

tributum, aut non esse honorem exhibendum debitum eis quæ hæc curant

_potestatibus_, in magno errore versatur. Item si quis sic se putat

esse subdendum, ut etiam in suam fidem habere potestatem arbitretur

eum, qui temporalibus administrandis aliqua sublimitate præcellit, in

majorem errorem labitur. Sed modus iste servandus est, quem Dominus

ipse præcipit, ut reddamus _Cæsari quæ sunt Cesaris, et Deo quæ sunt

Dei_. Quamvis enim ad illud regnum vocati simus, ubi nulla erit

potestas hujusmodi, in hoc tamen itinere conditionem nostram pro ipso

rerum humanarum ordine debemus tolerare, nihil simulate facientes,

et in hoc non tam hominibus, quam Deo, qui hoc jubet, obtemperantes.

Itaque _omnis anima sit subdita sublimioribus potestatibus_, id est,

omnis homo sit subditus primum divinæ potestati, deinde mundanæ. Nam si

mundana potestas jusserit quod non debes facere, contemne potestatem,

timendo sublimiorem potestatem. Ipsos humanarum rerum gradus adverte.

Si aliquid jusserit procurator, nonne faciendum est? Tamen si contra

proconsulem jubeat, non utique contemnis potestatem, sed eligis majore

servire. Non hinc debet minor irasci, si major prælata est. Rursus si

aliquid proconsul jubeat, et aliud imperator, numquid dubitatur, illo

contempto huic esse serviendum. Ergo si aliud imperator, et aliud Deus

jubeat, quid faciemus? Numquid non Deus imperatori est præferendus?

Ita ergo _sublimioribus potestatibus anima_ subjiciatur, id est, homo.

Sive idcirco ponitur _anima_ pro homine, qui secundum hanc discernit,

cui subdi debeat, et cui non. Vel homo, qui promotione virtutem

sublimatus est, _anima_ vocatur a digniore parte. Vel, non solum

corpus sit subditum, sed _anima_, id est, voluntas: hoc est, non solum

corpore, sed et voluntate serviatis. Ideo debetis subjici, quia _non

est potestas nisi a Deo_. Numquam enim posset fieri nisi operatione

solius Dei, ut tot homines uni servirent, quem considerant unius

secum esse fragilitatis et naturæ. Sed quia Deus subditis inspirat

timorem et obediendi voluntatem, contigit ita. Nec valet quisquam

aliquid posse, _nisi_ divinitus ei _datum_ fuerit. _Potestas_ omnis

_est a Deo_. Sed ea _quæ sunt, a Deo ordinatæ sunt_. Ergo potestas est

ordinata, id est, rationabiliter a Deo disposita. _Itaque qui resistit

potestati_, nolens tributa dare, honorem deferre, et his similia, _Dei

ordinationi resistit_, qui hoc ordinavit, ut talibus subjiciamur. _Hoc

enim contra illos dicitur, qui se putabant ita debere uti libertate

Christiana, ut nulli vel honorem deferrent, vel tributa redderent._

Unde magnum poterat adversus _Christianam religionem scandalum nasci

a principibus seculi_. De bona potestate patet, quod eam perfecit

Deus rationabiliter. De mala quoque videri potest, dum et boni per

eam purgantur, et mali damnantur, et ipsa deterius præcipitatur.

_Qui potestati resistit_, cum Deus eam ordinaverit, _Dei ordinationi

resistit_. Sed hoc tam grave peccatum est, _quod qui resistunt, ipsi_

pro contumacia et perversitate _sibi damnationem_ æternæ mortis

acquirunt. Et ideo non debet quis resistere, sed subjici."

This remarkable passage contains all--the origin of power, its object,

its duties, and its limits. We must observe, that St. Anselm expressly

confirms what I have hinted in the text on the subject of the wrong

meaning sometimes given in the first centuries to Christian liberty;

many imagining that this liberty carried with it the abolition of the

civil powers, and particularly of those which were infidel. He also

shows the scandal which this doctrine might cause; thus explaining how

the Apostles, without attempting to attribute to the civil power any

extraordinary and supernatural origin, like that of the ecclesiastical

power, had nevertheless powerful reasons for inculcating that this

power emanates from God, and that whoever resists it, resists the

ordinance of God.

Passing on to centuries nearer our own time, we find the same doctrines

in the most eminent commentators. Cornelius a Lapide interprets the

passage of St. Paul in the same way as St. Anselm, and explains, by

the same reasons, the solicitude with which the Apostles recommended

obedience to the civil powers. These are his words:

"_Omnis anima_ (omnis homo) _potestatibus sublimioribus_, id est

principibus et magistratibus, qui potestate regendi et imperandi

sunt præditi; ponitur enim abstractum pro concreto; _potestatibus_,

hoc est potestate præditis, _subdita sit_, scilicet iis in rebus,

in quibus potestas illa sublimior et superior est, habetque jus et

jurisdictionem, puta in temporalibus, subdita sit regi et potestati

civili, quod propie hic intendit Apostolus: per potestatem enim,

civilem intelligit; in spiritualibus vero subdita sit Prælatis,

Episcopis et Pontifici.

"Nota.--Pro _potestatibus sublimioribus_, _potestatibus_

supereminentibus vel _præcellentibus_, ut, Noster vertit, 1 Pet. ii.,

_sive regi quasi præcellenti_, Syrus vertit, _potestatibus dignitate

præditis_: id est magistratibus secularibus, qui potestate regendi

præditi sunt, sive duces, sive gubernatores, sive consules, prætores,

&c.

"Seculares enim magistratus hic intelligere Apostolum patet, quia his

solvuntur tributa et vectigalia quæ hisce potestatibus solvi jubet ipse

v. 7, ita Sanctus Basilius de _Constit. Monast._ c. 23.

"Nota.--Ex Clemente Alexand. lib. iv. _Stromatum_, et S. Aug. in Psal.

cxviii. cont. 31, _Initio Ecclesiæ, puta tempore Christi et Pauli,

rumor erat, per Evangelium politias humanas, regna et respublicas

seculares everti_; uti jam fit ab hæreticis prætendentibus libertatem

Evangelii: unde contrarium docent, et studiose inculcant Christus,

cum solvit didrachma, et cum jussit Cæsari reddi ea quæ Cæsaris sunt;

et Apostoli: idque ne in odium traheretur Christiana religio, et ne

Christiani abuterentur libertate fidei ad omnem malitiam.

"Ortus est his rumor ex secta Judæ et Galilæorum de qua Actor. 5, in

fine, qui pro libertate sua tuenda omne dominium Cæsaris et vectigal,

etiam morte proposita abnuebant, de quo Josephus, libr. xviii.

_Antiqu._ 1. Quæ secta diu inter Judæos viguit; adeoque Christus et

Apostoli in ejus suspicionem vocati sunt, quia origine erant Galilæi,

et rerum novarum præcones. Hos Galilæos secuti sunt Judæi omnes, et

de facto Romanis rebellarunt: quod dicerent populum Dei liberum non

debere subjici et servire infidelibus Romanis; ideoque a Tito excisi

sunt. Hinc etiam eadem calumnia in Christianos, qui origine erant et

habebantur Judæi, derivata est: unde Apostoli, ut eam amoliantur, sæpe

docent principibus dandum esse honorem et tributum.

"Quare octo argumentis probat his Apostolus principibus et

magistratibus deberi obedientiam....

"His rationibus probat Apostolus Evangelium, et Christianismum, regna

et magistratus non evertere, sed firmare et stabilire: quia nil

regna et principes ita confirmat, ac subditorum bona, Christiana et

sancta vita. Adeo, ut etiam nunc principes Japones et Indi Gentiles

ament Christianos, et suis copiam faciant baptismi et Christianismi

suscipiendi, quia subditos Christianos, magis quam Ethnicos, faciles

et obsequentes, regnaque sua per eos magis firmari, pacari et florere

experiuntur."

With regard to the mode in which civil power proceeds from God, the

celebrated commentator agrees with the other theologians. Like them, he

distinguishes between direct and indirect communication, and takes care

to define the particular meaning of the term, _divine origin_ of power,

when applied to ecclesiastical authority.

In his explanation of these words, _all power is from God_, he thus

expresses himself:

"_Non est enim potestas, nisi a Deo_; quasi diceret principatus et

magistratus non a diabolo, nec a solo homine, sed a Deo ejusque divina

ordinatione et dispositione conditi et instituti sunt: eis ergo

obediendum est.

"Nota primo.--_Potestas sæcularis est a Deo mediate; quia natura et

recta ratio, quæ a Deo est, dicat, et hominibus persuasit præficere

reipublicæ magistratus, a quibus regantur. Potestas vero ecclesiastica

immediate est a Deo instituta; quia Christus ipse Petrum et Apostolos

Ecclesiæ præfecit._"

The celebrated Dom Calmet explains the same passage with no less

learning; he quotes numerous passages from the holy Fathers, showing

what ideas the first Christians held on the subject of civil power,

and how calumniously they have been accused of being the disturbers of

public order.

"_Omnis anima potestatibus_, &c. Pergit hic Apostolus docere Fideles

vitæ ac morum officia. Quæ superiori capite vidimus, eo desinunt, ut

bonus ordo et pax in Ecclesia interque Fideles servetur. Hæc potissimum

spectant ad obedientiam, quam unusquisque superioribus potestatibus

debet. Christianorum libertatem atque a Mosaicis legibus immunitatem

commendaverat Apostolus; at ne quis monitis abutatur, docet hic, quæ

debeat esse subditorum subjectio erga Reges et Magistratus.

"Hoc ipsum gravissime monuerant primos Ecclesiæ discipulos Petrus et

Jacobus; repetitque Paulus ad Titum scribens, sive ut Christianos,

insectantium injuriis undique obnoxios, in patientia contineret, _sive

ut vulgi opinionem deleret, qua discipuli Jesu Christi, omnes ferme

Galilæi, sententiam Judæ Gaulonitæ sequi, et principum authoritati

repugnare censebantur_.

"_Omnis anima_, quilibet, quavis conditione aut dignitate,

_potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit_; Regibus, Principibus,

Magistratibus, iis denique quibus legitima est authoritas, sive

absoluta, sive alteri obnoxia. Neminem excipit Apostolus, non

Presbyteros, non Præsules, non Monachos, ait Theodoretus; illæsa tamen

Ecclesiasticorum immunitate. Tunc solum modo parere non debes, cum

aliquid Divinæ Legi contrarium imperatur: tunc enim præferenda est

debita Deo obedientia; quin tamen vel arma capere adversus Principes,

vel in seditionem abire liceat. Repugnandum est in iis tantum, quæ

justitiam, ac Dei legem violant; in cæteris parendum. Si imperaverint

aut idolorum cultum aut justitiæ violationem cum necis vel bonorum

jacturæ interminatione, vitam et fortunas discrimini objicito, ac

repugnato; in reliquis autem obtempera.

"_Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo._ Absolutissima in libertate

conditus est homo, nulli creatæ rei, at uni Deo subditus. Nisi mundum

invasisset una cum Adami transgressione peccatum, mutuam æqualitatem

libertatemque homines servassent. At libertate abusos damnavit Deus,

ut parerent iis, quos ipse principes illis daret, ob pœnam arrogantiæ,

qua pares Conditori effici voluerunt. At, inquies, quis nesciat,

quorumdam veterum Imperiorum initia et incrementa ex injuria atque

ambitione profecta. Nemrod, exempli causa, Ninus, Nabuchodonosor,

aliique quamplures, an Principes erant a Deo constituti? Nonne

similius vero est, violenta Imperia primum exorta esse ab imperandi

libidine? liberorum vero Imperiorum originem fuisse hominum metum, qui

sese impares propulsandæ externorum injuriæ sentientes, aliquem sibi

Principem creavere, datamque sibi a Deo naturalem ulciscendi injurias

potestatem, volentes libentesque alteri tradiderunt? Quam vere igitur

docet Apostolus, quamlibet potestatem a Deo esse, eumque esse positæ

inter homines authoritatis institutorem?"

He points out four ways in which power may be said to emanate from

God, and it is remarkable that none of them are extraordinary or

supernatural; all of them serve to confirm more and more what reason

and the very nature of things teach us.

"Omnino Deus potestatis autor et causa est. I. Quod, hominibus tacite

inspiraverit consilium subjiciendi se uni, a quo defenderentur.

II. Quod imperia inter homines utilissima sint servandæ concordiæ,

disciplinæ, ac religioni. Porro quicquid boni est, a Deo ceu fonte

proficisciter. III. Cum potestas tuendi ab aggressore vitam vel opes,

hominibus a Deo tradita, atque ab ipsis in Principem conversa, a Deo

primum proveniat, Principes ea potestate ab hominibus donati, hanc ab

ipso Deo accepisse jure dicuntur; quamobrem Petrus humanam creaturam

nuncupat, quam Paulus potestatem a Deo institutam: humana igitur et

divina est, varia ratione spectata, uti diximus. IV. Denique suprema

authoritas a Deo est, utpote quam Deus, a sapientibus institutam,

probavit.

"Nulla unquam gens sæcularibus potestatibus magis paruit, quam primæ

ætatis Christiani, qui a Christo Jesu et ab Apostolis edocti, nunquam

ausi sunt Principibus a Providentia sibi datis repugnare. Discipulos

fugere tantum jubet Christus. Ait Petrus, Christum nobis exemplum

reliquisse, cum sese Judicum iniquitate pessime agi passus est. Monet

hic Paulus, resistere te Dei voluntati, atque æternæ damnationis reum

effici, si potestati repugnas. 'Quamvis nimius et copiosus noster

populus, non tamen adversus violentiam se ulciscitur: patitur,' ait

sanctus Cyprianus. 'Satis virium est ad pugnam; at omnia perpeti

ex Christo didicimus. Cui bello non idonei, non prompti fuissemus,

etiam copiis impares, qui tam libenter trucidamur? si non apud istam

disciplinam magis occidi liceret, quam occidere,' inquit Tertullianus.

'Cum nefanda patimur, ne verbo quidem reluctamur, sed Deo remittimus

ultionem,' scribebat Lactantius. Sanctus Ambrosius: 'coactus, repugnare

non novi. Dolere potero, potero flere, potero gemere: abversus arma,

milites, Gothos quoque; lacrymæ meæ arma sunt. Talia enim sunt

munimenta Sacerdotis. Aliter ne debeo nec possum resistere.'"

I have said in the text, that there was to be remarked a singular

coincidence of opinions on the origin of society between the

philosophers of antiquity, deprived of the light of faith, and those of

our days who have abandoned this light; both wanting the only guide,

which is the Mosaic history, have found in their researches after the

origin of things, nothing more than chaos, in the physical as well as

in the moral order. In support of my assertion, I will insert passages

from two celebrated men, in which the reader will find, with very

little difference, the same language as in Hobbes, Rousseau, and other

writers of the same school.

"There was a time," says Cicero, "when men wandered in the fields like

the brutes, feeding on prey like wild beasts, deciding nothing by

reason, but every thing by force. No religion was then professed, no

morality observed; there were no laws of marriage; the father could not

distinguish his own children, and the possession of property by virtue

of principles of equity was unknown. Hence the blind, unrestrained

passions ruled tyrannically in the midst of error and ignorance, and

used the powers of the body for their gratification as their most

injurious satellites."

"Nam fuit quoddam tempus cum in agris homines passim bestiarum more

vagabantur, et sibi victu ferino vitam propagabant; nec ratione

animi quidquam, sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant. Nondum

divinæ religionis, non humani officii ratio colebatur; nemo nuptias

viderat legitimas, non certos quisquam inspexerat liberos; non jus

æquabile quid utilitatis haberet, acceperat. Ita propter errorem atque

inscitiam, cæca ac temeraria dominatrix animi cupiditas ad se explendam

viribus corporis abutebatur, perniciosissimis satellitibus." (_De Inv.

1._)

The same doctrine is to be found in Horace:

"Cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris,

Mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter

Unguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro

Pugnabant armis, quæ post fabricaverat usus:

Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,

Nominaque invenere: dehinc absistere bello,

Oppida cœperunt munire et ponere leges,

Neu quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.

Nam fuit ante Helenam mulier teterrima belli

Causa: sed ignotis perierunt mortibus illi,

Quos Venerem incertam rapientes, more ferarum,

Viribus editior cædebat, ut in grege taurus.

Jura inventa metu injusti fateare necesse est,

Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi,

Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum,

Dividit ut bona diversis, fugienda petendis."

_Satir._ lib. i. sat. 3.

"When men first began to crawl upon the earth, they were only like a

herd of brute and speechless animals, contending with their nails or

their fists for a few acorns or for a den. They afterwards contended

with sticks and such arms as experience taught them to invent. At

length they discovered the use of words to express their thoughts;

gradually they became weary of fighting, and built cities, and made

laws to prevent theft, robbery, and adultery; for, before Helen, women

had been the cause of terrible wars. He who was the strongest, abusing

his power, after the manner of brutes, attacked the weak, like a bull

among a subject herd; they thus contended for the favors of inconstant

Venus; but their end was inglorious. If you consult the origin of

things, you will acknowledge that laws have been made in apprehension

of injustice. Nature enables us to discern good from evil, what is to

be sought after from what is to be avoided, but she is incapable of

distinguishing justice from injustice."

NOTE 29, p. 311.

Concerning this question, as to the direct or indirect origin of civil

power, it is remarkable, that, in the time of Louis of Bavaria, the

imperial princes solemnly sanctioned the opinion that power emanates

directly from God. In an imperial Constitution, published against the

Roman Pontiff, they established the following proposition: "In order

to avoid so great an evil, we declare that imperial dignity and power

proceed directly from God.--Ad tantum malum evitandum, declaramus,

quod imperialis dignitas et potestas est immediate a Deo solo." That

we may form an idea of the spirit and tendency of this doctrine, let

us see what kind of man this Louis of Bavaria was. Excommunicated by

John XXII., and at a later period by Clement VI., he went so far as

to depose this latter Pontiff, in order to exalt to the Pontifical

Chair the antipope Peter, for which reason the Pope, after repeated

admonitions, divested him of his imperial dignity, substituting Charles

IV. in his stead.

Ziegler the Lutheran, a zealous supporter of direct communication, in

order to explain his doctrine, compares the election of a prince to

that of a minister of the Church. The latter, says he, does not receive

his spiritual authority from the people, but immediately from God. From

this explanation it is evident with how much reason I have said, that

such a doctrine tended to place the temporal and spiritual powers on a

level, by making it appear that the latter could not claim, by reason

of its origin, any superiority over the former. I do not mean, however,

to assert, that this declaration, made in the time of Louis of Bavaria,

had directly this aim, since it may rather be regarded as a sort of

weapon employed against the pontifical authority, the ascendency of

which was dreaded. But it is well known that doctrines, besides the

influence resulting immediately from them, possess a peculiar force,

which continues to develop itself as opportunities occur. Some time

after, we see the kings of England defenders of the religious supremacy

which they had just usurped, supporting the proposition advanced in the

imperial Constitution.

I know not with what foundation it can be said that Ziegler's opinion

was general before the time of Puffendorf; in consulting ecclesiastical

and secular writers, we do not find the least support for such an

assertion. Let us be just even to our adversaries. Ziegler's opinion,

defended by Boecler and others, was attacked by certain Lutherans,

amongst others by Boehmer, who observes, that this opinion is not

favorable, as its partisans pretend, to the security of states and

princes. To repeat what I have already explained in the text, I do

not consider that the opinion of _direct communication_, rightly

understood, is so inadmissible and dangerous as some have imagined; but

as it lay open to an evil interpretation, Catholic theologians have

done well to combat its tendency to encroach upon the divine origin of

ecclesiastical power.

NOTE 30, p. 317.

I might quote a thousand remarkable passages showing the reader how

unjust it is in the enemies of the clergy to accuse them of being

favorable to despotism. But, to be brief, and to spare him the fatigue

of perusing so many texts and quotations, I shall merely present to

him a specimen of the current opinions on this point in Spain at the

beginning of the 17th century, a few years after the death of Philip

II., the monarch who is represented to us as the personification of

religious fanaticism and political tyranny. Among the numerous books

published at that time on these delicate points, there is a very

singular one, which does not appear to be very well known; its title is

as follows:

_A Treatise on the State and Christian Politics, for the use of Kings

and Princes, and those holding government appointments, by Brother John

de Ste.-Marie, a religious in the province of St. Joseph, of the order

of our glorious Father St. Francis._

This book, printed at Madrid in 1615, furnished with all the

privileges, approbations, and other formalities in use, must have

been well received at that epoch, since it was reprinted at Barcelona

in 1616, by Sebastian de Cormellas. Who shall say whether this work

did not inspire Bossuet with the idea of that intituled _Politics

derived from the very words of Scripture_? The title is certainly

analogous, and the idea is in fact the same, although differently

carried out. "I think," says Brother John de Ste.-Marie, "I shall

escape all difficulty, by laying before kings in this work, not my

own reasonings, nor those afforded by eminent philosophers and the

records of profane history, but the words of God and His saints, and

the divine and canonical histories, whose teaching commands respect,

and whose authority cannot be prejudicial to any one, however powerful

a sovereign he may be; in fact, to these a Christian cannot but submit,

since every thing in them is dictated by the Holy Ghost, the author of

these divine maxims. If I cite examples of Gentile kings, if I appeal

to antiquity, and adduce passages from philosophers unconnected with

the people of God, I shall do so incidentally only, and as we resume

possession of what of right belongs to us, and has been unjustly

usurped by others." (Chap. 2.)

The work is dedicated to the king. Addressing him, and praying him to

read it, and not to allow himself to be imposed upon by those who would

dissuade him from its perusal, the good religious says, with a pleasing

candor, "Let no one tell you that these things are metaphysical,

impracticable, and all but impossible."

The following inscription is placed at the head of the 1st chapter:

"Ad vos (O Reges) sunt hi sermones mei, ut discatis sapientiam et non

excidatis: qui enim custodierint justa juste, justificabuntur: et qui

didiscerint ista, invenient quid respondeant." (_Sap._ 6, v. 10.)

In the first chapter, the title of which is, "A treatise in which the

import and definition of this word commonwealth are briefly discussed,"

we read these remarkable words: "So that monarchy must degenerate if

it be absolute and without restraint (for power and authority thus

become unreasonable); in all things falling under the cognizance of

law, it should be bound by the law; and in special and incidental

matters it should be subject to advice, from the connection which it

ought to have with the aristocracy, which is its assistant, and forms

a council of learned and powerful men. Without this wise modification,

monarchy will create great errors of government, will give but little

satisfaction, but, on the contrary, will cause great discontent among

the governed. The wisest and most enlightened men of every age have

invariably considered this form of government the best; and without

such a modification no city or kingdom has ever been considered well

governed. Good kings and the wisest statesmen have always been in favor

of this system; bad kings, on the contrary, elated by their power,

have pursued the opposite course. Hence, if a monarch, whoever he be,

decides by himself, without taking advice, or against the advice of his

councillors, he passes the legitimate bounds of monarchy, and even

when his decisions are fortunate, he is a tyrant. History is full of

these examples and of their disastrous consequences; it will be enough

to adduce one only, that of Tarquin the Proud, as related in the 1st

book of Livy, a king whose pride was unbounded, and who, to render

himself absolute, and to put every thing under his feet, strove to

weaken the authority of the Roman Senate by diminishing the number of

Senators, thus arrogating to himself an absolute right of decision in

all the affairs of the empire."

In chapter 2, in which the author treats of "the meaning of the word

king," we read as follows: "We meet here very opportunely with the

third meaning of the word king, which is the same as that of father;

as we find in Genesis, when the Sichemites gave to their king the

name of Abimelech, which means 'Father and Lord.' Kings were formerly

styled the fathers of their states. Whence King Theodoric, defining

royal majesty (as Cassiodorus relates), makes use of these words:

'_Princeps et Pastor publicus et communis._--The king is the public and

common father of the state.' From the extreme resemblance between the

office of a king and that of a father, Plato was induced to call the

king the father of a family; and the philosopher Xenophon says: _Bonus

Princeps nihil differt a bono Patre_. The difference solely consists

in one having few and the other a great number of persons under his

dominion. And it is certainly very reasonable to give kings this title

of father; for they ought to be the fathers of their subjects and of

their kingdoms, watching over their welfare and preservation with the

love and solicitude of a Father. Royalty, says Homer, is nothing else

than a paternal government, like that of a father over his children:

'_Ipsum namque regnum imperium est suapte natura paternum._' _The best

manner of governing well is, for the king to be possessed with the

love of a father, and to regard his subjects at his own children. The

love of a father for his children, his solicitude that they should

want for nothing, his devotedness to each of them, all this bears the

greatest resemblance to the love of a king for his subjects. He is

called father, and this name lays him under the obligation of acting in

accordance with the meaning it conveys._ This name, so well adapted to

kings, and which, when well considered, is the greatest of all titles

and epithets of majesty and power, since it embraces all, the genus and

the species, the father being alone the lord, the master, or the chief;

this name, I say, is above all human names for expressing authority

and solicitude. Antiquity, with a view to confer upon an emperor an

extraordinary degree of honor, called him the Father of the State,

which was greater than Cæsar, Augustus, or any other glorious name;

it decreed him this title, either to flatter him, or to lay him under

the weighty obligations required by the name of father. In fine, to

give kings this name is to remind them of their duty, viz. to direct,

govern, and maintain their states and kingdoms in justice; like good

pastors, to feed their rational sheep; like physicians, to care for

them and heal them; to take care of their subjects, as a father does of

his children, with prudence, love, and solicitude; for the king is for

_them_, rather than for himself. 'Kings are under greater obligations

to their kingdoms and states than to themselves;' in fact, if we

consider the institution of kings and monarchs, we shall find that the

king was appointed for the good of the kingdom, and not the kingdom for

the good of the king."

In his 3d chapter, of which the following is the title, "Whether

the name of king necessarily implies an office," he thus expresses

himself:--"Besides what we have advanced, it may be proved that the

name of a king is the name of an office, by the common maxim, 'the

benefice is the reward of the office.' Since, therefore, kings receive

such great benefices, not only from the considerable tributes they

receive from the State, but also from the advantage they derive from

benefices and ecclesiastical rents, they certainly do hold an office,

and that the greatest of all, for which reason the entire kingdom so

bountifully assists them. This is what St. Paul says in his Epistle to

the Romans: _Ideo et tributa præstatis_, &c. Kingdoms do not contribute

for nothing; all those states, taxes, and great revenues, that name,

that high authority and eminent dignity, are not given gratuitously.

They would have their title of king for nothing if they had no subjects

to rule and govern, and if they were freed from this obligation: _In

multitudine populi dignitas regis_. This great dignity, wealth, rank,

majesty, and honor, are possessed by them with the perpetual obligation

of ruling and governing their states, so as to preserve them in peace

and justice. _Let kings bear in mind, therefore, that they are only

invested with this title to serve their kingdoms; and the latter,

that kings ought to be paid._ They hold an office requiring them to

labor: _Qui præest in sollicitudine_, says St. Paul. Such is the title

and the name of king, and of him who rules: one who is the first not

only as regards honors and enjoyments, but also as regards cares and

solicitude. _Let them not imagine that they are kings merely in name

and representation, and appointed only to make themselves honored_;

merely to exhibit their royal person and sovereign dignity in a pompous

manner, like some of the kings of the Persians and Medes, who were

mere shadows of kings, forgetful of their office, as though they had

never received it. Nothing is more destitute of life and substance than

the shadowy image which stirs its arm or its head only when some one

acts upon it. God forbade the Israelites to have statues or painted

images, representing a hand where there was none, and a face that

did not exist, exhibiting to the eye an imaginary body, and feigning

by apparently living actions to see and to speak; for God loves not

feigned images, painted men, or sculptured kings, like those spoken of

by David: _Os habent et non loquentur, oculos habent et non videbunt_.

What does it avail to have a tongue that speaks not, eyes that see

not, ears that hear not, or hands which do not work? Is it any thing

more than an idol of stone, bearing only the external representation

of a king? To bear the supreme name and all authority, and not to be

capable of any thing, sounds badly. The names which God has given to

things are like the title of a book, which, in a few words, contains

every thing that is included in the book. This name of king was

given to kings by God himself, and contains every thing to which they

are obliged by virtue of their office. If their actions are not in

accordance with the name, it is as if the mouth should affirm what

the head denies, like a buffoon, whom no one believes in earnest.

Every one would regard as a mockery and a delusion a signboard bearing

the inscription, 'Pure gold sold here,' if, in reality, nothing but

tinsel was sold. The name of king should not be an empty thing, a mere

superfluity in the royal person--it should be what it implies and gives

itself out for. Your name indicates that you rule and govern; rule and

govern, therefore, in reality. Do not be mere pasteboard kings, to use

a common expression, that is, kings in name only. In France, there was

a time when kings had nothing but the name, and the government was

entirely in the hands of their generals, whilst they, like animals,

were occupied only with gluttony and luxurious living. That it might be

known they were living, for they never went out, they used to appear in

public once a year, on the 1st of May, in the squares of Paris, seated

on a throne, as kings in a dramatic representation, and there they

were saluted, gifts were presented to them, and they, on their part,

granted certain favors to whomsoever they thought proper. In order to

show to what a degree of degradation they had fallen, Eginard tells

us, in the beginning of his Life of Charlemagne, that they were devoid

of courage and incapable of great actions; they merely held the empty

name of king; for, in reality they were not kings, neither had they

any participation in the government or riches of the kingdom; every

thing was entrusted to the mayors of the palace, styled majors-domo

of the royal household; and the latter usurped every thing to such a

degree, that they left the wretched king nothing but his title. Seated

on his throne, with his long hair and beard, the monarch played his

part, pretending to give audiences to ambassadors arriving from all

parts, and to furnish them with answers to convey to their masters;

whilst in reality they merely answered according to the instructions

they had received, either by word or writing, although they appeared

to answer on their own responsibility. So that royal power for such a

king was reduced to the mere name, to this throne and this ridiculous

majesty; the real kings and masters were those favorites by whom the

monarch was oppressed. God said of one of the kings of Samaria, that

he was merely to be compared to a little vapor, which, seen from afar,

appeared something, but when touched was no longer any thing. Simia

in tecto rex fatuus in solio suo. (St. Bernard, _de Consider ad Eug._

cap. 7.) _A monkey on a housetop, which, presenting the appearance of

a man, is taken for such by those who know not what it is; such is a

useless king upon a throne. Monkeys also serve to amuse children, and

the king is a laughing-stock to him who looks upon him apart from any

royal act, invested with authority, and making no use of it. A king

dressed in purple, seated on a throne with great majesty, suited to his

grandeur, grave, severe, and terrible in appearance, but in reality

an absolute nonentity. Like a painting_ de la main du Greco, _which,

placed in an elevated position, and seen from a distance, looks very

beautiful, and produces a great effect, but when nearly approached is

but a rough sketch_. All pomp and majesty, properly considered, are

a mere sketch and shadow of a king. _Simulacra gentium_, says David,

speaking of kings who have nothing but the name; and according to the

Hebrew text: _Imago fictilis et contrita_. A figure of pounded earth,

crumbling on all sides; an empty phantom, great in appearance, but

a mere piece of deception. The name which Elifaz unjustly applied

to Job is perfectly applicable here, when he designated this good

and just king, a man void of foundation and substance, bearing only

external appearances; he styled him _Myrmicoleon_, that is, the name

of the animal which, in Latin, is called Formica-leo, because it is a

monstrous conformation, one half of its body, in fact, representing a

fearful lion, an animal always used as an emblem of a king, and the

other half an ant, that is, a most feeble and insignificant thing. Such

are the authority, the name, throne, and majesty of a fierce lion and

of a powerful monarch; but as regards the essence, you will find only

that of an ant. There have been kings whose very name filled the world

with terror; but these kings were void of substance in themselves, in

their kingdoms they were as mere ants; their names and offices were

very great, but without effect. Let the king, therefore, bear in mind

that he has an office to fulfill, and not only an office, but that

he is obliged to speak and labor on all offices, of which he is the

general superintendent. St. Augustine and St. Thomas, explaining that

passage of St. Paul which treats of episcopal dignity, say, that the

word _bishop_, in Greek, is composed of two roots signifying the same

thing as _superintendent_. The name of bishop, king, and every other

superior, are names signifying superintendence over, and co-operation

with, every office. This is what is expressed by the sceptre used by

kings in public acts, a ceremony used by the Egyptians, who borrowed

it from the Israelites. The latter, in order to point out the duty of

a good king, painted an open eye placed in an elevated position on

the point of a rod in the form of a sceptre, representing, on the one

hand, the great power of the king, the solicitude and vigilance which

he ought to exercise; on the other, that he ought not to be satisfied

with holding the supreme power, with occupying the most exalted and

most eminent position, and, in possession of these, passing his life in

sleep and repose; on the contrary, he should be the first in commanding

and counselling, he should appear in every office, incessantly watching

and inspecting, like a man doing the business in which he is engaged.

Jeremiah also understands it in this sense, for when God asked him what

he saw, he answered: _Virgam vigilantem ego video_. Thou hast seen

well; and verily I tell thee, that I who am supreme, will watch over my

flock; I who am a shepherd, will watch over my sheep; I who am a king

and a monarch, will watch without ceasing over all my inferiors. _Regem

festinantem_, says the Chaldean, a king who is in haste; for, although

he has eyes and sees, if he remains in repose, in his pleasures and

amusements, if he does not go about from place to place, if he does

not act so as to become acquainted with all the good and evil that is

going on in his kingdom, he is as though he did not exist. Let him

consider that he is the head, and even the head of the lion, which even

in its sleep keeps its eyes open; that he is the rod with eyes, that he

is the torch; let him open his eyes, therefore, and sleep no longer,

trusting to those who are blinded, and see no better than moles; who,

if they have eyes, only employ them to see their own interest, and to

distinguish at a greater distance what may conduce to their own profit

and aggrandizement. Such persons have eyes for themselves, and it would

be better if they had them not, for their eyes are those of birds of

prey--of vultures."

In his fourth chapter, the title of which is, "On the office of

kings," the author thus explains the origin of royal power and its

obligations:--"From this it follows," says he, "that the institution of

the state of royalty, or king, represented by the head, was not merely

for the use and profit of the king himself, but for that of his whole

kingdom. Hence he ought to see, hear, feel, and understand, not only by

himself and for himself, but by all and for all. He ought not merely

to fix his regards upon his own greatness, but on the good of his

subjects, since it is for them, and not for himself, that he was born

a king. _Adverte_, said Seneca to the Emperor Nero, _rempublicam non

esse tuam, sed te reipublicæ_.--When men first issued from solitude,

and united to live in common, they knew that every one would naturally

labor for himself or his own family, and that no one would take an

interest in all; they agreed to select a man of great merit, that all

might have recourse to him; a man who, distinguished above all the rest

by his virtue, his prudence, and courage, should be the chief over all,

should govern all, watch over all, and should exert himself for the

advantage of all--for the common weal--like a father for his children,

or a shepherd for his sheep. Now, considering that this man, abandoning

his own affairs to look after those of others, could not maintain

himself and his family (every one was then maintained by the labor of

his hands), it was agreed that all should contribute to his support,

in order that he might not be distracted by any other occupations

than those of the common weal and the public government. Such was the

end for which kings were instituted--such was their beginning. The

good king ought to be more solicitous for the public than for his own

private interest. He possesses his grandeur at the expense of great

solicitude; the anxiety, the disquietude of mind and body, which is

fatigue for him, is repose, support, and protection for others. Thus

smiling flowers and fruits, whilst they adorn the tree, exist not so

much for the tree, nor on account of the tree, as for the sake of

others. Do not imagine that all happiness is in the beauty and grace

of the flower, and in those who are the flowers of the world: powerful

kings and princes may be termed the flowers of the world, but flowers

who consume their lives, who are full of solicitude, and whose fruit

will rather contribute to the enjoyment of others than to their own.

'For,' says the Jew Philo, 'the king is to the kingdom what the wise

is to the ignorant man, what the shepherd is to his sheep, the father

to his children, light to darkness, and what God is upon earth to all

his creatures.' The investiture he gave to Moses, when he appointed him

the chief and king over his people, was to tell him that he ought to be

as God, the common father of all; for the office and dignity of a king

require all this. _Omnium domos illius vigila defendit, omnium otium

illius industria, omnium vacationem illius occupatio._ (Seneca, _Lib.

de Consol._) This is what the prophet Samuel says to Saul, recently

elected king, when he expounds to him the obligations of his office:

'Consider, Saul, that God has this day constituted thee king over all

this kingdom; thou art bound by the office to govern the whole of it.

Thou hast not been made a king to enjoy repose, to become proud, and to

glory in the dignity of a king; but to govern thy kingdom, to maintain

it in peace and justice, to defend and protect it against its enemies.'

_Rex eligitur, non, ut sui ipsius curam habeat_, says Socrates, _et

sese molliter curet, sed ut per ipsum ii, qui elegerunt, bene beateque

vivant_. They were not created and introduced into the world for their

own convenience and pleasure or to be fed upon every dainty morsel of

food (if such were the case, no one would willingly submit to them);

but they were appointed for the advantage and common good of all their

subjects, to govern them, protect them, enrich them, preserve and serve

them. All this is perfectly admissible; for although the sceptre and

crown appear to be the emblems of domination, the office of a king

is, strictly speaking, that of a slave. _Servus communis, sive servus

honoratus_, are words which have sometimes been applied to a king,

_quia a tota republica stipendia accipit ut serviat omnibus_. And

the Supreme Pontiff glories in this title, _Servus servorum Dei_. In

ancient times this name of slave was one of infamy; but since Christ

bore it it has become a name full of honor. Now, since it is neither

repugnant nor derogatory to the essence nor nature of the Son of God,

neither can it be derogatory to the nature and grandeur of the king.

"Antigonus, king of Macedon, was perfectly aware of this, and said

candidly to his son, when he rebuked him for the severity with which

he governed his subjects: _An ignoras, fili mi, regnum nostrum nobilem

esse servitutem?_ Before his time Agamemnon expressed himself in

the same manner: 'We live apparently in the midst of grandeur and

exaltation; but in reality we are the servants and slaves of our

subjects.' Such is the office of good kings--an honorable servitude.

From the moment of their being created kings, their actions no longer

depend upon their own will, but on the laws and rules which have been

given them, and on the conditions upon which they have undertaken their

office. And although they may fail to comply with these conditions

(which are the effects of a human convention), they may not fail to

comply with that dictated by natural and divine law, the mistress of

kings as well as of subjects. Now, these rules are almost all included

in the words of Jeremiah, which God, according to St. Jerome, addresses

to kings on giving them the command:--_Facite judicium et justitiam,

liberate vi oppressum de manu calumniatoris, et advenam, et pupillum,

et viduam nolite contristare, neque opprimatis inique, et sanguinem

innocentum non effundatis_. Such is the summary of the obligations

of a king; such the laws of his institution, which lay him under the

obligation of maintaining in peace and justice the orphan, the widow,

the poor, the rich and the powerful man, and him who can do nothing for

himself. Upon him rest the wrongs of his ministers towards some, the

injustice suffered by others, the sorrows of the afflicted, the tears

of those who weep, not to mention many other burdens--a flood of cares

and obligations--imposed upon every prince or chief of a state. For

if he is the head to command and govern, and to bear the burdens of

others, he should also be the feet upon which the whole weight of the

state is sustained. Kings and monarchs, says the holy man Job, as we

have seen, bear and carry the world upon their shoulders, on account

of their office. Hence the figure we meet with in the Book of Wisdom:

_In veste poderis, quam habebat summus sacerdos, totus erat orbis

terrarum_. From the moment a man is created king, let him consider

himself loaded with a burden so heavy that a strong carriage would

not support it. Moses felt this strongly; for God having made him His

viceroy, His captain-general, His lieutenant in the government, instead

of returning thanks for so distinguished a favor, he complains that

so heavy a burden should be placed upon him. _Cur afflixisti servum

tuum? Cur imposuisti pondus universi populi hujus super me?_ Again,

continuing his complaint, he says, _Numquid ego concepi omnem hanc

multitudinem? Aut genui eam, ut dicas mihi: Porta eos?_--'Lord, have

I conceived all this multitude, or begotten them, and thou shouldst

say to me, Carry them on thy shoulders?' Now, it is remarkable that

God said nothing of that to Moses; he merely tells him to rule and

govern them, to fulfill towards them the office of captain and chief.

Nevertheless, what says Moses? That God commanded him to bear them on

his shoulders--_Porta eos_. It appears, then, that he has no reason

to complain, since he is merely told to be the captain, to direct,

rule, and govern. It is a common expression, 'A word to the wise is

sufficient.' He who knows and understands what it is to govern and

to be the chief, knows also that government and obligation are the

same thing. The very words _regere_ and _portare_ are synonymous, and

have the same meaning: there is no government nor employment without

obligation and labor. In the distribution of the offices which Jacob

made among his children, he appointed Reuben to be the first in his

inheritance and the highest in command--_prior in donis, major in

imperio_. And St. Jerome translates _major ad portandum_, for command

and obligation are the same thing; and the obligation and the labor are

so much more considerable as the command is more exalted. St. Gregory,

in his _Morales_, says, that the power, domination, and rule of kings

over the whole world should not be looked upon as an honor but as a

labor. _Potestas accepta non honor, sed onus æstimatur._ And this truth

was ever received by the blindest among the Gentiles. One of them,

taking the same view of the subject, says, speaking of another Pagan,

that his god Apollo had made him all glorious and happy by the gift of

a certain office: _Lætus erat, mixtoque oneri gaudebat honore_. So that

power and command composed of a little honor and weighty obligations.

The Latin word for honor only differs from that for burden by one

letter--_onos_ and _onus_. Besides, there always were and always will

be persons willing to undertake the responsibility for the sake of

the honor, although every one avoids as much as possible any thing

that lays him under an obligation, and seeks after what is glorious; a

dangerous choice, for the latter is not always the most secure."

If such language is taxed with flattery, it would be difficult to

comprehend what is meant by _telling the truth_. And observe, that

the above truths are not told without reflection; the good religious

takes such pains to inculcate them, that were it not for the childlike

candor of his language, which discloses the purest of intentions, we

might accuse him of irreverence. This passage is long, but exceedingly

interesting, for it faithfully reflects the spirit of the age.

Innumerable other texts might be adduced to prove how unjustly the

Catholic clergy are accused of being favorable to despotism. I cannot

conclude without inserting here two excellent passages from the learned

Father Fr. Ferdinand de Zeballos, a religious of the order of St.

Jerome in the Monastery of St. Isidore del Campo, and known by a work

intituled, "False Philosophy, or Atheism, Deism, Materialism, and

other new sects convicted of State Crimes against their Sovereigns and

Rulers, against the Magistrates and Lawful Authorities." Madrid, 1776.

Observe with what tact the learned writer appreciates the influence of

religion upon society. (Book ii. dissertation 12, art. 2.)

"_A mild and moderate government is most agreeable to the spirit of

the gospel._

§ I.

"One excellent and estimable point in our holy religion is, that

she offers to human policy, in her important truths, assistance in

preserving good order among men with less trouble. 'The Christian

religion,' says Montesquieu, with much truth, 'is far removed from

pure despotism. Mildness being so strongly recommended in the gospel,

it is opposed to the despotic fury with which princes might administer

justice and practise cruelties.' This opposition on the part of

Christianity to the cruelty of the monarch should not be active,

but passive and full of mildness, which Christianity can never lose

sight of without losing its character. This is the difference between

Catholic Christians and the Calvinists and other Protestants. Basnages

and Jurieu, in the name of all their reformation, wrote that it is

allowable for the people to wage war against their princes whenever

they are oppressed by them, or their conduct appears tyrannical.

"The Catholic Church has never changed the doctrines she received from

Jesus Christ and His Apostles. She loves moderation, she rejoices in

good: but she does not resist evil, she overcomes it by patience.

Governments established under the direction of false religions cannot

be satisfied with a moderate policy. With them the despotism or tyranny

of princes, the ferocity of penalties, the rigor of an inflexible

and cruel legislation, are so many necessary evils. But why has it

been given to the Catholic religion only to purge human governments

from such inhumanity? First, on account of the forcible impression

produced by her dogmas; secondly, through the effect of the grace of

Jesus Christ, which renders men docile in doing good, and energetic

in combating evil. Wherever false religion predominates, and where,

in consequence, these two means of aid are wanting, the government is

under the necessity of supplying them as far as possible by efforts of

a severe, harsh, and terror-inspiring policy, in default of that virtue

which ought to exist in religion to restrain citizens.

"Hence the Catholic religion, by the influence of her dogmas over human

affairs, relieves governments from the necessity of being harsh. In

Japan, where the prevailing religion has no dogmas, and gives no idea

of heaven or hell, laws are made to supply this defect--laws rendered

useful by the cruelty with which they are conceived and the punctuality

with which they are executed. In every society in which deists,

fatalists, and philosophers have promulgated this error, that our

actions are unavoidable, it is impossible to prevent laws from becoming

more terrible and sanguinary than any we have known among barbarian

nations; for in such a society, men, after the manner of brutes, being

urged by palpable motives to do what they are commanded and omit what

they are forbidden, these motives, with chastisements, must be daily

more formidable, in order to avoid losing from habit the power of

making themselves felt. The Christian religion, which admirably teaches

and explains the dogmas of rational liberty, has no need of an iron

rod to govern mankind. The fear of the pains of hell, whether eternal,

to punish crimes unrepented of, or temporal, to wash away the stains

of sins confessed, relieves judges from the necessity of augmenting

punishments. On the other hand, the hope of gaining heaven, as a reward

for laudable actions, words, and thoughts, induces men to be just,

not only in public but also in the secrecy of the heart. What laws or

penalties would avail governments not possessed of this dogma of hell

and of glory, to make their citizens men of real merit? Materialists,

denying the dogma of a future state, and deists, holding out to the

wicked the flattering security of paradise, place governments under

the painful necessity of arming themselves with all the instruments

of terror, and of always inflicting the most cruel punishments, to

restrain the people from destroying one another.

"Protestants have already come to this point by rejecting the dogma

of the eternity of hell, or, at least, by preserving merely the fear

of a temporary pain. The first reformers, as d'Alembert observes to

the clergy of Geneva, denied the doctrine of purgatory, and retained

that of hell; but the Calvinists, and modern reformers, by their

limitation of the duration of hell, leave only what may be properly

termed purgatory. Is not the dogma of the last judgment, when each

one's secret offences, however small, shall be exposed to the whole

world, of singular efficacy in restraining the thoughts and desires,

and all the perversity of the heart and of the passions? It is evident

that this dogma so far relieves political governments from the painful

and continual vigilance which it would have to exercise over a town

in which the idea of this judgment has perished, together with the

thoughts which it inspires."

§ II.

"There are certain aberrations observable among philosophers,

which lead us to think that these men were possessed of some true

discernment in their lucid moments, or whilst they were in the Catholic

religion. Hence they have said, 'that religion was invented for a

political purpose, to spare sovereigns the necessity of being just,

of making good laws, and of governing well.' This folly, which stands

self-condemned when we come to speak of religion previously formed,

supposes, nevertheless, the truth we are speaking of. It is evident

to every one, even to the philosophers whose extravagant assertion

we have just adduced, that the Christian religion, by her dogmas, is

serviceable to human governments, and aids in making good citizens,

even in this world. Yet they avail themselves of this very point to put

forth their insane malice: but, in reality, and in spite of themselves,

they mean to say, that the dogmas of religion are of such service to

governments, and so efficacious in facilitating a great part of their

work, that they appear to be formed on purpose, and according to the

designs of a magistrate or a political government. We cannot say,

on this account, that religion alone is sufficient to govern men,

without any judicial aid, without the intervention of the laws and

of penalties. In speaking of this efficacy of the dogmas inculcated

by religion, we are not rash and presumptuous; we do not reject as

superfluous the office of law and police. We are told by the Apostle,

that for the just there would have been no need of laws; but there are

so many wicked, who, through their forgetfulness of their destiny and

the terrible judgments of God, live under the exclusive rule of their

passions, that it has been found necessary to make laws and institute

punishments, in order to restrain them. Hence, the Catholic religion

does not reject the wise vigilance of police, nor abrogate its office;

she seconds it, on the contrary, and receives assistance from it, to

the very great advantage of good governments; the people, through its

influence, are ruled better, and with less austerity and severity."

§ III.

"The second reason which renders the most mild and moderate governments

sufficient in Catholic States is, the assistance which the grace of

the gospel affords for doing good and avoiding evil,--an assistance

imparted by the use of the sacraments, or other means employed by the

Spirit from above. Without this, every law is harsh; this unction

softens every yoke, renders every burden light."

In his third article, Father Zeballos repels the accusation of

despotism with which the enemies of monarchy reproach it. On this

occasion he points out the just limits of royal authority, and

overthrows an argument which some persons have pretended to found on

the Scriptures, for the exaggeration of the prerogatives of the throne.

He expresses himself as follows:

"When the objection, that the sovereign had the power of seizing the

property of every citizen, was made against monarchy, it was rather

an argument against the nature of despotism than against the form

of monarchical government. 'What does it avail,' says Theseus in

Euripides, 'to amass riches for our heirs, to bring up our daughters

with care, if we are to be deprived of the greater portion of these

riches by a tyrant, if our daughters are to serve the most unruly

passions?' You perceive, then clearly, that in pretending to argue

against the office of a monarch, it is a tyrant only that is spoken

of. True, the frequent abuse of power resorted to by kings has caused

these names and forms to be confounded. Others have already observed

that the ancients were scarcely acquainted with the nature of true

monarchy; this was very natural, since they never witnessed any thing

but the abuse of it. This gives me the opportunity of making a remark

upon the circumstance of the Hebrews asking to be governed by kings.

'Make us a king to judge us, as all nations have,' said they to the

prophet. Samuel saw with grief this levity, which was about to cause

a total revolution in the government appointed by God. Nevertheless,

God commands the prophet to take no notice of this affront, which was

principally offered to the Lord; for they were abandoning Him, being

unwilling that He should rule over them any longer. 'As they have

forsaken Me, and served strange gods, so do they also unto thee,' and

ask for kings like unto those of the nations. Observe what an intimate

connection always exists between a change of government and a change in

religion, especially when the change is from a true to a false one.

"But what is particularly deserving of notice is, the acquiescence

granted to the people's demand. They wish to be ruled by kings, exactly

as all other nations were. The Lord chastises their spirit of revolt by

leaving them to their desires. He commands Samuel to comply with their

request, but to point out to them, at the same time, _the rights of the

king_ who was to rule over them like unto the nations, and said: 'This

will be the right of the king that shall reign over you: he will take

your sons, and will put them in his chariots, and will make them his

horsemen, and his running footmen, to run before his chariots; and he

will appoint them to be his tribunes, and his centurions, and to plough

his fields, and to reap his corn, and to make him arms and chariots.

Your daughters also will he take to make him ointments, and to be his

cooks and bakers; and he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and

your best olive-yards, and give them to his servants. Moreover, he will

take the tenth of your corn, and of the revenues of your vineyards, to

give to his eunuchs and servants. Your servants also, and hand-maids,

and your goodliest young men, and your asses, he will take away, and

put them to his work. Your flocks also he will tithe, and you shall be

his servants; and you shall cry out in that day from the face of the

king whom you have chosen to yourselves; and the Lord will not hear you

in that day, because you desired unto yourselves a king. And the people

would not hear the voice of Samuel, and they said, Nay, but there shall

be a king over us, and we also will be like all nations.' (1st Kings,

chap. viii., from verse 11 to middle of verse 20 inclusively.)

"Some persons, being determined to extend the power of kings beyond

its limits, draw from these words the formula of royal right. A blind

pretension, and reflecting little honor on legitimate monarchs such as

the Catholic sovereigns. Unless a person wishes knowingly to deceive

himself on this portion of the Scripture, or is blind, he may see by

the context, and by comparing this passage with others, that it is not

legitimate right that is here meant, but _de facto_ right. I mean to

say, that the Holy Spirit does not explain what just monarchs ought to

do; but what had been done, and was still done, by the kings of Pagan

nations, mere tyrants, and commonly so called. Observe, that the people

demanded nothing but to be placed on an equality with the Pagan nations

in a political point of view. They had not the prudence to demand a

king such as he ought to be, but such as was common in those days; and

this was what God granted them. If God, as the prophet observes, has

sometimes given the people kings in His wrath, what people were more

deserving of this than those who had abandoned God himself, and refused

to be ruled by Him? Indeed, God did chastise His people severely by

granting them their foolish demand. He did give them a king, but a

king who was to exercise what, according to the perverse custom of the

times, formed the royal right described in the sacred text just quoted.

"What man in our days, conversant with what has been written upon

the different natures of governments, upon their abuse, and without

even understanding what is said in the Scriptures, could imagine that

the text of Samuel contains the legitimate form of royalty or of

monarchy? Does this power impart the right of seizing the property of

the subjects, their lands, their riches, their sons and daughters,

and even their natural liberty? Is this the model of a monarchy, or

of the most tyrannical despotism? To dispel every illusion on this

point, we need only compare with what we have just read the 21st

chap. of the third Book of Kings, in which the history of Naboth, an

inhabitant of Jezrael, is narrated. Achab, the king of Israel, wished

to enlarge the palace, or pleasure-house which he possessed in that

town. A vineyard of Naboth's, near the palace, came within the plan of

the gardens that were to be added. The king did not seize it at once,

of his own authority, but asked the proprietor to let him have it on

the honest condition of paying him the price at which he should value

it, or giving him a better in another place. Naboth would not consent

to this, because it was the inheritance of his ancestors. The king,

not being accustomed to meet with a refusal, threw himself upon his

couch oppressed with grief; the queen, Jezabel, came, and told him to

calm his agitation: 'Thy authority is great indeed,' said she to him;

_Grandis authoritatis es_: she promises to put him in possession of

the vineyard. This abominable woman wrote to the judges of Jezrael to

commence an action against Naboth for a calumny, to be proved against

him by two suborned witnesses; and she demanded that he should be

condemned to death. The queen was obeyed; Naboth was stoned to death.

All this was necessary that the vineyard might enter into the royal

treasury, and that, watered by the blood of the proprietor, it might

produce flowers for the palace of these princes. But, in reality, it

produced none, neither for the king nor for the queen; it furnished

them with nothing but briars and mortal poisons. Elias presents himself

before Achab when he was going to take possession of Naboth's vineyard;

he announces to him that he, and all his house, even to the dog that

approacheth the wall, shall be erased from the face of the earth.

"You look upon royal right as explained to the people by Samuel as

legitimate; tell me, then why Achab and Jezabel are so severely

punished for taking the vineyard and the life of Naboth, _since

the king had a right to take from his subjects their most valuable

vineyards and olive trees_, according to the declaration of the

prophet. If Achab possesses this right after he is established the king

of the people of God, whence comes it that he, so violent a prince,

should entreat Naboth with so much civility? And why is it necessary

to accuse Naboth of some calumny? His resistance to the king's right,

by refusing to accept the just value of what was suitable to the

enlargement of the palace and gardens, would have been a sufficient

motive for instituting an action against him. We find, however, that

Naboth committed no injustice against the king by refusing to sell his

patrimony, not even in the estimation of the queen, who boasted of

her husband's _great authority_. This great authority, which Jezabel

admitted in the king, was neither more nor less than the royal right

spoken of by Samuel to the people; it was, as I have said, a _de facto_

right to take and seize upon every thing by mere force, as Montesquieu

says of the tyrant.

"_Do not therefore, mention this passage, nor any other of the

Scriptures, to justify the idea of a government so ill-conceived. The

doctrine of the Catholic religion is attached to legitimate monarchy,

with its suitable characteristics, and in accordance with the qualities

which modern publicists recognise, viz. as a paternal and sovereign

power, but conformable to the fundamental laws of the state. Within

limits so suitable, nothing can be more regular than this power, the

most extensive of all temporal powers, and that which is most favored

and supported by the Catholic Church._"

Such is the horrible despotism taught by these men so basely

calumniated! Happy the people who are ruled by a prince whose

government is regulated by these doctrines!

NOTE 31, p. 330.

The importance of the matter treated of in this part of my work obliges

me to insert here, at some length, passages proving the truth of what

I have advanced. I did not think it advisable to give a translation

of the Latin passages, that I might avoid augmenting excessively the

number of pages; besides, among the persons who may wish to make

themselves thoroughly acquainted with the subject, and who will

consequently take an interest in consulting the original texts, there

are few ignorant of the Latin language.

Observe how St. Thomas expresses himself on royal power, and with what

solid and generous doctrine he points out its duties in the third book,

chap. 11, of his treatise _De Regimine Principum_.

DIVUS THOMAS.

"_De Regimine Principum_, liber iii. caput XI.

"Hic Sanctus Doctor declarat de dominio regali, in quo consistit, et in

quo differt a politico, et quo modo distinguitur diversimodo secundum

diversas rationes.

"Nunc autem ad regale dominium est procedendum, ubi est distinguendum

de ipso secundum diversas regiones, et prout a diversis varie invenitur

traditum. Et primo quidem, in Sacra Scriptura aliter leges regalis

dominii traduntur in Deuteronomio per Moysen, aliter in 1 Regum

per Samuelem prophetam, uterque tamen in persona Dei differenter

ordinat regem ad utilitatem subditorum, quod est proprium regum,

ut Philosophus tradit in 8 ethic. Cum, inquit, constitutus fuerit

rex, non multiplicabit sibi equos, nec reducet populum in Ægyptum,

equitatus numero sublevatus, non habebit uxores plurimas, quæ alliciant

animam ejus, neque argenti, aut auri immensa pondera: quod quidem

qualiter habet intelligi, supra traditur in hoc lib. describetque sibi

Deuteronomium legis hujus, et habebit secum, legetque illud omnibus

diebus vitæ suæ, ut discat timere dominum Deum suum, et custodire verba

ejus et cæremonias, et ut videlicet possit populum dirigere secundum

legem divinam, unde et rex Salomon in principio sui regiminis hanc

sapientiam a Deo petivit, ad directionem sui regiminis pro utilitate

subditorum, sicut scribitur in 3 lib. Regum. Subdit vero dictus Moyses

in eodem lib. Nec elevetur cor ejus in superfluum super fratres suos,

neque declinet in partem dexteram, vel sinistram, ut longo tempore

regat ipse et filius ejus super Israel. Sed in primo Regum, traduntur

leges regni, magis ad utilitatem Regis, ut supra patuit in lib. 2

hujus operis, ubi ponuntur verba omnino pertinentia ad conditionem

servilem, et tamen Samuel leges quas tradit cum sint penitus despoticæ

dicit esse regales. Philosophus autem in 8 ethic. magis concordat cum

primis legibus. Tria enim ponit de rege in eo. 4, videlicet, quod

ille legitimus est rex qui principaliter bonum subditorum intendit.

Item, ille rex est, qui curam subditorum habet, ut bene operentur

quemadmodum pastor ovium. Ex quibus omnibus manifestum est, quod juxta

istum, modum despoticum multum differat a regali, ut idem Philosophus

videtur dicere in 1 politic. Item, _quod regnum non est propter regem,

sed rex propter regnum_, quia ad hoc Deus _providit de eis, ut regnum

regant et gubernent, et unumquemque in suo jure conservent_: et hic

est _finis regiminis, quod si ad aliud faciunt in seipsos commodum

retorquendo, non sunt reges sed tyranni_. Contra _quos dicit Dominus

in Ezech_. Væ pastoribus Israel, qui pascunt semetipsos. Nonne greges

pascuntur a pastoribus? Lac comedebatis, et lanis operiebamini, et

quod crassum erat occidebatis: gregem autem meum non pascebatis: quod

infirmum fuit, non consolidastis, et quod ægrotum non sanastis, quod

confractum non alligastis, quod abjectum non reduxistis, et quod

perierat non quæsistis; sed cum austeritate imperabatis eis et cum

potentia. In quibus verbis nobis sufficienter forma regiminis traditur

redarguendo contrarium. Amplius autem regnum ex hominibus constituitur,

sicut domus ex parietibus, et corpus humanum ex membris, ut Philos.

dicit in 3 politic. Finis _ergo regis est, ut regimen prosperetur,

quod homines conserventur per regem_. Et hinc habet commune bonum

cujuslibet principatus participationem divinæ bonitatis: unde bonum

commune dicitur a Philosopho in 1 ethic. esse quod omnia appetunt,

et esse bonum divinum, _ut sicut Deus qui est rex regum, et dominus

dominantium, cujus virtute principes imperant, ut probatum est supra,

nos regit et gubernat non propter seipsum, sed propter nostram salutem:

ita et reges faciant et alii dominatores in orbe_."

NOTE 32, p. 336.

I have noticed the opinion of D. Felix Amat, Archbishop of Palmyra,

with respect to the obedience due to _de facto_ governments. I have

remarked, that this writer's principles, besides being false, are

opposed to the rights of the people. The Archbishop of Palmyra appears

to have been at a loss to discover a maxim to which it is possible to

conform under all circumstances that may occur, and which do occur but

too often. He dreaded the obscurity and confusion of ideas when the

legitimacy of a given case was to be defined; he wished to remedy an

evil, but he appears to have aggravated it to an extraordinary degree.

Observe how he sets forth his opinion in his work entitled _Idea of the

Church Militant_, chap. iii. art. 2:

"The more I reflect," says he, "on the difficulties I have just pointed

out, the more I am convinced that it is impossible to resolve them,

even those which are ancient, with any degree of certainty; and it is

equally impossible to derive any light from them to aid us in resolving

those which are formed at the present day by the struggle between the

prevailing spirit of insubordination in opposition to the judgment and

will of the governor, and the contrary effort made to limit more and

more the liberty of those who obey. Starting from the divers points

and notions that I have laid down relative to the supreme power in all

really civil societies, it appears to me, that, instead of losing time

in mere speculative discussions, it will be more useful to propose a

practical, just, and opportune maxim for the preservation of public

tranquillity, especially in Christian kingdoms and states, and for

affording the means of re-establishing it when it has been troubled or

destroyed.

"The _Maxim_.--No one can doubt the legitimacy of the obligation of

every member of any civil society whatever to obey the government which

is de facto and unquestionably established. I say '_unquestionably

established_,' because there is here no question of a mere invasion

or temporary occupation in time of war. From this maxim follow two

consequences: 1st, to take part in insurrections, or assemblages of

people, addressing themselves to the constituted authorities with a

view to compel them to grant what they consider unjust, is always an

act contrary to right reason; always unlawful, condemned by the natural

law and by the Gospel. 2dly, individual members of society, who combine

together and take up arms, in small or large numbers, for the purpose

of attacking the established government by physical force, are always

guilty of rebellion, a crime strongly opposed to the spirit of our

divine religion."

I will not here repeat what I have already said on the unsoundness,

the inconveniences, and the dangers of such a doctrine, but merely

add, that with respect to governments only established _de facto_, to

grant them the right of commanding and exacting obedience involves a

contradiction. To say that a _de facto_ government is bound, whilst

it does exist, to protect justice, to avoid crimes, to prevent the

dissolution of society, is merely to maintain truths universally

admitted, and denied by no one; but to add, that it is unlawful, and

contrary to our holy religion, to combine together and raise forces for

the overthrow of a _de facto_ government, is a doctrine which Catholic

theologians have never professed, which true philosophy has never

admitted, and which no nation has ever observed.